The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[KipPotapych]

I will be rather short, though I could expand on quite a bit of what you said.

It's an excellent performance given that[…]

Does it matter though? I am not talking about the “against all odds” here. I am talking about sustainability in general and Kursk in particular, arguing against the “significantly higher Russian losses”. It is pretty clear (at least to me) that this is not the case, not in general and Kursk in particular.

You are also basically making my point here.

The Ukrainian performance is even better considering that their soldiers died from other causes than Russians. They took most of their casualties from long range artillery, rocket fires and gliding bombs. Russians turned the use of extreme means into a daily habit like using one or two iskander to strike an Himars launcher or FAB3000 to eliminate a few soldiers firing form a high rise building.

Obviously what you are describing is caused by the Russians. Not sure that I follow your train of thought.

It has also been stated numerous times by both sides that about half (or more?) the casualties are sustained from drones on the battlefield.

Russians on their side had most of their dead in meat assaults and abandoned wounded soldiers.

This is simply not true. I’d be interested in hard evidence for the abandoned wounded soldiers part. You write like Ukrinform.

When Russians assaulted Ukrainian lines the ratio was often 6 to 1 in favour of Ukrainians in direct fire combat.

Goes both ways, I am sure. Any reasonable person should expect that. There are no supermen involved here on either side. Hence, it all averages out and the ratio provided suggests a different story. To note, I could argue that the ratio is even worse, but I didn’t and won’t because it is irrelevant and makes little difference.

Bakhmut is considered to be the bloodiest battle, or one of them, where Russia lost an epic amount of men, over 80% of whom were convicted criminals and less than 10% of the very capable troops. This was also the battle when “meat attacks” were born in the media. Glide bombs were not a factor either. See the numbers I cited above as far as the losses are concerned. Thee is no 1:6 and the like in the battles that matter, that involve large number of men. It is completely irrelevant if taking some individual tree line, Russians/Ukrainians sustain 6 casualties to 1, or 12 to 1, or 24 to 1. It has no effect on the overall war progress and attrition. Of course, importance of some tree lines cannot be overstated, but my point remains.

while Russian lost their best troops during the first three months of the war.

Ukriane lost their best in the months to follow, if that is where you are leaning. Not sure what the argument is here.

That's why it was a success beyond all expectations. It took 6 months for the Russians to recover 55% of the territory until Ukrainians voluntarily withdrew.

it wasn’t. Ukriane lost about 3,000-4,000 (more?) sq km of their territory as a result (ie this was a contributing factor), recovered about 50 sq km (or less?) in the recent counterattacks, and lost the 1,000 sq km or whatever it was they controlled in Kursk. Math is simple.

IMO they could have stayed another 6 months had they wanted but that would have required too much resources.

They couldn’t. This is clear as a nice sunny day. I mean they could stay and get killed, but I do not think that is your argument.

They already stayed well beyond reasonable time.

This is key though. The only way for this whole thing to make any sense was to get in, cause the most significant damage they could, take the cherished PoWs (irrelevant in the big picture) and leave.

Only int he last 3 months, Russians started to regain advantage thanks to redeployment of more capable troops from inside Russia and the Zaparozhia region and also thanks to North Koreans. That N-K soldiers had to be called for help was in itself a success on top of the success. It added international humiliation to Putin and his army. And an humiliation for Kim Jun Un too.

Russians have been chipping away at the salient for months, not the past three months. It all matters. Avdiivka didn't just randomly fall… wait for it… because of the pipe adventures by the Russians.

I doubt anyone cares about the “humiliation” and embarrassment you always talk about. It has no relevance.

North Koreans weren’t “called up for help”.

That Ukrainians have been defeated a few times during these six months is normal. You never have a 100% victory ratio.

Defeated a few times? 100% victory? We must be following different conflicts.

There were no real reason to attack the Kursk Oblast.

No, there was not. And it was a strategic failure.

use the units stationed near the border in a more active manner instead of letting them slowly eroded by Russian artillery fire

Except they pulled their best troops from all over the place, where they were urgently needed. They have not “employed” some passively stationed border guards. The results speak for themselves, as I already mentioned: thousands of sq km in lost territory that is highly unlikely to be recaptured/returned otherwise and thousands of dead most capable troops that are definitely not coming back; in addition to the millions of dollars spent on bonuses and KiA payments (if any payments were made, I have no idea), millions that the country does not have. This money could have been spent on attracting new recruits, for example, among gazillion other ways with better returns. To each their own though, as far as the success measurement goes.

I don't think that the number of Ukrainian POWs that the Russians caught recently is that important.

Of course not. Only what the Ukrainians took as prisoners is important because they can be used as a medium of exchange. Are the Ukrainian PoWs less valuable than their Russian counterparts? If it is just the numbers you are referring to, neither is relevant in the big picture.

