The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
^ “Podval” is a basement. “Pogreb” is a cellar. The latter is intended for storage of consumable items (nowadays, it is mostly food, ie preserves, for example, and then potatoes, carrots, etc - stuff one would grow at their “dacha”) and is still widely used today. For example, a big “hole” they dig under a garage is never refereed to as basement because it is a cellar. Not sure how else to explain, but there is a difference that is crystal clear to me, haha.

Edit: Here is a “story” of Pohrebki in Ukraine (translate via Google from Ukrainian):

It was first mentioned as the village of Pogribky in the royal charter as the property of the Spassky Monastery in 1552. It defined the northern boundary of the Novgorod-Seversky Spassky Monastery on the left bank of the Desna. The southern border of the land was the Shostka River, and the eastern border reached the village of Ivot. The boundaries of this monastery land were marked with an oblique cross carved on ancient oaks with bee hollows. The land was served by the sembar borts - honey collectors, probably since the time when their ancestors lived in semi-earthed houses - cellars.

They approach the justification of the origins of the name of this settlement in different ways, as we learn from local history materials. In the first case, its occurrence is associated with Peter's times, claiming that once on the site of the current village there were once the cellars of Peter I; in the second case, local residents, telling legends, prove that on the territory of the modern village in ancient times there were cellars of the Novgorod-Seversky Monastery, which preserved various varieties of wines.[…]



Another example of “Pohrebishche”, also in Ukraine, which has the same meaning (but a larger cellar):

The town is very old and origin of its name is not clear. Pohreb means a big cellar in Ukrainian. On the other hand, Pohrebaty can be interpreted as to perform a burial. According to Imperial Russian ethnographer Lavrentii Pokhylevych in his work "Tales of inhabited areas of the Kyiv province" in 1884, before the Mongol invasion of Rus, during the times of Kyiv the town was called Rokitnya. Mongols leveled the town leaving only the cellars.[…]


So to conclude, while “pogrebenie” (the process of burial or, at times, a burial site) and “pogreb” (cellar) have the same root, the two words have nothing to do with each other, which is true for both Russian and Ukrainian.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Ukrainians manage to make small advances in the east of the Kursk salient (east of Sudzha). These advances are small and don't compensate for the losses in the north and the west, but show that Ukrainians are not desperate and are able of initiative.
I think I covered it in the last update, it's the area around Plekhovo.

Ukrainians retreat from the entire area south of the Kurakhove reservoir: Between Dalne in the north and Trudove in the south-west.
Russians are also pushing from the east. They have reached Romanivka (if I spell it correctly), in the string of villages aligned east-west.
They haven't fully retreated yet which is interesting but I think everything in the Kurakhovo area is effectively done, a question of when not if. And it's not a very long when. If the pattern with Avdeevka holds, Ukraine will struggle to set up static lines past Kurakhovo. That's what happened with Avdeevka, and that's what happened with Ugledar.

The fall of Vuhledar caused a rapid advance in this area. Velikaya Novoselka and Kurakhove are the areas where Russian advances are the most important in speed and real estate taken.
Well this is Russia's main offensive, the southern culmination of what we thought was the Pokrovsk axis that swung southward.

The fact that Leo-2A4s are seen in these areas shows that Ukrainian commanders don't let this part of the front without modern weapons.
They didn't send everything to Kursk.
Ukraine had been operating Leo-2A4s and M113s in the area for a while. I think one of my updates even listed the unit. They lost Leo-2A4s many months ago in a counter-attack at Pobeda.

The common name in Russian for a cellar is "padval". That's the word I heard the most often. My wife who is a native Russian speaker explained to me that "pogrebok" is a traditional, albeit still in use, word which refers to a food cache under the kitchen in villages or to a semi underground food storage under a tumulus. Whereas "padval" refers to an underground floor under a building or a modern house, where you will find technical installations, and where you can also store food if you want. Conclusion: If you visited Russia in rural areas, you may have heard the word "pogrebok" more often.
Подвал (podval) has to be part of the building I believe with the walls part of the house structure. And a погреб (pogreb) can be a hole dug next to the house or under the house. The walls will still be lined with something (meaning not earthen walls) but it can be separate from the house. It can be under a garage, under a house, or just in the yard.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
show that Ukrainians are not desperate and are able of initiative.
After sleeping on this one, I had some thoughts. The current attacks can often be relatively large, we've seen company-sized mechanized elements moving. But they can also be quite small. Squad-sized attacks are very common, but they can be even smaller. Some attacks are pairs of soldiers or teams of 4. In other words Russia's hold on an area might not be all that substantial. So in principle it's not unusual or surprising that Ukraine can dislodge recent gains with a counter-attacking effort. Prime example, Russian forces just got pushed out of the northern outskirts of Kupyansk where approximately a platoon-sized element of Russian forces was present (based on the footage we had). It's more interesting that for a long time Ukraine made almost no successful counter-attacks at all, and now we have a whole series of them. I still think this is evidence of Ukrainian reinforcements arriving.
 

