Sharing a Singaporean Perspective (Post 1 of 2)
Always great to hear your insights on this matter, especially in framing the developments in phases. It adds clarity to the understanding of future developments.
1. In 2014, the size of the Chinese economy reached about US$10.4 trillion, while the US economy stood at US$17.4 trillion in GDP. Some have estimated that the Chinese economy is just 40% smaller than the US when measured at market exchange rates. While China’s growth has slowed considerably compared to the 10% annual growth rates of the past few decades, it is still expected to maintain a significant growth advantage over advanced industrial economies. Consulting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers projects that China will grow at an annual rate of 4.6% between now and 2050, while the US will grow by 2.4% a year. This means that China's defence and coastguard budgets will have room to grow in the next decade.
2. The rest of this post is just a casual observation of current developments. Please take what I say about China with a pinch of salt.
I'm just wondering about the Chinese ability to hold their 'gains' as all players enter the 'second phase.'
3. Absolutely. They will consolidate their gains and use it as a basis to push for more, at the right time. The right time is when the other party makes a wrong move. It is clear that China has a plan. And they execute it, when the time is ripe.
I know this is a little speculative but, do you think they will start to overtly increase military deployments in the region?
4. Does it matter? China will do what they want on islands or rocks they have actual control of. No one is willing to go to war to stop China. Some in the Philippines believe that the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) or suing China will cure all their self inflicted ills; when correctly understood the EDCA is just a band-aid. In fact, no matter how loud the noise the Philippines (as a country incapable of defending itself) and Viet Nam (ruled by a communist party, one party state) make at regional meetings and events about Chinese actions, they don't dare to fire the first shot. While there is sympathy, this noise is the sound of defeat. They are unable to change the facts on the ground. For details, see the 23 Feb. 2016 letter from the US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper to US Senator John McCain answering questions on Chinese reclamation and militarization of its disputed holdings in the South China Sea (quoted in full in the next post below).
5. From my vantage point, both the US (with long standing and strong security related ties with a number of ASEAN countries) and China (with strong economic ties with ASEAN and as a rising global economic power in its own right) are resident powers in the South China Sea, and that is not in dispute. They are both members of ADMM Plus. Both have legitimate and respective roles to play in the region. As smaller countries, the goal of individual member states of ASEAN cannot be to oppose US or China's soft power initiatives. As this extract of
The StraitsTimes from Nov 2015 noted:
The Straits Times said:
Nov 2015 - ...Days after he shared his views on the South China Sea with Beijing, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong reiterated Singapore's stance on the territorial dispute to leaders from the United States and the Philippines.
In meetings with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Philippine President Benigno Aquino, Mr Lee stressed that while Singapore did not have a claim on the disputed waters, it had an interest in preserving peace, stability and freedom of navigation in the area.
He again called for "moderation and restraint" from all the claimants, and for Asean to be at the heart of the discussions.
"The dispute should be resolved through negotiations and in accordance with international law. In this regard, Asean can play an effective and moderating role, without taking any sides," said a statement from the Prime Minister's Office...
Mr Lee also met his Japanese counterpart Yoshihiko Noda, who called for more tie-ups between Singapore and Japanese firms in infrastructural development and investment in the region. Both men also welcomed the launch of negotiations on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which brings Asean and its six dialogue partners together, at the Asean Summit in November.
The US and the Philippines are among the more outspoken voices in the increasingly heated dispute over the South China Sea, where China faces competing claims from Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Brunei.
Mr Lee just concluded a six-day trip in China on Friday, saying that China understood Singapore's position on the dispute and that it was not at odds with China's....
However, some of the less astute regional and American politicians with short time horizons think that polarization is a choice. Some ASEAN member states think that being on one-side is a win (eg. Cambodia and Laos, who are firmly Chinese client states under China's sphere of influence and the Philippines, who become a US client state, without the ability to think for themselves - as they are beholden to their foreign pay masters). In
June 2015, President BS Aquino III of the Philippines likened present-day China to Nazi Germany, in a disgraceful speech made in Japan by the Philippine head of state. Resorting to name calling over disputed maritime claims, at a head of state level in a speech in Japan is at the very least impolitic. It is little wonder then that Sino-Philippines relations will remain poor for the duration of BS Aqunio's next two months, when his term of office ends.
6. The reality is not about binary choices. There should not be a false dichotomy between doing nothing or standing with fellow frontline ASEAN states. In certain cases, the actions of our ASEAN neighbours may not be defendable and they have to bear the conseqences of their irrational choices.
7. Just picking a side is so wrong (for any ASEAN member state that is not a US ally by treaty), at so many levels. From my perspective, having to choose a side, in the period from 2016 to 2021, means we all lose. Classic examples of ASEAN states who have hedged their bets by drawing closer to the US (but have not chosen a side) include Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore.
