Middle East Defence & Security

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Being a hypothetical, there is much unknown here. It's unprecedented. But I think it also misses an important context - when Israel negotiated peace with Syria back in the 2000's for example, one of the demands was no Iranian presence on Syrian soil. Likewise, Israel is highly likely to demand something similar of Lebanon in the current and following negotiations if they extend to peace talks.
So in any realistic case, such presence would in itself be in violation of the peace agreement.
I'll use Syria as an example once again. If Iran's military presence in Syria is used, for example, to rearm Hezbollah in Lebanon, then that could certainly be constructed as a military threat and violation of an agreement.
In that case, Israel could, as in the Assad precedent, request Syria to remove Iran's presence on its own (with a deadline), or in the less likely case inform Syria that it will remove Iran's presence and de-conflict so that Israeli and Syrian military assets do not shoot at each other.

During ISIS's peak of popularity, its Sinai branch fired missiles at the Israeli city Eilat. Although a breach of the peace agreement, it did not break down, and Israel and Egypt coordinated to remove the threat, including with Israeli airstrikes on Egyptian soil and deconfliction with Egyptian forces.
Again interesting aside but it doesn't address the argument I'm making.

What time period are you referring to? I can only assume you mean the IAI Searcher (Forpost) sale to Russia, which at the time was dwarfed by other western arms sales to Russia, including an entire French Mistral LHD whose sale was only cancelled at the last moment. Israel was not the exception back then. West-Russia relations were much less hostile back then.
In the mid-'00s Russia didn't sell Iskanders to Syria on Israeli request. After the events of '14, Israel didn't sell tech to Ukraine on Russia's request. Post '14 Israel continued to not only sell UAVs to Russia but Elbit system had set up shop in the Urals to work at the Ural Civil Aviation Plant to produce the Forpost-RU, the very same that's currently bombing Ukrainian forces near Sudzha. That joint cooperation started around 2011, but continued well beyond '14 and iirc sometime around '18 they were still doing it. Do you know when they stopped? I sure don't.

Yes, actually.
Israel and Iran were also mutually hostile post-revolution, yet they cooperated against the Iraqi nuclear program.
But the comparison with the USSR-USA is a bad one. USA-USSR were each other's main adversaries. For Israel, that would be Iran. Russia ceased to be a major adversary after the USSR collapsed, and even before that when peace with Egypt and Jordan was negotiated and Soviet/Russian presence at Israel's borders was reduced to just a fraction of the past.

A closer comparison would be the US preferring Iran take over a certain area from the USSR, as Iran was not nearly as important an adversary.
But another difference here is that the US is a superpower with global reach. Israel is not. Its resources are limited, and just defending its borders takes up significant treasure and manpower, far beyond what western nations would typically accept.
I don't believe Russia is any kind of adversary for Israel at this point. Russia and Israel deconflicted over Syria quickly and efficiently, and Israel went out of their way to cooperate with Russia. Russia on the other hand allowed Israel quite a bit of freedom in striking targets inside Syria without Russian interference, and limited Syrian IADS capabilities to minimize threats to Israel. Those are not the actions of adversaries. Consider Israel's public statements. Do they call Russia an adversary? It seems to me you want to have this idea of Axis vs Allies and put Israel on the "Allies" side so you push this idea but it doesn't line up with reality. Arguing that Alawite civilians shouldn't be protected because they're untrustworthy because Assad worked with Russia is hypocritical in the extreme.

Because, as I explained, there is no reason to get kinetic over things. Hostile actions are kept at a low. Israel sells arms to Europe. Russia sells arms to Israel's adversaries, including Hezbollah, and invests in political influence campaigns across the west, including in Israel.
It's not like Israel and Russia are neutral to one another. It's more hostile than friendly.
It's another way to say they're not adversaries. Just not friends either. It's not one or another.

Tell me, do you honestly believe the Alawites generally see Israel favorably and would accept an alliance?
This is an absurd question. If they don't favor such an alliance, they should be exterminated by jihadis?

What do you find wrong about this statement?
If you really can't figure that out, I don't think I can help you.

There are also clashes in Jenin between PA security forces, local terrorist orgs, and Hamas. All of them consider Israel an enemy, and all are terrorist organizations. So when they kill each other, just because there are civilians being murdered by them, it somehow makes the local civilian populations view Israel favorably? No. It won't.
Who cares how they view Israel? What does this have to do with the statement I made?

My first response in the forum (I wrote much more on Twitter) on the subject was:
"I hate the IRGC and Assadists as much as everyone else, but this brutality is meant to signal to us that they're (HTS) just Assadists 2.0.
Like I said on the day it happened (HTS revolution) - I'm happy for the Syrians who feel like they've been liberated, and at the same time Jolani is still the ISIS longbeard he always was. "

In a wider look at the region, Alawites have multiple options to choose from as protectors, and given sentiment toward Israel in the region - Israel is an unlikely option. Is that a wrong assessment?
Alawites have no choices whatsoever. They live under an authoritarian regime in a semi-failed state.

If so, why do you believe Alawites would prefer Israeli support over Russian, Iranian, or Turkish?
Who said anything about Israeli support? Other then you of course...

Israel is not the middle east's police. Nor is it anyone's cultural parent.
It doesn't have the resources to intervene on everyone's behalf. One tribe massacring another is called "ethnic cleansing" in the west, and "Monday" in the middle east.
It intervened in Druze and Kurds' favor because they've proven valuable allies in the past.
If the EU and US decided they want Israel to take up that role and finance the relevant expenses - I'm all for it. Really. But when our own security challenges take budgetary precedent, I don't see that happening. I certainly don't see the EU supporting Israel in such an endeavor, especially with their unique interests in Syria.
This thread isn't called "Israel and Israeli business". It's called Middle East Defence & Security. I regard the murder of Alawite civilians in particular, and mass murder of civilians of any kind in general, to be reprehensible, and would like to see some actions taken to address it by the gaggle of counrties that have all stuck their grubby hands into Syria over the past 15 years. They all bear some portion of responsibility. I don't know why you assume I'm calling for Israel to form a military alliance with some sort of Assadist Alawite movement. You seem to be responding to something other than what I wrote. So far the only country that has done something to assist the civilians is Russia, but not because they wanted to. They got no choice when throngs of civilians turned up at the base. It's not like the Russian base is set up for riot control. They get very little credit for that. Everyone else gets less.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
That's a great explanation for why Israel wants to act outside current international law. I'm not unaware of this. It changes nothing about my argument.
Maybe there are good reasons to act outside the framework of international law. I'd say any nation should prioritize its own security over international laws and norms. But I also have yet to meet a case where Israel had to act outside international law to achieve its goals. Hence my belief these are sufficiently comprehensive and enabling.


I believe they never signed a peace treaty from the last war so it's not just a de facto state of war, it's a de jure state of war.
Correct. That was a big part of my case. I did mention a de facto state of war because not always a de jure one is sufficient. At least as explained to me once by an actual lawyer. Because like in many national legal systems, there too "reasonableness" is commonly used.

Of course they're not just done for their own sake. They're done for a purpose. But they don't stop being violations. Law is only law when it's obeyed even to your detriment. If that sounds illogical, think about it. If a law is something you only follow when it suits you, it isn't law.
There is no law that prohibits Israel from operating, at the moment, over Syrian and Lebanese airspace.
This will change however if both agree a comprehensive peace treaty with Israel.
Quoting the UN charter is irrelevant because you made it in reference to Syria, with whom, as you said, there is a de jure state of war.

Too literally? You keep making maximalist claims then walking them back. Have you tried writing what you actually mean? There is nothing unusual about two countries having bad relations but being at peace. Israel prefers a grey area where they don't have to respect the sovereignty of their neighbors.
Can you provide an example of such country in the grey area? One willing and able to make peace with Israel but refused by Israel, only to permit military operations?