I’d bet my socks it is way more than 20. Unless, of course, almost none surrendered and are killed instead. I mean think about the area that collapsed, the number of troops involved, the distance many of them have to travel to get back to the areas of control or even contested, etc. While there are no “thousands of troops being surrounded” or whatever the man said, but there are certainly pockets that contain plenty of soldiers that are unlikely to come back home unless they surrender and are later traded or returned due to some other agreement. This is pretty trivial, in my opinion.

 

[crest]

Soviet designs often shared a high degree of commonality even among vehicles that otherwise were very distinct. You can drop a BTR-82A (or any other BTR turret) into a BMP-1 or into any BTR, or into a BRDM-2, with basically no work. You can swap turrets between T-62s, 72s, 80s, and 90s. Russia operated a T-62 chassis with a T-90M turret for a period. You can swap tank roadwheels between almost all Soviet tank types. And older tanks can often be simpler, and therefore easier to get into working condition. But there's also a question of how many of them are still available, and if the parts are in production. The T-62 and T-54/55 situation is a good example. Russia made an effort to restart support for the T-62 family and production of spare parts in the 2000s. They were delivered to Syria and Libya as military aid. So when time came for mobilization efforts there were upgrade variants available (with one actually selected and implemented) and parts available. The T-54/55 family on the other hand doesn't share this benefit, and more of that fleet went into scrap metal. There's also the question of throwing a T-80B into the front lines with no work done other then basic repairs, vs saving it and turning it into a T-80BVM, essentially a modern MBT as far as this war is concerned anyway. Same with the in-storage T-72 fleet. We saw almost no T-72Bs pulled from storage and just sent to the front. In fact that's the variant that disappeared from Russian service almost entirely. They were all used for B3 conversions. The T-80B fleet got the same treatment. So there's a question of whether the reactivation of older tanks was due to ease, or due to the more modern tanks being reserved for upgrading.

Said it better then I did, and to clarify when I said the only standerd is the can they used at the front standered I ment at these small and mobile facility's as I am primarily talking repair of battle damage something quite a bit different from a full repair facility.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

don't think Russia is as low on armour as you think, well it's true there has been more use of civilian transport it's also true in some areas it may be preferable, eg bad roads can handle a lighter vehicle better then an multi tonne one. I don't disagree that there is a shortage but I don't think it's that major of one. Russia still uses a large number of ifv in general. And notably I don't see them doing things like using captured m113s something the have a fair number of and in the case of a true armour shortage it would just make sense to be using them. To be honest that fact is kinda my personal "red flag" as far as all the talk about armour shortages. Kinda like frankensams are a sign of lack of air defence

Armor stocks have been a reliable indicator of losses throughout much of the war but recently it became irrelevant as Russia effectively exhausted its stockpile.

Now the main metric for loss ratios is artillery.

This is simply not true. I’d be interested in hard evidence for the abandoned wounded soldiers part. You write like Ukrinform.

Found this neat graph. Primary source is said to be a leak from an unnamed medical service in Russia.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1900967629340234029

Top graph: Recorded Russian suicides.

Bottom graph: Admitted casualties by severity. Green is light injuries. Yellow is moderate. Red is critical.

We can see that critical injuries are only a tiny fraction of admitted casualties throughout the entire war. This means they're just not admitted to medical care. So either they're abandoned, or they don't make it in time until they're stabilized.
We can also see an increasing number of suicides occurring, probably as they realize none will come rescue them.

A recently increasing share of moderate injuries and reduction of light injuries means there are probably more injuries overall and that soldiers with light injuries are turned down more often. Which isn't a good thing because light injuries can sometimes quickly develop to life threatening ones.

 

[crest]

Armor stocks have been a reliable indicator of losses throughout much of the war but recently it became irrelevant as Russia effectively exhausted its stockpile.

Now the main metric for loss ratios is artillery.



Found this neat graph. Primary source is said to be a leak from an unnamed medical service in Russia.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1900967629340234029

Top graph: Recorded Russian suicides.

Bottom graph: Admitted casualties by severity. Green is light injuries. Yellow is moderate. Red is critical.

We can see that critical injuries are only a tiny fraction of admitted casualties throughout the entire war. This means they're just not admitted to medical care. So either they're abandoned, or they don't make it in time until they're stabilized.
We can also see an increasing number of suicides occurring, probably as they realize none will come rescue them.

A recently increasing share of moderate injuries and reduction of light injuries means there are probably more injuries overall and that soldiers with light injuries are turned down more often. Which isn't a good thing because light injuries can sometimes quickly develop to life threatening ones.

I would argue that Russia hasn't effectively exhausted there armour stockpiles. Reduced yes but there is alot left, just because every push isn't a armoured Collum don't mean there out of armour. There is still plenty (multiple daily) of armoured pushes from Russia, and to be fair with a army several times larger the the one they started with one shouldn't expect the same armour density, as well as several other factors. I could be wrong but like I said you don't really see Russia getting desperate and putting m113s into service yet. This idea that Russia is out of armour has been going on for quite some time. A shortage is not necessarily a sign of absence but a combination of greater need and bottlenecks in getting serviceable units to needed areas + the effects of continued losses that because logistics is a thing cannot be immediately replaced. Between refurbishment of stockpiles and reclaiming battlefield losses Russia seems to be quite some distance from relying on new production to continue what is still a high tempo of armour usage.