Fredled

Active Member
Feanor said:
It's more interesting that for a long time Ukraine made almost no successful counter-attacks at all, and now we have a whole series of them. I still think this is evidence of Ukrainian reinforcements arriving.
You might be right if you believe Zelensky (LOL).

Reuters said:
Russian war bloggers say that if Russia can pierce the Ukrainian defences around Kurakhove, they will be able to push westwards towards the city of Zaporizhzhia while securing their rear to allow a swing towards Pokrovsk.
Ukrainian military officials acknowledge the situation in the east is the worst now that it has been all year. Zelenskiy has blamed several factors including delays of up to a year in equipping brigades, partly because of the long time the U.S Congress took to sign off on a major Ukraine assistance package.
Some of these brigades, he said earlier this month, would now enter the fray:
Zelensky said:
In order to stop the Russian army, new reserves, kitted out with the equipment we have been waiting for so long, will now arrive.
I also read elsewhere that thousands of Ukrainian soldiers are undertaking training in western nations, and at some time, they should arrive in Ukraine.
I also think that they are not sending more forces to Kursk and this rebalance the front line.
ATACMS and Storm Shadows are used in Kursk at the moment because they celebrate the authorisation to strik Russia, but it's a short term event.
_________________
Interresting tidbit from Ukrinform:
No mercy for the traitors

ATESH sabotaged a railway between Kherson and Crimea.

And a rare comment on a specific event:
Nazar Voloshyn Spokesperson for the Khortytsia Operational-Strategic Group said:
The enemy has recently been pushing towards the outskirts of Kurakhove. They are trying to establish fire control over the city as well as the logistics routes leading to it. They are attempting to break through our defenses.

In the Kurakhove sector of the front, Russians have been actively using artillery and guided air bombs. However, the Ukrainian Defense Forces are holding off the Russian advances, inflicting significant losses on the invading forces in both personnel and equipment.

Kurakhove is under the control of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Over the past day, more than 350 occupiers were killed or wounded in that direction, along with two tanks, three motorcycles, a mortar, and several vehicles. Several more vehicles and a hostile motorcycle were also damaged.
 

Fredled

Active Member
Trump taps retired General Keith Kellogg for Ukraine envoy role
Their plan for ending the war:
1/
Reuters said:
freezing the battle lines at their prevailing locations and forcing both Kyiv and Moscow to the negotiating table
If they start negotiating, troops will forcibly stay at the current front line.
However, allowing Russia to keep all the captured territories would be a terrible idea. It would be a defeat for Ukraine and their allies.
It should be clear from the get go that none of the parties will get all the territories they want but that Russia won't keep all the territories it took by force since 2022.

Of course territory concessions will be forced upon Ukraine and their allies by the Russian military might and what will be realistic to apply.
Nobody makes illusions about this. But the basis of talks should be officially the respect of Ukrainian territorial integrity and the respect of the UN Charter.

2/
Reuters said:
the U.S. would tell Ukraine that it would only get more American weapons if it enters peace talks. The U.S. would at the same time warn Moscow that any refusal to negotiate would result in increased U.S. support for Ukraine.
This is an oxymoron. If both Ukraine and Russia accept to talk, then there is a boolean contradiction: You can't give more weapons to Ukraine if you promised Russia that you won't. But you have to give more weapons to Ukraine because you promised to do so.

Secondly, Putin won't change his mind because Trump threaten to give more weapons to Ukraine. First he thinks that the Red Army will always prevail because historically it always did. Second he doesn't believe that weapon deliveries can increase from current volumes.
Promising not to increase military support is a weak argument. Not completely void, but not a compelling one.

