Middle East Defence & Security

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
IDF Merkava tanks near Jenin, in yet another escalation of measures taken against local J&S terrorism, and magnitude and quality of terror activity.
2024 was a year of many firsts for Jenin. First use of drones, then of fighter aircraft, helicopters, APCs (instead of MRAPs and LAVs), and now MBTs.
It is however isolated to Jenin for now, which has been known as a hotspot for terrorist activity for decades already.
In 2002 Jenin was the center of Operation Defensive Shield. Not necessarily in its importance, but at least the difficulty of operations.
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A mega terror attack in central Israel was thwarted by sheer luck, several days ago. 5 buses were set to detonate at peak hour 9AM, but detonated prematurely due to incorrectly set timer. The potential for casualties was in the hundreds, and would have been the second largest terror attack in Israel's history, after October 7th. Unfortunately, the government disregards it, failing to judge the attack based on intent rather than result.
There have been no casualties, as the buses were empty and parked at the time of attack.
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Tens of thousands came to attend Hasan Nasrallah's funeral in Lebanon. There is no indication that Israel will use the opportunity, except for perhaps some symbolic measures.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
I don't know if this report is true. But it contains an interesting detail - the so called "Generals' Plan".
The Generals' Plan, aka Eyland Plan, is a maximum pressure strategy intended to force Hamas into releasing hostages by invoking every leverage point deemed critical to Hamas' survival.
It was reportedly considered several months ago, shortly after being publicly presented in September 2024. It was also reported at the time that Biden vetoed its implementation.

The general outline of the plan is to gradually go from north to south, evacuating a designated combat zone of civilians, designating it as a closed military zone and laying a siege that would be lifted only when Hamas terrorists in that zone surrender.
There have been other interpretations such as permanent annexation of parts of Gaza, particularly its northern sections, as well as a thicker buffer zone between Israel and Gaza, extending 1-2km deep.

Personally, I do not believe its implementation at the moment would be wise. The goal should IMO be the release of all hostages ASAP even for increased concessions, and then resumption of the war in full force, including the implementation of the plan, not as leverage, but as a strategic outline for a renewed offensive.
Otherwise, this may result in Hamas executing hostages to increase their leverage as well.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Opposition head Yair Lapid proposes a "complementary plan" to Trump's Gaza plan.
Egypt would assume control over Gaza for 15 years, including allowing Palestinians to move into Egypt, in exchange for the erasure of Egypt's current foreign debt of some $155 billion.

For only a $155 billion, crap deal. Double it and maybe it makes sense, sort of. Term should be generational, 25 years.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
For only a $155 billion, crap deal. Double it and maybe it makes sense, sort of. Term should be generational, 25 years.
Gazans would assimilate quite well in Egypt, actually. In a country of 115 million, they're barely a calculation error. A lot of them are Egyptians already, and if we are to believe that not all Gazans are Hamas, then ideologically they're really not far from the average Egyptian.
What Egypt is really desperate for, aside from political stability which is always in short supply, is some hard cash.

Still, I believe it's in the same category as Trump's idea - presented to drive others into action rather than be the plan itself.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Opposition head Yair Lapid proposes a "complementary plan" to Trump's Gaza plan.
Egypt would assume control over Gaza for 15 years, including allowing Palestinians to move into Egypt, in exchange for the erasure of Egypt's current foreign debt of some $155 billion.

For only a $155 billion, crap deal. Double it and maybe it makes sense, sort of. Term should be generational, 25 years.
If I was Egypt, there wouldn't be an amount of money you could pay me to take on the Gaza strip for any temporary length of time. Permanently and with the right to put military assets there as I please with no restrictions? It's my territory after all... maybe. Assimilate the Gazans completely, and have the ability to do mostly anything with the territory might be worth it.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
Egypt relinquish claim for Gaza at Camp David due to officially recognize the State of Palestine. In principe just like Jordan relinquish claim for West Bank also for State of Palestine. Thus taking back control of Gaza is not only matter absorbing back Gaza inhabitants but also means relinquish idea of State of Palestine. Something I doubt any Egyptian administrations wiling to do.

Even for 15 years it is on paper temporary but will raise question what will happen to State of Palestine after that 15 years period. Will Israel agree to give similar 15 years deal to Jordan taking control West Bank ? That could be workable for Arabs administration and especially the mood in Arab street, as they see it as transition period to the State of Palestine.