Also artillery is the main metric for loss? I don't know what exactly you mean, if you mean the cause of casualties I agree if you mean there lose is the main metric for measuring material losses I'm not sure you can take any one system and say "the side that losses more of these is losing the war of attrition". With the exception of manpower but even that needs to take things like proportionality, total population, quality of the soldiers lost, ect into consideration.

A more reliable metric imop would actually be the tempo of use over a sustained period of time. Taken over the entire warspace not the density of any one section at any one time. Since new production numbers are far short of losses and the usage in real numbers is still high and continues to be so. I don't know how you can say the stockpiles are exhausted.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

I would argue that Russia hasn't effectively exhausted there armour stockpiles. Reduced yes but there is alot left, just because every push isn't a armoured Collum don't mean there out of armour. There is still plenty (multiple daily) of armoured pushes from Russia, and to be fair with a army several times larger the the one they started with one shouldn't expect the same armour density, as well as several other factors. I could be wrong but like I said you don't really see Russia getting desperate and putting m113s into service yet. This idea that Russia is out of armour has been going on for quite some time. A shortage is not necessarily a sign of absence but a combination of greater need and bottlenecks in getting serviceable units to needed areas + the effects of continued losses that because logistics is a thing cannot be immediately replaced. Between refurbishment of stockpiles and reclaiming battlefield losses Russia seems to be quite some distance from relying on new production to continue what is still a high tempo of armour usage.

You're dismissing several factors:

1. Drop in armor quality - AFVs become increasingly older.
2. Drop in share of armor in assaults - Golf carts, motorbikes, scooters, civilian cars, and even just on foot, have all become much more common while even basic APCs have become quite rare.
3. Commitments outside Ukraine - Russia must also secure the world's longest border. Current situation may leave significant border areas with no armor to speak of. Russia needs thousands of modern MBTs just to defend its borders with NATO and China.

Also artillery is the main metric for loss? I don't know what exactly you mean, if you mean the cause of casualties I agree if you mean there lose is the main metric for measuring material losses I'm not sure you can take any one system and say "the side that losses more of these is losing the war of attrition". With the exception of manpower but even that needs to take things like proportionality, total population, quality of the soldiers lost, ect into consideration.

I mean the ratio of losses of howitzers and MRLs. These are still very much dominant.
Once these are gone too, we'll have to look at other factors.

 

[rsemmes]

...is said to be a leak from an unnamed medical service in Russia.

You have one anecdote and you draw a conclusion? We have already been reading (RUSI) about the difficulty of removing WIA from the frontline (Ukrainians in Kursk, do you have an anecdote for them?), we don't see helo-medevacs in the battlefield. Yes, the conclusion is that a lot of those "critical" die because there is no/before evacuation, for both sides.
Maybe, (another possible conclusion) is that those lightly injured are treated within their unit, for the same reason. (I do agree, been wounded is not a good thing, even if I haven't try it.)

...AFVs become increasingly older.
Yes, Leo1 is not the latest model (of MBT.)

...even basic APCs have become quite rare.
I haven't seen those statistics. In 2024 90% of videos had more than 3 APCs and now only 10% of them? There are less for both sides or only for Russia?

Russia needs thousands of modern MBTs just to defend its borders with NATO.
Are we planning to invade NATO?

Yes, the Russian Army is in Russia, not in this war; that would be a big pool of equipment to be used while being replaced from (slow) new production. (Unlike the 100 Challenger UK is getting every month; for the planned invasion of Russia.)

 

[Big_Zucchini]

You have one anecdote and you draw a conclusion? We have already been reading (RUSI) about the difficulty of removing WIA from the frontline (Ukrainians in Kursk, do you have an anecdote for them?), we don't see helo-medevacs in the battlefield. Yes, the conclusion is that a lot of those "critical" die because there is no/before evacuation, for both sides.
Maybe, (another possible conclusion) is that those lightly injured are treated within their unit, for the same reason. (I do agree, been wounded is not a good thing, even if I haven't try it.)

It's not an anecdote. The source is named, I just don't have the time digging up a month of posts because the author forgot to link the reference.
If you're already aware about the difficulty of evacuating wounded, then you agree with my argument that Russia in fact leaves a lot of critically wounded soldiers behind.

...AFVs become increasingly older.
Yes, Leo1 is not the latest model (of MBT.)

I was talking about Russian AFVs.

...even basic APCs have become quite rare.
I haven't seen those statistics. In 2024 90% of videos had more than 3 APCs and now only 10% of them? There are less for both sides or only for Russia?

