The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[Vanquish]

Not you can't say that about anything they do. When Russia captured the town of Kurakhovo, you can't say that wasn't a success. You can call it a Pyrrhic victory, but you can't say nothing was accomplished. Here however we have a large scale mechanized assault (a mech company with support elements at least). The target is a couple of small villages. Ukraine doesn't appear to have captured either village, and has lost double digits of vehicles to Russian drone strikes. Contrast that with Ukraine's counter-attacks in Chasov Yar where Russia has pushed into the factory and been pushed back out of it twice now and Ukraine still holds the factory. Those efforts were definitely successful for Ukraine. Ukraine will still eventually lose Chasov Yar, but those specific counter-attacks were successful. Here Ukraine will eventually lose the area too, but this specific effort was not a success.

If you want another example, look at the fighting in the Seversk salient. That's a successful Ukrainian defense. It's been successful for 2+ years and Russian gains are extremely modest for massive expended resources (cumulatively).



Last time I checked nobody invaded the USA. Russia isn't a super power. The USSR was, but the USSR and Russia are two different countries, no matter how much the latter tries to act like it still has the power and influence of the former.

I feel that there are military victories and moral victories. Ukraine desperately needs a victory of any kind after 1048 days of war. I would imagine most news of the war in Ukraine is of what they are doing in the Kursk region, not of what is going on elsewhere. I would expect the opposite to be true in Russia.

I have to think Ukraine opening up a little boil in Russia must be really irritating to Putin especially seeing as they seem to be able to do little about it after 5 months. Politically at the very least that must be embarrassing for Putin although not to the point where he has to stay away from windows.

In regards to Russia being a super power I dare say most of the world believes that. Before their invasion of Ukraine I would have had them as a top three military power. Now after nearly three years of war and still not having control of Ukraine I would agree that Russia's stock is waning.

 

[Feanor]

I feel that there are military victories and moral victories. Ukraine desperately needs a victory of any kind after 1048 days of war. I would imagine most news of the war in Ukraine is of what they are doing in the Kursk region, not of what is going on elsewhere. I would expect the opposite to be true in Russia.

Except... it's never good to let political considerations dictate military decisions like that. Yes the ultimate goals of wars are political but if you expend resources on futile attacks to win "moral" victories, while the enemy continues to roll forward in other areas at a pace that dwarfs your efforts, the end is going to be unpleasant. If this war ends with a ceasefire along the line of contact, retaining an extra few sq kms in Kursk with no population and no economic value won't be nearly as significant as losing Pokrovsk, something that's starting to loom large on the horizon. If Russia feels they can take Pokrovsk reasonable quickly, they may do what they did in '15 when they finished the fight for Debal'tsevo before signing Minks 2.0 so that it would fall on the rebel side of the line. Also from what I've seen in Ukrainian sources, they're not thrilled with Kursk. I'm not sure it scores the kind of victory that one would expect.

I have to think Ukraine opening up a little boil in Russia must be really irritating to Putin especially seeing as they seem to be able to do little about it after 5 months. Politically at the very least that must be embarrassing for Putin although not to the point where he has to stay away from windows.

Well if it annoys Putin then I guess it's good use of resources.

In regards to Russia being a super power I dare say most of the world believes that. Before their invasion of Ukraine I would have had them as a top three military power. Now after nearly three years of war and still not having control of Ukraine I would agree that Russia's stock is waning.

Perception and reality are different, I think that Russia had a chance of becoming one of the future great powers in a multi-polar world. I think this war did a lot to blow those chances. On the flip side none of this seems to have really done much damage to Russian aspirations in Africa, and much of Russia's near-abroad has taken the "wait and see" position. Except Georgia who apparently wants to be friends now. Presumably to avoid the fate of Ukraine.

 

[vikingatespam]

I have to wonder if the lack of focus on stopping RU in the Donetsk and Luhansk areas indicates UKR knows it will be giving those up in the upcoming negotiations. RU territory now is the most valuable negotiating card.

 

[KipPotapych]

I have to wonder if the lack of focus on stopping RU in the Donetsk and Luhansk areas indicates UKR knows it will be giving those up in the upcoming negotiations. RU territory now is the most valuable negotiating card.

I don’t think they would be giving those up. It’s not like they would simply give away Kramatorsk os Sloviansk, for example. I believe Russia controls under 70% of DNR, about 72-73% of Zaporizhia Region, 75% or so of Kherson Region, and something like 99% of LNR (do not quote me on these numbers since they come from my memory). Unless there is a complete collapse of the Ukrainian defences, I do not believe anyone is giving up much of what they are in full control of. If that were not the case, Kursk would have no meaning at all, I do not think (and I actually do not think it is that great of a bargaining chip to begin with, especially with the Russian forces being next to Sudzha now or there about).

 

[rsemmes]

True enough and when a super power gets invaded and can't repulse it, that's kind of embarrassing to.

"Can't" or hasn't tried to? Has Russia deployed enough resources to do the job? From a military point of view, it makes sense to keep Ukrainian forces there, they are not going to take Kursk, but as long as they keep feeding the cauldron...
It is better, for Russia, than a successful defence of Ukrainian territory, and Ukraine has a few places where to deploy troops to do that.

 

[seaspear]

I don't believe there are strategic targets within range of UKR forces in Kursk but this has pushed some buttons of people ordering it retaken at any cost leading to very high casualties of forces trying to remove the UKR forces and diverting forces from other regions ,this has been a war of attrition for some time felt not just on the front lines

 

[Fredled]

According to this news article, more than 1700 members of the "155e Gemechaniseerde Brigade" deserted, and 50 of them even run away in France during the training. And now it seems this brigade is actually disbanded, and what left over of it distributed among other units.
Is this correctly?

Yes it's correct. I have hear about it in details on French chanel LCI. The french government is embarrassed because they spent hundreds of million equipping and training them. But ultimately said that it was up to the Ukrainians to use the resources as they see best.

