Royal New Zealand Air Force

[Todjaeger]

We have a large moat around us with a minimum with of 2200 km, this means we can only be reached by air or sea over a considerable distance,which is well outside the combat radius of all but some long range transports or bombers. So as I have always said we do need to improve our surveillance so additional P8's and a basic AEW ability. the E 7 would be a total overkill. The ability to destroy or neutralise what was deemed hostile would be needed and this is more about the weapons than the aircraft, Second hand aircraft in the F15,16,18 range would be perfectly adequate if fitted with a good radar and a modern fire control ability say using possibly the CAMM ( similar to what our navy has) for airborne targets and the AGM 158 for surface targets. F 35 again would be overkill

I take issue with the notion that NZ is surrounded by a large 'moat' as others put it. Yes, that much water and distance between NZ and other land masses, does add to the difficulties in successfully engaging with NZ, but it also provides opportunities to do so as well. Namely that same 'moat' is also a 'highway' or really a SLOC which potential hostiles can transit and close with NZ. Unless/until NZ has sufficient Situational Awareness capabilities to cover maritime domain awareness, then the potential exists for hostile vessels to close with NZ and carry out ill intent. The same applies to various points along NZ's SLOC between NZ and major Kiwi trading partners and/or foreign resources, but these are even more difficult to establish and then maintain SA of.

I do not mean to harp on about this, but just seeing NZ's status as an island nation as being protected by a 'moat' is to continue the 'sea blindness' which has infected NZ defence planning for so very long. Yes, the need for a long, over water transit adds a complication to plans a hostile force might have, but it also introduces opportunities as well.

Consider this hypothetical;

In a time of rising tensions between great and middle powers, factionalism has broken out within an ASEAN/S. Pacific nation as different factions want very different relations with rivaling great/middle powers. As a result of this factionalism, an ASEAN/S. Pacific nation has become unstable and either a NZ force, or a Kiwi contingent to an international stabilization force, is to be deployed to stabilize the situation and attempt to prevent the impacted ASEAN/S. Pacific nation from sliding into the status of a 'failed state' or even becoming a client state for one of the great or middle powers.

As a result of either the deployment of Kiwi personnel, or the intent to deploy Kiwis, naval vessels and/or merchant shipping are going to be involved to get boots on the ground, or to ship in logistical support.

Now, imagine what sort of impact the presence, in NZ, of a foreign "fishing vessel" could have upon such a deployment. Particularly if the vessel had a bit of extra kit and/or personnel to either gather intel, or take direct action. Imagine the issues NZ would face, if one or two naval mines were dropped covertly in the Ports of Auckland, or somewhere else in a naturally limited chokepoint around NZ? Or alternately, if such a vessel (or a foreign flagged cargo vessel) were to have some extra personnel tasked with taking direct, covert action to damage or disable vessels which are to steam from NZ to the area NZDF personnel are to deploy to. This same protective 'moat' also provides a route where forces can get close to NZ while detection is difficult, and then be able to take action which impacts NZ as a whole, and the potentially slip away again.

With the potential for a scenario like I outlined above, plus other possibilities, I really do not see the point of getting fixated upon a particular solution, particularly one with as narrow a range of capabilities.

 

[Gooey]

Let me pose a scenario that is not totally off the planet but is illustrative of a number of scenarios to our northern regions.
The Chinese have created a base in Tulagi in the Solomon Islands.
As well as controlling Tulagi, they occupy Santa Isobel and Malaita and are preparing, with Chinese help, to invade Guadalcanal/Honiara.
Naturally the Aust and NZ governments find this totally unacceptable, have backed the Honiara government and have deployed COIN Ops forces to assist.
So, what can the RNZAF bring to the operation which adds to or is complimentary to the ADF?

ASSAIL my apologies for selectively slicing your scenario, which I borrow to emphasis '... what can RNZAF bring to the party (sic)'; tip-top, bonus points for incorporating Tulagi Island on the 78th anniversary of Battle of Coral Sea.

Given our deteriorating strategic environment your scenario is entirely reasonable as a low-end conflict in our AO, sadly. What it does not include are the higher-end responses that could/would be necessary to deter escalation of a CCP supplied insurrection. This would include air supremacy for logistics and ISR missions; with potential for ASuW and ASW.