Your first question makes no sense.
There is less for both sides but by far more so for Russia as Russia has been on the offensive for a very long time and Ukraine committed to very few offensives throughout this war.

Russia needs thousands of modern MBTs just to defend its borders with NATO.
Are we planning to invade NATO?

No. But Russia perhaps, although that is not relevant for that argument.

Yes, the Russian Army is in Russia, not in this war; that would be a big pool of equipment to be used while being replaced from (slow) new production. (Unlike the 100 Challenger UK is getting every month; for the planned invasion of Russia.)

I don't understand this paragraph.

 

[rsemmes]

you agree with my argument that Russia in fact leaves a lot of critically wounded soldiers behind.

It is an anecdote because it is one example. Out of how many medical services, the same trend in all of them, any other factor to consider, any other possible conclusion?
Yes, RUSI and me, we agree that Ukraine does that; your "a lot" would be a different matter.
I did notice that you talk only of Russia, but, as two sides are fighting and both take casualties, the ratio could be getting better for Russia. Does Ukraine use APCs to rotate troops? That would be safer.
Drawing conclusions from a limited number of edited videos makes sense to you? Is there a trend, for both sides? Yes. Your "quite rare" means what exactly? Nine out of the ten videos you see? Maybe is just your (biased?) impression.
It is relevant about the number of tanks needed along the borders.
Same relevance, the number of tanks (and everything else, like Fredled said, every single howitzer and every single aircraft) that could go to the front.

 

[crest]

You're dismissing several factors:

1. Drop in armor quality - AFVs become increasingly older.
2. Drop in share of armor in assaults - Golf carts, motorbikes, scooters, civilian cars, and even just on foot, have all become much more common while even basic APCs have become quite rare.
3. Commitments outside Ukraine - Russia must also secure the world's longest border. Current situation may leave significant border areas with no armor to speak of. Russia needs thousands of modern MBTs just to defend its borders with NATO and China.

I mean the ratio of losses of howitzers and MRLs. These are still very much dominant.
Once these are gone too, we'll have to look at other factors.

1. Well of course the average age is increasing as I said new production does not exceed attrition itself. Also factor in the overall increase in need for a army much larger and you would expect a rise in age as the surpluses needed is drawn from reserve and refurbished stockpiles
2. The drop in armoured assault size has many factors, armour densities have shrunk to compensate for a larger overall army and quite frankly the atv,motorbike ect is more of a change in tactics, a successful one I may add. Turns out in a drone environment it is often better to have seven men spread out on motorbikes then seven men in one transport. Terrain is also a issue in many places something less likely to get stuck is also a advantage so is the option to zip into a treeline for that matter.

Assault sizes have also shrunk from both sizes even as army sizes increased this is because large assaults unless spread over a wide front are not working. The trend has been to send smaller assaults in succession or different vectors. Single large formations tend now to turn around once the lead (e.w tank) get taken out, again this is a tactical lesson learned. Your not losing the war just because your not tossing 25 tanks and 50 ifvs at something. But you most likely will lose if you do keep doing that because it's a foolish thing to do. Hell even small convoys space out much more for the same reason

3. That's part of my point about a larger army...these things needed to be done before still need to be done. But on a bigger scale requiring even more equipment

The arrty point that sounds like just plain old attrition and again I don't see Russia having a lack of artillery. Not even close, would they like more? Has there ever been a army in action that said we want less artillery?
As far as I can tell gun for gun Russia is actually increasing its lead, tho to be fair Ukraine's ammo shortage has been sorted out. If anything it's the problem of running low on the big guns.

These pockets and salients have been very unhealthy for artillery systems especially the towed variety as is generally the case for retreats even fighting ones. In this war it's especially dangerous as drones absolutely shred the old idea of rear echelon safety, yes that goes both ways but Ukraine has long lost its drone advantage over Russia. They may be more innovative in it but Russian production gives them far more drone saturation plus the fiberoptic advantage arguably the e.w advantage is solidly in there favour. Add in the airpower advantge there much more numerous counter battery systems.. anyways I'm getting off point here. the point is there is many more factors to attritional war then just losses especially if you only look at one system in isolation. And not even in relation to the other side

 

[seaspear]

I cant help but think if Russia had spent money keeping a high degree of their vast amounts of old tanks and other equipment protected and in good order they could of mobilised hundreds a week in overwhelming numbers instead of just matching losses

 

[crest]

I cant help but think if Russia had spent money keeping a high degree of their vast amounts of old tanks and other equipment protected and in good order they could of mobilised hundreds a week in overwhelming numbers instead of just matching losses

I think trying to do that was a large factor in the bankruptcy of the u.s.s.r

 

[Fredled]

Ukriane lost about 3,000-4,000 (more?) sq km of their territory as a result

This is your interpretation. My interpretation is that without the Kursk invasion, Ukrainians would have lost an additional 14000 sq km because Russians would have been able to send more troops to the Donbas and would have had enough troops in the Zaporyzhia region to launch attacks there.
So if my calculation is correct: 14000 - 4000 = 10000. They saved 10K sq km. <==
In the last weeks Russians had 60K troops stuck in this area. And not ont only ground troops: Russians also used massive amount of air power and drones which they couldn't use elsewhere.

the “significantly higher Russian losses”. It is pretty clear (at least to me) that this is not the case, not in general and Kursk in particular.