Ok so first you write that hosting Iranian bases means you're at war with Israel. Now you're writing that it doesn't mean that. Can you figure out what your position is?
I actually wrote quite a lot about it in my 2 comments. I suggest reading them through instead of picking quotes.
The problem here is that you insist on prioritizing technicalities, and I prioritize practicalities.

To repeat briefly:
("Country at peace with Israel" = Country that was de facto at war with Israel, then made peace)

De facto:
No country currently at peace with Israel has hosted Iranian troops due to understanding it would risk reigniting conflict.

De jure:
As evident in the cases of Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza - Israel demands removal and banning of entities deemed hostile to Israel. If the process involves full peace, then Israel also demands robust mechanisms to ensure this. For Lebanon and Syria it includes Iran.
For Gaza it means Hamas as a starting point.


Vague context that has nothing to do with the fundamental argument I made. You're obfuscating
Perhaps, but it's crucial context. It essentially covers both de facto and de jure aspects, addresses the likely hypotheticals and reduces your proposed hypotheticals to some very unlikely and unprecedented scenarios.

When you say Iranian troops what do you mean? Is that your roundabout way to talk about Hezbollah?
Yes and no. In 2006 in Lebanon, there were 2 main armed forces fighting against Israel - Hezbollah, and IRGC.
While neither is part of the formal armed forces of Iran, they are both treated by the international community as such, as they are both integrated into the Iranian security apparatus and receive orders directly from Iranian state leadership.
Many other such organizations exist throughout the middle east, but none is fooled by that. We know on whose behalf they operate.

Absurd. The determination of a national army that some other sovereign state poses an imminent threat does not constitute a lawful reason for military action against them. Full stop. Any state that acts in this manner commits an illegal act of aggression.
I disagree. The concept of a pre-emptive strike is certainly one covered and permitted by international law.
This is one topic I do not know how to find the reference though. I only learned about it through listening to international law experts.

In the end, the assessment leading to pre-emptive strike stands the trial of legitimacy. Allies, enemies - all judge and respond accordingly. If there is at any point also an international court, then possibly that too. Even in the ICJ, which has since come under sanctions for excessive bias, Israel was found not guilty of accusations of misconduct of all forms.

In the mid-'00s Russia didn't sell Iskanders to Syria on Israeli request. After the events of '14, Israel didn't sell tech to Ukraine on Russia's request. Post '14 Israel continued to not only sell UAVs to Russia but Elbit system had set up shop in the Urals to work at the Ural Civil Aviation Plant to produce the Forpost-RU, the very same that's currently bombing Ukrainian forces near Sudzha. That joint cooperation started around 2011, but continued well beyond '14 and iirc sometime around '18 they were still doing it. Do you know when they stopped? I sure don't.
I don't know the specifics about the Forpost project, but I know that as of 2022 when last I checked, the Israeli MoD automatically rejects defense export licenses to Russia and puts severe restrictions on travel to Russia by anyone serving in the military or with security clearance (minimal requirement to work in defense industry).
The Forpost seems to be the exception, rather than the rule. I'm sure if it was anything substantial, it was raised by Israel's allies. But the Forpost itself is something IAI insisted on from the start that is an obsolete aircraft.
Yes, Russia limited the quality of arms sold to Syria, Iran, and proxies. But it sold these in large quantities nonetheless. Mutually limiting capacity of arms trade to each other's enemies is not friendship. That's just lowering the flames.
By all means, Israel cannot treat Russia as a positive actor unless it is to stop a greater evil. In this case, Turkey.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
don't believe Russia is any kind of adversary for Israel at this point. Russia and Israel deconflicted over Syria quickly and efficiently, and Israel went out of their way to cooperate with Russia. Russia on the other hand allowed Israel quite a bit of freedom in striking targets inside Syria without Russian interference, and limited Syrian IADS capabilities to minimize threats to Israel. Those are not the actions of adversaries. Consider Israel's public statements. Do they call Russia an adversary? It seems to me you want to have this idea of Axis vs Allies and put Israel on the "Allies" side so you push this idea but it doesn't line up with reality.
You keep confusing low intensity with the absence of it.

Arguing that Alawite civilians shouldn't be protected because they're untrustworthy because Assad worked with Russia is hypocritical in the extreme.
I never made that argument. I'm sure neither did you. So what's the relevance of this?

This is an absurd question. If they don't favor such an alliance, they should be exterminated by jihadis?
If they don't accept and negotiate for the protection of any of the above mentioned nations, then I wouldn't rate their liberties high on the survivability scale.

If you really can't figure that out, I don't think I can help you.
So do you not know or do you not want to tell?

Who cares how they view Israel? What does this have to do with the statement I made?
It has a lot to do. How they view Israel greatly affects whether they would ask Israeli support against HTS, which in turn greatly affects whether they would receive it.

Alawites have no choices whatsoever. They live under an authoritarian regime in a semi-failed state.
If they have no choice, they have no agency. If they have no agency, they have no business pretending to and seek military alliances.
If they seek military alliances, they have agency and therefore have choice.

Who said anything about Israeli support? Other then you of course...
Then why are you here making claims about me somehow supporting HTS's attacks on them, and criticizing Israel for not supporting them?

This thread isn't called "Israel and Israeli business". It's called Middle East Defence & Security. I regard the murder of Alawite civilians in particular, and mass murder of civilians of any kind in general, to be reprehensible, and would like to see some actions taken to address it by the gaggle of counrties that have all stuck their grubby hands into Syria over the past 15 years. They all bear some portion of responsibility. I don't know why you assume I'm calling for Israel to form a military alliance with some sort of Assadist Alawite movement. You seem to be responding to something other than what I wrote. So far the only country that has done something to assist the civilians is Russia, but not because they wanted to. They got no choice when throngs of civilians turned up at the base. It's not like the Russian base is set up for riot control. They get very little credit for that. Everyone else gets less.
The whole argument about Alawites started from you quoting a comment I made about Israel's opportunity to offer protection to the Alawites similar to how it offered to the Druze and Kurds.
That comment was also part of a series of comments on how the Alawites could go about forming relations and seeking the protection of either Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
There is no law that prohibits Israel from operating, at the moment, over Syrian and Lebanese airspace.
This will change however if both agree a comprehensive peace treaty with Israel.
Quoting the UN charter is irrelevant because you made it in reference to Syria, with whom, as you said, there is a de jure state of war.
I think we've wandered pretty far afield, so let me bring this back to what I was saying. I believe Israel prefers to have the ability to operate in the airspace (and not just airspace) of neighboring states rather than having firm nation-state entities that may or may not be friendly.

Can you provide an example of such country in the grey area? One willing and able to make peace with Israel but refused by Israel, only to permit military operations?
Gaza comes to mind. Israeli operations in Lebanon come to mind.

I actually wrote quite a lot about it in my 2 comments. I suggest reading them through instead of picking quotes.
The problem here is that you insist on prioritizing technicalities, and I prioritize practicalities.
I answered all your comments until this one line by line.

To repeat briefly:
("Country at peace with Israel" = Country that was de facto at war with Israel, then made peace)

De facto:
No country currently at peace with Israel has hosted Iranian troops due to understanding it would risk reigniting conflict.
Just to be clear, are you walking back your earlier claim about any presence of Iranian forces constituting a state of war with Israel by the nation hosting them?

De jure:
As evident in the cases of Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza - Israel demands removal and banning of entities deemed hostile to Israel. If the process involves full peace, then Israel also demands robust mechanisms to ensure this. For Lebanon and Syria it includes Iran.
For Gaza it means Hamas as a starting point.
I think Gaza is a great example. Israel won't recognize them as a country but will pretend they aren't part of Israel either. That way you don't have to respect their sovereignty, control their foreign policy, but simultaneously disclaim responsibility for the population.