Interesting note: Most of the recruits were not volunteers, but mobilised ones. Which in part explained the high ratio of desertion. Possibly some of them agreed to enlist when they knew that they would be trained in France and took the opportunity to disappear in western Europe once they arrived. The French police is not even looking after them. Nobody really care.

More embarrassing is the bulk of desertion inside Ukraine. First the general of the brigade was dismissed as soon as he arrived in Ukraine. To dismiss such a high rank officer while combat operations have not even started is unusual. It means something was really wrong with him.
I don't know if the brigade was disbanded after or before, or if this was the consequence or the reason for his dismissal, but the disbandment was a grave mistake. The force lost his cohesion. Soldiers would not perform as effectively when inserted in other brigades as they would in the brigade they were trained and acquainted with, That was the first reason of discontent.

The second reason was the absence of drone in the armement of the brigade. In France, it was assumed that they will receive drones and training to used them once in Ukraine because Ukrainians is much better with drone technology and experience than the French. Alas, they didn't receive a single drone. This was a scandal because the Ukrainian army is using over 5000 drones a day and producing a consistant amount.

The third reason was that, on their first day of arrival, they were sent to the Pokrovsk front line, the most dangerous one in the whole country. That was a mistake because they should have been deployed in less intense areas to gain experience. Perhaps the military command in the Pokrovsk axis needed reinforcement urgently and they were the only ones available at this time.

At the end of the day, literally, the entire brigade was dilapidated.

__________________________________________________________________

I have to think Ukraine opening up a little boil in Russia must be really irritating to Putin especially seeing as they seem to be able to do little about it after 5 months.

Except... it's never good to let political considerations dictate military decisions like that.

Even if it became political, the initial goal and reason for the Kursk incursion was military. They broke through Russian lines in order to strike them in the back, disrupt logistic (they still control the main north-south railroad), force the Russian to modify their plans and deploy more troops to this area. Most analysts estimate that over 50 000 Russian troops have been moved there to repel the Ukrainians, not counting Koreans.

The raid on Berdin, was sort of, a break through inside the break through. A mini Kursk incursion inside the Kursk incursion. They took Russians by surprise, used advanced anti-drone jamming, targeted a weak spot in the Russian line, used western tanks and IFV in the most advantageous circumstances. All these things are disrupting the Russian invasion force aparatus.

After that, people, mostly in the Western media, started to speculate about a varieties of scenarios without listening what Ukrainians were telling about it. Why did they waste resources there instead of using them in the Donbas? Because the northern border between Sumy and Kharkiv is also a part of the front.

That Putin is irritated and that it's a blow to Russia's prestige is of course an excellent additional reason to do it, yet not the first one.

I have to wonder if the lack of focus on stopping RU in the Donetsk and Luhansk areas indicates UKR knows it will be giving those up in the upcoming negotiations.

There is no lack of focus, or lack of effort to preserve the territories in eastern Ukraine. Instead reinforcements have been sent to Pokrovsk, they kept Kurakhove and Toresk as long as they could, they repelled assaults in Kupiansk, they fiercely fought for the defence of Vovchansk. They are making repeated counter-attacks on Russian lines. These counter-attacks don't allow them to regain much territories but they weaken Russian troops.
Ukrainians do this amidst mass desertion among their ranks, lack of recruits, poor commandment and lack of ammunition and weapons.

I agree with @KipPotapych that the Ukrainian leadership is not even remotely considering giving up any territory not yet under firm Russian control. Were the front line will be when Trump will force every one to negotiate is where the demarcation line will be.

RU territory now is the most valuable negotiating card.

No. It isn't. Because it's too small and by the Trump's Inauguration deadline, it will be even smaller.
There is an interresting detail thought: Zelensky has said recently, that it can be used to negotiate. But I think he means that it will be forcing Putin to negotiate rather than to make a swap of occupied territories.

In regards to Russia being a super power I dare say most of the world believes that.

I think that Russia had a chance of becoming one of the future great powers in a multi-polar world. I think this war did a lot to blow those chances. On the flip side none of this seems to have really done much damage to Russian aspirations in Africa, and much of Russia's near-abroad has taken the "wait and see" position. Except Georgia who apparently wants to be friends now. Presumably to avoid the fate of Ukraine.

The perception of Russia as the Second, then the Third or on par with or after China was still alive and well until February 2022. The Ukrainian resistance blew that both in the perception and in the reality. Yet, not evenly across the world. The Global South, both the population and the official propaganda, still believes that Putin has the upper hand in the fight against Western and American imperialism. They think that Putin is inflicting an humiliating defeat against the West. Not the opposite.

The invasion of a tiny portion of the Kursk Oblast, albeit minimal geographically has somewhat altered this perception. But further Russian defeat is needed to reverse it. There is a lot of wait and see in the so-called neutral countries.

 

[seaspear]

I don't believe the UKR have the capacity to inflict a noticeable defeat of Russia on the front lines set backs and pyrrhic victories yes certainly the use of missiles strategically ,it must be getting beyond some credibility to the Russian public that these drones and missiles were shot down directly over targets like fuel refineries ,what may be of concern to the Russian people are rising food prices and high interest rates ,the low exchange rate for the Ruble causing the price of imports to increase ,the Russian people may connect this to the war or may not its still an offence to call it a war or even reveal casualty figures ,the Russian mayor is cited as treating six hundred thousand Russian servicemen in a specialist centre originally set up for covid victims state media then amended these figures to six hundred ,the correction did not come from the mayors office though ?