The unique contribution of air based kinetic options remains valid in this example, with flexibility (multi-missions), range/speed (reach/response) and firepower. Missing these capabilities is the real stupidity of the previous NZ Gov.’s ACF decision that I believe now gives it no meaningful kinetic options to CONTRIBUTE to the defence of NZ (beyond a cool national anthem).

An assumption is that the RNZAF force will be forthcoming as part of the NZ Gov. CONTRIBUTION to the AO and mandated NZDF main effort (ala Timor). This will be entirely proportional to the resources that NZ decides to invest in the next decade(s). If it is the current level (<1% GDP), then there will be little meaningful beyond a light infantry Company, some P8s and a patrol frigate (if lucky). If it is a NATO-potato standard (2% GDP), if could include more of the above plus light jets and FFGs. If NZ Gov. decides that it must spend more resources (say 2.5-3+% GDP) due to the current threat levels and strategic unpredictable (I would argue that it should), then it could be F-35B with PGMs, more FFGs, AH, etc. as well as increased quantities of land and P8s.

Some notes:

1. A RNZAF niche capability, such as STOL ACF (i.e. F-35B) is my contribution to the shopping list brigade; for limited LHD and then small airstrip ops, in the Sth Pacific.

2. If RNZAF is to get back into the ACF game, then the only FVEY, first-world adult answer worth the effort is JSF. Potentially, via temporary 4th generation aircraft.

3. I emphasis CONTRIBUTION, as NZDF will always be operating as part of an Allied response. If deference has failed and this scenario degenerates into Takao's higher-end Type 3/4, 052D, 055 SAG then US ISR (targeting) and SSNs/air would most likely contribute to ADF and NZDF air and sea. Crikey, sounds like Battle of Coral Sea Part 2!

4. The concept of NZ sea blindness, seems to apply to military air too. Which is amazing considering our history of 1941 in Crete and 1942 in Sth Pacific.

5. Aside from the aircraft, operational capability and national prestige, I opinion that the lack of a ACF capability has also robbed the RNZAF of the professional knowledge to best advise NZ Gov. on all things air combat. So making NZ decision makers even more blinkered (sea/air blind). Until increased resources are allocated to RNZAF and NZDF over the next decade(s), this lack of professional knowledge will only perpetuate.

 

[OldTex]

What NZ needs to do is work it's DCP to determine with key alliance partners Aus & US what it is that NZ could bring to the party that would actually add value and not be more a hindrance than a help. I'd like to think that is what has gone, in spades, into last year's DCP with the big surprise being, eventually, 2 fairly capable amphib vessels; plus it has the P8 & the fore-shadowed maritime satellite & UAV capabilities; and SH-2G replacement. As I've previously mentioned, make the DCP the first priority, complete it then make the next priority giving that plan more depth, particularly with a bigger air transport fleet.... then maybe we can start considering AT6 for COIN etc... if Allies suggest that is worth pursuing.

Perhaps where NZ can add value is through the provision of launch services for small sats (SAR and AIS come to mind) from Mahia (and potentially other sites) . Between NZSA and ASA there should be ample opportunities for sovereign satellite surveillance capabilities to be developed and put into service. These would complement the broad area surveillance capabilities provided by Jindalee OTHR and MQ-4 Triton (when they are fielded). This information would aid the generation of a RMP. This would then be used to prioritize P-8 (or other MRA) assets to conduct reconnaissance and verification. The prosecution of the contacts could then be passed to other maritime or air assets if necessary.

 

[Rob c]

1. The threat is building against stealth aircraft and munitions. Its ships and kit are designed to defeat F/A-18E and F-35C. Plus the munitions they bring. Second hand aircraft won't cut it.

