South China Sea thoughts?

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
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Verified Defense Pro
Selling weapons to Taiwan - you could do it if you want to slam the door shut on diplomatic relations with China.
its the reason why the frenhc, germans, dutch, danes and swedes never sold their subs to Taiwan

when I was contracting in 2000-2002 the taiwanese approached the company I was working with to see if we could facilitate access to Collins tech or the subs themselves

rebuffed for the same reason
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
its the reason why the frenhc, germans, dutch, danes and swedes never sold their subs to Taiwan

when I was contracting in 2000-2002 the taiwanese approached the company I was working with to see if we could facilitate access to Collins tech or the subs themselves

rebuffed for the same reason
Yes, i remember, in the nineties the Netherlands had the plan to sell some Zwaardvis/Walrus-Class submarines to Taiwan, but the Chinese forbid us. In exchange China promised to order Fokker aeroplanes, which they never did.
So now Fokker and RDM (the only Dutch shipyard capable of building submarines) are both bankrupt....



Some news ...
China lands first military plane on disputed reef
AFP
April 18, 2016

Beijing (AFP) - Beijing landed a military plane on a disputed South China Sea reef it has built up into an artificial island, state media said Monday, in the first official confirmation of such a flight.

An air force plane landed on Fiery Cross reef in the Spratlys archipelago on Sunday to evacuate sick workers, the official People's Liberation Army Daily said.

China claims nearly all of the strategically vital sea, even waters close to its Southeast Asian neighbours, and has created artificial islands in an effort to assert its claims.

It has significantly expanded Fiery Cross, which is also claimed by Vietnam and the Philippines, drawing international criticism.

In 2014, China began work on a 3,000-metre (9,840 feet) runway on the reef, which is around 1,000 kilometres (620 miles) from its island province of Hainan.

Beijing in January carried out several of what it called civilian flights to Fiery Cross, enraging Hanoi.
Complete article at https://www.yahoo.com/news/china-lands-first-military-plane-disputed-reef-state-084528232.html
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
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Verified Defense Pro
The NZ Prime Minister has been in Beijing for bilateral talks and Chinese media have run articles warning him about raising the SCS dispute. Since Xinhua and the Global Times are mouthpieces for the PRC govt, these are an attempt by the PRC to exert economic blackmail on NZ in order to advance the PRC's illegal claims in the SCS. Of note, the original Xinhua and Global Times stories have been taken down.
 

Rimasta

Member
Selling weapons to Taiwan - you could do it if you want to slam the door shut on diplomatic relations with China. Not a good thing when China is one of the few nations able to influence DPRK, or when your economies are that intricately intertwined, for example.
Well I think more than selling advanced weapons to the Taiwanese (which I agree, would not help the overall situation) is even the threat of American recognition of Taiwan as a independent nation. The Chinese are facing mounting diplomatic and political pressure on several issues, including the issue of disappearances of person(s) to the Chinese mainland from Hong Kong clearly displeasing London. And even though Beijing has repeatedly stated it will not recognize the decision of the Permament Court of Arbitration in The Hague, arguing the court has no jurisdiction in the matter, the ruling will most likely not favor China's claims and despite their avowed stance regarding the upcoming ruling, it would be w considerable political blow to China. Now the British are throwing in with the Americans in the South China Sea.

Britain aligns with US on response to South China Sea case


The South Koreans are saying that there are signs the North is preparing a 5th nuclear weapons tests, so what control the Chinese have over the North is appearing to be of less value to the United States. This is evidenced by the deployment of THAAD to the Korean Peninsula which in turn is prompting the Chinese military to seek to change its nuclear weapons posture. I don't see Chinese influence having any meaningful effect on Pyongyang actions for the foreseeable future, and the Americans appear to be growing exasperated with China's inability to reign in North Korea.

South Korea Says North Is Preparing for 5th Nuclear Test - ABC News

I thought OPSSG made a really good point about it being a clash of perspectives almost. That China perceives the U.S. as a potential adversary seeking to contain it, while the U.S. perceives China as not realizing their actions are forcing American actions since this issue could be said to be a core interest to the United States, that being freedom on the seas.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Providing Context to News on the South China Sea (Post 3 of 3)
And Indonesia has learn from the past, to stay passive was a bad choice.
Specially after whats happen last month, when one of Indonesia's patrol ships intercepted a Chinese fishing vessel on March 19 off the Natuna Islands, which was protected by a Chinese Coast Guard ship, i think it is the right decision.
10. Not sure if Indonesia is learning the right lessons or are they keeping the Pinoys in good company. As you are undoubtedly aware, Brunei, Cambodia and Laos (as ASEAN Chairman), have come to four-point consensus with China on the South China Sea. This is a sign of a fractured ASEAN stance arising from a lack of leadership. IMO, Indonesian politicians and law enforcement are in good company with the Pinoys, where they shoot first and think of consequences later, as the five points below illustrate:

One, on 21 March 2016, two Taiwanese fishing vessels reported being shot at by an Indonesian patrol vessel in the Strait of Malacca. According to the ship’s captains, Lien I Hsing No. 116 was fired at four or five times, while Sheng Te Tsai had 12 bullet holes. The two vessels, carrying 25 crew members on board, were on their way to Singapore to unload their catches and restock. Indonesian officials admitted to shooting the vessels, but claimed it was self -defense when one of the fishing boats nearly rammed the Indonesian patrol boat after being ordered to stop.