Rosja przypadkowo ujawniła skrywane dane. Szokująca wypowiedź mera Moskwy

Podczas wystąpienia przed stołecznym parlamentem Moskwy mer miasta, Siergiej Sobianin, ujawnił szokującą informację. Poinformował, że lokalne centrum medyczne zostanie przekształcone w szpital wojskowy, który ma stać się „największym w Rosji”. Placówka będzie leczyć około 600 tysięcy osób...

www.wprost.pl

 

[KipPotapych]

The Kursk salient keeps shrinking:



The map represents a change in control in the past 24 hours as adjusted by Deepstate (the side by side pic is taken from Rob Lee’s post).

I see people say that this last little attack is an embarrassment for Russia/Putin, it was unexpected, they broke through the Russian lines, etc (the same is often said about the repelled Russian attacks in Kursk and elsewhere). I don’t understand the train of thought here. What exactly is embarrassing? This isn’t exactly winter of 2022, the war has been fought for nearly 3 years now: it is no longer a “global superpower” fighting a “third-world country” because that would have been long time over, but something between a regional and global power fighting Ukraine that is fully sustained by the most economically developed and technologically advanced states, including, arguably, the only true “global superpower” on this planet. One would think that in the current state of the war one should expect some back and forth and so on. Furthermore, the Ukrainian forces broke through the “line zero”, ie the frontline itself, moved two and half kilometres in before losing most of their equipment, probably men as well (be it killed/wounded or taken as PoWs), while achieving next to nothing or nothing at all. So I do not get the train of thought there on the “embarrassment” part. In fact, looking the map cited above, it appears that the Russian attack that I cited in one of my posts above a few days ago and heard very little of since was probably more successful and they made some incremental changes that are probably to produce, or add to, further development in their favour in the near future. All I heard about it since posting somewhere above is that the Russian forces lost 6 (I think that was the number cited) armoured vehicles and are “taking massive casualties”. And I am assuming things will develop a lot faster once Russians approach and start cutting off Sudzha (Ukrainian forces may end up in lot of trouble, actually, if that were to happen relatively quickly and probably otherwise).

Having said the above, why would it “irk Putin” too? An attack took place, it failed, the enemy took relatively high (or very high single day) casualties, while everything else keeps grinding on as it was (or maybe better because of it). Seems like it all worked as intended, no?

Then there are laughs about the Chechens for whatever reason, while from my understanding it was their unit(s) that inflicted most of the casualties (I am judging simply by the videos of the damaged and destroyed equipment posted online) and allegedly took quite a few prisoners during this Ukrainian assault.

Anyway, I do not get the laughs and the embarrassment bit whatsoever.

On the other hand, is it embarrassing for the Ukrainian command to have this narrow vision and shortsighted moves, lack of strategic planning, etc? Well not really because a) everyone should be used to it by now and b) they are underdogs that pick up scraps where they can, even though some scraps should be left alone and more attention should be paid to a bigger picture (but I am sure it is extremely hard to resist the scraps).


To end this post, here is a CSIS podcast that I strongly recommend. It was posted on December 18, but I only got to it today - everything is relevant as it was at the time of release though, some things probably more so. In the podcast, Max Bergmann and Maira Snegovaya are joined by Mike Kofman. I think there is both video and audio only embedded on the page cited below. They discuss the current state of the war, the problems facing both Russia and Ukraine, touch on Syria and how it affects Ukraine, prospects of negotiations, Trump, Europe, etc. It is a very good listen - definitely better than some rando on the internet writing/making clickbait videos.

The War in Ukraine in 2025 with Michael Kofman | Russian Roulette | CSIS Podcasts

Max and Maria were joined by Russian military expert Michael Kofman to discuss where the war in Ukraine may be headed in the year to come. With a new administration in Washington and political turmoil across Europe, Russia continuing to make grinding gains on the battlefield, and calls for some...

www.csis.org

 

[KipPotapych]

Moe details on the Russian assault “advertised” earlier (at least I think that is the one). The 47th Brigade (is it everywhere or what?) reports the following:
- the assault was implemented in 6 waves;
- about 50 vehicles were involved, including tanks, BTRs, BMPs, BMDs, ATVs;
- the losses on the RU side include 45 KiA and 53 WiA;
- they are not disclosing equipment losses, but the video they released shows some hits, some misses, definitely a small part of the reported 50 were affected if that is all there is to show;
- they report that the attack was repelled.

The last point makes me wonder if it is something “new” and related to this instead:



Or is it what was reported previously and related to this (more likely the case, seems to me):



Source for both of the above: x.com

Video and report from the 47th:

‼️47 окрема механізована бригада

⚡️⚡️"Маґура" відбила масований штурм росіян на Курщині разом із суміжниками СОУ ворог задіяв величезну кількість техніки та особового складу. Першими в їхніх колонах йшли танки з тралами, щоб розмінувати проходи. Атаки здійснювалися накатами в 6 хвиль. ворог також намався прориватися танками...

t.me

A good thread on the recent Ukrainian assault/offensive attempt/whatever you call it:

Thread by @LovelyLad_ on Thread Reader App

@LovelyLad_: A few thoughts about the "2nd Kursk Offensive" analyzing the operation through publicly available sources. Thread This operation is obviously inspired by the 1st offensive in August and it tried to rec...…

threadreaderapp.com

Edit: Further shrinkage:



Source: x.com

 

[Fredled]

In several video reports I have seen, including this one (not pro Ukrainian), the map shows Berdin under Ukrainian control. I haven't heard or read anything about Ukrainians having lost "most of their equipment" there.

Russians started attempts to cut off Ukrainians still supposedly inside Pogrebki and the string of hamlets south of it along the road. This should force Ukrainians to leave the north of the Kursk salient in the next days.

Russians launched a large attack on Sudzha from the south east, involving up to 50 armoured vehicles. They have been stopped by the Ukrainian forces stationed in Sudzha. That was one of the most intense battle on the front line in recent days.

Russians gained more ground in the Kupiansk and Lyman areas and along the Oksil river. And this is very bad news for Ukrainians.