Whatever is the case, maintaining an uninterrupted flow of weapons and ammunitions to Ukraine will be necessary before, during anf after the negotiations. Putin won't negotiate if the Ukrainian defence is weakened.

3/
Reuters said:
NATO membership for Ukraine would be taken off the table for the immediate future.
This is at the same time a terrible idea and in contradiction with the position of the other allies.

Terrible because it would give Putin a double victory: Reaching his goal of stopping NATO expansion and leaving Ukraine in position of weakness allowing him to resume invasion and bombing for whatever reason at any time. My personal opinion is that outside NATO, Russia will attack Ukraine again within 3 to 5 years.

It's in opposition with the clear political decision taken by all other NATO members, save Hungary and by all Ukraine's allies in general, and last but not least, by Ukraine. European countries won't agree with Trump on this.
Trump is known for disliking NATO, but if he prevents Ukraine from joining NATO he will fail to stop the war.

The good point is that they added "for the immediate future", leaving hope that in the intermediary future or a more remote future, the US may accept Ukraine's bid for membership.

The only alternative would a military alliance with Ukraine with the same effect as NATO membership. But Putin won't be fooled.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
From what I understood President Trump does not singularly decide who can join N.A.T.O but the joint vote of all members Hungary and Turkey and other members can veto this, The E.U has announced it will enter negotiations to start entry talks up membership for Ukraine despite the wishes of Hungary
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
From what I understood President Trump does not singularly decide who can join N.A.T.O but the joint vote of all members Hungary and Turkey and other members can veto this, The E.U has announced it will enter negotiations to start entry talks up membership for Ukraine despite the wishes of Hungary
Neogitations can be started any time but actually joining requires a consensus meaning Trump can certainly veto it all on his own. Now when it's someone small and vulnerable like Hungary there are ways to twist arms and push things to get them to agree. But when it's the USA vetoing it...
 

Fredled

Active Member
Trump can veto it. But in 4 years he is gone. And the accession process will take more than 4 years. Hungarian leadership can also change in the meantime.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
This is a good article on the Oreshnik missile:


We now know for a fact that it had no explosive payload and was basically a demonstrative/signalling move. A few interesting quotes from the article:

After examining images of the wreckage, [Jeffrey] Lewis said the two largest pieces of debris were part of its warhead bus, which sits atop the booster and eventually drops the warheads from space onto their targets.

My guess is something impacting the surface at those speeds would not have many meaningful partitions remaining, but the bus and whatever separates at the first and second stages.

"This is a new capability, but this is not a new capability that represents a dramatic change in the way that conventional weapons are developed," he said. "It's a series of old technologies that have been put together in a new way."

I believe it was pretty clear from the start that there would be no groundbreaking revelations.

Lewis said the new design had most likely removed a stage of the booster from the RS-26, reducing its range. He noted that using the Oreshnik with conventional warheads was an expensive means "to deliver not that much destruction".


I am not sure how valid this argument is within the spectrum of this particular conflict, but for wider applications as well. For instance, like I said in my previous post, this thing is pretty much guaranteed to pass through the Ukrainian air defense, regardless of where it strikes in the country. It surely makes zero sense to use such missiles for the attacks such as the one that took place yesterday, for example, where numerous relatively small targets were spread out through the entire country. However, a concentrated strike on a relatively large target in a well defended area, this missile could be the ticket and two or several, depending on the scope of the strike and value of the target(s), could significantly outweigh the cost constraints vs the massive strike with the “conventional” means. Surely there are limitations, namely cost and accuracy, but with the proper target I believe these are negligible. Plus one gets a few minutes to wonder whether the incoming projectile carries a conventional or a nuclear payload (ha!).

Senior Ukrainian officials told Reuters this week that the missile used to attack Dnipro carried no explosives and caused limited damage.

To reference the lack of explosive payload I mentioned above.

Lewis noted that the sheer speed of reentry was enough to cause damage even if the warhead were non-explosive material such as metal. The warheads descended on Dnipro at a steep angle, he noted, which implied the missile had been launched on a "lofted" trajectory: fired to an unusually high apogee, or maximum altitude, to reduce range.

Kapustin Yar, where the missile was launched, is only about 800km from the impact point, so a lofted attack is plausible, said Ankit Panda, a senior fellow at the U.S.-based Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Lewis noted that its reported flight time of 15 minutes would have taken it about 1,500 km on a normal trajectory.