Because you are looking at the last vehicle loss count where Ukrainians loss more vehicles than usual. This is explained because in the last 4 months, most of the Russian assaults were not mechanised, or only very lightly with quads and motor bikes which are not included in the count. Either because armoured vehicles were not available or because they were immediately destroyed before arrival. And this is true for the entire front. Whereas Ukrainian movements were almost exclusively mechanised.

Also, you will notice that the vehicles lost by the Ukrainians in the last 7 days were old soviet BMPs and T64, light vehicles, and one Abram, one Bradley and a Bushmaster here and there. It's strange because I thought that most of the vehicles used by the Ukrainians in this region was NATO types. It indicates that Ukrainians had removed their best equipment first and left behind what was obsolete or ready to break down.

Bakhmut is considered to be the bloodiest battle, or one of them, where Russia lost an epic amount of men, over 80% of whom were convicted criminals and less than 10% of the very capable troops. This was also the battle when “meat attacks” were born in the media. Glide bombs were not a factor either.

In Bakhmut, Russian had crushing numerical advantage with artillery. Glide bombs were used more massively later when Russians realised that they had wasted most of their shells.

North Koreans weren’t “called up for help”.

So what did they do in the Kursk region? And maybe Norht Korean rockets and shells too, were not delivered as help, but to be displayed at a show room. Huh?

They have not “employed” some passively stationed border guards.

Part of the Ukrainian army was stationed in the Sumy region and under constant artillery fire from Russia. It's not like Russians didn't have important forces north of Sumy and that the border was controlled only by regular custom officers. There were real military forces there on both sides. Ukrainian forces in Sumy didn't move for two years before the Kursk invasion. They either joined the special force which invaded the Kursk region or could have been dispatched somewhere else, reinforing other parts of the border.

The Russians didn't have enough forces to invade the Sumy region at that time only to the extent that Ukrainians deployed enough forces to counter them. Before the Kursk invasion, Russians made daily attempts to enter Ukraine with small groups. Without enough forces deployed in the area, Russians would have invaded.

In short, from your last two posts, Sudzha has been another great Ukrainian victory

Yes, because the Russians never succeeded in retaking Sudzha. Ukrainians left Sudzha because Trump asked them to.
When Russians entered Sudzha, Ukrainians had already left. Only a small rear guard stayed in the south of the town. Russian almost didn't fight against Ukriainian soldiers. They only bombed remotely the last retreating convoys.

The situation is of course very difficult for the Ukrainians now because Russians have attacked their retreat with full force. It doesn't mean that they didn't have a victory in Sudzha.

Ukrainians would have left Sudzha anyway, but much later and with less losses if not pressed by the cut in military aid. It's Donald Trump who liberated Sudzha. Not Putin.

I don't think Russia is as low on armour as you think, well it's true there has been more use of civilian transport it's also true in some areas it may be preferable, eg bad roads can handle a lighter vehicle better then an multi tonne one. I don't disagree that there is a shortage but I don't think it's that major of one. Russia still uses a large number of ifv in general. And notably I don't see them doing things like using captured m113s something the have a fair number of and in the case of a true armour shortage it would just make sense to be using them. To be honest that fact is kinda my personal "red flag" as far as all the talk about armour shortages. Kinda like frankensams are a sign of lack of air defence

I agree. I have read that Russians are not using armoured vehicles in assault as often as before but still use them for resupply. Not because the terrain is not good. They were using them when the terrain was bad before. But because they are being destroyed too quickely.
Of course they still have a lot of them, and they are able to repair many of them. But there are clear signs that it's not as widely available to them as before.

I cant help but think if Russia had spent money keeping a high degree of their vast amounts of old tanks and other equipment protected and in good order they could of mobilised hundreds a week in overwhelming numbers instead of just matching losses

I think trying to do that was a large factor in the bankruptcy of the u.s.s.r

And doing it now will be a factor in the bankrupcy of the Russian Federation.

 

[Big_Zucchini]

I cant help but think if Russia had spent money keeping a high degree of their vast amounts of old tanks and other equipment protected and in good order they could of mobilised hundreds a week in overwhelming numbers instead of just matching losses

Higher AFV density is not necessarily proportional to mission success. That would depend a lot on how you plan your missions and according to what enemy profile.
A poorly executed assault may simply lead to more AFVs being available for a prepared enemy to destroy. In turn blocking routes, disorienting assaulting troops, and demoralizing them.
Russia criminally neglected its AFV fleet. But if they were given more time and limited money, the smartest investment would be in giving them CAS capability.
Old Soviet doctrine sought to make a maneuvering unit as effective as possible on its own, but also assumed aerial inferiority and thus forcing ground maneuvering units to be independent. Primary fire support would be delivered via multiple levels of artillery.
But no matter how much you improve your artillery game, aircraft are unbeatable in tonnage of instantaneously delivered fun.