Toresk has fallen completely. Russians are now attacking the suburbs in the north of the city.

In Pokrovsk, Russians getting closer and closer to the city from the south - south west, after taking Novy Trud, Vevshtshenko and Vovkove, and now entering Peshtshiane. If Ukrainians don't send reserves to Pokrovsk ASAP, they will lose the city in the next few weeks.

In other parts of the front, no significant change are observed, all thought there are fighting.

Ukraines have more success with deep strikes. Several oil depots, drone and ammunition storage have been destroyed. These strikes are intensifying.

Well if it annoys Putin then I guess it's good use of resources.

The goal of every Ukrainian military operation is to make Putin embarrassed enough so that he gives up on the invasion of Ukraine.
It's not clear yet at which points he will start to be annoyed by the cost of the war in Ukraine. So the effort should continue.

 

[Feanor]

In several video reports I have seen, including this one (not pro Ukrainian), the map shows Berdin under Ukrainian control.

I don't have time to dig this up now but there is footage from the ground of Russian soldiers with knocked out and destroyed Ukrainian vehicles in Berdin next to them that clearly indicate no Ukrainian control there. Ukrainian forces reached the outskirts and contested the village but failed to hold it.

I haven't heard or read anything about Ukrainians having lost "most of their equipment" there.

It appears that roughly a mech company plus sized element was used and we have enough videos of Ukrainian vehicles getting hit to indicate they lost 10+ vehicles there.

Russians started attempts to cut off Ukrainians still supposedly inside Pogrebki and the string of hamlets south of it along the road. This should force Ukrainians to leave the north of the Kursk salient in the next days.

Russians launched a large attack on Sudzha from the south east, involving up to 50 armoured vehicles. They have been stopped by the Ukrainian forces stationed in Sudzha. That was one of the most intense battle on the front line in recent days.

The recent Russian efforts, and more importantly Ukraine's inability to stop the advances suggest that the days of the salient are coming to an end.

Toresk has fallen completely. Russians are now attacking the suburbs in the north of the city.

Is this for sure? The last updates I see from Suriyakmaps and even from Russian WarReports don't necessarily support this. The town looks like it's about to fall, but hasn't yet.

In Pokrovsk, Russians getting closer and closer to the city from the south - south west, after taking Novy Trud, Vevshtshenko and Vovkove, and now entering Peshtshiane. If Ukrainians don't send reserves to Pokrovsk ASAP, they will lose the city in the next few weeks.

That would be very impressive. I suspect we're looking at 4-8 more months of fighting around Pokrovsk. I would be surprised to see it fall before at least May of this year and it would indicate Ukraine is in worse shape then I think.

The goal of every Ukrainian military operation is to make Putin embarrassed enough so that he gives up on the invasion of Ukraine.
It's not clear yet at which points he will start to be annoyed by the cost of the war in Ukraine. So the effort should continue.

If that's really the strategy, it's a bad one. I think Putin is committed to a victory and won't abandon the war no matter how embarrassing individual moments are.

 

[KipPotapych]

I don't have time to dig this up now but there is footage from the ground of Russian soldiers with knocked out and destroyed Ukrainian vehicles in Berdin next to them that clearly indicate no Ukrainian control there. Ukrainian forces reached the outskirts and contested the village but failed to hold it.

This is certainly the case. In fact, I don’t know of any maps that show Berdin under Ukrainian control at the moment. I know some rushed and marked it as such right away upon the initial reports and then backtracked the same or the next day and changed it to grey zone. Furthermore, the Ukrainians are “currently” attacking Russian positions as follows:



This is a snapshot from the latest Perpetua’s map:

UA map

map.ukrdailyupdate.com

I would further propose that there is currently little or no Ukrainian presence in Berdin and it is likely back under Russian control for the most part. I may dig out a few posts later with geolocated footage that clearly indicates Russian troops walking around where Ukrainian armour previously was in the area around and within.

It appears that roughly a mech company plus sized element was used and we have enough videos of Ukrainian vehicles getting hit to indicate they lost 10+ vehicles there

Yes, I’d say it was a dozen or more vehicles that were confirmed hits, many completely burned.

The recent Russian efforts, and more importantly Ukraine's inability to stop the advances suggest that the days of the salient are coming to an end.

It surely appears to be the case. I wonder how long though.

Is this for sure? The last updates I see from Suriyakmaps and even from Russian WarReports don't necessarily support this. The town looks like it's about to fall, but hasn't yet.

It probably depends on how one looks at it. My understanding is that there are a few streets left under Ukrainian control in the northwest of the Toretsk city itself, but everything else is controlled by Russia. If one includes the “greater Toretsk area”, then there is still a bit of a way to go. The Russian forces also moved (north)west past the city:



That is from the same map as cited above. Their own comment on this development:

That would be very impressive. I suspect we're looking at 4-8 more months of fighting around Pokrovsk. I would be surprised to see it fall before at least May of this year and it would indicate Ukraine is in worse shape then I think.

I also think that weeks is an exaggeration. On the other hand, there were some quite disturbing reports of severe manpower issues, more severe than other “hot” parts of the front; many fortifications that they built around are considered to be “undefendable”, that is in addition to those that aren’t nearly complete, and so on. I believe I skipped posting those reports here. They also do not have enough personnel to man all those fortifications. They do not have enough troops to properly defend in the city environment either once it comes to that, which will probably happen quickly if the issue of the personnel shortage isn’t fixed (some reports indicated it isn’t feasible though). Having that in mind, I wouldn’t be surprised if it falls much sooner than expected once the assault begins. I still highly doubt it will be mere weeks. The city also has geographic features that Ukrainian forces defend quite well historically (my observation).

If that's really the strategy, it's a bad one. I think Putin is committed to a victory and won't abandon the war no matter how embarrassing individual moments are.

