A Review of Recent Events in the South China Sea (Post 3 of 3)
China build the artificial island on the atoll they already hold for some time..SCS (South China Sea) islands and atoll is disputed area between Cina, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philipines, and Malaysia. Each of them already control some of the islands/atoll in the area.
Yes, most Asean members that faced disputed with China on SCS did not have military capabilities yet to faced China. But this SCS issue is one of the reasons why most Asean countries in that facing SCS begin considerably increased their military expenditures.
They will not have to build anything militarily that able to defeat China, but they just need to build military capabilities that China found not easy to defeat. China can't afford to lingered much of her military resources to SCS, since it will open vulnerability on other disputed regions facing Japan, Taiwan, India,..let alone inviting US Pacific Fleet on this..
For that China try to limit their potential adversary in SCS. For example, eventhough China shown steern face against Vietnam or Philipines..she took more benign face agaist Indonesia..saying that Indonesia's Natuna islands and its ZEE surounding the Islands is not part of China SCS claim, eventough initially China maps shown some of Indonesian waters surounding Natuna in South China Sea..part of China's claim..
Still it's not hampering Indonesia to continue build and fortified Natuna's Ranai AB to make it able operating for long term their Flankers and Vipers later on.
16. Agreed, with eight additional notes:
One, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore are hedgers. They have neither treaty alliances nor ideological allegiances; they possess viable military-to-military ties with both the US and China that may be deepened or reduced as needed; and each has overtly pursued “balanced” political-economic ties with both great powers.
Two, on 15-16 Feburary 2016, US President Barack Obama hosted leaders of the 10 ASEAN countries at Sunnylands (see
the joint statement issued and released by the Whitehouse), a secluded 200 acre resort beloved by US presidents since Dwight Eisenhower and the site of the successful 2013 Xi-Obama Summit and
Xi-Obama Summit 2.0 in 2015, where China and the US met and agreed on the path forward for how these two very big -- but very different -- countries can continue to get along). At the US-ASEAN Sunnylands Summit of 2016, Obama would have heard first hand, the different voices of ASEAN concerns and he would also know that Cambodia and Laos (as China constrained states) would be reporting back to China, everything that was said there.
Three, American activities in the South China Sea have not been conducted so as to support Philippine or Vietnamese territorial claims, but to assert a generalized principle of freedom of the seas. Any action to assert or defend their territorial claims will be left, evidently, to the claimants themselves. Any such action taken by a claimant alone would surely be repulsed by China, easily and quickly. Therefore, no such action is likely to occur without concrete prior assurance of American military support. There is no reason to assume that such assurance would ever be forthcoming. If they are paying attention to domestic politics in the United States, China and the rival South China Sea claimants must be aware of how problematic it would be for an American administration to rouse public support for a military confrontation with China over obscure bits of rock and sand in a corner of the world that, to most Americans, is quite remote. Occasional polls register only some low-to-mid-range concern about “China,” mostly about trade. Importantly, no effort is being made by the present administration to prepare the public for trouble in the South China Sea, nor is there any indication that any successor to the Obama administration will do so.
Four, ASEAN is not exactly united on the issues relating to disputes with China over the South China Sea. Cambodia, Laos, Viet Nam and Mynmar are China constrained countries, where their security strategy prioritize the central role of China. Cambodia and Laos in particular are beholden to China, as they need China's aid and investments, however, Viet Nam is starting to adopt the strategy of the hedgers.
Five, lately Indonesia, as a middle power in waiting and the world's 16th largest economy, with a GDP of US$878 billion in 2012, and a GDP growth rate 6.2% (it is a middle power in waiting because Indonesia will become the word's 7th largest economy by 2030) has been distracted by domestic events and not able to focus on leading ASEAN, however I note Indonesia's increased spending on defence, since the unveiling of the 'minimum essential force' a few years ago. Further, to demonstrate Indonesian resolve to the Chinese, not only are they willing to make counter productive shows of force, they are willing to sink as many fishing boats (including 134 fishing boats from other ASEAN countries between October 2014 to Feburary 2016), caught fishing in their EEZ. This is of course less conducive to ASEAN unity. Indonesia because of its domestic politics is no longer able or willing to lead ASEAN.