I have not got time to answer all that was said in this post at this time but will later, however I will say that I made it very clear that the aircraft were to stay below the radar horizon which is the point at which the curvature of the earth causes the the radar to lose its ability to detect surface targets and this is governed by the height of the radar transmitter and the further out you go the higher horizon is so that an aircraft flying below the radar horizon is not detectable. I also suggested the weapon to be used was the AGM158 which is stealthy and salvo fired from multiple directions would become a real handful. The second hand aircraft are never in harms way as they are just the launch platform. I will deal with the rest later, don't nit pick details but look at the hole picture. ,

 

[Gibbo]

Twenty years ago NZ had an offer of 28 F-16s at a bargain price.
An old fiend of mine who was in the NZ Air Force at the time was always professionally guarded in saying too much about defence stuff, but I do recall the comment it was the" deal of the century." Eyes rolled.
Defence dollars were scarce and other priorities, both budgetary and political ended the deal.
Often wondered the "what if "had it gone through.
Certainly had some chats in general terms as to the pro's and con's of a NZ Fast Air.
One attribute was not so much some high end take on the big guy confrontation but rather the ability to have a modest show of force.
The ability to send a pair of aircraft at distance.
The grey area of political brinkmanship when hopefully shots are nor fired, but your flag is shown.
Japan is constantly doing this against both Chinese and Russian Air incursions as her outlying island sovereignty is tested.
At this stage NZ does not have this challenge and hopeful never will.

So in the 2020's whats the best bang for your buck if your a modest sized nation of 5 million in the south Pacific.
Bring back Fast Air or invest in other assets.

I'd suggest with the existing budget, Fast Air is but a dream.


Regards S

Yeah I reckon dumping the F-16 deal was akin to friggin treason! So what do we do in 2020?... get the DCP sorted, with some extra depth to it's currently proposed capability (sorry, I am sounding like a broken record). Then we find a niche where we can play a modest, but highly respected contribution. There's 2 areas which I have recurring thoughts about but it would be for the experts to debate the detailed merits, or otherwise, of said capabilities being introduced to the NZDF.
(1) A properly equipped combat search & rescue capability... not the full cast of ground-attack aircraft, tankers and airborne command post aircraft that may be required (we rely on allies for those), but we provide the AAR capable choppers do the actual pickups, which SF & medics on board. I'm not going to suggest what type of chopper... but 4-5 of such a fleet would be a real niche that we could excel in... and even sell it as a 'saving lives' capability (not withstanding you may have to kill people to effect a successful retrieval)
(2) Fast-jet recon, with electronic warfare capability... again it might only require 5 a/c or so... long range would be the key for our region. The focus here is to get in quick & out quick... or have satellites made this a redundant capability these days?

Yes not outright defensive capabilities, but potentially key contributions to the collective effort, which is where we need to focus our energies.

 

[ASSAIL]

I have not got time to answer all that was said in this post at this time but will later, however I will say that I made it very clear that the aircraft were to stay below the radar horizon which is the point at which the curvature of the earth causes the the radar to lose its ability to detect surface targets and this is governed by the height of the radar transmitter and the further out you go the higher horizon is so that an aircraft flying below the radar horizon is not detectable. I also suggested the weapon to be used was the AGM158 which is stealthy and salvo fired from multiple directions would become a real handful. The second hand aircraft are never in harms way as they are just the launch platform. I will deal with the rest later, don't nit pick details but look at the hole picture. ,

The formula for calculating radar horizon range is Rnms= 1.23(sq root radar antenna ht + sq root target ht)
Therefor an attacking aircraft at 25,000ft can see and be seen at just over 200nms by a ships antenna at 100ft
I’m not aware of the height restrictions if any to launch an AGM 158 but it would appear that a strike aircraft would have to be at or above 25,000 ft to gain targeting info in order to launch and this would be very close to the missiles max range.
The alternative is to remain below the radar horizon and pop up at shorter ranges to Aquire the target and fire which infers greater risk to the attacker.

 

[Rob c]

This paragraph highlights the limitations with kit-focused issues as opposed to looking a the wider issues on the Red and Blue sides.

First the Red mission and intent needs to be considered, as well as their capabilities. NZ can't really be invaded nor struck (as you say, a 2200 km moat). Which makes it very valuable for a Pacific campaign, just as it was in the 1940s. For a FVEY or similar operation this has huge advantages, especially for operations in the SCS or south west Pacific. Which makes it a valuable target if you can effect it - there's likely to be a bunch of third line enablers there that will rapidly impact Blue forces. NZ's critical vulnerability though, is it's an island. It can't survive without imports and it cannot sustain such Blue forces. And it's unlikely you have weeks of supply. It may be worth trying to undermine the FVEY alliance - especially if combined with anti-nuke information operations or similar. Even better - you cut the SLOC to the west and you impact Australia too - stuff from the US has to fight through or go twice as far. At that range, you can't really use aircraft - so submarines and ships are it. Their advantage is they don't even have to come within range of NZ to blockade.