Note that Iran reportedly did the opposite when launching their ballistic missiles to Israel, namely reducing payload, increasing the range, and reducing accuracy. Yes, I know we are talking about completely different things here. Again, this strike had indicated that Russia possesses the tech and at the very least working samples capable of delivering great and accurately placed destruction. I am bringing this up only because there was plenty of talk for the past while that Russia could have no working capability or at least none in good working order to carry out such or intercontinental strikes. That talk, of course, is extremely shortsighted (to say the least and rather quite politely) and dangerous.

"If Russia is working on a MIRV with a conventional CEP, we’ve never seen it," he said, referring to circular error probable (CEP), a measure of weapon accuracy. A nuclear missile typically has a CEP of 50 to 200 metres, meaning half of all rounds aimed at the target will land within that distance of the aimpoint.

In videos of the attack, each warhead appeared to drop smaller payloads that could be seen striking the ground. Wright said that if the missile used such submunitions, accuracy was less of a problem because: "it would distribute them over a wide area. It makes it useful for attacking large facilities".


To my point above and what I said in one of my previous posts regarding the matter.

Lewis cautioned that given the expense, using this type of ballistic missile to hit Ukraine might be more a psychological tactic than a military one. "If were inherently terrifying, (Putin) would just use it. But that's not quite enough," Lewis said. "He had to use it and then do a press conference and then do another press conference and say: 'Hey, this thing is really scary, you should be scared.'"

That’s a fair point. Yet again, I believe that the actual use, not some symbolic signalling, has way more implications than “you should be scared”. Of course, the practical use is quite limited in the scope of this conflict, but that also goes well with the high cost of production. And I would surely replace “scared” with “aware” in Dr Lewis’s quote. That would make a lot more sense and bring it in line with reality, in my opinion.

My question here is why they didn’t use an explosive payload striking the plant they did? Were there uncertainties? Would it reduce the psychological effect of the strike? I really wonder what the calculus was in this regard. I mean would Russia pleasantly induce some significant damage to the plant in question? Without a doubt. Would they gladly level it to the ground without using nukes? Of course they would (impossible to do so with one of these missiles with conventional payload, so that is not what I am implying in case someone thinks so).

Anyway… I wanted to discuss a few more things, but time (and possibly character limit) is not on my side today. Maybe tomorrow or over the weekend.

I also wanted to briefly discuss the situation in Syria earlier today but failed to find a relevant thread aside from the “Middle East Security” one.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I also wanted to briefly discuss the situation in Syria earlier today but failed to find a relevant thread aside from the “Middle East Security” one.
Technically this is the thread where Syria's war was being discussed. But of course it's not quite appropriate to the current context. ISIS is almost out of the picture and Syria's civil war is dragging on.

 

Fredled

Active Member
The ICBM capability of Russia is probably much lower than that of the USSR 40 years ago. But it's certainly not zero.
I assume that as long as they have civil space rocket technology working, they can also master military ones. Even if the technologies are very different, it's still similar areas of expertise.

Russia can't just refurbish Soviet ICBMs by adding new electronic devices as they do with old tanks. Most, if not all the Soviet era missiles are or at least should be not fit for carrying a nuclear payload because of the risk.
But they can build new ones based on the same model.

Of course, it was one more way to remind the world that he can nuke the West if we cross the red lines. As if we forgot. He does this because he doesn't understand why, in his case, the nuclear deterrent is not working while it works for everybody else.
In reality, it's working but he doesn't feel it that way.

The second reason is that he wanted to correct the misconception that the West had after the Sarmat-II failure.

Russian didn't add conventional explosive in the warheads because the mechanical constraints would make it too risky. A nuclear warhead also contain explosive used to detonate the charge, but it's not as risky as a conventional bomb.
With empty re-entry modules, they limited the risk of yet one more humiliation.
___________

Ukraine started to strike Crimea with long range missiles: Sevastopol, oil fields, ammunition depots, S-400 radar...
It's said that they do it to reduce the ability of the Russian to launch a rumoured assault on Zaporizhia.

Ukraine's General Staff confirms strike on oil depot in Russia's Rostov region
Videos are circulating on line.