Six, as I noted before, the Malaysians and Vietnamese have adopted a
joint submission to the UN on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Please note that the Vietnamese and Malaysian claims over-lap with Philippine EEZ claims. If the Philippines was willing to accept the joint Vietnamese and Malaysian position, ASEAN can work to present a joint position on baselines. But it is precisely the incompetence of Pinoy diplomats and politicians that prevent the emergence such a joint multi-country position.
Seven, historically, Philippines is a house divided with presence of internal insurgents of different ideologies. The southern Philippines lies along a strategic fault line, with its porous borders, weak rule of law, long-standing and unaddressed grievances of Muslim minorities, and high levels of poverty and corruption offering a fertile field for nurturing terrorist groups. With US help it has made progress in combating terrorism within the Philippines but there limits of success in the Philippine COIN fight. In other words, the Philippine Government as a weak state and American pet project is not able to win against non-state actors without external help. If they are not sovereign in its undisputed territory, it follows that there is little or no chance for them to be successful in a contest for their disputed EEZ claims against any other claimant in the South China Sea. China's defence budget and its navy dwarfs that of the Philippines, despite Aquino's half hearted efforts to improve their primitive and dated capabilities. In 2016 China's proposed defence spending of 954 billion yuan (or US$147 billion) is about 59 times that of the Philippines.
Eight, many members of ASEAN, do believe in standing together with the Philippines and Viet Nam. ASEAN members are not neutral, but its another thing entirely to demonstrate open hostility to a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Demonstrating open hostility to China, as permanent member of the UN Security Council is against the national interest of other ASEAN members.
17. Their coast guard (aka The Philippine Navy) have real problems with raise, train and sustain at an organisational level - their training system for both ships and aircraft is broken. They are without the requisite technical competence to maintain their fleet of aircraft and ships and at an organisational level, and not ready to modernise.
18. As
Reuters reported on 8 April 2016: The United States has allocated more than US$120 million in military aid to the Philippines in 2016, the biggest in about 15 years, said a senior Filipino diplomat. Jose Cuisia, Manila's ambassador to Washington, said Manila was also in talks with the United States to acquire a fourth Hamilton-class cutter to strengthen the Philippine capability to patrol the waters. For context, see this
2014 Q&A on the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), prepared by the Pinoys. As the Q&A noted, the EDCA is an agreement between the Philippines and the US which is envisioned to advance the implementation of the Philippine-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty.
19. IMO, there is nothing mutual in the US-Philippine defense treaty. The bottom-line is this: The Pinoys do not want to pay to fund their own Navy. They want free hand-me-downs from the Americans in the form of EDA transfers of old 45+ year old coast guard cutters.
20. For Rodrigo Duterte, the brutal death squads that have claimed the lives of more than 1,000 people during his tenure as mayor of Davao City in the Philippines’ main southern island of Mindanao are not a problem. They’re a political platform. Further, in the event that Rodrigo Duterte, Mayor of Davo City and presidential candidate front runner wins, he intends to put an end to:
(i) their armed forces modernisation efforts - which is par the course for an advocate for working with the National Democratic Front (NDF). The NDF is a communist front organisation led by the Communist Party of the Philippines and Eastern Mindanao hosts the remnants of the communist insurgency. Millions of pesos are annually lost by businesses due to extortion activities by the Communist Party of Philippines’ armed wing, the NPA. Communist Party founder Jose Maria Sison had expressed a willingness to work with the presumptive Duterte administration. After the election, Sison will reiterate his usual demand for an immediate ceasefire between the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the NPA and at least 3 cabinate positions for his comrades (including the departments of agrarian reform, labor and employment, and social welfare and development); and
(ii) the Philippine experiment with capitalism and democracy. Duterte is not only noted for leftist human rights abuses, he is a presidential candidate that
jokes about rape of an Australian in the Philippines, as part of his campaign for president; and later tells the American and Australian Ambassadors that he will downgrade ties with both US and Australia, if he wins because they were offended by his remarks about rape. Duterte has already clashed with the US ambassador, warning him to "shut his mouth" after the diplomat criticized the mayor’s comment he should have been the first in line to rape an Australian missionary who was murdered in the Philippines decades ago. Duterte has demonstrated repeatedly that he has little understanding of the national interests of the Philippines, its complex diplomatic challenges, and its indispensable alliance with the US. This will of course increase the moral hazard of giving aid to the Philippines.