Imagine thinking that one can get embarrassed enough to quit the war they spent ridiculous amount of resources on, where tens and hundreds of thousands of men had died and got mutilated, and so on. This is some backward logic, in my opinion. Especially thinking that they will just leave after another “embarrassment”, while you are the one who decides what is embarrassing and what is not (there aren’t many/any “nots” though. Especially when you are actually losing and most people understand that there is likely (if not certainly) no way you can win at this point. I don’t, personally, get it. But hey, stranger things did happen. To hope for that outcome is pretty weird though.


Here is a quick comment on the Ukrainian-built fortifications from the commander of the Chosen Company:

Thread by @RyanO_ChosenCoy on Thread Reader App

@RyanO_ChosenCoy: Manpower isn’t the only issue facing Ukraine. There is a repeated failure on organizing proper defenses by some leadership within units which then puts more pressure on other units when lines colla...…

threadreaderapp.com

In the comments, it was noted that one of the examples he provided looked like that since November 2016 (!):



I actually came to post something other than what I wrote above… but now I don’t remember, haha.

 

[Feanor]

A Russian mil-blogger wrote something that I think is insightful in a way that is often missed in discussions of Russia and it's capabilities. I'll translate and then I'll comment:

But in general the critical loss of strategic units and resources, and components of the Russian Armed forces is compensated by their extreme prior ineffective use, as a result the entire structure remains stable as a whole, the army stands firmly on it's feet, on the bottom.

In other words you can't enable a strategic advantage by striking something important, because it was only important on paper, in reality it didn't work.

You also can't get access to objective data on the situation in the Russian Armed Froces because the information is a secret for Russia's Armed Forces.

The information you can get from official documents, reports (even if they are secret) is disinformation.

Even if you were to get access to the secret communications of the commander of the General HQ, 90% of what you hear would be lies.

Russia's Army is not a vertical structure, it's a bee hive.

Гениальное -

Но вообще критичность выхода из строя стратегических соединений и ресурсов и единиц ВС РФ компенсируется предельной неэффективностью их предыдущего использования, в результате чего поддерживается устойчивость всей военной структуры в совокупности: армия продолжает твердо стоять на ногах на дне.…

mina030.livejournal.com

I don't think this is true literally, word for word. I think a lot of emotions and frustration with Russia's military bureaucracy went into these words. But I think there are kernels of truth here that can be more insightful then 1000 videos of Russian strikes hitting Ukrainians or vice versa. Russia's military has developed a way to fight the current war in Ukraine that works. It doesn't work well, and it's probably not optimal, but it works. As a result Russia is steadily rolling forward, more-so in areas with more resources, less-so in areas with less resources. Ukraine has been less successful in this department partially because fewer resources are available and partially because Ukraine is suffering more from the current war and is therefore reaching their limits sooner. But part of the situation is that we're not seeing emergence of some new Russian Army that's guided by the experience of the current war. We're seeing a fairly fundamental failure to internalize, systematize, and ultimately institutionalize the experience of the current war. I think the end result is that the Russian Armed Forces are currently a very dangerous adversary because they have, through local experience and lateral connections, learned how to fight in this new drone-filled lateral-networked environment in a way that nobody but Ukraine has. A NATO unit that deploys to this front line under these conditions will learn some painful lessons, with a price paid in much blood. I think that if NATO can extract the lessons learned from this war, and make them a part of NATO's future military planning, they can reap the benefits of the lessons learned in this war and end up ultimately ahead as a result of not getting involved. But I think if NATO fails to learn the lessons of this fight and gets into it while Russia still has a large core of personnel that grew up and learned their military lessons in these conditions, it may be that NATO's better equipped and in general terms better trained forces, falter in this new environment and face loss of tempo, attrition, and ultimately defeat, at the hands of an adversary that understands on a nearly instinctual level what a drone threat means, what kinds of resources are effective, and why sometimes riding an electric scooter makes more sense then riding a M2A9000 into battle, because the wire guided drone with an butt load of explosives strapped to it doesn't care how sophisticated the tractor is, whose tracks need to be disabled.

 

[rsemmes]

The "Embarrassing War", do they teach that in Saint-Cyr... or Frunze?

 

[Vivendi]

A NATO unit that deploys to this front line under these conditions will learn some painful lessons, with a price paid in much blood. I think that if NATO can extract the lessons learned from this war, and make them a part of NATO's future military planning, they can reap the benefits of the lessons learned in this war and end up ultimately ahead as a result of not getting involved. But I think if NATO fails to learn the lessons of this fight and gets into it while Russia still has a large core of personnel that grew up and learned their military lessons in these conditions, it may be that NATO's better equipped and in general terms better trained forces, falter in this new environment and face loss of tempo, attrition, and ultimately defeat, at the hands of an adversary that understands on a nearly instinctual level what a drone threat means, what kinds of resources are effective, and why sometimes riding an electric scooter makes more sense then riding a M2A9000 into battle, because the wire guided drone with an butt load of explosives strapped to it doesn't care how sophisticated the tractor is, whose tracks need to be disabled.

To some extent I agree however your scenario seems highly unlikely, since one huge advantage NATO has, is the massive air power. It would have made a huge difference in a hypothetical war involving NATO. Only very recently did Ukraine get a handful of "modern aircraft": very old F-16s that are one generation behind what many NATO countries are operating. Look at how quickly Israel destroyed Russian made SAMs in Iran using F-35, with no losses. NATO could with a massive but short air campaign destroy much of Russia's SAMs, followed by destruction of a lot of critical military infrastructure all over Russia (including ammunition warehouses, airfields, weapons factories), and Russia would not be able to do anything to stop it apart from going nuclear. A drone won't help against a Tomahawk, Storm Shadow or JASSM-ER. It also won't stop cost-effective SDB-IIs that can target both stationary and mobile targets. After destroying Russia's SAMs you would have seen a very different war from what Ukraine is currently fighting.