However if only Gaza with Egypt and if somehow both Egyptian administration and street accept it, I agree with @John Fedup it will take more than USD 155 Bio to make Egypt take care Gaza temporary or permanently.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Even for 15 years it is on paper temporary but will raise question what will happen to State of Palestine after that 15 years period. Will Israel agree to give similar 15 years deal to Jordan taking control West Bank ? That could be workable for Arabs administration and especially the mood in Arab street, as they see it as transition period to the State of Palestine.
I think the general intent is to depopulate Gaza as much as possible by giving them a way out, physically and legally (assimilation).
This could have several tiers of benefits for Israel.
If Gaza is completely depopulated, it could be later annexed and thus Israel's borders would be some 40km shorter, in turn vastly lowering the risk of a repeated October 7th-like attack. The recurring motive is IDF's manpower crisis.
If Gaza is only partially depopulated, some parts of it could be annexed thus giving some of the gains detailed above.
If Gaza returns to violent behavior toward Israel, a less populated Gaza could be more permissive for military action as civilian casualties would become less likely, and concrete structures (which require more and heavier munitions) will be fewer in number.

I do not endorse Lapid's plan. I think Israel should strive toward full evacuation, regardless of destination, and shouldn't reward Egypt that took barely minimal steps to foster peace, including unwillingness to deradicalize its population. It would only incentivize Egyptian hostility.

And oddly, despite me voting for Lapid and being firmly anti-Netanyahu, I agree with Netanyahu's stance more - DMZs across all borders, with cross-border presence, to reduce October 7th-like attack risks.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
3 things to understand regarding Israel's Syria policy:
  1. HTS only controls a minority of Syrian territory (population is another matter, territory is of its own significance).
  2. Israel has friendly relations with several factions in Syria.
  3. Turkey sponsors HTS, and is seen as a rising adversary of Israel.
  4. HTS is still an offshoot of ISIS and Al Qaeda. They don't moderate overnight, and now they have a state sponsor with access to modern weaponry.

What we can infer from this:
  1. Israel has an interest in maintaining an effective defensive posture in Syria as long as terrorists roam free.
  2. Friendly factions - Druze (south) and Kurds (north) can be exploited to limit Turkey's reach into Syria in exchange for military assistance.
  3. Israel needs to establish deterrence early on and facts on the ground before Syria stabilizes.

There is also, however, a conflicting interest. Middle eastern refugees, are affecting European politics against Israel. It is therefore in its interest that refugees return from Europe to Syria. However it is evident that it is of lower priority for Israel.

In the context of all this:

Yesterday Netanyahu stated that Israel will not accept Syrian state forces south of Damascus, essentially asking for a DMZ in Druze-controlled areas and areas adjacent to the Golan.
Israel also conducted airstrikes south of Damascus hours later.

One user proposed a Druze-Kurdish corridor. In red are Alawites, green Syria's central government, and in yellow are Druze in the south and Kurds in the north. Between them a fictional corridor.
I personally do not believe such corridor is tenable. There is no Druze nor Kurdish population there. It's empty desert, and as Syria's central government grows in power, so will the feasibility of such bridge diminish.
But HTS are not unreasonable. They may be able to reach a silent agreement with Israel like Assad did, wherein they agree to Druze and Kurdish autonomy and a land bridge between the two, in exchange for calm with Israel.
I remind Syria under Assad was a member of the axis and was hit hard by Israeli airstrikes since 2012, but in its final years it enjoyed calm with Israel as it prevented some IRGC activities near Israel's border.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
Lapid plan (as he talks) so far is the only offer from any Israel Politician that perhaps have some chances to be accepted by Arab street. Depopulation of Gaza by Jewish State will not be accepted by Arab Street, and the Arab Regime do listen to their street.

Trump already say he will not force the Arab, and Arabs leader already say they will not accepting any depopulation of Gaza.

Add:
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That Map of Syria basically modified map of French Mandate of Syria in 1922. I have been put this at this forum sometime ago. Seems more dividing Syria base on Tribal base again. Not sure giving Druze and Kurdish same state will be stable in long term, and giving Kurdish their own state will not going to be acceptable by Turkey. Turkey is getting bigger player in Syria whether Israel like it or not.
 
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Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
USAID apparently transferred over $2.1 to Gaza, of which 90% are believed to have been taken by Hamas. In the video, it's also explained that USAID funds have also been granted to other terrorist organizations like Hezbollah, Al Shabaab, Taliban, among others.
During Biden's term and until shutdown by the DOGE, many of the safety mechanisms were waived, and even without them it's clear that Hamas would get their hands on this money either way.
This is money that could have gone to help Israel and Ukraine, or toward fighting terrorism instead of propping it up.