Ukrainian units operating in the Pokrovsk and Kurakhove sectors of the Donetsk region will receive additional reserves, ammunition, weapons, and military equipment.
One more sign that new trained units are arriving.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

There are reports of a new Russian assault tactic materializing, using very small assault teams to penetrate porous Ukrainian lines and grab individual defensible positions to disorganize Ukrainian defenses. Examples provided include the Russian breakthrough in northern Toretsk, and the recent Russian breakthrough to the western half of Kurakhovo. It's not clear how effective this is since in Kurakhovo the area in question hasn't fallen to Russia yet, though it has in Toretsk.


Kursk area.

Russian forces continue to bite off pieces of Ukrainian lines in the Kursk salient. Dar'ino does now appear to be fully under Russian control. Ukrainian forces did counter-attack north-east of Martynovka. No dramatic changes to the front lines but Ukraine is in general losing ground.


Russian wire-guided drones continue to strike Marders in Kursk region.


Russian wire-guided drone strikes a BMP-2 and a Bradley in Kursk region.


A Bradley blown to pieces by a direct hit from something. I don't know what hit it and the explosion is spectacular. Perhaps it was ferrying munitions.


Russian Lancet strike on a Ukrainian howitzer, Yunakovka, Sumy region. Allegedly it's a Bogdana, but it's hard to make out. It's something artillery-shaped and truck mounted.


Russian strikes near Maliy Bobrik, Sumy region hitting 3 vehicle-shaped objects, allegedly HIMARS TELs.


Russian Iskander-M strike near Tokari village, Sumy region. Allegedly targeting a Ukrainian staging area.


A destroyed Cougar MRAP in Kursk region.


A destroyed Ukrainian BMP-1 near Kremyannoe. Warning footage of corpses.


Ukrainian Bradley and BREM-2 in the Kursk area with the unfolded drone cages. This might be the very same BREM-2 we saw previously as it's a fairly rare vehicle.


Ukrainian M577 and Bushmaster somewhere in the Kursk border area.


Russian MChS workers clear UXO in Kursk region.


A UK veteran serving with Ukrainian armed forces captured in Kursk region. Russia continues the practice of calling all foreign fighters in Ukrainian service mercenaries but this is of course not corret.


Kharkov area.


There are reports of new Russian cross-border attacks towards Kazach'ya Lopan' but no supporting footage. It's likely that if an attack took place, it was repulsed.


Russian strike on a Ukrainian vehicle near Volchansk.


Russian FAB-3000 (1500?) strike in Volchansk.


Russian Krasnopol' fires in the Kharkov area. We're seeing less footage of the type being used lately.


Russia has started putting anti-drone netting on residential buildings in Belgorod region.


Kupyansk area.

We have confirmation that Ukraine has pushed Russian forces out of the northern outskirts of Kupyansk. Meanwhile Russian forces have reportedly crossed the Oskol near Dvurechnoe. Note it doesn't appear to be a major bridgehead.


Russian drone drops on Ukrainian forces near Kupyansk, warning footage of corpses.


Oskol front.

On the Borovoe axis Russian forces have taken Kopanki and are pushing on Zeleniy Guy. Around Torskoe Ukrainian forces have pushed Russian forces back from the village. Note this is a continuing back and forth. In all likelihood the fall of Torskoe will come when Russian forces push through Terny from the north. Meanwhile near Terny Russian forces have taken a pocket in the field east of the village.


Chasov Yar.

Russian forces have cleared the last fields east of the canal, pushing Ukrainian forces out.


Russian Strela-10 allegedly downs a Ukrainian Furiya UAV. Note while the Strela-10 itself is quite old Russia has started using new missiles during this war that keep the system somewhat relevant.


BDA footage of a Ukrainian underground facility, allegedly a command bunker, in the forest near Chasov Yar. The facility was hit by a RS-74 strike.


Toretsk.


Russian forces continue to recapture areas of southern Toretsk lost in Ukraine's recent counter-attack. However the main issue still remains, the primary mine complex and adjacent refuse mounds are in Ukrainian hands.


A Russian soldier throwns a mine bundle into a building held by Ukrainian soldiers.


A series of Russian wire-guided drones striking Ukrainian transport near Toretsk.


An interesting view of a "road of death" near Toretsk where piles of destroyed Ukrainian vehicles lie burned out as a Russian wire-guided drone flies by.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Pokrovsk area.

