The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[KipPotapych]

I don’t think Trump will dramatically increase aid. Sanctions, yes. Military aid by something groundbreaking? No. Plus, it is not Trump that decides the aid at the end of the day. He can cut it, but he cannot just “disburse” it. There is almost nothing in his disposal that had already been approved.

 

[PachkaSigaret]

The biggest issue is regrouping and organization of defense lines by the Ukrainian side. On the other hand, Russia needs to regroup itself and move forces to the east where they are… perhaps, not losing the initiative, but experiencing difficulties, which I am sure are temporary in nature. With the Kursk saga over, Russia has considerable resources to spare, whether progressing in Sumy or relocating them to the east (and south) or both.

Indeed, the only caveat that'll I'll add is that both Ukraine and Russia are undermanned along large swaths of the border. Ukraine could try another incursion elsewhere like in the Bryansk region. However that'll inevitably end up like another Kursk debacle. Russia might be hesitant to shift too many forces elsewhere. I will add that there are some very small segments of the Chernigov region that Russia has crossed into. Nothing major, but that shows they can attempt an incursion elsewhere as well. However, is it worth it? Probably not without overwhelming force.

I'd say this "ceasefire" is just another superficial concession wrung out of a partner by Trump's hysterionics. The playbook is quite trite at this point.

I would agree with Suriyak's assessment below that there is no actual expectation that Russia will entertain the offer. Ukraine has far, far more to gain from a 30 day pause. The entire affair is just a dog and pony show to give Trump another "win" that actually means nothing.

I'd wager that there was never any intention of fully withdrawing aid and all the blather was just Trump's typical posturing. He has no actual plan that survives contact with reality.

That's how I view it. Nothing really concrete being laid out here, certainly nothing that will lead to a lasting peace.

 

[KipPotapych]

Another thing to consider here is that what happens if Russia agrees to this ceasefire. What happens during the month? Assuming nothing acceptable is offered by Ukriane as far as actual peace is concerned, the exact same pressure will be exerted on Russia, be it sanctions, the “increased military aid”, whatever. Nothing will change in that sense. If you look at it from that angle, if there is no incentive offered to Russia to accept this deal, they won’t. In fact, it would be dumb for them to do so. There must be something in the details that we do not know.

Also to note, it’s not like whatever the Americans and Ukrainians agreed to will be thrown to the table during the next meeting with the Russians with the expectation that they either accept it or reject it without considerations.

Unless that’s the plan, of course. So far Trump got what he wanted from Ukriane in exchange for nothing.

 

[SinisterMinister]

Another thing to consider here is that what happens if Russia agrees to this ceasefire. What happens during the month? Assuming nothing acceptable is offered by Ukriane as far as actual peace is concerned, the exact same pressure will be exerted on Russia, be it sanctions, the “increased military aid”, whatever. Nothing will change in that sense. If you look at it from that angle, if there is no incentive offered to Russia to accept this deal, they won’t. In fact, it would be dumb for them to do so. There must be something in the details that we do not know.

Also to note, it’s not like whatever the Americans and Ukrainians agreed to will be thrown to the table during the next meeting with the Russians with the expectation that they either accept it or reject it without considerations.

Unless that’s the plan, of course. So far Trump got what he wanted from Ukriane in exchange for nothing.

If there were incentives offered to Russia, one would think they would have been widely publicized. Instead none of the points of the "deal" as it has been advertised seem to offer Russia anything.

Which simply further emphasizes that this isn't a real attempt at a ceasefire. It is a way for Trump to restore aid to Ukraine while claiming he achieved something and uh, "put the ball in Russia's court" (the ball is made of lead)

 

[Feanor]

Yeah, I don't know what's really going on with this ceasefire offer. Perhaps this really is an attempt to simply say Russia is at fault. But also I don't think Trump wants to spend money supporting Ukraine. So perhaps there's something real behind it that we can't see? I also can't help but wonder about the timing, just when Ukraine is about to get kicked out of Kursk.

 

[seaspear]

It might be that Ukraine is making a choice of which land to hold Russian versus Ukrainian land they can recapture in the east certainly mining towns have more value for them , and causing Russia to have significantly more losses than Ukraine in recapturing Russian land and destabilising their offensives elsewhere might be be viewed as a plus

 

[KipPotapych]

^ My understanding is that the losses in Kursk are about even, if not unfavourable for Ukraine. Add the quality of the personnel lost (and expandable North Koreans that likely will not fight outside of the Russian borders) and Ukriane is at a great loss. I don’t think that is even debatable, frankly.

If there were incentives offered to Russia, one would think they would have been widely publicized. Instead none of the points of the "deal" as it has been advertised seem to offer Russia anything.