Perhaps, but it's crucial context. It essentially covers both de facto and de jure aspects, addresses the likely hypotheticals and reduces your proposed hypotheticals to some very unlikely and unprecedented scenarios.
When examining intentions and in this case what I outlined as something I consider a preference by Israel, hypotheticals are important because they let us test the limits of the concept.

Yes and no. In 2006 in Lebanon, there were 2 main armed forces fighting against Israel - Hezbollah, and IRGC.
While neither is part of the formal armed forces of Iran, they are both treated by the international community as such, as they are both integrated into the Iranian security apparatus and receive orders directly from Iranian state leadership.
Many other such organizations exist throughout the middle east, but none is fooled by that. We know on whose behalf they operate.
We will have to disagree here. I don't believe Hezbollah is part of the Iranian armed forces. I would agree the IRGC is, but I was not aware of their involvement in the 2006 war. Do you have any good materials on this?

I disagree. The concept of a pre-emptive strike is certainly one covered and permitted by international law.
This is one topic I do not know how to find the reference though. I only learned about it through listening to international law experts.
It was an idea proposed by Bush Jr but pretty much rejected by everyone. The pre-emptive strike doctrine is not covered by international law and a pre-emptive strike against another sovereign state based on a perceived threat would be illegal under the UN Charter. The fact that some experts and lawyers would argue otherwise says more about them.

In the end, the assessment leading to pre-emptive strike stands the trial of legitimacy. Allies, enemies - all judge and respond accordingly. If there is at any point also an international court, then possibly that too. Even in the ICJ, which has since come under sanctions for excessive bias, Israel was found not guilty of accusations of misconduct of all forms.
I strongly disagree. The idea that because nobody complains you're allowed to break the law is absurd.

I don't know the specifics about the Forpost project, but I know that as of 2022 when last I checked, the Israeli MoD automatically rejects defense export licenses to Russia and puts severe restrictions on travel to Russia by anyone serving in the military or with security clearance (minimal requirement to work in defense industry).
The Forpost seems to be the exception, rather than the rule. I'm sure if it was anything substantial, it was raised by Israel's allies. But the Forpost itself is something IAI insisted on from the start that is an obsolete aircraft.
Yes, Russia limited the quality of arms sold to Syria, Iran, and proxies. But it sold these in large quantities nonetheless. Mutually limiting capacity of arms trade to each other's enemies is not friendship. That's just lowering the flames.
By all means, Israel cannot treat Russia as a positive actor unless it is to stop a greater evil. In this case, Turkey.
It's the fact that it was a violation of US-led sanctions and iirc involved US technology that makes it particularly brazen. Also the fact that it went well beyond just a sale, but to joint cooperation and development. And let's not forget, this is what we see publicly. Consider that Israel is also still not willing to provide military aid to Ukraine. More Romanians weapons went to Ukraine then Israeli ones. There are many small indicators.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
You keep confusing low intensity with the absence of it.
So low we can't see it? It will be interesting to see if "hostile" Israel's prime minister attends the Victory Day parade in Moscow this May 9th. :rolleyes:

I never made that argument. I'm sure neither did you. So what's the relevance of this?
Ok, let's rewind. I wrote that Israel, among a list of others, shares some of the blame for the current situation in Syria. I then suggested that something ought to be done to protect Alawite civilians, pointing out that a logical way to do this would be for Russia to get agreement from Turkey and Israel, and step in, were it not for the war in Ukraine. You then promptly went off on a tangent about the trustworthiness of Alawites because of Assad, and how that means a military alliance with Israel would be impractical. What?

If they don't accept and negotiate for the protection of any of the above mentioned nations, then I wouldn't rate their liberties high on the survivability scale.
Who is the "they" here? We have an ethnic cleansing being conducted by a jihadi semi-state level actor against a population with only a weak set of local rebels to oppose it. Who are you trying to negotiate, or not negotiate, with?

So do you not know or do you not want to tell?
I was almost 100% sure I had been clear, but on the off chance I hadn't been, I re-read the thread carefully. I believe I was clear in what I was taking issue with. My issue is that you place the prevention of ethnic cleansing contingent on a political arrangement between Israel and the local population, where the existence of a prior authoritarian regime makes such agreement (to you) inherently problematic. In other words, because you find it politically unsuitable, your implied position is "let them die". Did I "tell" well enough here?

It has a lot to do. How they view Israel greatly affects whether they would ask Israeli support against HTS, which in turn greatly affects whether they would receive it.
Again, not sure why your default position is the exploration of some sort of Israeli military alliance with them. I don't know where you are getting this or why it matters.

If they have no choice, they have no agency. If they have no agency, they have no business pretending to and seek military alliances.
If they seek military alliances, they have agency and therefore have choice.
What are you talking about? Who is seeking a military alliance? One last time, this is about preventing an ethnic cleansing campaign against a civilian population with no real legitimate central political representation within a semi-failed state.

Then why are you here making claims about me somehow supporting HTS's attacks on them, and criticizing Israel for not supporting them?
I'm criticizing anyone and everyone who has been involved in Syria over the past ~15 years that isn't actively working to address this situation and prevent the murders. That includes Israel.

The whole argument about Alawites started from you quoting a comment I made about Israel's opportunity to offer protection to the Alawites similar to how it offered to the Druze and Kurds.
That comment was also part of a series of comments on how the Alawites could go about forming relations and seeking the protection of either Russia, Turkey, Iran, Israel.
Yes. All while under the rule of HTS with active murders ongoing. My criticism in this case would go to the idea that it's on the Alawites to form alliances to prevent this. I believe all the countries that had a hand in Syria have an obligation to at least make an effort to stop the killings.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
think we've wandered pretty far afield, so let me bring this back to what I was saying. I believe Israel prefers to have the ability to operate in the airspace (and not just airspace) of neighboring states rather than having firm nation-state entities that may or may not be friendly.
Yes but you never substantiated it and only ignored the substantial historical precedent suggesting otherwise.
No Arab nation can credibly militarily threaten Israel, certainly less so as time goes by. So why would Israel bother making peace with all its neighbors, in a way that negates its freedom of operation?
You made a claim against mountains of evidence so at least you should elaborate.


Gaza comes to mind. Israeli operations in Lebanon come to mind.
1. When have Gaza and Lebanon ever been "willing and able" to make peace with Israel and when has Israel refused such offer?
Emphasis Gaza, world record holder in "kill every Jew but somehow still exist" category.
2. Israel didn't operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah attacked Israel on October 8th, 2023. Israeli operations in Lebanon have come to a near halt and there is no active maneuver as per the ceasefire agreement. Israel and Lebanon are currently in further negotiations about remaining Israeli presence and in the longer term a normalization agreement.

So both examples are invalid from the start. On multiple levels.

Just to be clear, are you walking back your earlier claim about any presence of Iranian forces constituting a state of war with Israel by the nation hosting them?
No.

I think Gaza is a great example. Israel won't recognize them as a country but will pretend they aren't part of Israel either. That way you don't have to respect their sovereignty, control their foreign policy, but simultaneously disclaim responsibility for the population.
Statehood is practically meaningless. Gaza is also not a good example because I was referring specifically to a process of peace talks. The only reason I mentioned Gaza in the first place is because Israel is seeking the removal of established terrorist groups before any restoration project commences. That's not a peace process. That's a demilitarization process. Several crucial steps are missing til actual peace.

Your assertion also insinuates Israel somehow benefits from a state of war with Gaza. I do not see any argument supporting this. Freedom of operation in itself is near meaningless in territories not requiring operations.
Israel was always either proactive in offering peace or accepting of every such American initiative. Every former peace process with the Palestinians involved Israeli pledges of gradual withdrawal, often displacement of its own citizens, and cessation of military operations in territories.