8. By way of background, in May 2013, the crew of Philippine Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) vessel, PCG-BFAR MCS-3001 (a 115.45 ton vessel and over 30m in length) killed an unarmed Taiwanese citizen by firing over 50 rounds at a smaller Taiwanese fishing boat (a 15.15 ton vessel at 14.7m in length), in a fisheries law enforcement incident. Not sure what the Philippines was thinking when they chose to initiate the May 2013 Guang Da Xing No. 28 incident. In that incident, rogue BFAR fisheries enforcement killed a Taiwanese fisherman in violation of their rules of engagement. This eventually led to Taiwan imposing sanctions. As Philippines was in the wrong, no other country wanted to be tainted by the incident. Consequently, it showed China that no country would stand with the Philippines, when they were guilty of wrong doing. The facts were simple, these individual BFAR agents were wholly at fault, and criminal in conduct. They even tried to doctor evidence of the video recorded and the death was avoidable, if they had been more restrained in their escalation procedures for the use of force. In lieu of proper crisis management, the incompetent BS Aqunio government refused to apologise in a timely manner and do the right thing (aka. compensate the fisherman's family), when their BFAR agents were in the wrong. Since the Philippine side inflamed the situation by being unprincipled in its conduct, the correct way forward for Taiwan was the application of increased sanctions until all 4 of the Taiwanese demands were met, including that the Philippines and Taiwan negotiate a fisheries agreement for waters claimed by both in the Luzon Strait (to which the Philippines had walked away from unilaterally earlier, prior to the incident).
9. Further, as far back as 1999, the Philippine Navy has been ramming and/or sinking Chinese fishing boats (incidents reported on 23 May 1999 and on 20 June 1990). The most recent reported incident of the Philippine Navy ramming a Chinese fishing boat that I know of was on 19 October 2011, which resulted in Manila issuing an apology to the Chinese embassy.
10. While l am concerned about law enforcement officials in claimant states engaging in criminal behaviour, I am equally concerned that the destiny of the South China Sea does not become a Chinese lakeside destination for China (with one dominant power that calls all the shots). If China's goals are moderate, they will win. If China's goals are slightly less than moderate but freedom of navigation for trade is not impeded, they will still win. With One Belt, One Road (一带一路) and the creation of AIIB (亚洲基础设施投资银行), rolled out with breath taking speed, China as the second largest economy in the world is showing the world its ability to lead. It also cannot be denied that China's pattern of behaviour with regard to using non-tariff trade sanctions against the Philippines in some sectors as a tool of coercive diplomacy has resulted in caution by the smaller regional players. It tells ASEAN members that the China-ASEAN free trade agreement only works, if they follow Beijing's lead. Which is why, ASEAN members are now even more welcoming of US and comforted by the presence of forward deployed US military forces in Asia.
11. If China starts shooting they lose.
12. Shooting is something China does not intend on doing (as the Philippines had to learn the hard way). They don't need to. All their goals are achieved without firing a single shot. So I am sure they will not initiate a shooting incident in 2016, as the PLAN has recently signed up to CUES. This is why I am not concerned about further developments in 2016, but there will be some new developments by May 2016, which will provide colour to the 15th annual IISS dialogue to be held in Singapore (or better known as the Shangri-la Dialogue 2016).
Or will China just stay the same course (more white ship deployments, more reef expansion works, increased efforts to sustain bilateral instead of multilateral ties with regional nations) but with increased intensity?
13. I have a view that I prefer not to articulate - other than to say that you should take note of:
(i) the fact that Singapore's defence budget has increased, in response to an urgent need to recapitalise certain categories of ageing defence assets - such as the retirement or upcoming end of life of the following:
(a) the last F-5 squadron that stood down in Sept 2015 (replaced with a 2nd squadron of F-15SGs),
(b) the 4 KC-135R (to be replaced with six A-330 MRTT),
(c) the Searcher UAVs (replaced with the Heron-1 and Hermes 450 UAVs),
(d) the older suite of air defence radars, including the FPS-117A (replaced by the ELM-2084 Multi Mission Radar, the existing Giraffe AMB, the SHIKRA radar and the future Ticom 55 aerostat); which will provide a extremely high resolution air picture for Singapore's air defenders,
(e) the older ground based air defence missiles, like I-Hawk missiles (replaced with the Spyder air defence missile firing units and the ASTER 30),
(f) the fleet of V-200s (replaced with the Protected Response Vehicle),
(g) old AEVs, ARVs and VLBs like the M728 AEVs (replaced with the AEV, known as the Pionierpanzer 3 Kodiak), the old ARVs (replaced with the Buffel Armoured Recovery Vehicle), and the old M60 based VLBs (replaced with the Biber Armoured Vehicle Launched Bridge),
(h) old land-rover vehicles (replaced with the URO VAMTAC and the Ford 550 ambulances),
(i) older sat com 3 tonner (replaced with the MAN 5 Ton Very Small Aperture SAT Comm),
(j) the two Super Puma squadrons (to be replaced with a new aircraft type),
(k) the replacement for the AMX-13S1 and so on (too lazy to list further).