Also keep in mind Ukraine has been fighting with "one hand tied behind their back"; for a very long time they could not attack any targets on Russian soil using Western provided missiles and munitions, and they had for a long time no or very few of their own long-range missiles, a huge advantage for Russia.

Russian economy is starting to struggle. More than 800,000 soldiers have been killed or severely wounded. A large number of young, resourceful Russians left Russia during the first months after the full-scale invasion. More sanctions were recently added. Unless Russia accept negotiations during 2025 I suspect we will see a collapse of Russian economy late 2025 or in 2026. I think such a collapse will have a much bigger impact on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, than winning or losing a few square km of land per month.

Even with a Russian asset in the WH the situation actually looks pretty bleak for Russia, if European leaders are willing to keep providing aid, and keep the sanctions until at least the end of 2025.

 

[Feanor]

To some extent I agree however your scenario seems highly unlikely, since one huge advantage NATO has, is the massive air power. It would have made a huge difference in a hypothetical war involving NATO. Only very recently did Ukraine get a handful of "modern aircraft": very old F-16s that are one generation behind what many NATO countries are operating. Look at how quickly Israel destroyed Russian made SAMs in Iran using F-35, with no losses. NATO could with a massive but short air campaign destroy much of Russia's SAMs, followed by destruction of a lot of critical military infrastructure all over Russia (including ammunition warehouses, airfields, weapons factories), and Russia would not be able to do anything to stop it apart from going nuclear. A drone won't help against a Tomahawk, Storm Shadow or JASSM-ER. It also won't stop cost-effective SDB-IIs that can target both stationary and mobile targets. After destroying Russia's SAMs you would have seen a very different war from what Ukraine is currently fighting.

This is one possibility but I'm not so sure. NATO's defense spending has increased, but without the US they will have problems. Many NATO armies readiness rates remain poor, and there has been a substantial depletion of arsenals to give to Ukraine in many areas.

From an air war standpoint just European NATO definitely has an advantage over Russia, but I don't know that the advantage is as devastating as you describe. I think NATO would win eventually, but it probably wouldn't be all that short. Recall a US-led coalition spent many weeks battering down the Iraqi air force and air defense grid in 1991. Russia is much larger and in theory a much more challenging opponent then Iraq. So realistically we're probably looking at several months. I guess the term "short" is fungible, and compared to a 3 year slog on the ground, a 3-6 month war would be short. But I also think there will be nasty surprises in store for NATO. Prime example, the R-37M that suddenly made upgraded MiG-31s relevant. I don't think anyone saw that coming. Here's another potential one - during the recent tactical nuclear weapon drills Russian MiG-31s were flying with air-air R-33s with nuclear payloads (training version I hope). How well hardened against EMP is an F-35? How about an E-3 Sentry? And this bring us to the real point. I think Russia will go nuclear long before NATO reaches the kind of air dominance you describe. Stopping all Russian tactical nuclear inbounds is going to be impossible. Some are practically guaranteed to get through. And let's not forget things like SCALP/Storm Shadows, Patriot batteries, IRIS-Ts, NASAMS, and other systems have been handed over to Ukraine in substantial quantities. Have those arsenals been replenished?

By the way, I'm not even sure that the current evolution of smaller weapon systems would render them as vulnerable to air dominance as traditional forces. Thermal shrouds, extreme dispersion, and extreme autonomy for smaller units are becoming the norm. That famous knife fight above? The Russian element that solider was a part of was in the single digits, and even after being all alone, he didn't retreat or expect backup, he completed his mission. With the evolution of things like Iran's pocket-SAM (the 358) or the use of FPV drones against helos, you can credibly threaten enemy aircraft (thus challenging air dominance) without something like an S-400 btln protected by a Pantsyr battery. And if you don't need a T-90 tank company to engage a NATO mech formation because instead you have a swarm of drones, operating on different frequencies, some wire-guided some not, it changes the game. Consider that Ukraine's T-72M1s are substantially inferior to Ukraine's Leo-2A6s. But their performance didn't make much of a difference in the summer offensive of '23. A lot of traditional advantages are less impactful in this new environment.

But of course there are multiple possible scenarios for NATO involvement in a fight against Russia. Many have talked about a possible French or European expeditionary force fighting alongside Ukraine on the existing front. In other words an involvement that would presumably be well below the current threshold of nuclear escalation for Russia while simultaneously providing some much needed aid to Ukraine. This may or may not materialize, but I can see a "volunteer" formation staffed by EU citizens, funded and equipped by NATO, going to Ukraine to fight as part of the "Foreign Legion". It wouldn't be an official part of any NATO country's military, but it would effectively face the problem discussed above.

I think there are lessons here for NATO to learn and in a hurry. Russia may yet end up institutionalizing the lessons of this war, but even if they profoundly fail to do so, many other observers are rapidly learning from this.

Also keep in mind Ukraine has been fighting with "one hand tied behind their back"; for a very long time they could not attack any targets on Russian soil using Western provided missiles and munitions, and they had for a long time no or very few of their own long-range missiles, a huge advantage for Russia.

I think this is a misleading view. European NATOs arsenals are not on the scale that would enable rapid and wholesale destruction of Russia's economic or military-industrial potential. The portion of that arsenal that has been handed over to Ukraine even less so. And Ukraine has shown a less-than-ideal use of some western munitions like the recent HIMARS strike on a shopping center in Donetsk. Or the strikes on Ryl'sk and L'gov that didn't hit any visible military targets and instead destroyed civilian infrastructure. I think even if Ukraine was given the green light to hit whatever they want, the results wouldn't be substantially different from what we saw here. Russia's advantage is not in the permissiveness but in the volume of their strikes.

Russian economy is starting to struggle. More than 800,000 soldiers have been killed or severely wounded.

