Fully agree and the other thing is, if we look back to DWP2010 and another "what if" scenario ..... if only the Govt back then had the fortitude to start to rebuild a new ACF (or interim capability to maintain skillsets) then where would we be today some 6+ years later? Probably 3/4 of the way to FOC etc!
Granted, the country was coming through the GFC and therefore there wasn't the will (in terms of priorities), which unfortunately was mostly understandable. Even DWP2015 didn't present the opportunity, because by and large and for better or worse, DWP15 was pretty much a "steady as she goes" update of the previous DWP10 (rather than a reset, and to the disappointment of our Trans-Tasman neighbours in a number of quarters).
So now the defence capability project (DWP's 10 & 15) is on track, could the next DWP in 2020 provide the reset?
Then if so, what should an "ACF" look like? Can't see any political boldness to be (ideally) lock step with our neighbour's (5th generation), so would we stump for a 4th generation type rehash (and if so what's the point), or, as per the recent discussions on the P-8, should that present the opportunity to acquire another few airframes?
Not only would that make up numbers/availability for normal ISR taskings, but additionally it could also give NZ a great maritime interdiction asset? What would be the pros and cons? Obviously unlike a fighter/attack jet the (larger more conspicuous) P-8 wouldn't be mixing it down to sea level on attack, but presumably that's not necessary with long range stand off delivery (at altitude) capabilities anyway - a possible win-win?
From the FASC doxs - sorry it is a cut and paste job as I cannot link to it but the air combat capability is returning in a new form ....
FASC Response Capability
The FASC project is currently analysing the need for response capabilities, also known as ‘air attack’ in air power doctrine terminology, which are able to coerce an actual, or potential, adversary into changing or maintaining their behaviour to the benefit of the NZDF or NZ Government. The response capabilities of interest to the FASC project are:
Anti Submarine Warfare (ASW): Operations that are conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the effective use of submarines and mitigating against the threat of underwater units and mobile weapons within the maritime environment by destroying or neutralising the threat presented;
Anti Surface Warfare (ASuW): Operations that are conducted to mitigate against the threat of enemy surface forces within the maritime environment and disrupting the enemy's sea lines of communication by destroying or neutralising their surface forces and merchant ships;
Air Interdiction (AI): Action to destroy, disrupt, divert or delay the enemy’s surface potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or otherwise achieve its objectives. It is carried out at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required;
Electronic Warfare (EW): Seeks control of the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, both to enable friendly-force operations, and to deny an enemy the same degree of freedom. It includes defending electronic emitters and receivers from attack via the electromagnetic spectrum (Electronic Protection or EP), and attacking or exploiting enemy electronic emitters and receivers (Electronic Attack or EA).
Concept of Operations for FASC
1. The operational concept for the FASC in Defence will be largely a continuation of the extant P-3K2 Orion based concept, adapted to exploit any greater platform and capability systems performance of the FASC fleet and support systems.
2. The annual operational rate of effort for the FASC will be determined by the capabilities of the acquired platforms. The capacity of FASC to deliver at least the current rates of effort, between 2500 to 3200 hours of airborne operations per year, is expected from the project. The capacity of a FASC fleet to support contemporaneous operations in various areas including New Zealand and the Southern Ocean, South Pacific, Asia-Pacific or at times globally; is valued by the Government.
3. The capability would be operated and supported from a main operating base (or possibly two main operating bases if the fleet composition makes that more appropriate) within New Zealand.
4. Within the New Zealand area, FASC operations will assist with protecting New Zealand’s interests in the Exclusive Economic Zone and Southern Ocean, and contribute to security through combating terrorism and providing support to the civil power. In the broader region, the FASC will be one of the elements that will work with Australian forces to promote and maintain a cooperative approach to regional security.
5. Deployed operations will be conducted from appropriately supported forward operating bases and, where available, will integrate with coalition or partner operations and support arrangements.
6. In the South Pacific, the FASC will enable New Zealand to contribute to the region’s peace and security, and help to maintain the sovereignty of those territories for which New Zealand has constitutional responsibilities.
7. The FASC will also assist during civil emergencies, and with Exclusive Economic Zone surveillance, search and rescue and humanitarian assistance. In the Asia-Pacific region, the FASC will contribute to military operations and will continue to be a key Defence contribution to Five Power Defence Arrangement activities. Globally, the FASC may be used by the Government to support multilateral military operations.
8. Within the military context, these FASC operations will involve support for maritime forces, land forces, air forces and Special Forces, as well as independent air operations. Within the broader whole-of-Government context, FASC operations will also support Government agencies including Fisheries, Customs, Police, Conservation, Maritime New Zealand and the Rescue Coordination Centre.
9. Defence's concepts for a multi-mission force (multipurpose platforms) mean that several of these Government agencies will receive concurrent support from FASC operations. The roles required of the FASC to support these military and whole-of- Government operations consist of surveillance and reconnaissance, search and rescue, direct support anti-submarine warfare and anti-surface warfare, precision strike and command, control and communication. The FASC will also undertake and enable core training and ancillary flying activities necessary to sustain its operations.
10. The existing command and control arrangements apply to the FASC and would deploy forward for both national and coalition missions with national command and control (C2) elements supporting deployed elements either stand alone or embedded in the coalition C2 arrangements. Where appropriate, operational control of FASC elements will be delegated for deployed operations and tactical control delegated for on-scene control of aircraft.
11. Where appropriate, FASC control arrangements must allow sufficient freedom of action for aircraft to contribute to a network enabled environment to allow a broader range of forces and stakeholders to operate more effectively with shared situational awareness. FASC information sharing will be accomplished using the aircrafts’ communication systems in the airborne environment and using a mission planning and analysis system in the ground environment.
Note that EW, EA, Air Interdiction and A/SuW are all part of it. Kind of written for a certain Boeing product if we want to get cynical about it don't you think.