Ukraine was not NATO though. Its ground army parity with Russia was coupled with a significant aerial inferiority. In both capacity and tech. Russia could easily develop the means to suppress Ukraine's air defenses (which unlike its airforce, were quite capable) and provide standoff strike capability to maneuvering troops. But it didn't. They thought they'd get an automatic victory.
By the time Russia learned and started making glide bombs, the war already went far off course for Russia. And shortly afterward, Ukraine already managed to drive down Russian standoff strikes significantly, while increasing its own output via new western munitions.

If Russia would:

1. Focus strategic munitions on air defenses in the opening stages of the war.
2. Come prepared with glide bombs.

It could very quickly dismantle Ukrainian fortifications built between 2014-2022, and significantly push out the safe areas for fortification. Overall resulting in significantly higher territorial gain.

I'll also add that in the early stages, the lack of: 1. An organized front, 2. Coherent Russian movement tactics, and 3. Ukrainian (relative) freedom of movement outside main roads... contributed to Ukraine capturing a disproportionate level of Russian equipment and AFVs.
A more modern and sizable Russian AFV fleet would likely simply result in a more modern and sizable Ukrainian AFV fleet within the first 6 months, giving Ukraine a 2nd wind for its early counter-offensives.

The arrty point that sounds like just plain old attrition and again I don't see Russia having a lack of artillery. Not even close, would they like more? Has there ever been a army in action that said we want less artillery?
As far as I can tell gun for gun Russia is actually increasing its lead, tho to be fair Ukraine's ammo shortage has been sorted out. If anything it's the problem of running low on the big guns.

Russia is burning through good barrels at an insanely high rate and certainly is nowhere near replacing them. Not just through attrition, but from day to day combat usage.
I couldn't find an old summary of artillery guns in Russian use, but generally there's a disproportionate number of types even for an army the size of Russia's.
Long 152mm supplies are rapidly declining. These are the 2S5 and 2S19 seen below. By the way the image is from CovertCabal's video from 6 months ago.
That's Russia's primary concern. These are Russia's 2nd longest range howitzers. Their utility in counter-battery is tremendously higher than any other type, together with the longer range 203mm 2S7.
As we can see, by mid 2024, within Russia's long term storage depots, 2S7 numbers dropped to only 1/3rd of pre-war numbers, indicating that by now they're borderline extinct. They weren't produced in large numbers to begin with.
And long barrel 152mm 2S5 were also cut in about half. 2S19 showed more survivability but also produced in low numbers.

Those that remain in larger numbers are 2S1 which is 122mm, and 2S3 which has a short barrel 152mm incapable of reaching distances relevant for counter-battery.
The rest are mortars.

Another point to be made about 2S1 - it uses a single piece shell, so range cannot be easily adjusted via charge bags, further compounding its inefficiency.

Here's the towed artillery video. Skip to the Excel chart if you like. But I'll summarize it by saying that the larger, longer range, more modern pieces were reduced to about a 1/3rd of pre-war numbers, and those that survived more are smaller, older, shorter ranged systems, and mortars.

I'll also add that these images are often several months old, so the actual depletion is higher than what can be presented.

The type of artillery I don't expect Russia to run out of is MRLs. Their tubes are easy to manufacture. But the munitions themselves aren't necessarily. I haven't found good data on ammo production, but if MRLs were okay 1:1 substitutes for howitzers, it'd be done a long time ago by everyone.

 

[rsemmes]

never succeeded in retaking Sudzha.

Kherson was the Greatest Russian Victory.

Your interpretation of facts is wilder than your imagination; and they go far beyond your "logic".
Where and when did Trump asked that, "Leave Sudzha"? Asked or told, like Boris (Johnson) about "peace"?
"...small rear guard, ...almost didn't fight" What AAR have you been comparing to which ones?
"They only bombed..." Not almost all of them in the last month?
"Ukrainians would have left Sudzha anyway..." Straight from the horse's mouth? So, Zelenski is confiding in you (asking for your advice too?) or are those his public statements, from the beginning?
BTW, can we play the same game with Zelenki's statements about the Kursk invasion than with Putin's statements about Ukraine's invasion?
"...by the cut in military aid." It's the world's fault... It's NATO's fault... It's Trump's fault... but Zelenski is a military genius who is fighting a war he cannot win. He is delusional, you just create a parallel universe where things are exactly what you want them to be.