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I wouldn’t be surprised if the reason Russia is able to stay in Syria is this “counterweight” to Israel (and other parties as well). It looks like this is all of a sudden beneficial to have the Russians present there, at least for now, pending further development, likely permanent (reasonably speaking). I am sure Israel doesn’t mind it either.
To that ^ point:

 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Syria:

HTS vs Druze clashes in Jaramana, suburb of Damascus. Jaramana is not a predominantly Druze area.

Israeli PM Netanyahu and MoD Katz have instructed the IDF to prepare to defend the Druze population in Jaramana. Syrians on the ground reported hearing jet sounds, but no explosions were reported.


Gaza:

42-day Phase 1 of the ceasefire has ended yesterday. While both sides are trying to negotiate the 2nd phase, they're also taking practical steps.
Israel has halted humanitarian aid entry into Gaza.

Israel reportedly asks to keep Russia in Syria as a counterweight to Turkey.


Israel:

Order of 40,000 GP bombs of 2,000lbs class, including unspecified quantities of penetrating and non-penetrating, and 4,000 of an unknown to me I-2000 type penetrating warhead. Worth up to $2 billion.
Or $50,000 per bomb alone.

Order of 5,000 GP bombs of 1,000lbs class, of which 4,800 penetrating and 200 non-penetrating. And 5,000 JDAM guidance kits. Worth up to $675 million.
Or $135,000 per complete JDAM unit.

Order of D9R and D9T armored bulldozers worth up to $295 million. These are most relevant to Gaza and J&S to clear obstacles, traps, and fortifications and rubble.

Notice that these are absolute maximum monetary values, which usually get lowered in negotiations and depending on types selected by Israel.


Analysis:
Israel wants balkanization of Syria.
Ideal situation:
  • 2 allies - Druze and Kurds.
  • Working relations with HTS.
Workable situation:
  • 2 neutral parties - Druze and Kurds.
  • Hostile relations with HTS.
  • Russia in Alawite territory.
Bad situation:
  • Hostile relations with HTS.
  • HTS controls all territory.
  • Turkey as sponsor.
This spectrum shows that for Israel there is a clear interest in a divided Syria, and that there is some logic behind Russia staying as a counterweight for Turkey. But itself is not ideal, and only makes sense if Israel is sufficiently certain Turkey intends to and is capable of entering Syria with enough influence and force.
Unlike the SAA, a new HTS army with Turkish backing would have access to much more modern weaponry, including ballistic missiles with high accuracy, cruise missiles, advanced air defenses, sensors, naval assets, etc.

Israel demanding a DMZ up to Damascus, supporting the Druze, active diplomacy to mitigate Turkish influence, controlling a new buffer zone, and strikes on HTS forces violating Israeli requests - is a proactive approach that signifies a tectonic shift in Israeli policymaking, which under Netanyahu for as long as he was in power, has been so far characterized as passive, reactionist, and modest in scope.

However in Gaza the policy is still that, and not the proactive push we see in Syria. Part of that is related to Hamas holding hostages and binding Israel's hands, but arguably Israel could be more aggressive in Gaza as well.
What Israel could do:
  1. Set a reality such that by default nothing comes into Gaza from Israel or Egypt unless specified in a hostage deal, or unless Gaza accepts a reparations program in which it covers Israeli war expenses and compensates victims of the war.

  2. Set Salah Al Din road and Wadi Gaza as the new Gaza-Israel border, and everything up to it will become a closed military area under IDF control, and annexed to Israel. This would reduce Israel's border with Gaza from 70km to 33km, enabling much more effective defense.


  3. Resume targeted eliminations unless a hostage-related temporary ceasefire is in effect.

  4. Ban construction of concrete structures and underground work. This to reduce strain on manned aircraft and lower expenditure of penetrating warheads.

  5. Initiate a ground maneuver into areas previously uncovered, including the entirety of Khan Younis and Mawasi. The Mawasi humanitarian zone can be relocated somewhere else along the coastline.
 

T.C.P

Well-Known Member
Syria:

HTS vs Druze clashes in Jaramana, suburb of Damascus. Jaramana is not a predominantly Druze area.

Israeli PM Netanyahu and MoD Katz have instructed the IDF to prepare to defend the Druze population in Jaramana. Syrians on the ground reported hearing jet sounds, but no explosions were reported.