By not considering the likely threat (surface vessels, not bombers), you've under estimated the actual problem. Bombers come to you simplifying the targeting problem - ships don't.

Yes NZ will be a valuable target especially if the US amies prediction of a breakdown in world order comes to pass. In which case help may not be available to us They even predicted the possible breakdown of civil order in the USA, With our current armed forces it would be easy to simply sail into a harbour, say Wellington or maybe Napier with ro ro ships and take over.
If you had read what I was saying properly I definitely included ships and advocated the AGM 158 as a possible fit for our aircraft. You would need to read all of the recent posts on the subject to get the full meaning of what was said.

 

[Todjaeger]

Yeah I reckon dumping the F-16 deal was akin to friggin treason! So what do we do in 2020?... get the DCP sorted, with some extra depth to it's currently proposed capability (sorry, I am sounding like a broken record). Then we find a niche where we can play a modest, but highly respected contribution. There's 2 areas which I have recurring thoughts about but it would be for the experts to debate the detailed merits, or otherwise, of said capabilities being introduced to the NZDF.
(1) A properly equipped combat search & rescue capability... not the full cast of ground-attack aircraft, tankers and airborne command post aircraft that may be required (we rely on allies for those), but we provide the AAR capable choppers do the actual pickups, which SF & medics on board. I'm not going to suggest what type of chopper... but 4-5 of such a fleet would be a real niche that we could excel in... and even sell it as a 'saving lives' capability (not withstanding you may have to kill people to effect a successful retrieval)
(2) Fast-jet recon, with electronic warfare capability... again it might only require 5 a/c or so... long range would be the key for our region. The focus here is to get in quick & out quick... or have satellites made this a redundant capability these days?

Yes not outright defensive capabilities, but potentially key contributions to the collective effort, which is where we need to focus our energies.

Not sure that either of the two suggestions would really be workable, certainly not without either having the NZDF given up existing capabilities or requiring fairly significant additional funding.

For the suggestion of having a CSAR capability which the NZDF could make available for use by friends/allies... Without even getting into what would be required to provide a useful CSAR capability, there are some questions and issues which immediately spring to mind. The first and probably most major question would be, "just where would NZDF have to be, to conduct CSAR missions, and how would they get there?" The second major issue would be just what the circumstances would have to be and what agreements would need to be in place, for other countries to engage in expeditionary operations and not only rely upon, but actually be able to rely on NZ to provide a CSAR capability?

For the first question (which really has two parts) I can only assume that if NZ were to carry out CSAR operations, this would be part of expeditionary warfare and likely as part of a coalition. I just cannot see CSAR ops being conducted from NZ without the defence situation degrading seriously enough that the defence of the realm was a real concern. With that in mind, that any CSAR ops would be conducted away from NZ, that means any NZDF CSAR helicopters would need to be somehow brought into the theatre of operations, but also have a vessel or facility to operate from. All of this would be required in order for such a unit to start conducting operations, never mind what assets and resources would be needed during the CSAR ops. This in turn would either require sufficiently large and capable number of transport and logistical support assets to enable a NZDF CSAR capability to be rapidly deployed from a NZ base to wherever in the world NZ needed to conduct CSAR, or during a deployment NZ would need to transport a CSAR capability to a FOB and then be able to sustain the forward deployed capability.

The second issue I raised has to do with the potential problems other nations might have in relying upon NZ for a CSAR capability, as well as issues NZ might have with carrying out CSAR ops for another country and in fact these two sub issues are related. For example, if Country A has entered into agreements with NZ in which NZ would provide a CSAR capability should something happen to personnel from Country A, what happens if (really, WHEN) Country A is involved in an op that NZ cannot/will no support politically or diplomatically? Either NZ would be forced to provide the CSAR capability even though the gov't/population of NZ wants nothing to do with the op in question, or NZ tells Country A that due to Kiwi objections to the op, no CSAR capability will be provided. In many respects this concern is like that which had been expressed previously regarding a jointly-owned RAAF/RNZAF C-17 Globemaster III fleet. The major difference being that a CSAR operation is inherently more dangerous than the majority of airlift ops that a jointly owned transport fleet would be exposed to.