I think those numbers are pure fantasy. Ukrainian Mediazona provides a very different set of numbers. Ukraine's MoD are liars, like their Russian counter-parts, and I don't know of anyone else significant making claims this extreme.

A large number of young, resourceful Russians left Russia during the first months after the full-scale invasion. More sanctions were recently added. Unless Russia accept negotiations during 2025 I suspect we will see a collapse of Russian economy late 2025 or in 2026. I think such a collapse will have a much bigger impact on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, than winning or losing a few square km of land per month.

Even with a Russian asset in the WH the situation actually looks pretty bleak for Russia, if European leaders are willing to keep providing aid, and keep the sanctions until at least the end of 2025.

How many of those that left came back afterwards? Remember the '22 partial mobilization resulted in iirc ~2 million Russians leaving, mostly for the near-abroad. However the majority came back after less than a year. I think Russia's economy "starting to struggle" is no an indication of imminent collapse on a 12 month timeline. And as far as the territorial movements go, I would agree that if we were talking about the kinds of movements we saw Oct '23 - Jan '24 then yes, they wouldn't matter. But we saw hundreds of sq kms changing hands each month in the second half of '24. My estimate is somewhere around 4 000 sq kms were taken by Russian last year. By itself that pace isn't enough to end Ukraine but it's an indication that the pace can change. If we see another qualitative jump in the speed of Russia's advance, Ukraine may lose the war on the ground simply due to Russian forces pushing to the Dnepr. And by the way, last year's advances have pushed the front line up to two strategic resource deposits, the giant pile of lithium north-west of Velikaya Novoselka, and the coal mine near Udachnoe (west of Pokrovsk) that's of vital importance to Ukraine's metallurgical industry.

 

[rsemmes]

Also keep in mind Ukraine has been fighting with "one hand tied behind their back"; for a very long time they could not attack any targets on Russian soil using Western provided missiles and munitions, and they had for a long time no or very few of their own long-range missiles, a huge advantage for Russia.

I would say Ukraine has been fighting with an extra hand. Ukraine can use Ukrainian weapons in whatever way Ukraine sees fit.

Edit.
Has Russia been hitting (Ukrainian?) satellites providing Ukraine with information? Or any other Ukrainian resource providing intelligence?

 

[Fredled]

I would further propose that there is currently little or no Ukrainian presence in Berdin and it is likely back under Russian control for the most part.

I agree. With Russians pushing from almost every direction, advancing in the west and in the south near Sudzha, which is south of Berdin, it would make little sens for Ukrainians to stay there, and very unlikely that they have this possibility.
From what I heard, Ukrainians attacked Berdin with 20 IFV/APC and 3 tanks. They are moving a lot back and forth. They are sometimes spotted briefly beyond Russian lines or in places that they lost a few days before, then they disapear again. IMO what we see from the geolocations in Kursks are maneuvers rather than repositioning. Ukrainians are slowly being pushed back. That's a fact.

About Pokrovsk: As with every other towns, it stays under Ukrainian control until the day it doesn't. Russians can be bogged down in an endless siege for months, then in a few days they take the city. Currently Russians are one mile from the city. When I say "in a few weeks", it can be a few months as well. And this if they don't sent meaningful reinforcements. If they do, then it can last until God knows when.

__________________________

A NATO unit that deploys to this front line under these conditions will learn some painful lessons

To some extent I agree however your scenario seems highly unlikely, since one huge advantage NATO has, is the massive air power.

And if you don't need a T-90 tank company to engage a NATO mech formation because instead you have a swarm of drones, operating on different frequencies, some wire-guided some not, it changes the game.

I'm afraid NATO countries don't fully grasp the importance of drone warefare. They do see drones are important but not as much as they should. I haven't hear of massive drone production program in any of the NATO country. Of course such program may be sercret, but multi billion spending decision are often known publically. When UK announced sending 30 thousand drones to Ukraine, everybody was laughing. At the bginning of the war this number would have seemed huge. Today it's barely 6 days of use. Ukraine has used over one million drone in 2024 (1.5 million maybe), as much as artillery shells. Europe and US are nowhere near this production level. Our drones are still prohibitively expensives for mass production. We just can't produce something cheap. However high end drones are still way superior to what we can meet over Ukraine. But not in the anti infantry IFV field.

The other bad surprise was that Russians are able to jam everything GPS guided. And it seems that GPS became the main navigation system and that we don't have much alternative to it. There are some counter-measures being developed, but the big advantage NATO missiles had 25 years ago is no more.

I think those numbers are pure fantasy.

800K killed or wounded is the figure given by the Ukrainian MoD/Ukrinform. But there are other indications that the number of casualities is very bad for Russians. One metric is the money Russia is ready to pay to hire volunteers. The record was recently broken at 5000 000 Rubles in upfront payment just for signing up (this doesn't include the salary). It shows both inflation and the difficulty to recruit.

And Ukraine has shown a less-than-ideal use of some western munitions like the recent HIMARS strike on a shopping center in Donetsk. Or the strikes on Ryl'sk and L'gov that didn't hit any visible military targets and instead destroyed civilian infrastructure. I think even if Ukraine was given the green light to hit whatever they want, the results wouldn't be substantially different from what we saw here.

It seems that Russians are able to intercept ATACMS. And sometimes Storm Shadows. Now when we say ATACMS, we are talking about 30 years old end-of-life technology.
I don't think that Ukrainians make poor use of their ammunitions, save a few mistake here and there which can be sometimes dramatic. They also scored big hits. The last week oil depots were burning every night in Russia and still burning at the time of writing.
Of course the western media, not only Ukrinform, are amplifying any rumour of success, often to discover later that the damages inflicted were minimal if not non-existent. It's not that easy to hit targets several hundred miles away and the Russian air defence is quiet effective when they deploy enough of them, and the modern ones.

Unless Russia accept negotiations during 2025 I suspect we will see a collapse of Russian economy late 2025 or in 2026. I think such a collapse will have a much bigger impact on the outcome of the war in Ukraine, than winning or losing a few square km of land per month.