The 2016 defence budget of SGD13.97 billion (USD10.2 billion) is an increase of 6.4% over 2015. The rate of growth is the fastest seen in the country since 2011 with increases having averaged around 3.5% annually over the past five years. The 2016 budget will also see defence expenditure increase as a proportion of GDP for the second consecutive year; and
(ii) the three key changes taking place with the Singapore Navy, as new platforms, with new operational concepts are introduced, namely:
Firstly, eight new and very well armed Littoral Mission Vessels (LMVs), being built locally in Singapore to replace eleven Fearless Class vessels. The LMVs will carry a baseline complement of 23, expandable to a maximum of 61. The reduction in manning is being achieved through the use of advanced sense-making and decision support systems, increased levels of automation, and improvement in operational methods through design and equipment selection.
Secondly, the two Type-218SGs, replacing the last two Challenger class submarines. IHS Janes has reported on the size and some indicative vectors on the capability of the two new Type-218SGs, being built by TKMS at Kiel,
starting June 2015, here. The first two of the Type-218SGs are to be delivered by 2020. There will be a follow-on Type-218SG order, so that we can retire our final two Swedish built AIP boats in service.
Thirdly, a new Joint Multi-Mission Ship (JMMS) a new amphibious capability to project air power with a mini-LHD for the Singapore Navy. Speaking to the media ahead of SAF Day on 1 July 2014, Singapore's Minister of Defence, Dr Ng Eng Hen said Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines underlined the need for a
JMMS:
"A larger JMMS would be able to carry more helicopters or have more helicopters operating. When we responded to Typhoon Haiyan...basically, the typhoon was so devastating that comms and communication were knocked out. There was no centralised ability for command and control of the airspace. In that context, a ship like the JMMS would have been very useful."
However, the centre should not simply respond when a crisis hits, he said. Instead, it should build networks – similar to United Nations agencies and voluntary welfare organisations – and pre-position them so that countries know where these resources are. Learning from its previous HADR missions, the SAF realised the value of having larger naval vessels which could act as springboards for extended helicopter operations, said Dr Ng.
14. While the Endurance Class have served the SAF well, a larger JMMS that would have greater capacity and greater range to respond. There will also be some equipping changes for last mile delivery by the Singapore Army, which I would assume means having a more capable watercraft than the existing LARC V. On 17 March 2016, RSS Endurance will be the first foreign warship to call at Viet Nam's newly inaugurated Cam Ranh International Port, at their invitation. Such port calls reflect warm ties and reinforce Singapore's support for freedom of navigation.
15. With regard to your question, I would rather let ASEAN ministers have their say on growing ADMM cooperation (along with ASEAN resolve to grow security ties demonstrated yet again, in May 2016), at the right time. I will point it out when they do so (if I happen to do a drive by to DT at that time).
16. From where I am standing, 2022 to 2026 (round 3), will be a period where a miscalculation by one party can more likely occur. During that time, we will look back at 2016 and realise how calm it was in 2016 (round 1), where China was just getting started and still in first gear. And it is clear that Brunei and Malaysia as claimant states have started what we call "phase zero planning", respectively, so as to have a response plan for a range of contingencies relating to conflict arising from the South China Sea.
17. Malaysia's Defence Minister, Hishammuddin Hussein, is scheduled to meet Australian Defence Minister Marise Payne in late March 2016 to discuss China's placement of military equipment on disputed islands, in a sign that Malaysia is considering a tougher stand against Beijing, its largest trading partner. "If the reports we've received from various sources regarding the build-up and placement of military assets in the Spratlys are true – this forces us in a pushback against China," Mr Hishammuddin said, adding he would also hold talks with the Philippines and Vietnam. Malaysia has in the past shied away from taking a confrontational stand against China over the disputed waters, balancing its foreign policy against its relationship with Beijing.
18. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong is also planning to visit Australia in May for discussions that will seek to forge a series of new agreements between the two countries, including a deal to enhance defence cooperation. Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop and her Singapore counterpart, Vivian Balakrishnan, declared after the 9th Joint Singapore-Australia Ministeral Meeting (for the ministries of Trade & Industry, Defence and Foreign Affairs) in Sydney in March 2016 that both countries are committed to the rights of states to conduct freedom of navigation and airspace of the South China Sea. "That's what Australia has done in the past and what we'll continue to do," Ms Bishop told reporters. Dr Balakrishnan said though Singapore was a tiny city state, its trade was three times its GDP, and hence security of passage through the South China Sea was "essential". "So we totally subscribe to the concept of freedom of navigation and over-flight and we would highlight the South China Sea as important for both Australia and Singapore..."
19. Of particular interest to me is how Malaysia is leveraging on existing FPDA military to military relationships to demonstrate in a low key manner Malaysian resolve in round 2. More importantly, the FPDA has an intelligence sharing arrangement that keeps the five countries updated on developments in the South China Sea.