As for a fast jet recon/EW capability, especially a long-range one, that sounds very much like whatever the RAAF might planning/doing with the MC-55A “Peregrine” EW aircraft built on modified G550 aircraft. To put this into perspective, the US State Dept. approval of the purchase of four aircraft was announced in June 2017 with a cost of USD$1.3 bil. That would require some serious coin in order for NZ to get a comparable capability, which would also be NZ replicating some of the efforts of Australia and the US.

Another item, which I had not raised previously, is that while this are indeed specialist/niche capabilities (which are also rather expensive and as a result why they are niche capabilities) they are also IMO not capabilities that NZ would really get much use or value out of. I could be mistaken, but IIRC the cost for one of the RAAF's MC-55A EW aircraft was/is comparable to that of a P-8A Poseidon. However, a RNZAF P-8A Poseidon can provide valuable patrolling SA directly to NZ and from within NZ's sea approaches. If the RNZAF had aircraft like the MC-55A, I doubt much use for the capabilities in/around NZ itself, or directly to NZ forces unless/until they were deployed in a hostile area somewhere.

 

[Todjaeger]

The formula for calculating radar horizon range is Rnms= 1.23(sq root radar antenna ht + sq root target ht)
Therefor an attacking aircraft at 25,000ft can see and be seen at just over 200nms by a ships antenna at 100ft
I’m not aware of the height restrictions if any to launch an AGM 158 but it would appear that a strike aircraft would have to be at or above 25,000 ft to gain targeting info in order to launch and this would be very close to the missiles max range.
The alternative is to remain below the radar horizon and pop up at shorter ranges to Aquire the target and fire which infers greater risk to the attacker.

Also with respect to the radar horizon, one has to consider the potential that a target ship or TF might have an organic AEW capability of some sort.

An attacking aircraft flying at an altitude of 25,000 ft has a radar horizon of ~206 n miles to ship-mounted radar ~100 ft. above the water. However, that same aircraft would be detectable to a radar system engaged in air or air/surface searches aboard a helicopter orbiting at 10,000 ft. from ~317 n miles. In effect, a TF has a decent chance of knowing when there is incoming hostile air well before the hostile air would be in a position to detect the TF unless offboard sensors were available and used.

 

[Shanesworld]

Also with respect to the radar horizon, one has to consider the potential that a target ship or TF might have an organic AEW capability of some sort.

An attacking aircraft flying at an altitude of 25,000 ft has a radar horizon of ~206 n miles to ship-mounted radar ~100 ft. above the water. However, that same aircraft would be detectable to a radar system engaged in air or air/surface searches aboard a helicopter orbiting at 10,000 ft. from ~317 n miles. In effect, a TF has a decent chance of knowing when there is incoming hostile air well before the hostile air would be in a position to detect the TF unless offboard sensors were available and used.

How does reduced cross section fit into the above formula?

 

[Rob c]

This misses the point of a Defence Force greatly, and highlights a kit-approach to problems misses a lot.

1. A nation's sovereignty does not stop at the border. This is the key to the Defence of Australia crap of the 1990s - if you have to go offshore you can't do that if you think otherwise. NZ has sovereign interests in a multitude of places off the small islands, including the Persian Gulf, Singapore and it's surrounds, Antarctica, the Pacific Islands, Australia and the Pacific out to Hawaii. The NZDF cannot defend that.

2. The way it can is through making alliances (and, in DFAT friendly language, diplomatic agreements). To this end, you will become an adjunct force to Australia and the US. Which is a good thing! You support US operations in Iraq and Australian operations in Timor Leste (like you have) you prove your value to them and when the time comes it's not NZ defending the area in point 1 - it's the US, Australia and NZ. Which makes life easier!

3. This will demand forces that can work together (so probably not second hand fighter aircraft) and sometimes going to places you'd rather not in support of your allies. Of course you won't agree on everything - but as it is NZ and Australia have an excellent reputation among senior US military peeps because we call them when they need it. Some have even suggested that we exceed the Brit capability in this over the past decade or so.