When examining intentions and in this case what I outlined as something I consider a preference by Israel, hypotheticals are important because they let us test the limits of the concept.
Yes but you draw a conclusion simply because hypothetically it is possible, but disregard all the non-hypotheticals that contradict it.


We will have to disagree here. I don't believe Hezbollah is part of the Iranian armed forces. I would agree the IRGC is, but I was not aware of their involvement in the 2006 war. Do you have any good materials on this?
81 IRGC members were reportedly killed in Lebanon in 2006. This and the level of their involvement is reported mostly by Arab primary sources.
Briefly, they are alleged to have operated and assisted in operating Hezbollah's rocket artillery systems, primarily long range ones in the Beqaa valley, and strategic weapons like the AShM complex that hit Sa'ar 5 INS Hanit. 250-300 IRGC operatives were reportedly in Lebanon.
2006 was a different time. I could not find any visual evidence even in the generally scarce Lebanon war footage.

The primary source appears to be Ashark Alawsat. The reports were considered sufficiently credible to be quoted by Israeli think tanks even many years later.

[/URL]


It was an idea proposed by Bush Jr but pretty much rejected by everyone. The pre-emptive strike doctrine is not covered by international law and a pre-emptive strike against another sovereign state based on a perceived threat would be illegal under the UN Charter. The fact that some experts and lawyers would argue otherwise says more about them.
When several laws conflict, it's up to interpretation and mostly reasonableness.
A government is also mandated to ensure the safety of its people, to the best of its ability. An imminent threat, for example the launching of munitions or potentially a nuke into one's state, and non-prevention of that, would certainly violate this principle.

If it really was the case that preemptive strikes are not permitted, which I don't believe, then I'd say forget about int'l law until it becomes relevant again.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
I strongly disagree. The idea that because nobody complains you're allowed to break the law is absurd.
You conflate formalities with practicality. The actual capacity to complain to a higher authority and its capacity to pass judgment are very limited, such authority was only relatively recently established, and it's not even considered legitimate by the majority of the world.

What de facto serves as a control loop mechanism is how allies and enemies react.
Allies could range from full material and diplomatic support, to sanctions and military action (essentially turn from allies to enemies). Enemies could go nuts and they could also be neutral.
The topic of Israel has been manufactured into an inherently controversial one, and it becomes further reinforced with increasing muslim populations in the west and amplified typically by modern left wing parties. So the starting point is already shifted.

These things aren't only seen behind closed doors. Most of it is very public.

If we look at 2023-2025, Israel stood trial at the ICJ and was found not guilty. The ICJ's authority was subsequently severely reduced with some western nations rejecting orders, under the correct argument of ICJ overstepping their jurisdiction and making a mockery of justice.
Israel's allies took mostly symbolic actions to appease local anti-Israel voters, though at their own detriment ultimately. No real actions were made even by the most hostile western nations. And every arms supplier to Israel supported Israel to a large extent. No meaningful negative actions were made.

The reaction of other nations is currently the most effective way to gauge their approval or disapproval of a nation's actions.


It's the fact that it was a violation of US-led sanctions and iirc involved US technology that makes it particularly brazen. Also the fact that it went well beyond just a sale, but to joint cooperation and development. And let's not forget, this is what we see publicly. Consider that Israel is also still not willing to provide military aid to Ukraine. More Romanians weapons went to Ukraine then Israeli ones. There are many small indicators.
1. There is very little known about the Israeli involvement in Forpost. It violating sanctions is a bold and unfounded claim, as first an Israeli defense company wouldn't risk that. If it was somehow in violation, the US certainly didn't consider any involved Israeli company worthy of sanctions.

2. Israel does provide military aid to Ukraine. Your maximalist claim is unfounded. There are de facto Israeli weapons in Ukraine, including those sold to Ukraine as a first user.
In the Ukraine war thread I recently posted about Israeli company RADA's MHR radars being deployed.

3. Quantity is of little substance. Though I'd say in relative terms Israel did provide quite a lot. Israel's own expenditure of 4%-5% in peacetime is something no European country except Poland can match even when accounting for aid to Ukraine. All that money goes to fighting the axis, particularly Iran which is a party to the war in Ukraine.

Also being a country at war means Israel's capacity to aid Ukraine is much reduced.
First, because its own defense expenditure reached 10% last time I checked.

Second, because war materiel earmarked for export is sometimes pulled to assist the IDF directly. A high profile example is the cancellation of a deal to sell hundreds of Merkava 2 and 3 models.

Third, at the same time, Israeli defense industries prioritized Europe and delayed some deliveries to global customers while Europe's items were expedited. While at war, Israel's MIC supported European rearmament in overdrive, enabling countries to donate stuff they'd otherwise delay because replacements are overbooked.

Fourth, Israel through American help, accelerated withdrawal of equipment that was highly relevant to Ukraine, including its red squadrons entire stock of F-16s, and 8 Patriot batteries. The former likely used for parts, and the latter are being refurbished and upgraded as they were not upgraded in Israel for a while.


Ok, let's rewind. I wrote that Israel, among a list of others, shares some of the blame for the current situation in Syria. I then suggested that something ought to be done to protect Alawite civilians, pointing out that a logical way to do this would be for Russia to get agreement from Turkey and Israel, and step in, were it not for the war in Ukraine. You then promptly went off on a tangent about the trustworthiness of Alawites because of Assad, and how that means a military alliance with Israel would be impractical. What?
My comment about trustworthiness is unrelated to anything you said, but a continuation of my posts on the theme of Alawite options and potential Israeli opportunities.
Even if the Alawites begged Israel for help, the mentioned factors would certainly be taken into account when deciding if and how much to help.
After all, it's not trivial for Israel to start doing ISR sorties over north-west Syria. That requires diverting assets currently overflowing with tasks.


Who is the "they" here? We have an ethnic cleansing being conducted by a jihadi semi-state level actor against a population with only a weak set of local rebels to oppose it. Who are you trying to negotiate, or not negotiate, with?
Then they can form a coherent political group with single leadership to handle diplomacy.

My issue is that you place the prevention of ethnic cleansing contingent on a political arrangement between Israel and the local population, where the existence of a prior authoritarian regime makes such agreement (to you) inherently problematic. In other words, because you find it politically unsuitable, your implied position is "let them die". Did I "tell" well enough here?
I don't believe Israel should spend even more resources when its current commitments are crushing its economy.
Unless there is strategic gain to be made, or someone else is willing to fund it.
Let's not pretend that it was so one sided. While Alawite civilians are victims, it was Alawite gangs that initiated the current round of violence and themselves are responsible for some atrocities.
Such is the culture in the region. If a tribe gets the upper hand and kills all the other tribes, it will find divisions within its own and start killing again.

So Israel should not help those who do not seek friendly ties with it that transcend mere fear for their lives. Like shared values.
And it also shouldn't be educating people with dominantly barbaric culture that need to learn to stand on their own.

But if they choose to accept certain changes and to pledge to benefit Israel in exchange, then Israel should definitely be helping them.

However, there are 2 more important factors:

1. Israel is not the only candidate for sponsorship. Actually the least likely one.
2. As long as HTS butcher their own civilians (Any Syrians), Israel cannot trust them and will remain hostile to it.
3. As the Druze benefited from Israel's intervention, so do Alawites. The destruction of SAA's arsenal early on vastly reduced HTS's capacity for violence, and continued strikes this week further reinforce this.
As of yet, there is no sign of Israel targeting any major faction other than HTS, Palestinian groups (PIJ, Hamas), and various terror orgs close to Israel's border.


Again, not sure why your default position is the exploration of some sort of Israeli military alliance with them. I don't know where you are getting this or why it matters.
You directed this toward Israel. I mentioned higher likelihood of sponsorship from Russia, Iran, or Turkey.