Russian forces advance along a wide front west of Selidovo, and have taken Zheltoe and approached Pushkino. Russian forces west of Selidovo are now practically on line with the western outskirts of Pokrovsk and are slowly pushing northwest as well as west. Note we're still a long way from an actual attempt to take Pokrovsk-Mirnograd.


Allegedly a knocked out Ukrainian T-72M crew fleeing, as a Russian soldier fires an RPG into the tank. This is in Zheltoe.


Two abandoned Ukrainian BMPs finished off out near Yurievka.


A stationary Leo-1 getting blown up in the Pokrovsk area. Note we don't know which side is doing it.


Russian forces captured a Pantera T6 armored car in the Pokrovsk area.


A knocked out and abandoned Ukrainian BOV APC in the Pokrovsk area.


Russian 2S7 operations in the Pokrovsk area.


Russian IMR-2 doing road clearing in the Pokrovsk area. Note while it's not a mine-clearing vehicle as such, the massive dozer blade does it give it protection from mines, especially on a flat surface like a road.


Footage from inside Tsukurino.


An interesting look at Russian army transport in Novogrodovka.


Russian Buk-M2 operating in the Pokrovsk area. Note it appears to be up-armored with neat-looking panels but some of them are unpainted rust. It's unclear if this is a poorly made factory set or a well-made improvised set. Up-armoring SAMs has been a pattern with quite a few Tor seeing with factory-made armor panels. Note the obligatory anti-drone picket, this one with a Russian Vepr' semi-automatic shotgun.


Kurakhovo area.

Russian forces have cleared all of Berestki, and pushed in the fields north of it. Russian forces also advanced out of Dal'noe. In the area around the Sukhie Yaly river Russian forces continue to push north to the river. Yelizavetovka and Il'yinka are now under Russian control with Romanovka contested. In Kurakhovo itself half or just under half of the town is in Russian hands. Last but not least, Russian forces now hold almost the entire northern shore of the reservoir, and are near Starie Terny from the east. There is still a pocket of Ukrainian forces north of the reservoir but they're probably in the process of withdrawing.


Large explosions at the Kurakhovo powerplant, possibly Ukrainian forces blowing up facilities before retreating, possibly a Russian strike.


Russian drone strike on allegedly a Ukrainian vehicle in the western part of Kurakhovo. Note the feed cuts out due to EW so it's not clear that they hit it.


Allegedly Russian forces in the western side of Kurakhovo where the multi-story apartments are.


Russian forces raise the flag over Berestki, north of the reservoir.


Russian assault teams enter Yelizavetovka.


Russian forces have captured a knocked out Kozak-2 armored car in the Kurakhovo area.


Russian forces pose with a destroyed 2S7 near Kurakhovo.


Velikaya Novoselka area.

Russian forces have captured Razdol'noe and entered Velikaya Novoselka. They've also advanced along a wide front east of Velikaya Novoselka.


A Russian UGV called Mole carries explosives into allegedly Ukrainian positions in the Velikaya Novoselka area.


Russian drone strike on allegedly a Ukrainian 2S22. It's hard to make out, but it looks like it on a KrAZ chassis.


Zaporozhye.


Russian forces continue to advance towards Orekhov, this time from the east, entering Belogor'ye.


A Russian BMD-4M operating on the Zaporozhye front. This suggests there is a VDV element here. We've seen VDV get non-airborne vehicles but I haven't seen the opposite.


Russian Kh-38ML strike on a bridge in Malinovka.


Dnepr front.

Russian drone hits a 2S22 Bogdana in the Kherson area and we have BDA afterwards from the ground.


Russian Msta-SM on the Dnepr front near Kahovka.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Strikes.

A Shahed drone fell on a clinic in Kiev allegedly after being shot down.


Shahed strikes in Borispol, Kiev region.


Shaheds over Kiev.


Damage from Russian strikes in Kharkov, the target is some sort of industrial structure.


Russian strikes landing in Chernigov. This town hasn't been hit very hard in the past.


Russian strikes landing in Sumy, target unclear.


A Russian Gerber drone stuck in the tree in Sumy region.


Russian strike landing near Kramatorsk allegedly on a Ukrainian staging area.


Shaheds over Dnepropetrovsk.


Russian strikes landing in Odessa. One of the targets was allegedly a building where several organizations affiliated with Ukraine's MoD are housed.


Russian strikes landing in Il'chevsk and Chernomorsk, Odessa.


