^ My understanding is that the losses in Kursk are about even, if not unfavourable for Ukraine. Add the quality of the personnel lost (and expandable North Koreans that likely will not fight outside of the Russian borders) and Ukriane is at a great loss. I don’t think that is even debatable, frankly.
If there were incentives offered to Russia, one would think they would have been widely publicized. Instead none of the points of the "deal" as it has been advertised seem to offer Russia anything.
Which simply further emphasizes that this isn't a real attempt at a ceasefire. It is a way for Trump to restore aid to Ukraine while claiming he achieved something and uh, "put the ball in Russia's court" (the ball is made of lead)
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Almost annoying, isn’t it? I am referring to the parroting.
The thing is, however, this has not changed since most of these people have been saying it for a long time, the ball is in Russia’s court. Either Russia can end this war whenever it wants by leaving Ukraine, it’s on Putin to stop his attacks and “slaughtering civilians”, etc. So that hasn’t changed at all.
There are other things to consider as well. For example, the resumption of aid. How much aid is there left to resume? Not much. There are zero talks about any more American aid being approved or even debated. I mean there are literally no hints of such from any party (the silence is rather quite loud, in this case). Before the election, there were numerous reports suggesting that the aid will be greatly reduced regardless of who wins the top seat. Absolute majority of what’s left will take a couple of years (or more?) to be provided. So this “resumption of aid” clause is a lot of talk, but, perhaps, has very short legs. Intel sharing is crucial though. Yet, not a deal breaker either because it has been the case for over three years now (the countdown starting at the invasion).
For now, it is surely a lot of talk and implied declarations of “winning”. In reality, if you consider what has happened in the past couple of weeks, Ukraine took an “L”… for now. They literally caved for something that they considered completely unacceptable for a long time and until… 2-3 days ago - a ceasefire of any sort and without guarantees to boot, their primary (and unreasonable) demand. What did they get in return? Something they had had before losing it a few days ago. This also clearly indicated that they can be leveraged and the US, in spite of various claims, is of vital importance.
Lastly, they would be much better off if they accepted the same terms last week, while still holding the Kursk card, and Russia would (maybe) be in more of a pickle.
For Russia, again, what has been publicized provides no incentive to accept the “revealed” terms, but keep pushing. On the one hand, this is not going to be agreed upon within a couple of days (Trump said he
hopes to talk to Putin this week), so there is still time to close the Kursk issue for good. Some pro-Ukrainian sources suggest that it is nearly closed already:
There are others that suggest the remaining “Guevo salient” was probably abandoned as well. I don’t know if either is the case, obviously - most other maps suggest a different story. Nonetheless, this should be resolved rather sooner than later. In other words, likely before Russia agrees or otherwise to any ceasefire.
On the other hand, again, because this does not have a deadline of “tomorrow”, likely allows for negotiations (a reasonable assumption), so they can continue their thing to the end of the month and into April, seeing what happens and accept the deal, if seen beneficial, in order to prepare for the May and summer offensive. It actually may put Ukraine in a precarious position by having already accepted the ceasefire. Though this likely tells us that they do not believe the changes in Toretsk direction and elsewhere are permanent in nature and likely will be reversed (some Ukrainian general actually stated as much just the other day - I will add the link if I find it).
So yeah, it isn’t necessarily what it appears to be and Russia has more cards to play here than people think (maybe even more than they did yesterday). Funny, because many analysts right away declared that this will be rejected almost immediately, if not right at announcement. We will see what happens. There were no indications from Russia one way or the other (noise aside). My guess is they will play it long to see what happens. Today, there are no indications that they need to rush. Even if what we see today is all to it. The worst we see today is Lindsey Graham’s (noncredible) threat of some sanctions:
That’s a lot of nonsense, in my opinion. Especially uranium stuff.
Last thing, they actually made Yermak wear a suit! And to end on a fun note (and a proof for the last sentence, lol):