I'm criticizing anyone and everyone who has been involved in Syria over the past ~15 years that isn't actively working to address this situation and prevent the murders. That includes Israel.
HTS has no access to Assad's arsenal. The playing field is more or less even now. Good luck, and you're welcome.


Yes. All while under the rule of HTS with active murders ongoing. My criticism in this case would go to the idea that it's on the Alawites to form alliances to prevent this. I believe all the countries that had a hand in Syria have an obligation to at least make an effort to stop the killings.
Those who do not wish to defend themselves, deserve none's protection.
If they wish to defend themselves, it becomes their responsibility to arrange that.

When people in my country were massacred, we didn't abandon everything and hoped the world would save us. None came. And everyone around us cheered, Sunnis and Alawites and Shi'ites and all. We started working. None owes us anything. None owes anyone anything.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
While I'm sure most perceive Trump's policies in Europe as dovish, some going as far as calling it appeasement; In MENA there are 2 clear indicators of hawkish policies:

1. Initiation of a strike campaign against Houthis.

Strikes against Houthis til now were rare and low intensity. Reduction of Tomahawk usage in favor of JDAMs is a welcome change, but also we're now seeing higher intensity.
It's not just about dismantling war materiel at a higher rate than Houthis rearm. But about ending their ability to threaten commercial shipping for the forseeable future. I don't know if this is a new goal, but the new trajectory is positive.

2. US is leading Gaza policy instead of Israel.
Although the ceasefire between Israel-Hamas has expired, the war hasn't restarted. Hamas is essentially getting a free ceasefire.
Israel could resume the fighting, but it is also possible the US is pressuring Israel not to, until it reaches a certain milestone in negotiations or an exodus plan.

There are reports of advancement in dialogue with Somalia and Somaliland, and Sudan.

EDIT:
Strikes in Yemen demonstrate that while Israel has capability to reach such distances, its ability to conduct a strike campaign efficiently is debatable. The US, however, brings that capability to the table.
This has ramifications on Iran. Israel can get the job done on limited tasks, but it could achieve much higher effectiveness if it enlists the US to help it.
 
Last edited:

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Gaza fighting resumed yesterday with airstrikes in Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon.

Gaza evacuation order map:
1742284810478.png


Reminder of where the IDF has already been.
Red - Operational control as of Feb 2025.
Orange - Operational control until ceasefire in Jan 2025.
Yellow - Full extent of maneuver so far.
gaza.jpg

Credible defense reporter claims CoGS Eyal Zamir authorized a much more aggressive operational plan than the one implemented between 2023-2025. Regarding both the ground and air components.


Airstrikes in Syria against remnants of SAA arsenal. Reportedly in Daraa, southern Syria. Daraa, I remind, is a contested area with partial control of rogue terrorist organizations that are deemed hostile to both HTS and Israel.


Syria (HTS) and Hezbollah are now reportedly in a state of active conflict. HTS fighters were filmed heading toward Lebanon and Syrian rocket artillery was also documented toward Shi'ite southern Lebanon.
This is a delicate situation for all sides, with Israel, Lebanon, Hezbollah, and HTS all standing to gain something and lose something from this situation and how one could pull things in their direction is not trivial at all.
HTS wants to kill Hezbollahns, but it has no interest in fighting the Lebanese Army.
The Lebanese Armed Forces want to gain legitimacy as Lebanon's defenders but have no interest in defending Hezbollah. To the contrary.
Hezbollah would much rather not be bombed by anyone at the moment, but they certainly don't mind the LAF taking the hit for them.
Israel would rather everyone be killed except the LAF which it needs to get stronger so it could prevent a second Hezbollah from rising in Lebanon.

Syrian rocket artillery firing into Lebanon.

Reportedly Lebanese Air Force bombing HTS targets.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Yes but you never substantiated it and only ignored the substantial historical precedent suggesting otherwise.
No Arab nation can credibly militarily threaten Israel, certainly less so as time goes by. So why would Israel bother making peace with all its neighbors, in a way that negates its freedom of operation?
You made a claim against mountains of evidence so at least you should elaborate.
You have literally just come full circle and made my original argument for me. Israel prefers not to make peace so as not to negate their freedom of operation.

1. When have Gaza and Lebanon ever been "willing and able" to make peace with Israel and when has Israel refused such offer?
Emphasis Gaza, world record holder in "kill every Jew but somehow still exist" category.
2. Israel didn't operate in Lebanon until Hezbollah attacked Israel on October 8th, 2023. Israeli operations in Lebanon have come to a near halt and there is no active maneuver as per the ceasefire agreement. Israel and Lebanon are currently in further negotiations about remaining Israeli presence and in the longer term a normalization agreement.

So both examples are invalid from the start. On multiple levels.
Justifications for behavior do not contradict the argument I'm making. Is it your position that Israel would like to be surrounded by stable nation-state entities in a formalized state of peace? Or is it your position that Israel wants to continue to have operational freedom?

We seem to be at an impasse. You are claiming two directly contradictory things at the same time. You are stating that any country that hosts Iranian military assets enters a state of war with Israel with no formal declaration necessary and automatically by virtue of hosting those assets. You then made many oblique statements whose sum pointed at this not being the case. So one last time - tomorrow Mexico hosts an Iranian military base. Israel goes to war with Mexico? A yes or no answer please. No more long-winded b.s. about Israeli foreign policy. This question is very simple and you're intentionally obfuscating it.

Statehood is practically meaningless.
Oh? So can we then get rid of Israeli statehood since it's so meaningless? This is simply not true and you know it. Israel fought long and hard to have its statehood. Statehood is certainly not meaningless.

Gaza is also not a good example because I was referring specifically to a process of peace talks. The only reason I mentioned Gaza in the first place is because Israel is seeking the removal of established terrorist groups before any restoration project commences. That's not a peace process. That's a demilitarization process. Several crucial steps are missing til actual peace.

Your assertion also insinuates Israel somehow benefits from a state of war with Gaza. I do not see any argument supporting this. Freedom of operation in itself is near meaningless in territories not requiring operations.
Israel was always either proactive in offering peace or accepting of every such American initiative. Every former peace process with the Palestinians involved Israeli pledges of gradual withdrawal, often displacement of its own citizens, and cessation of military operations in territories.
You're justifying Israeli behavior, not addressing the underlying argument. In fact you've once again made my argument for me, but in the inverse form. Israel does not inherently benefit from freedom of operation. But the reality is Israel will be surrounded by hostile populations, has been and will be for the foreseeable future. The benefit of having that freedom of operation will almost certainly be there at least in the medium term, I suspect even in the long term. For someone who wants to talk about context, you sure are willing to ignore it here. It's a given, and a given that will not change any time soon, that Israel benefits from freedom of operation in Gaza.

Yes but you draw a conclusion simply because hypothetically it is possible, but disregard all the non-hypotheticals that contradict it.
This is not a discussion of possibilities. This is a discussion started in reply to my remark that Israel prefers the current state of affairs in Syria to that of a firm authoritarian at peace with Israel, where Israel would lose much of its freedom of operation in Syria.

81 IRGC members were reportedly killed in Lebanon in 2006. This and the level of their involvement is reported mostly by Arab primary sources.
Briefly, they are alleged to have operated and assisted in operating Hezbollah's rocket artillery systems, primarily long range ones in the Beqaa valley, and strategic weapons like the AShM complex that hit Sa'ar 5 INS Hanit. 250-300 IRGC operatives were reportedly in Lebanon.
2006 was a different time. I could not find any visual evidence even in the generally scarce Lebanon war footage.

The primary source appears to be Ashark Alawsat. The reports were considered sufficiently credible to be quoted by Israeli think tanks even many years later.

[/URL]
The second link is dead but I appreciate the information.