Russia struck Ukrainian missile TELs in Odessa region, claiming they are Grom TELs, Ukraine's home-grown operational-tactical ballistic missile complex. However they may be Neptune or Patriot TELs. There are also no secondary detonations, meaning they could be decoys of either one.


Ukrainian Mi-8 intercepting Russian UAVs.


Russia's MinDef in a rare display admitted that Ukraine hit a S-400 successfully, and claimed some downed ATACMS, showing this footage, which to me looks very staged. Russian officialdom also claims 7/8 downed but we can tell there are at least 2 impacts, meaning this is a lie. Note this is a strike against the Khalino airfield. It's unclear what other damage there was, and the airfield is one of the ones where Russia was building HAS.


Ukraine struck the Atlas fuel storage facility in Rostov region, Russia. Multiple downed UAVs were reported in the region, and it's not clear if this was the only target.


Ukraine hit some sort of industrial enterprise in Kaluga, maybe a fuel storage facility


Ukraine allegedly struck a bus stop in Novaya Kahovka. Reportedly 4 civilians killed and 17 wounded. Reportedly they double-tapped the rescue teams. Note we just have the claims not the strike footage. It could be a downed Ukrainian munition or an FPV drone that failed, but if they did double-tap the rescue teams, then it's a warcrime.


A small plane flying by a Russian petro-chemical facility was fired on because it violated restricted airspace, and was thought to be a Ukrainain UAV though the on-board lights clearly show it's an airplane.


A look at Ukrainian long-range UAV preparation and launch.


Russian construction of HAS is picking up.


An interesting look at Russian UAV hangars for the new Gerber drones. While the protection doesn't seem that significant, it greatly reduces damage if the facility gets hit.


Other interesting bits.

A Russian Mi-28NM firing a Kh-39. This war has been the debut for both the MN variant and this new munition.


In a circle of life moment Russian forces have recaptured a Spartak AMN-590951 MRAP that they lost to Ukraine some time ago.


Russian forces have apparently captured a working Leo-2A4. It's strange that neither it nor the Bradley were sent to a research facility.


More footage of the captured Bradley being used by Russia's 30th MRBde.


Russian forces show off an intereting anti-UAS system based on the YakB machinegun.


A fire took place at a storage facility in Odessa where materiel for the war was allegedly being staged. Russian sources are crediting this to the resistance movement but of course there isn't much of a resistance movement in Odessa. If pro-Russian forces are behind this they are far likelier linked to Russian intelligence services.


Ukraine has removed Gen. Pavlyuk from the position of commander of the land forces and has replaced him with Gen. Drapatiy.


A look at one of Ukraine's Frankensams, this one a Buk with RIM-7 missiles. Note the underground shelter. The footage from inside the vehicle suggests the electronics haven't really been upgraded.


Italian M113s (VCC-2s) in service with Ukrainian MVD troops from Donechina btln.


Ukraine's 95th Mech, 2nd Btln, received some quantity of Bradleys.


Ukraine's 155th Mech with their Leo-2A4s. The layout of the K-1 and rubber sheeting is different from prior Leo-2A4s done with ERA. Note the unit in question is training in France, perhaps these tanks are also there.


A rare CR-2 with Ukraine's 82nd Air-Assault Bde, with cage side armor, but no roof cage.


The Netherlands reportedly handed over another 3 Patriot TELs to Ukraine.


A Netherland mine trawler withdrawn from service is being prepared to hand over to Ukraine. Note mine protection is a major deficiency in the VMF and if Ukraine gains the ability to deploy many modern sea mines, Russia will have problems.


Germany reportedly delivered 4 more PzH-2000 to Ukraine, bringing the total delivered to 24. No clear picture on how many have been lost in combat, though the number isn't 0 anymore.

 

Fredled

Active Member
Thanks for this report, Feanor.

Feanor said:
There are reports of a new Russian assault tactic materializing, using very small assault teams to penetrate porous Ukrainian lines and grab individual defensible positions to disorganize Ukrainian defenses. Examples provided include the Russian breakthrough in northern Toretsk, and the recent Russian breakthrough to the western half of Kurakhovo. It's not clear how effective this is since in Kurakhovo the area in question hasn't fallen to Russia yet, though it has in Toretsk.
I have also read reports of micro attacks by 4 or5 soldiers, sometimes as small as two, from Ukrinform and other sources.
Generaly, small incursions are referred as sabotage, but recently their goal was to take position. It works as long as they are not detected by the Ukrainians. The smaller the group, the less it can be detected.