 

[crest]

This is your interpretation. My interpretation is that without the Kursk invasion, Ukrainians would have lost an additional 14000 sq km because Russians would have been able to send more troops to the Donbas and would have had enough troops in the Zaporyzhia region to launch attacks there.
So if my calculation is correct: 14000 - 4000 = 10000. They saved 10K sq km. <==
In the last weeks Russians had 60K troops

That's math, that's science people

 

[crest]

Higher AFV density is not necessarily proportional to mission success. That would depend a lot on how you plan your missions and according to what enemy profile.
A poorly executed assault may simply lead to more AFVs being available for a prepared enemy to destroy. In turn blocking routes, disorienting assaulting troops, and demoralizing them.
Russia criminally neglected its AFV fleet. But if they were given more time and limited money, the smartest investment would be in giving them CAS capability.
Old Soviet doctrine sought to make a maneuvering unit as effective as possible on its own, but also assumed aerial inferiority and thus forcing ground maneuvering units to be independent. Primary fire support would be delivered via multiple levels of artillery.
But no matter how much you improve your artillery game, aircraft are unbeatable in tonnage of instantaneously delivered fun.

Ukraine was not NATO though. Its ground army parity with Russia was coupled with a significant aerial inferiority. In both capacity and tech. Russia could easily develop the means to suppress Ukraine's air defenses (which unlike its airforce, were quite capable) and provide standoff strike capability to maneuvering troops. But it didn't. They thought they'd get an automatic victory.
By the time Russia learned and started making glide bombs, the war already went far off course for Russia. And shortly afterward, Ukraine already managed to drive down Russian standoff strikes significantly, while increasing its own output via new western munitions.

If Russia would:

1. Focus strategic munitions on air defenses in the opening stages of the war.
2. Come prepared with glide bombs.

It could very quickly dismantle Ukrainian fortifications built between 2014-2022, and significantly push out the safe areas for fortification. Overall resulting in significantly higher territorial gain.

I'll also add that in the early stages, the lack of: 1. An organized front, 2. Coherent Russian movement tactics, and 3. Ukrainian (relative) freedom of movement outside main roads... contributed to Ukraine capturing a disproportionate level of Russian equipment and AFVs.
A more modern and sizable Russian AFV fleet would likely simply result in a more modern and sizable Ukrainian AFV fleet within the first 6 months, giving Ukraine a 2nd wind for its early counter-offensives.


Russia is burning through good barrels at an insanely high rate and certainly is nowhere near replacing them. Not just through attrition, but from day to day combat usage.
I couldn't find an old summary of artillery guns in Russian use, but generally there's a disproportionate number of types even for an army the size of Russia's.
Long 152mm supplies are rapidly declining. These are the 2S5 and 2S19 seen below. By the way the image is from CovertCabal's video from 6 months ago.
That's Russia's primary concern. These are Russia's 2nd longest range howitzers. Their utility in counter-battery is tremendously higher than any other type, together with the longer range 203mm 2S7.
As we can see, by mid 2024, within Russia's long term storage depots, 2S7 numbers dropped to only 1/3rd of pre-war numbers, indicating that by now they're borderline extinct. They weren't produced in large numbers to begin with.
And long barrel 152mm 2S5 were also cut in about half. 2S19 showed more survivability but also produced in low numbers.

Those that remain in larger numbers are 2S1 which is 122mm, and 2S3 which has a short barrel 152mm incapable of reaching distances relevant for counter-battery.
The rest are mortars.

Another point to be made about 2S1 - it uses a single piece shell, so range cannot be easily adjusted via charge bags, further compounding its inefficiency.
View attachment 52460

Here's the towed artillery video. Skip to the Excel chart if you like. But I'll summarize it by saying that the larger, longer range, more modern pieces were reduced to about a 1/3rd of pre-war numbers, and those that survived more are smaller, older, shorter ranged systems, and mortars.

I'll also add that these images are often several months old, so the actual depletion is higher than what can be presented.

The type of artillery I don't expect Russia to run out of is MRLs. Their tubes are easy to manufacture. But the munitions themselves aren't necessarily. I haven't found good data on ammo production, but if MRLs were okay 1:1 substitutes for howitzers, it'd be done a long time ago by everyone.

Thanks for the numbers on the barrels still looks like a decent amount in reserve to be honest, I do remember reading somewhere they have increased production tho I don't know how much. I also have a hunch that they can be outsourced somewhere like north Korea would have plenty and most likely produce them as well. Considering there Soviet equipment and if it's possible for a country to be more focused on artillery then the Soviet Union the only real candidate would be north Korea. I'm not going to look for numbers on it tho because well. Noone in the west is going to know and north Korea is going to say they have not just infinity of them but there also vastly improved and can do your taxes for you or something like that.