4. Like it or not, you will almost always fight beside us. We cover your western flank and northern flank, we share enormous amounts of culture and history and have similar needs and goals. I've sat in meetings where (at a high level) we have discussed, with NZDF people, the idea of giving up major chunks of NZDF capability (think entire Corps or fleets) because if the NZDF ever needs those capabilities they'll be alongside Australian's who will have brought them.

5. This doesn't even touch on the other, non-military national security issues that you've missed that see NZ publicly sharing and conforming to other nations.

6. None of this should be shameful or upsetting. The the biggest Army's of the world couldn't stop catastrophic invasions in 1940 or 1941, and their tactical and strategic situations were a magnitude easier than NZ's. France and the USSR needed allies to win their nation back. Furthermore, despite what (4) may sound like - Australia does this! We can't defence our area's of interest, we never have been able to. So we look to a strong ally with shared values - the UK and then the US. The ADF cannot defend Australia's interests alone. But with help, it can. NZ is the same.

What I said does not miss the point at all, The reality is that if you first of all cannot control your own sovereignty you have no ability to control anything else. Most of what you mentioned is important but if you lose control of your sovereignty you lose control of everything. We need to get the horse back in front of the cart, as what you are talking about is what is in the cart but we need the horse(our sovereignty ) first to be able to use what is in the cart. To say the french situation was easier than ours would be is ridiculous as They were kept blind to the threat and had know way of having surveillance information of the German army's disposition, strength ,or location. they lost air cover and completely misread the situation. The moat we have around us simplifies the situation as with good surveillance there is nowhere to hide. The rest later.

 

[alexsa]

Good day folks .... I sense the discussion is getting emotive. For the sake of good order I think we should be able to take note of each others veiws and, while enjoying a robust conversation, keep the angst out ot it. All we ask is a bit of respect to be shown by all. I note there are those on this forum who are very experianced and well understand the issues.

alexsa

 

[Todjaeger]

How does reduced cross section fit into the above formula?

AFAIK it does not, because it is something else. The formula for determining radar horizon is just that, the RCS (radar cross section) of an object like a ship or aircraft is a separate variable. I believe (which also means I would very well be wrong on this) that in terms of RCS a potentially detecting radar system would have a certain resolution at a given range. For example, the Acme APG-X radar (completely made up by me) might have a resolution to detect contacts with a RCS of 1 sq. m. at 100 n miles. What this would mean that a possible contact, with a nominal RCS of 1 sq. m. which is ~101 n miles away, would be outside the detection capabilities of the Acme APG-X radar, or if the possible contact was only 75 n miles away but had a RCS of perhaps 0.5 sq. m. that too might be beyond the Acme APG-X radar's detection capabilities.

What the radar horizon is talking about is how the curvature of the Earth, potentially along with intervening terrain, would be a barrier which radar signals or visual observation just could not 'see' a contact. In this case the size or RCS of a contact is not relevant because there is a barrier between the observer and observed.

 

[Rob c]

Also with respect to the radar horizon, one has to consider the potential that a target ship or TF might have an organic AEW capability of some sort.

An attacking aircraft flying at an altitude of 25,000 ft has a radar horizon of ~206 n miles to ship-mounted radar ~100 ft. above the water. However, that same aircraft would be detectable to a radar system engaged in air or air/surface searches aboard a helicopter orbiting at 10,000 ft. from ~317 n miles. In effect, a TF has a decent chance of knowing when there is incoming hostile air well before the hostile air would be in a position to detect the TF unless offboard sensors were available and used.

Yes first of all you need that AEW within our moat area and the Helicopter would be vulnerable to attack before the ship and to be useful would have to have an anti air capability of longer range the the anti ship missile in use, say in excess of 300 km RNZAF practice was to do anti shipping at 50 ft which gives a very small radar horizon for fire control radars.

@RobC

You are clearly keen to respond but this does not make sense. We are all occasionally guilty of poor message structure but please check before your post. Please review.

alexsa

 

[Todjaeger]

Yes first of all you need that AEW within our moat area and the Helicopter would be vulnerable to attack before the ship and to be useful would have to have an anti air capability of longer range the the anti ship missile in use, say in excess of 300 km RNZAF practice was to do anti shipping at 50 ft which gives a very small radar horizon for fire control radars.

Not quite sure that we are talking about the same things. The potential AEW capability I was referring to was one that was supporting a possible hostile ship or TF, and not the NZDF.