Which simply further emphasizes that this isn't a real attempt at a ceasefire. It is a way for Trump to restore aid to Ukraine while claiming he achieved something and uh, "put the ball in Russia's court" (the ball is made of lead)

View attachment 52442

Almost annoying, isn’t it? I am referring to the parroting.

The thing is, however, this has not changed since most of these people have been saying it for a long time, the ball is in Russia’s court. Either Russia can end this war whenever it wants by leaving Ukraine, it’s on Putin to stop his attacks and “slaughtering civilians”, etc. So that hasn’t changed at all.

There are other things to consider as well. For example, the resumption of aid. How much aid is there left to resume? Not much. There are zero talks about any more American aid being approved or even debated. I mean there are literally no hints of such from any party (the silence is rather quite loud, in this case). Before the election, there were numerous reports suggesting that the aid will be greatly reduced regardless of who wins the top seat. Absolute majority of what’s left will take a couple of years (or more?) to be provided. So this “resumption of aid” clause is a lot of talk, but, perhaps, has very short legs. Intel sharing is crucial though. Yet, not a deal breaker either because it has been the case for over three years now (the countdown starting at the invasion).

For now, it is surely a lot of talk and implied declarations of “winning”. In reality, if you consider what has happened in the past couple of weeks, Ukraine took an “L”… for now. They literally caved for something that they considered completely unacceptable for a long time and until… 2-3 days ago - a ceasefire of any sort and without guarantees to boot, their primary (and unreasonable) demand. What did they get in return? Something they had had before losing it a few days ago. This also clearly indicated that they can be leveraged and the US, in spite of various claims, is of vital importance.

Lastly, they would be much better off if they accepted the same terms last week, while still holding the Kursk card, and Russia would (maybe) be in more of a pickle.

For Russia, again, what has been publicized provides no incentive to accept the “revealed” terms, but keep pushing. On the one hand, this is not going to be agreed upon within a couple of days (Trump said he hopes to talk to Putin this week), so there is still time to close the Kursk issue for good. Some pro-Ukrainian sources suggest that it is nearly closed already:



There are others that suggest the remaining “Guevo salient” was probably abandoned as well. I don’t know if either is the case, obviously - most other maps suggest a different story. Nonetheless, this should be resolved rather sooner than later. In other words, likely before Russia agrees or otherwise to any ceasefire.

On the other hand, again, because this does not have a deadline of “tomorrow”, likely allows for negotiations (a reasonable assumption), so they can continue their thing to the end of the month and into April, seeing what happens and accept the deal, if seen beneficial, in order to prepare for the May and summer offensive. It actually may put Ukraine in a precarious position by having already accepted the ceasefire. Though this likely tells us that they do not believe the changes in Toretsk direction and elsewhere are permanent in nature and likely will be reversed (some Ukrainian general actually stated as much just the other day - I will add the link if I find it).

So yeah, it isn’t necessarily what it appears to be and Russia has more cards to play here than people think (maybe even more than they did yesterday). Funny, because many analysts right away declared that this will be rejected almost immediately, if not right at announcement. We will see what happens. There were no indications from Russia one way or the other (noise aside). My guess is they will play it long to see what happens. Today, there are no indications that they need to rush. Even if what we see today is all to it. The worst we see today is Lindsey Graham’s (noncredible) threat of some sanctions:



That’s a lot of nonsense, in my opinion. Especially uranium stuff.

Last thing, they actually made Yermak wear a suit! And to end on a fun note (and a proof for the last sentence, lol):

 

[seaspear]

I would be interested to know who your sources are that claim that Ukrainian losses are higher than Russian

 

[T.C.P]

Regarding the Kursk adventure. A lot of the criticism is hindsight, imagine if RUssia had not gone hard into dibre optics at the time they did. The earliest reports coming in were that normal FPVs were being countered heavily by Ukraine's dense EW. Ukraine was using the very best stuff they had in the offensive. If they had amnaged to reach the nulear reactor, they could have really dug in.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

Interesting thread. In Hebrew but Twitter has a translate function.
Apparently Israeli company's RADA ieMHR radars, associated with Ukraine's early warning array, are apparently deployed on the frontline and used to semi-actively guide interceptor drones against Russian drones.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1899752125199949852

 

[rsemmes]

But you said "feelings" don't count? So make your mind up

Did I?
Why did Putin invade Ukraine? When did Putin say that he felt the threat of invasion? By Ukraine, of all countries.

Yes, there is a threat (an asteroid may hit this planet, that is a real threat) and we take action, the level of our actions (and time and timing) tells me how realistic we consider that threat.
Maybe the support has decreased, instead of the threat increased; so, our statements, perception or "feelings" about that threat. Now that Russia is in trouble (according to some people is about to collapse) we fear... What exactly?

Macron feels that US is a threat to Greenland. Do "feelings" count?