Gaza:

42-day Phase 1 of the ceasefire has ended yesterday. While both sides are trying to negotiate the 2nd phase, they're also taking practical steps.
Israel has halted humanitarian aid entry into Gaza.

Israel reportedly asks to keep Russia in Syria as a counterweight to Turkey.


Israel:

Order of 40,000 GP bombs of 2,000lbs class, including unspecified quantities of penetrating and non-penetrating, and 4,000 of an unknown to me I-2000 type penetrating warhead. Worth up to $2 billion.
Or $50,000 per bomb alone.

Order of 5,000 GP bombs of 1,000lbs class, of which 4,800 penetrating and 200 non-penetrating. And 5,000 JDAM guidance kits. Worth up to $675 million.
Or $135,000 per complete JDAM unit.

Order of D9R and D9T armored bulldozers worth up to $295 million. These are most relevant to Gaza and J&S to clear obstacles, traps, and fortifications and rubble.

Notice that these are absolute maximum monetary values, which usually get lowered in negotiations and depending on types selected by Israel.


Analysis:
Israel wants balkanization of Syria.
Ideal situation:
  • 2 allies - Druze and Kurds.
  • Working relations with HTS.
Workable situation:
  • 2 neutral parties - Druze and Kurds.
  • Hostile relations with HTS.
  • Russia in Alawite territory.
Bad situation:
  • Hostile relations with HTS.
  • HTS controls all territory.
  • Turkey as sponsor.
This spectrum shows that for Israel there is a clear interest in a divided Syria, and that there is some logic behind Russia staying as a counterweight for Turkey. But itself is not ideal, and only makes sense if Israel is sufficiently certain Turkey intends to and is capable of entering Syria with enough influence and force.
Unlike the SAA, a new HTS army with Turkish backing would have access to much more modern weaponry, including ballistic missiles with high accuracy, cruise missiles, advanced air defenses, sensors, naval assets, etc.

Israel demanding a DMZ up to Damascus, supporting the Druze, active diplomacy to mitigate Turkish influence, controlling a new buffer zone, and strikes on HTS forces violating Israeli requests - is a proactive approach that signifies a tectonic shift in Israeli policymaking, which under Netanyahu for as long as he was in power, has been so far characterized as passive, reactionist, and modest in scope.

However in Gaza the policy is still that, and not the proactive push we see in Syria. Part of that is related to Hamas holding hostages and binding Israel's hands, but arguably Israel could be more aggressive in Gaza as well.
What Israel could do:
  1. Set a reality such that by default nothing comes into Gaza from Israel or Egypt unless specified in a hostage deal, or unless Gaza accepts a reparations program in which it covers Israeli war expenses and compensates victims of the war.

  2. Set Salah Al Din road and Wadi Gaza as the new Gaza-Israel border, and everything up to it will become a closed military area under IDF control, and annexed to Israel. This would reduce Israel's border with Gaza from 70km to 33km, enabling much more effective defense.


  3. Resume targeted eliminations unless a hostage-related temporary ceasefire is in effect.

  4. Ban construction of concrete structures and underground work. This to reduce strain on manned aircraft and lower expenditure of penetrating warheads.

  5. Initiate a ground maneuver into areas previously uncovered, including the entirety of Khan Younis and Mawasi. The Mawasi humanitarian zone can be relocated somewhere else along the coastline.

Well the incident appears to be over and a major Druze leader has clearly stated that they do not support any Israeli intervention or parnition of Syria.

Kudos to the Druze!!
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member

Well the incident appears to be over and a major Druze leader has clearly stated that they do not support any Israeli intervention or parnition of Syria.

Kudos to the Druze!!
In Jaramana it's over but Druze were persecuted under Assad and still are under HTS.
Now HTS has a reason to make amends with the Druze. But Israel is also guided by the relations between its own Druze population and Syrian Druze, two communities that stay in contact and even trade (yes there was Israeli-Syrian trade).
The Israeli Druze demand increased support for Syrian Druze, and Israel's government's care for Israeli Druze concerns is a major factor in the Druze assimilation in Israel and service in the military.

The Druze have a good reason to publicly disavow ties with Israel to avoid being branded as traitors, but it's no secret there are and have been such ties for many years.

The Druze do not speak with Israel through flashy demonstrations, but through their channels with the Israeli Druze communities who are in close contact with the government.

EDIT: I also remind that Druze were persecuted for years in Idlib under HTS rule before Assad was overthrown.
 
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