21. The 71 year old, 7 term Mayor of Davos, was featured on “The Dangers of Duterte Harry,” by The Economist. The New York Times, Washington Post, Time, and CNN have all named him “Asia’s Donald Trump” and he has
pledged bold action. He promised to take on China if the Philippines prevails in an international tribunal over claims in the South China Sea and Beijing doesn’t abide by the decision or open talks. “
I will ride a jet ski and plant the Philippine flag there in their port,” Duterte said. Ian Storey, an expert on the South China Sea at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, said that whoever won the election would need to try to mend relations with Beijing—and such efforts would likely be supported by the U.S. A bigger concern, he said, would be if the new Philippine president “flip-flopped on the issue by, for instance, shelving the arbitration ruling and agreeing to joint development of resources on terms favorable to China.” Duterte, a foreign policy novice, has threatened to open direct negotiations with China, a move that would undermine a hardline approach by outgoing Philippine President BS Aquino III.
22. If Duterte wins, the Philippines will have more self inflicted problems than just lack of modernisation or chronic corruption. The locals do not go to war because the Philippine Government fails to deliver infrastructure and services. They may complain, but they generally do not as a first resort take up arms. The locals fight and support the NPA because they see their government as a threat. The issue to me is less delivery of development than delivery of justice, and local governments are not part of the solution, they are the core of the problem. The NPA typically flourishes in places where local governance is dominated by powerful families controlling political dynasties. These families typically dominate all political, judicial, and economic life and operate above the law. They are abusive, exploitive, and oppressive, frequently operating their own private armies. These private armies are a glorified name for gangs of armed thugs and they co-opt the state security forces through shared profits from illegal business. Infrastructure and service delivery is not a bad thing, but for me the key element in reducing the influence of the NPA is a concerted effort to bring local governing elites within the rule of law. The Philippine Government has failed to prosecute the perpetrators of extrajudicial killings is the official response to the November 2009 Maguindanao massacre in which a “private army” financed by the powerful Ampatuan family killed 58 people including more than 30 media workers. Almost six years later, the case is in effective judicial limbo, with no successful prosecutions and a total of 87 suspects still at large. IMHO, local elites like the Duterte family will resist any attempts at reform as they rely on impunity to sustain their power. As long as these elites like the Dutertes remain above the law the NPA will be able to cast itself as the only alternative to their dominance.
23. The Philippine Government under President BS Aqunio III is actually lucky that the leadership of the NPA and its assorted splinter factions is generally incompetent, obsessed with infighting and absorbed in their anachronistic mantras and incomprehensible rhetoric. A capable opponent could make matters much more difficult for the government. The NPA has declined as much due to its own ineptitude as to anything the government has done to fight it.
24. After years of inaction, in April 2016, the Philippines' Department of Justice has started an investigation on the alleged unexplained killings perpetrated by the Davao death squad and the supposed involvement of presidential candidate Duterte in the group. Philippine voters have long been attracted to strongman-style leaders. Ferdinand Marcos, who was elected president in 1965 and later ruled the country as a dictator, campaigned as a World War II hero and as someone, who “killed a man and advertised the fact.” More recently, Joseph Estrada, who was president from 1998 to 2001, was an action-film star. Philippine politics is no stranger to controversial characters and the firebrand Duterte is one of its most divisive, alarming leftist with his advocacy of extrajudicial killings as a deterrent against rampant crime and illegal drugs. With the Philippine track record of electing corrupt despots like Ferdinand Marcos and Joseph Estrada to power, I am certain of their country's ability to repeatedly make bad choices at the ballot box.