 

[rsemmes]

Simply put: If he doesn;t the US will give Ukraine enough military aid to at least destroy the Russian army even further and with a high chance that Ukraine will liberate another big area.
It will be extremely risky for Putin to refuse a ceasefire. But, as I said above, his decisions are not rational. So it's hard to tell what he will do.

Yes, everything is so simple for you, starting with every European politician knowing nothing; but you do. Words: Russian abandoning another big area, not Ukraine liberating.
Just one question... With what Ukrainian soldiers?

 

[Feanor]

Regarding the Kursk adventure. A lot of the criticism is hindsight, imagine if RUssia had not gone hard into dibre optics at the time they did. The earliest reports coming in were that normal FPVs were being countered heavily by Ukraine's dense EW. Ukraine was using the very best stuff they had in the offensive. If they had amnaged to reach the nulear reactor, they could have really dug in.

I don't know that this was a credible outcome. The forces committed and the Russian response meant the situation would turn positional fairly quickly. The casualties might be skewed more in one direction or another, but the only places where this war leaves the positional state is when either one side is battered down and forced back without enough time to properly reinforce (Ukrainian forces after Avdeevka) or when someone is caught off guard. The former lasts until the attacking side exhausts their momentum, and the latter until the defending side brings up sufficient units.

Also consider, just reaching the reactor and digging in by itself wouldn't be sustainable. You would need control of a wide area around the NPP and the town there. Don't forget it's not one reactor, it's an entire nuclear power plant, and you'd have supply lines tens of kms long back to Ukraine with giant flanks to guard. You would also need this salient to be wide enough to sustain the operations at the NPP. I suppose Ukraine could threaten to sabotage the reactors, essentially slipping into state terrorism territory, but I don't know that this would be a particularly credible threat and if carried out might lead to consequences like strikes against Ukrainian nuclear reactors on a large scale.

I wouldn't be surprised if Ukrainian leadership really thought that taking the fight into Russia would force Russia to negotiate. But if they did think so, I believe they were mistaken. I suspect Russia's position would harden in response to an act like that, and lead to more escalation not less.

I would be interested to know who your sources are that claim that Ukrainian losses are higher than Russian

In Kursk area specifically Ukraine is in a very limited space, and has to run logistics along known corridors. We also have plenty of footage of Ukrainian maneuver elements getting ambushed or taken out by drones. I think we can confidently say Ukrainian casualties are substantial. I think for the exact ratio we will have to wait until post-war analysis but I don't see how we can with complete confidence assign greater losses to either side at this point.

 

[Redshift]

Did I?
Why did Putin invade Ukraine? When did Putin say that he felt the threat of invasion? By Ukraine, of all countries.

Yes, there is a threat (an asteroid may hit this planet, that is a real threat) and we take action, the level of our actions (and time and timing) tells me how realistic we consider that threat.
Maybe the support has decreased, instead of the threat increased; so, our statements, perception or "feelings" about that threat. Now that Russia is in trouble (according to some people is about to collapse) we fear... What exactly?

Macron feels that US is a threat to Greenland. Do "feelings" count?

You are quite funny, go look up the stated reasons for the special military operation. They almost all fall into your "feelings" category.

 

[Feanor]

You are quite funny, go look up the stated reasons for the special military operation. They almost all fall into your "feelings" category.

Assuming we take them at face value. Personally I don't.

EDIT: Ukraine seems to be exiting Kursk region, though with casualties. Russian forces appear to have taken Sudzha.

 

[swerve]

Bizarre, what exactly is a written and detailed commitment from Trump really worth? Is there 500 billion dollars of rare earth resources in Ukraine?

No. $500 billion is about 150 years of current rare earth trade, btw: they're important because a lot of things need small amounts of them to work, or to work efficiently, not because of their monetary value. To give an indication: the EU imported €123.6 million, & exported €102.3 million worth in 2023. The entire trade could fit in one small cargo ship. The EU spent 15 times as much on importing avocados from various sources, & over 50 times as much on importing salmon from Norway.

Ukraine may have $500 billion worth of valuable minerals though, what are known as "critical minerals", of which rare earths are a subset. Others are lithium, copper & cobalt (Ukraine has lithium), but the US government's list is quite long. See US critical minerals list. From the way he's spoken, Trump may not know the difference.

Some of the Ukrainian deposits are in territory currently under Russian control, BTW.

 

[John Fedup]

Absolutely Trump doesn't know the difference along with his knee bending minions. Of course his buddy Elon does and is an exception. Elon is likely counting on his Chinese contacts to supply stuff.....DF Donald probably thinks his bro Vlad will help out.

 

[Fredled]

We have people going to Russia right now,it Is up to Russia now.