When several laws conflict, it's up to interpretation and mostly reasonableness.
Typically up to a judge's interpretation. Reasonableness is subject in the extreme. And I don't think we have conflicting laws to discuss. You aren't allowed to go into another sovereign state without a very short list of specific reasons.

A government is also mandated to ensure the safety of its people, to the best of its ability. An imminent threat, for example the launching of munitions or potentially a nuke into one's state, and non-prevention of that, would certainly violate this principle.
From my understanding, a government's mandate to ensure the safety of its people is an internal matter. We're discussing international law. And the problem is that you can stretch this idea to cover all kinds of illegal and problematic behaviors that involve violating the sovereignty of another state. The other issue is that if you have a missile on the launching pad about to fire at you, that's a very specific and narrow set of circumstances. And this doesn't even get into issues of imperfect intelligence about the imminent nature of the strike. In general preemptive strike, the Bush-era doctrine, is not accepted international law to the best of my knowledge. If you have something showing otherwise based on actual international treaties that are recognized and signed by the various states, we can discuss further. But it's also a tangent.

If it really was the case that preemptive strikes are not permitted, which I don't believe, then I'd say forget about int'l law until it becomes relevant again.
I think if you take out the "if it really was" part, you've just summarized Israel's foreign policy stance.

You conflate formalities with practicality. The actual capacity to complain to a higher authority and its capacity to pass judgment are very limited, such authority was only relatively recently established, and it's not even considered legitimate by the majority of the world.
There's the law and then there's life. But a murderer getting away with it because of institutional failures doesn't make them any less a murderer. Prime example, it's starting to look like Russia will in large part get away with invading and annexing a large chunk of Ukraine. It doesn't make it lawful. But again, we're wandering far afield.

What de facto serves as a control loop mechanism is how allies and enemies react.
Allies could range from full material and diplomatic support, to sanctions and military action (essentially turn from allies to enemies). Enemies could go nuts and they could also be neutral.
The topic of Israel has been manufactured into an inherently controversial one, and it becomes further reinforced with increasing muslim populations in the west and amplified typically by modern left wing parties. So the starting point is already shifted.

These things aren't only seen behind closed doors. Most of it is very public.

If we look at 2023-2025, Israel stood trial at the ICJ and was found not guilty. The ICJ's authority was subsequently severely reduced with some western nations rejecting orders, under the correct argument of ICJ overstepping their jurisdiction and making a mockery of justice.
Israel's allies took mostly symbolic actions to appease local anti-Israel voters, though at their own detriment ultimately. No real actions were made even by the most hostile western nations. And every arms supplier to Israel supported Israel to a large extent. No meaningful negative actions were made.

The reaction of other nations is currently the most effective way to gauge their approval or disapproval of a nation's actions.
Justice is not a popularity contest. You can't turn around and retroactively make something lawful because everyone agrees with what you did, or likelier doesn't care enough to object vigorously. Failures of enforcement are not justification.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
3. Quantity is of little substance. Though I'd say in relative terms Israel did provide quite a lot. Israel's own expenditure of 4%-5% in peacetime is something no European country except Poland can match even when accounting for aid to Ukraine. All that money goes to fighting the axis, particularly Iran which is a party to the war in Ukraine.

Also being a country at war means Israel's capacity to aid Ukraine is much reduced.
First, because its own defense expenditure reached 10% last time I checked.

Second, because war materiel earmarked for export is sometimes pulled to assist the IDF directly. A high profile example is the cancellation of a deal to sell hundreds of Merkava 2 and 3 models.

Third, at the same time, Israeli defense industries prioritized Europe and delayed some deliveries to global customers while Europe's items were expedited. While at war, Israel's MIC supported European rearmament in overdrive, enabling countries to donate stuff they'd otherwise delay because replacements are overbooked.

Fourth, Israel through American help, accelerated withdrawal of equipment that was highly relevant to Ukraine, including its red squadrons entire stock of F-16s, and 8 Patriot batteries. The former likely used for parts, and the latter are being refurbished and upgraded as they were not upgraded in Israel for a while.
Israel is certainly not sitting on their hands. But again, we don't see the kind of visible and impactful direct aid we see from other countries. There's a reason for that. The "axis" theory you've been advancing simply isn't true.

My comment about trustworthiness is unrelated to anything you said, but a continuation of my posts on the theme of Alawite options and potential Israeli opportunities.
Even if the Alawites begged Israel for help, the mentioned factors would certainly be taken into account when deciding if and how much to help.
After all, it's not trivial for Israel to start doing ISR sorties over north-west Syria. That requires diverting assets currently overflowing with tasks.

Then they can form a coherent political group with single leadership to handle diplomacy.

I don't believe Israel should spend even more resources when its current commitments are crushing its economy.
Unless there is strategic gain to be made, or someone else is willing to fund it.
Let's not pretend that it was so one sided. While Alawite civilians are victims, it was Alawite gangs that initiated the current round of violence and themselves are responsible for some atrocities.
Such is the culture in the region. If a tribe gets the upper hand and kills all the other tribes, it will find divisions within its own and start killing again.

So Israel should not help those who do not seek friendly ties with it that transcend mere fear for their lives. Like shared values.
And it also shouldn't be educating people with dominantly barbaric culture that need to learn to stand on their own.

But if they choose to accept certain changes and to pledge to benefit Israel in exchange, then Israel should definitely be helping them.
I believe anytime we have an ongoing mass murder there is some obligation on the international commnunity to help stop it. But again you're thinking of this in a very one-sided way, either Israel goes in whole-hog or it doesn't at all. There are many other things that could be done. One of the simplest could be very clear and unambiguous statements condeming the killings and calling for accountability. Another one is to apply some diplomatic pressure to other actors. A third is some sort of humanitarian effort. A good way to put Russia on the spot, for example, would be to pledge some quantity of humanitarian aid to be delivered via Russian bases in exchange for Russia pledging to allow a certain number of local civilians to stay in the refugee camps, preferable a number larger than who is currently already there. Currently Russia is trying to quietly ignore the situation and hope it goes away. Throwing a spotlight on it would potentially force their hand, and given that Russia already has some issues with foreign relations, scoring some points by saving civilians when put on the spot would be the smart way to handle it. With enough international pressure you could establish a "zone of safety" around these bases, with the perimeter patrolled by Russian personnel and international NGOs operating there, with other countries providing some level of support in the form of food or medicine or shelters. It doesn't have to be a major contribution from each individual member, but if the understanding is there that the countries that have been involved in Syria are being publicly called upon to do something about this, it can save many lives. In general I don't like the way any of the countries involved in Syria have handled the current killings.

However, there are 2 more important factors:

1. Israel is not the only candidate for sponsorship. Actually the least likely one.
2. As long as HTS butcher their own civilians (Any Syrians), Israel cannot trust them and will remain hostile to it.
3. As the Druze benefited from Israel's intervention, so do Alawites. The destruction of SAA's arsenal early on vastly reduced HTS's capacity for violence, and continued strikes this week further reinforce this.
As of yet, there is no sign of Israel targeting any major faction other than HTS, Palestinian groups (PIJ, Hamas), and various terror orgs close to Israel's border.
See above.

You directed this toward Israel. I mentioned higher likelihood of sponsorship from Russia, Iran, or Turkey.
Re-read my posts at the start of this. I clearly talked about a Russian-backed Alawite enclave, based on a deal with Israel and Turkey. Nowhere did it require Israel to ally themselves with Alawites, or get involved militarily.

HTS has no access to Assad's arsenal. The playing field is more or less even now. Good luck, and you're welcome.

Those who do not wish to defend themselves, deserve none's protection.
If they wish to defend themselves, it becomes their responsibility to arrange that.