There is no, and there won't be any total collapse because they still manage to export oil and gold. Russia has lost its financial and economical power totaly. In this sens, we can talk of a collapse. But it's not a collapse that prevent the Russian industry to produce weapons and hire soldiers.
The Russian economy is degrading gradually and will keep degrading in the next months and years if the war doesn't stop. This is a reality that only start to be seen today in the streets of the Russian cities.

But of course there are multiple possible scenarios for NATO involvement in a fight against Russia. Many have talked about a possible French or European expeditionary force fighting alongside Ukraine on the existing front.

Not on the front. The official contingent discussed at the high level would be deployed in the west of Ukraine, it best (or at worse?) would relieve reserves watching the Belrassian border.
It would involve air defence, air base and logistic.
I don't think they are ready to send a significant number of troops in a foreseable future. France certainly doesn;t have the money for that. The idea is still debated. According to analysts, such talks are more a message to Putin that Europe is not going to abandon Ukraine and is ready to take further steps. I don't think Putin is very impressed.

his may or may not materialize, but I can see a "volunteer" formation staffed by EU citizens, funded and equipped by NATO, going to Ukraine to fight as part of the "Foreign Legion".

It's already the case. The EU gives Ukraine cash. Ukraine use this cash to hire mercenaries from Europe, among other things. There is anestimated 20 to 30 thousand western mercenaries in Ukraine (10 to 15K from Poland). Without foreign money, Ukraine wouldn;t be able to afford so many. Most of them are carrier soldiers, poften from elite forces. On the flip side, most of them are above 50 years old.

Some analyst think that the "official deployment" would only make the presence of western mercenaries official and openly supported by the political leadership. Now, that's only speculation.

 

[Vivendi]

This is one possibility but I'm not so sure. NATO's defense spending has increased, but without the US they will have problems. Many NATO armies readiness rates remain poor, and there has been a substantial depletion of arsenals to give to Ukraine in many areas.

From an air war standpoint just European NATO definitely has an advantage over Russia, but I don't know that the advantage is as devastating as you describe. I think NATO would win eventually, but it probably wouldn't be all that short. Recall a US-led coalition spent many weeks battering down the Iraqi air force and air defense grid in 1991. Russia is much larger and in theory a much more challenging opponent then Iraq. So realistically we're probably looking at several months. I guess the term "short" is fungible, and compared to a 3 year slog on the ground, a 3-6 month war would be short. But I also think there will be nasty surprises in store for NATO. Prime example, the R-37M that suddenly made upgraded MiG-31s relevant. I don't think anyone saw that coming.

The US is still in NATO. Anyway the picture in Europe is not black and white. Finland and Sweden are now both NATO members and in particular Finland has significant capabilities, including arsenals. They already had solid arsenals 3 years ago and they immediately started adding more when Russia launched their full invasion. Poland also started investing heavily in defense since 2022. Also, weapons production has ramped up in nearly all European countries the last 3 years. New factories are being built. As for long range munitions: France is boosting SCALP production (and Exocet missiles), Germany still has around 600 Taurus, Netherlands has ordered Tomahawks, Finland has a number of JASSM and has recently ordered a number of JASSM-ER, the same has Poland and Netherlands done (more than 1,200 in total), in addition, Poland and Netherlands is about to get AARGM-ER SEAD/DEAD missiles (Poland: 360; Netherlands: 256), and Finland has also ordered an unknown number of these missiles. Norway is ramping up production of NSM/JSM missiles (two assembly lines are already up and running in Norway, I believe manufacturing 500 NSM/JSM per year; and two more are being set up, one in US and one in Australia).

The F-35 did not exist in 1991, it is a game changer. Also, I assumed the scenario was not an invasion of Russia but rather weaken Russian military capabilities to level where they will not be able to sustain their fight in Ukraine and be forced to pull out, a quite different scenario from Iraq.

Here's another potential one - during the recent tactical nuclear weapon drills Russian MiG-31s were flying with air-air R-33s with nuclear payloads (training version I hope). How well hardened against EMP is an F-35? How about an E-3 Sentry? And this bring us to the real point. I think Russia will go nuclear long before NATO reaches the kind of air dominance you describe. Stopping all Russian tactical nuclear inbounds is going to be impossible. Some are practically guaranteed to get through.

Yes as I already said Nuclear would be Russia's only realistic option (apart from pulling out of Ukraine). However if they do they will regret it, deeply. NATO would be forced to respond in kind, leading to destruction of Russia.

And let's not forget things like SCALP/Storm Shadows, Patriot batteries, IRIS-Ts, NASAMS, and other systems have been handed over to Ukraine in substantial quantities. Have those arsenals been replenished?

They are being replenished as we speak. IRIS-T production has been tripled and will be doubled again this year, to 800-1,000 missiles per year. German arms maker Diehl to ramp up production of IRIS-T air defence system | Reuters . NASAMS production is also up, as is production of AIM missiles and AMRAAMs; AMRAAM production is already 1,200 a year and can quickly be scaled up to 2,000 per year if there is a need for it. RTX Awarded $1.19B AMRAAM Contract - The Largest AMRAAM Award To-Date - The Aviationist . AASM production in France will reach 1,200 per year, France Will Increase Production of AASM Hammer Smart Bombs in 2025 | Defense Express .

A new factory in Germany will produce 1,000 Patriot missiles. First Patriot missile facility outside US starts up in Germany | Stars and Stripes

None of this is war level production, merely enhancement of existing lines. If NATO were to go on a war footing then much larger investments will be made of course. I am sorry but Russia cannot compete with NATO and Russians know this. There is a reason why Russia is very careful to stay below article 5 provocations, sticking to assassinations, sabotage, disinformation campaigns and cyber attacks against NATO countries.