We have gotten some positive messages on ceasefire.

link

We will not recognize any territories occupied by Russia. This is a fact.

link

One of the numerous "Deputy Head of the Presidential Office", Ihor Zhovkva, gives details about the truce proposal agreed with the US:

We are talking about the so-called complete truce. First and foremost, it means the cessation of aerial attacks with any type of weapon, whether ballistic and cruise missiles, guided bombs, or UAVs, including long-range drones. The first aspect is a complete ceasefire in the air.

The second aspect of the truce proposed by the Russian Federation is “silence” at sea.
It's necessary to ensure the continued operation of existing transportation routes, but as of now, there are many threats in the Black Sea, in the areas where Ukrainian and foreign vessels pass.

We also talked about a ceasefire on land, including the contact line.

link
It's interesting that, if it was not an error of translation, the sea truce was proposed by the Russians. Indeed that's where the Russians are the most crippled. But Ukrainians also see an advantage of such a truce.

The biggest advantage for the Ukrainians is the truce in the air.

"Talks about ceasefire on land" means that it may not be firmly decided and that they will see what Russians say about this.
_______________

EDIT: Ukraine seems to be exiting Kursk region, though with casualties. Russian forces appear to have taken Sudzha.

I don't believe in coincidence. This happened right at the time of the Jedah meeting and started after the spat at the Oval Office.

Ukrainnians are still denying that they lost Sudzha:

Fighting in Kursk region is ongoing, as well as fighting in the direction of Sudzhy. As of now, the information about the capture of Sudzhy by the Russians is not true,

link
Maybe false at the time of the press release. True at the time I wrote this reply... Let's see tomorrow.

wouldn't be surprised if Ukrainian leadership really thought that taking the fight into Russia would force Russia to negotiate. But if they did think so, I believe they were mistaken.

It's the first time that I read that the goal was to force Putin to negotiate. They always said it was to bring war to Russia. I don't think that Ukrainians believed that a single event could force Putin to negotiate. But it was one of the actions they took to slow the invasion and make war more difficult, and above all, to embarrass Putin.

Ukraine was using the very best stuff they had in the offensive. If they had amnaged to reach the nucear reactor, they could have really dug in.

Also consider, just reaching the reactor and digging in by itself wouldn't be sustainable. You would need control of a wide area around the NPP and the town there. Don't forget it's not one reactor, it's an entire nuclear power plant, and you'd have supply lines tens of kms long back to Ukraine with giant flanks to guard. You would also need this salient to be wide enough to sustain the operations at the NPP.

The Kursk NPP was too far. Ukrainians already went way beyond where they expected to go. Still, the Russians built a defence line to protect the NPP. It shows how scary this idea was to them.

A more realistic goal was to take the Glushkovo pocket. They almost succeeded, but the Russians reacted on time and Ukrainians didn't have an extra battallion ready for this. Ukrainians tried but it was not in the initial plan. Had they succeeded, the territory under their control wouldn't have been a salient but a more defensible line bordered by a river parallel to the Ukrainian border. And then, they could have dug in long term and have something serious to trade.

 

[crest]

A more realistic goal was to take the Glushkovo pocket. They almost succeeded, but the Russians reacted on time and Ukrainians didn't have an extra battallion ready for this. Ukrainians tried but it was not in the initial plan. Had they succeeded, the territory under their control wouldn't have been a salient but a more defensible line bordered by a river parallel to the Ukrainian border. And then, they could have dug in long term and have something serious to trade.

This is somewhat true. It also would have required even more diversion of forces from the eastren front from. Imop the biggest gain to Russia was the diversion of forces Kursk imposed on Ukraine. There is also the vulnerability of logistics in that area arguably worse the that of suzda.

As far as a bargaining chip I don't see how that area under Ukraine control would prevent what is currently happening from having developed? It's true Russia has been pushing from the west/north/west for awhile. But this collapse came primarily from the north and east, the area your talking about is primarily west/south/west.

The river your talking about turns sharply north west of snagost, far from providing a defensive obstruction for what has been happing the last few weeks let alone days.

It would have taken I think alot more then one more bttln to hold the river line snagost, north of snagost, glushkovo itself all the way to korenevo ( north of snagost but east side of the river) to take the kind of "pocket" your taking about, Let alone hold it. Logistics are horrible and Ukraine was already being pushed back along the rest of the front at the time

 

[rsemmes]

Regarding the Kursk adventure. A lot of the criticism is hindsight, imagine if RUssia had not gone hard into dibre optics at the time they did. The earliest reports coming in were that normal FPVs were being countered heavily by Ukraine's dense EW. Ukraine was using the very best stuff they had in the offensive. If they had amnaged to reach the nulear reactor, they could have really dug in.

"Hindsight" is what Zaluzhny said: 'And then what?'
Ukraine is not back to square 1, is back to square -3. And now what?