When people in my country were massacred, we didn't abandon everything and hoped the world would save us. None came. And everyone around us cheered, Sunnis and Alawites and Shi'ites and all. We started working. None owes us anything. None owes anyone anything.
Except a whole group of countries has been involved in Syria and have contributed to the current state of affairs. These countries have steered events in a manner that has produced the current outcome. They all bear some responsibility and at the very least have a moral obligation to address the current killings. They are failing in that obligation.

The part about nobody coming to help Israel is really cute. Gee if Alawites had a massive diaspora with influence in dozens of countries, whose members showed up in large numbers to the Middle East, and got billions of dollars in military aid including access to hardware and even sensitive technology, maybe they would also thump their chest about how nobody owns anyone anything. :rolleyes:

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I've made this part a separate post partly because it appears we're over 20 000 characters, and partly because it's a fairly separate subject.

1. There is very little known about the Israeli involvement in Forpost. It violating sanctions is a bold and unfounded claim, as first an Israeli defense company wouldn't risk that. If it was somehow in violation, the US certainly didn't consider any involved Israeli company worthy of sanctions.

2. Israel does provide military aid to Ukraine. Your maximalist claim is unfounded. There are de facto Israeli weapons in Ukraine, including those sold to Ukraine as a first user.
In the Ukraine war thread I recently posted about Israeli company RADA's MHR radars being deployed.
The second Forpost deal was signed in 2015, with deliveries taking place thereafter. It was clearly after the annexation of Crimea, the Donbas uprising, and the passing of US sanctions. What's more interesting is that follow-on deals were mentioned in Russian sources but details were completely left out. One possible interpretation is that they didn't happen, but another one is that they took place in a non-public manner. Israel was also not alone in continuing to deliver military goods to Russia, the continued deliveries of Iveco Lynx MRAPs comes to mind. And you're right, the details were kept fairly quiet. Nonetheless;


Note Russia didn't swap out the multi-mission optronics payload produced by Israel for the Russian GOES equivalent until sometime in late 2019 or after. Meanwhile "russified" Forpost was in production out of Israeli kits in 2016-2017 (with 20% localization based on operations conducted to produce finished item) and possibly without kits (but certainly requiring components) in 2018. There is also the possibility that no deliveries too place in 2018. The Forpost-R, the actual (allegedly) fully domesticated variant showed up again sometime in late 2019 (first publicized flight was in August of 2019). Contracts on the Forpost-R didn't get signed until December of 2019 with more in 2020.

Another curious detail is that the Isareli Heron was considered by Russia though reportedly declined for sale by Israel, and a picture of it was seen at one of the stands during a state visit. Something that looks like a clone of that Heron was seen in Russian in 2017 though it's been quiet since then.


As to providing aid to Ukraine, Australia provided more than Israel, and you'll notice that we don't see Israeli tanks, armored vehicles, or howitzers. What we have is some limited and not very visible aid intended not to provoke Russia.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
You have literally just come full circle and made my original argument for me. Israel prefers not to make peace so as not to negate their freedom of operation.
No you just didn't understand my question. I asked why would Israel bother making peace with its neighbors if it negates its freedom of operations, especially when no nation poses a credible threat to Israel.
In case that's not clear, I am directly referring to the peace with Egypt and Jordan, and the Abraham Accords. So I am asking why did Israel so eagerly accepted all these? And why did it give up freedom of operation in these countries.


Justifications for behavior do not contradict the argument I'm making. Is it your position that Israel would like to be surrounded by stable nation-state entities in a formalized state of peace? Or is it your position that Israel wants to continue to have operational freedom?
Stable nations in formalized peace of course. We only have about 77 years of evidence for it.

We seem to be at an impasse. You are claiming two directly contradictory things at the same time. You are stating that any country that hosts Iranian military assets enters a state of war with Israel with no formal declaration necessary and automatically by virtue of hosting those assets. You then made many oblique statements whose sum pointed at this not being the case. So one last time - tomorrow Mexico hosts an Iranian military base. Israel goes to war with Mexico? A yes or no answer please. No more long-winded b.s. about Israeli foreign policy. This question is very simple and you're intentionally obfuscating it.
No. I literally answered a simple "no" to the same question earlier.

Oh? So can we then get rid of Israeli statehood since it's so meaningless? This is simply not true and you know it. Israel fought long and hard to have its statehood. Statehood is certainly not meaningless.
You can try. It never went well for anyone other than Israel itself.
I don't understand your question though. I was talking about Gaza, not Israel. It was very clear and my wording was not ambiguous.
The topic of statehood in the Palestinian context is a faux topic designed to separate those with shallow understanding of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (who claim statehood is the core of it), and those with deeper understanding (who claim statehood was never part of the conflict).

You're justifying Israeli behavior, not addressing the underlying argument. In fact you've once again made my argument for me, but in the inverse form. Israel does not inherently benefit from freedom of operation. But the reality is Israel will be surrounded by hostile populations, has been and will be for the foreseeable future. The benefit of having that freedom of operation will almost certainly be there at least in the medium term, I suspect even in the long term. For someone who wants to talk about context, you sure are willing to ignore it here. It's a given, and a given that will not change any time soon, that Israel benefits from freedom of operation in Gaza.
Israel has freedom of operation in Gaza because the Palestinians never wanted, do not want, nor will ever want peace with Israel. It is necessary because of a state of war.
Israel does not have freedom of operation in Jordan and Egypt by choice. These too are very hostile populations. Jordan's population is the most hostile in the region. But peace is assured because they're led by dictators that can rein in the population and are interested in keeping the peace.

Israel does not strive for democratic neighbors. It works to find suitable partners, strengthen them, and have them rule and rein in the hostiles.
If by chance any such neighbor becomes democratic without losing its ability to maintain the peace - that's a nice bonus.


I think if you take out the "if it really was" part, you've just summarized Israel's foreign policy stance.
There are very rare cases where Israel operates in the gray area, but even then it's a gray, not something explicitly illegal. Legal consultation exists at all strategic levels and so far despite even standing trial over numerous wars, Israel was not once found guilty by a court.


Israel is certainly not sitting on their hands. But again, we don't see the kind of visible and impactful direct aid we see from other countries. There's a reason for that. The "axis" theory you've been advancing simply isn't true.
If anything, the axis theory only corroborates this. Israel is unable to provide more aid than it currently does, nor should it, because it's busy fighting its own wars and at exceptionally high expenditure, while European nations that should assist it are still not even rearming.
Frontier nations should be net recipients of western aid, not its providers.
We do not hear about Ukraine providing aid to Israel or Taiwan, or Taiwan providing aid to Israel and Ukraine.



believe anytime we have an ongoing mass murder there is some obligation on the international commnunity to help stop it. But again you're thinking of this in a very one-sided way, either Israel goes in whole-hog or it doesn't at all. There are many other things that could be done. One of the simplest could be very clear and unambiguous statements condeming the killings and calling for accountability. Another one is to apply some diplomatic pressure to other actors. A third is some sort of humanitarian effort.
How very European. Put the average European nation in the middle east and it'll be squashed within weeks.
"Oh no good sir you cannot go around raping our kids. I'm going to have to write you a letter with a frowning emoji and ask the UN to reduce your aid allowance to 3,000 daily calories equivalent within 5 years".


The part about nobody coming to help Israel is really cute. Gee if Alawites had a massive diaspora with influence in dozens of countries, whose members showed up in large numbers to the Middle East, and got billions of dollars in military aid including access to hardware and even sensitive technology, maybe they would also thump their chest about how nobody owns anyone anything.
I wouldn't blame them for it.