Feanor said:
Russia's MinDef in a rare display admitted that Ukraine hit a S-400 successfully, and claimed some downed ATACMS, showing this footage, which to me looks very staged.
It looks photoshopped to me (or AI generated). This rocket segment seems to have no weight as it lies on the ground...
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I have also read reports of micro attacks by 4 or5 soldiers, sometimes as small as two, from Ukrinform and other sources.
Generaly, small incursions are referred as sabotage, but recently their goal was to take position. It works as long as they are not detected by the Ukrainians. The smaller the group, the less it can be detected.
I think the distinction here is the depth of these attacks. These aren't small team assaults on a front position, these are penetrations past Ukrainian front positions to seize something defensible.

It looks photoshopped to me (or AI generated). This rocket segment seems to have no weight as it lies on the ground...
Maybe. It also doesn't look shot down, just like a stage of the rocket that fell. So maybe they just dragged over a ATACMS stage and put it next to the Pantsyr for a dramatic photo.
 

rsemmes

Member
Zelensky is still delusional.

Now it's not a "Victory Plan", it's just "to end the war"; but it is still NATO. NATO has to protect the unoccupied Ukraine and then, through diplomacy (not through magic) he will get back the rest; I cannot see what he can offer to achieve that.
It has to be NATO, but a no-NATO Ukraine seems to be a sine qua non condition for Russia, since Istanbul at least. What is Zelensky thinking?
Now, he is "considering" to cede Ukrainian territory under Russian control in a possible ceasefire; at least.

On the frontline...
What is that about (Kalibrated maps) crossing the Oskil to encircle Dvorichna? Is there any (actual) objective there or is this just an advance of opportunity?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Zelensky is still delusional.

Now it's not a "Victory Plan", it's just "to end the war"; but it is still NATO. NATO has to protect the unoccupied Ukraine and then, through diplomacy (not through magic) he will get back the rest; I cannot see what he can offer to achieve that.
It has to be NATO, but a no-NATO Ukraine seems to be a sine qua non condition for Russia, since Istanbul at least. What is Zelensky thinking?
Now, he is "considering" to cede Ukrainian territory under Russian control in a possible ceasefire; at least.

On the frontline...
What is that about (Kalibrated maps) crossing the Oskil to encircle Dvorichna? Is there any (actual) objective there or is this just an advance of opportunity?
I think Russia is working on a cross-Oskol offensive since that's the only way to take Kupyansk. Instead of launching a single large operation, they're doing many small ones. They're small enough to be ignored individually but many of them over time can give Russia a very solid hold on the other shore that's potentially harder to dislodge. They start out looking as mere distractions and if Ukraine chooses to respond, they will serve as diversions. But if Ukraine doesn't respond with sufficient force to dislodge them, they will build up.
 

Fredled

Active Member
rsemmes said:
Zelensky is still delusional.
He is very lucid. He says exactly what has to said.
If there is an invitation to NATO it's for the all Ukraine, that's obvious. There has never been any question about some part of Ukraine inside NATO and others not.

Zelensky can't never hint at territorial concession to Russia. The basis of any conversation on this topic is that the Donbas and Crimea are legaly Ukrainian territory because that's what it is. There is no departing from that.
Suggesting, even indirectly, that some territories currently under Russian control could be given to Putin as a gesture of good will to start negotiations would be a terrible mistake because it would imply that Putin has some rights or at least good reasons to deserve to own these land areas.
 

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Suggesting, even indirectly, that some territories currently under Russian control could be given to Putin as a gesture of good will to start negotiations would be a terrible mistake because it would imply that Putin has some rights or at least good reasons to deserve to own these land areas.
That is a somewhat black or white view. while I personally dislike the Idea of Putin gaining anything from this war, the international arena of politics and agreements is seldom black or white but normally very grey. By this I mean nobody with the exception of some very rich or powerful countries get every thing they want and even they fail at times, it is all a compromise. It is how much you wish to compromise that can lead to an agreement.
One of the factors that will influence the compromise is the level of support Ukraine has and is receiving from their supporters. This can be said to be less than optimal up to now, with Ukraine being forced to fight with one arm tied behind their back. This may reduce in future due to political considerations.
 
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