In that case, a AEW-like helicopter at 10,000 ft supporting a hostile TF would potentially detect a inbound hypothetical RNZAF ACF on an anti-shipping/maritime strike mission flying at an altitude of 50 ft when the RNZAF sortie crossed over the radar horizon ~131 n miles away from the AEW-like helicopter.

While 131 n miles is a considerably closer/shorter radar horizon than a 300+ n mile radar horizon, it would still be long before the strike package would detect the target ships without offboard sensors.

 

[OPSSG]

Everyone, please pause, review and rethink before posting.

We value all your input but if this trend continues, the Mod Team may have to elect to close this thread, for a few days, to allow cooling down time.

 

[Rob c]

2. Second hand aircraft cost more. Sure, the upfront costs are less, but you'll pay more for maintenance, more for integration and more for a mid-mid-life upgrade.

3. CAMM is a SAM based on an AIM-132. Why would you use that and not an AIM-132?

4. You are marshalling aircraft around the sky with, if you haven't 100% confirmed it, the possibility of a Type 003 or 004 around. Any of that needs AEW&C. Even in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria - where most of the time there hasn't been a red air force - AEW&C is essential. You want to conduct a precision strike on a modern threat (that's facing forces that use E-2's, E-3s and E-7s) you need that coordination. Sure, an E-7 may be overkill. So it's an E-2. They still cost 2 - 3x a fighter, so if you can afford 28 fighters it's actually 22 + 3 AEW&C.

5. The Red force (and now it's not just China, but anything) will be expecting to go to war against F-35s. You have to match that. That's what their defences are planned to defeat.

6. What are you using to target the ships? You need some form of over-the-horizon solution for your second-hand aircraft - so what sits there being risked? It could be US or similar satellites, but if it's RNZDF then it's a P-8. And that'll die. How does the targeting aircraft remain within line of sight but outside SAM range? You can't just lob missiles over the horizon without some targeting capability.

7. You seriously under-estimate the problems faced in conducting a strike against a prepared SAG of multiple ships. Again, these are ships designed to defeat a US CVNBG attack - a force that has more strike aircraft than your 28 RNZAF fighters.

8. Beyond AEW&C you are still missing enablers, likely AAR (low altitude is going to chew that fuel), search and rescue and EW support.

9 The attack you describe does not align with how the fast-jet drivers I work with have described a maritim

2 please justify with figures, I was in the RNZAF aircraft engineering for 20 years including at D eng as AE2 at Def HQ for 3 years and while there was a maintenance cost increase for second hand aircraft initially this was soon brought under control.
3 Because we have the sea ceptor, same family.
4 No problem with that suggestion
5 Answered that with response to one
6 P8 can stay outside missile range easily and still be in own radar range
7 Nz 75 and 5 sqns managed ok in the 1990's
8 A2A would be good but any threat needs to close the range, so can we can wait until in range if necessary should be ok at 800 km

 

[Todjaeger]

2 please justify with figures, I was in the RNZAF aircraft engineering for 20 years including at D eng as AE2 at Def HQ for 3 years and while there was a maintenance cost increase for second hand aircraft initially this was soon brought under control.
3 Because we have the sea ceptor, same family.
4 No problem with that suggestion
5 Answered that with response to one
6 P8 can stay outside missile range easily and still be in own radar range
7 Nz 75 and 5 sqns managed ok in the 1990's
8 A2A would be good but any threat needs to close the range, so can we can wait until in range if necessary should be ok at 800 km

#3 still does not make any sense. Going back through the prior posts, it was suggested here to use CAMM launched from presumably RNZAF aircraft in an air-to-air role. I too am confused on how/why one would think that CAMM, which is a surface-to-air missile family, would be able to be employed in an air-to-air role. To me, that is like thinking that the RIM-7 Sea Sparrow could be used for air-to-air combat instead of the AIM-7 Sparrow.

 

[alexsa]

Good day all

This is getting out of hand. RobC ... Sea Ceptor is an air defence system using the CAMM missile. The CAMM missile is surface to air but uses components of the ASRAAM (AIM-132)

This is the gist of Tod's response.

Can we play nice or this thread will be locked until calm returns

alexsa

 

[Rob c]

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