As to providing aid to Ukraine, Australia provided more than Israel, and you'll notice that we don't see Israeli tanks, armored vehicles, or howitzers. What we have is some limited and not very visible aid intended not to provoke Russia.
Israeli aid is backfilling for others' aid.
A has 1 tank and B has 1 tank and C has 1 tank.
What does it matter if B got 1 from A and gave 1 to C, or if A gave 1 to C without B? The end result of both is A with 0 tanks, B with 1 tank, and C with 2 tanks.
Ukraine gets from a pool of equipment influenced by how much flows into it. If nothing flows in, less will flow out. More flows in = more flows out. Israel helped keep the flow in.

I really don't see the point in talking about this topic though.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
@Feanor
Regarding your comment about the Axis:

The existence of an Axis, and a counterweight western alliance, is not some conspiracy theory. It is a perception. I was reminded of this topic when I watched Elbit's Investor Conference livestream and noticed they too operate as a company through this perception:
1742371143858.png
A perception that there are 2 blocs, neither truly united within itself but still each maintaining several core principles that even if indirectly bind their members.
The Axis - Russia, China, Iran.
Their common ground: Authoritarian regimes with imperial ambitions, that will spread their authoritarianism if they succeed, and are generally devoid of considerations such as quality of life and liberties, and promote STEM progress for the sake of conquest.

The West: US, NATO, some MNNA (South Korea, Israel, Japan, Australia etc), and the frontier nations.
Frontier nations: Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan.
Their common ground: Democratic or striving for democracy. Human development is a core interest, and promote STEM progress for the sake of human progress.

Here we see Elbit refer to the conflicts involving Israel not as an Israel-Iran war but as an Iran-Abraham Accords war and that is true because it does indeed involve the Abraham Accords nations even if at low intensity. These are not democratic nations (except Israel). But they do partner with the west on security matters, i.e. allies of opportunity. It is therefore true to refer to them as parties to the conflict but not parties to the "western bloc".

Where is the lack of unity? China severely limits assistance to Russia, not providing Chinese-manufactured complete military hardware. Iran and Russia are very transactional in their cooperation.
US-Europe at odds over how to assist Ukraine. Europe being cold to Israel and Taiwan.

It however makes sense to view these as generally 2 opposing blocs because of the significant similarities between members of each bloc, the significant levels of cooperation within each bloc, and the general understanding that what's good for a member of a bloc is good for all other members of the bloc, and vice versa.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
From Elbit Investor Conference 2025:

Israel's defense budget increase forecast according to Nagel committee:
1742376128804.png

Roi Kais and JPost:
Sudan, Somalia, and Somaliland contacted about transfering Palestinians.
Somaliland not ruling out possibility, conditions it on recognition. Somaliland FM says recognition is the most important topic for them.
 
Last edited:

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
@Feanor
Regarding your comment about the Axis:

The existence of an Axis, and a counterweight western alliance, is not some conspiracy theory. It is a perception. I was reminded of this topic when I watched Elbit's Investor Conference livestream and noticed they too operate as a company through this perception:
View attachment 52485
Well if it makes sense as a marketing strategy, then by all means, let's treat it as reality.

A perception that there are 2 blocs, neither truly united within itself but still each maintaining several core principles that even if indirectly bind their members.
The Axis - Russia, China, Iran.
Their common ground: Authoritarian regimes with imperial ambitions, that will spread their authoritarianism if they succeed, and are generally devoid of considerations such as quality of life and liberties, and promote STEM progress for the sake of conquest.
This is simply not accurate. Russia hasn't been "spreading" authoritarianism. Russia has been working with authoritarian and democratic neighbors in whatever way they deemed benefited them. They've scared off most of their western economic partners with the current invasion of Ukraine. But it's not because they want to make Finland a dictatorship. It's because Finland is unhappy with Russian behavior. Russia isn't trying to turn Ukraine into an authoritarian oligarchy. Ukraine already was one. Russia was trying to get the political clan they think is most favorable to them into a position of dominance. Ukraine has far less domestic freedom now then it did 4 years ago, 8 years ago, or 12 years ago. Their trajectory towards increasingly authoritarian internal policies has been a constant for some time. I don't want to go down the rabbit hole, but imperial ambitions also aren't limited to authoritarian states. And let's not forget Turkey is part of NATO, spent years knocking at the door of EU membership, and yet... imperial ambitions and support for groups so bad, even Russia doesn't want to back them.

The West: US, NATO, some MNNA (South Korea, Israel, Japan, Australia etc), and the frontier nations.
Frontier nations: Ukraine, Israel, Taiwan.
Their common ground: Democratic or striving for democracy. Human development is a core interest, and promote STEM progress for the sake of human progress.
You think Ukraine's oligarchs promote STEM progress for the sake of human progress? I take it you know nothing about Ukraine's internal situation in the 2005-2025 timeframe. As for Israel's commitment to human progress, I submit that they want progress for some humans but care substantially less about others. They're not alone in this, but it's a pattern. And if human development is a key element of the definition, consider the USA. Disintegrating education system, abysmal healthcare, increasing wealth inequality to levels that are actively problematic, religious fundamentalism in politics... don't get me wrong, the USA is still very wealthy. But it doesn't exactly fit with the pretty picture you paint. I don't know the politics of Europe well enough, but I suspect there are countries in Europe where this pattern also doesn't exactly fit.

Here we see Elbit refer to the conflicts involving Israel not as an Israel-Iran war but as an Iran-Abraham Accords war and that is true because it does indeed involve the Abraham Accords nations even if at low intensity. These are not democratic nations (except Israel). But they do partner with the west on security matters, i.e. allies of opportunity. It is therefore true to refer to them as parties to the conflict but not parties to the "western bloc".
Again marketing strategy does not necessarily conform to reality. I suspect Elbit defines these in terms of whom they can realistically sell to. If this was still 2016 and they could sell to Russia, they would be talking about a Russia-ISIS conflict instead.

Where is the lack of unity? China severely limits assistance to Russia, not providing Chinese-manufactured complete military hardware. Iran and Russia are very transactional in their cooperation.
US-Europe at odds over how to assist Ukraine. Europe being cold to Israel and Taiwan.

It however makes sense to view these as generally 2 opposing blocs because of the significant similarities between members of each bloc, the significant levels of cooperation within each bloc, and the general understanding that what's good for a member of a bloc is good for all other members of the bloc, and vice versa.
It does not because they are not blocs. They are actors whose interests converge in some areas. But it's important to look at their relationships with players like India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Brazil, Algeria, Turkey, Indonesia, etc. You will quickly see that these blocs are a product of your personal ideological preference. Russia's top of the line fighter jet is the Su-57. The first customer for it is Algeria. Russia's main exports are hydrocarbons, but their major trade isn't just China, it's India in a huge way. You ironically brought up the RoK as part of the "side of light" but they played a crucial role in Russian military and aerospace electronics development. They also have not committed to sanctions against Russia in the way other players have, and I wouldn't be surprised if RoK electronics still make their way into Russian military goods. Russia recently launched another GLONASS satellite. Any RoK components in that? But I thought they were on the side of "light".... :rolleyes:

This isn't Lord of the Rings. And it's not the Cold War. We have a number of actors some of whom have existing relationships, and some of whom have convergent interests, but the situation is not what you describe. Pre-Ukraine Russia had widespread access to various western technology in multiple key areas. And it's entirely plausible that post-war some of that access will return, though much of it won't.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
@Feanor you counter a claim about loose blocs - by saying they're loose?
I counter a claim about loose blocs by saying they're not blocs. I guess it's dictionary time, we're at that point...

"a group of nations united by treaty or agreement for mutual support or joint action "


BRICS is a bloc, a loose one. Your proposed "axis" isn't.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
I counter a claim about loose blocs by saying they're not blocs. I guess it's dictionary time, we're at that point...

"a group of nations united by treaty or agreement for mutual support or joint action "


BRICS is a bloc, a loose one. Your proposed "axis" isn't.
Very well, let's use a more appropriate word, like "Axis". It means partnership.
 
Top