I just don't see Russia not having some kind of plan for arty barrels they put alot of effort into shell production they must be expecting to need and therefore use those shells. Also it's not like they seem to be making any efforts at conservation either

 

[Feanor]

Russia is burning through good barrels at an insanely high rate and certainly is nowhere near replacing them. Not just through attrition, but from day to day combat usage.
I couldn't find an old summary of artillery guns in Russian use, but generally there's a disproportionate number of types even for an army the size of Russia's.
Long 152mm supplies are rapidly declining. These are the 2S5 and 2S19 seen below. By the way the image is from CovertCabal's video from 6 months ago.
That's Russia's primary concern. These are Russia's 2nd longest range howitzers. Their utility in counter-battery is tremendously higher than any other type, together with the longer range 203mm 2S7.
As we can see, by mid 2024, within Russia's long term storage depots, 2S7 numbers dropped to only 1/3rd of pre-war numbers, indicating that by now they're borderline extinct. They weren't produced in large numbers to begin with.
And long barrel 152mm 2S5 were also cut in about half. 2S19 showed more survivability but also produced in low numbers.

Those that remain in larger numbers are 2S1 which is 122mm, and 2S3 which has a short barrel 152mm incapable of reaching distances relevant for counter-battery.
The rest are mortars.

Another point to be made about 2S1 - it uses a single piece shell, so range cannot be easily adjusted via charge bags, further compounding its inefficiency.
View attachment 52460

Here's the towed artillery video. Skip to the Excel chart if you like. But I'll summarize it by saying that the larger, longer range, more modern pieces were reduced to about a 1/3rd of pre-war numbers, and those that survived more are smaller, older, shorter ranged systems, and mortars.

I'll also add that these images are often several months old, so the actual depletion is higher than what can be presented.

I mostly concur, but would like to elaborate on a couple of points. Much of Ukraine's artillery also operates closer to the front, meaning you don't always need as much range for counter-battery work. Newer systems like the Caesars and PzH-2000s are relatively scarce. Also Russia relies heavily on the Lancet for counter-battery work. This is partly due to a lack of longer range system, but in my opinion the bigger factor there is that Russian artillery wasn't well trained for counter-battery work. Early in the war they didn't have to contend with modern western howitzers and yet they still didn't shut down Ukraine's artillery. Meaning the loss of longer-ranged systems might not be as impactful to their ability to do counter-battery ops. On a side note, modern western howitzers require modern western ammo to be utilized to their fullest. Recently we've seen PzH-2000s much closer to the front line then in the past, and some commentators have suggested that Ukraine isn't getting quite the same good ammo it used to. Copperhead instead of Excalibur is a good example.

The type of artillery I don't expect Russia to run out of is MRLs. Their tubes are easy to manufacture. But the munitions themselves aren't necessarily. I haven't found good data on ammo production, but if MRLs were okay 1:1 substitutes for howitzers, it'd be done a long time ago by everyone.

I disagree. I think there's a very real chance Russia will not be able to replace MRLS lost in combat, nor maintain the quantity of them that it had in proportion to infantry formations pre-war. The factory that produces them is in bad shape, and out of the 3 types Russia fields, only one (the 122mm Grad/Tornado-G) was being produced. The BM-27s were basically living out their life. They got a second breath with the new chassis, but this is a way to get older systems working again. Nobody is making new BM-27 launchers. The Tornado-S appears to be just an upgraded BM-30. And when I say that, I mean they're taking BM-30s in inventory and upgrading them. I don't see any scratch-built new systems. To be fair they're also not being lost in any substantial numbers, at least that I've seen. But in general we haven't seen large numbers of new Tornado-G. We've seen fewer and fewer shots of Russian Grad systems in action. It's possible this is largely a munitions shortage, many Grad shots we see have them firing half-packets or even less. But I suspect that being shorter ranged, poorly protected even compared to something like a 2S3, and being much harder to hide then a towed gun, they're being lost at a rate that far exceeds realistic production output.

Thanks for the numbers on the barrels still looks like a decent amount in reserve to be honest, I do remember reading somewhere they have increased production tho I don't know how much. I also have a hunch that they can be outsourced somewhere like north Korea would have plenty and most likely produce them as well. Considering there Soviet equipment and if it's possible for a country to be more focused on artillery then the Soviet Union the only real candidate would be north Korea. I'm not going to look for numbers on it tho because well. Noone in the west is going to know and north Korea is going to say they have not just infinity of them but there also vastly improved and can do your taxes for you or something like that.

I just don't see Russia not having some kind of plan for arty barrels they put slit of effort into shell production they must be expecting to need and therefore use those shells. Also it's not like they seem to be making any efforts at conservation either

Russia's lack of artillery production remains one of the mysteries, at least for me. Russia isn't booting up more production of the 2S19M2s. It appears they're just putting out the same ~2 btlns per year, maybe a little more. For context, a btln is just 18 cannons. If it's an issue of chassis, they could have put the 2S43 into large scale production. Voschina trucks are certainly not in short supply. They could also have rebooted towed gun production, in fact producing 2A36s in large numbers would have been a pretty good idea. But we don't see it. Even the new 2S44 Giatsint-K appears to have been cobbled together from an old Soviet Giatsint-B on the new truck. Maybe that's just the first batch and they intend to restart production, but I'm skeptical. And there doesn't seem to have been any particularly substantial effort to boost MRLS production.