Two, maverick fisheries minister, Susi Pudjiastuti rose to prominence last year by blowing up impounded foreign boats that her ministry’s patrols had caught fishing without a license in Indonesian waters. But Susi was restrained by her cabinet colleagues in what she could do to Chinese fishing boats that Indonesia had captured and impounded. One was quietly scuttled, but her colleagues prevented her from blowing it up for the cameras. Sensing her opportunity following the confrontation on 20 March 2016, she quickly called a press conference to denounce China’s “arrogant” behavior – and later saying that Indonesia would consider taking China to court over the issue. Not to be outdone, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi summoned China’s chargé d’affaires in Jakarta the next day, telling him that she felt the ministry’s efforts at diplomacy had been “sabotaged” by the incident. The confrontation comes at a pivotal time, as the Coordinating Ministry for Politics, Law, and Security conducts an inter-agency review of Indonesia’s South China Sea policy, the first since China’s new assertiveness in the sea became apparent, which is designed to settle differences on the subject within the Jokowi administration. Unless a face-saving arrangement between Beijing and Jakarta is reached soon, the 20 March 2016 incident will push the review to take a harder line, despite the risk that would present to Jokowi’s ambitions for Chinese investment in Indonesia.

Three, as a nationalist and populist politician, what fisheries minister, Susi Pudjiastuti say and actually do is entirely different. She loudly condemns China over a specific instance but released data of fishing boats sunk shows that her problem is with other ASEAN states. In the above paragraph, I report that she condemns the Chinese but she uses the Indonesian military to act against Vietnamese, the Pinoy, the Siamese and the Malaysian fishermen by sinking their fishing boats. Between October 2014 to February 2016, Indonesia sank a total of 152 fishing boats from various countries: 50 from Viet Nam, 43 from the Philippines, 21 from Thailand, 20 from Malaysia, 14 from Indonesia, 2 from Papa New Guinea, 1 from Belize and only 1 from China. I note that in this time period, the Indonesians sank a total of 134 fishing boats from other ASEAN nations for illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.

Four, instead of uniting ASEAN, Indonesian politicians, playing the populist card, are constantly looking for opportunities to engage in acts that defy common sense while supporting criminal acts by their countrymen (that harm their relations with other ASEAN states). For example, their arrogant statements on a range of issues on the harm Indonesia causes to its immediate neighbours. This includes the shooting at fishing boats, the handling of the annual haze issue from Indonesian fires from land clearing or even the 2014 Indonesian Navy decision to name a new vessel after two convicted terrorists (whom the Indonesians honour as heroes). "The naming of the ship is a signal to Singapore that simply because past Indonesian leaders may have accepted the truce or Lee Kuan Yew's offering and visit to the shrine does not mean that current or future leaders will accept it," said Antonio Rappa, head of management and security studies at Singapore Institute of Management University. The question Singaporeans ask ourselves is how far these quasi bully boy tactics would go if Indonesia really wanted to exert its strong arm in its imagined abang-adik (big brother-little brother) dynamic?

Five, Indonesia's inability to lead will result in a fractured ASEAN. A power vacuum will develop; and every ASEAN member will seek to advance its own interest at the expense of another. Alternatively, let me rephase it another way (with regard to the balance of power in Southeast Asia) to help the Indonesians understand the conseqence of a leadership vacuum: A new equilibrium will arise, with great powers (i.e. US and China) having a greater say in lieu of an united ASEAN.​
I read these and none of the measures suggested convince me they are likely to work. Neither the diplomatic or the escalatory. The US & allies have been forced onto a reactive, defensive and ultimately ineffective position.
11. Please don't listen to American authors/idiots who cannot understand regional dynamics. I hope that you realise that the Taiwanese claims to the South China Sea is as extensive as China's and they were able to recently humiliate an American ally, over a shooting a sea incident that we have documented in this thread. Who are the US allies with a claim? In actual fact, there is only 1 very unreliable ally and their pattern of behaviour well documented.
The second article contains the following:

"If China is bent on changing the status-quo in Asia, why should America respects its so-called core interests? If Beijing won’t respect Washington’s interests, two can play such a game — with Beijing once again being forced to play defense."

The author then suggests a few things, including selling more advanced weapons to Taiwan. I'm not convinced that any of the suggestions would make the PRC even pause, but it did get me thinking, what diplomatic issues matter the most to the PRC. Taiwan was the one that came to mind, and if the US recognised Taiwan or at least threatened to might at least get the PRC to stop and think about their current stategy. Inflammatory certainly, but at least it would signal the US displeasure and shake things up a bit.
12. That is so not wise; and it violates the 1972 "Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqué". American credibility would be at stake, if it recognized Taiwan - loss of American credibility to China will have very adverse consequences for the smaller claimant states. IMHO, the history of the region does not fit your narrative. Taiwan currently holds, Itu Aba, an island with fresh water. And Taiwan's claims in the South China Sea, lend support and provide a legal basis for China's claims. Why would you want to help the Taiwanese? Have you forgotten the sanctions imposed on the Philippines by Taiwan over the 2013 Guang Da Xing No. 28 incident? This was the second fatal shooting at sea involving the Philippines Coast Guard. These are criminal acts by the Philippines, as they were violations of their own rules of engagement. The second incident occurred on 9 May 2013 and was between the Taiwanese fishing boat Guang Da Xing No. 28 and the Philippine Coast Guard patrol boat Maritime Control Surveillance 3001, which resulted in the death of Taiwanese fisherman Hung Shih-cheng in a hail of Philippine bullets.

13. While on the topic of arms sales, it is interesting to note that the American Defense Secretary Ash Carter on 28 April 2016 has opened the door to US arms sales to Vietnam. Thanks to China's aggression, Indonesia's inability to get its act together as leader of ASEAN and the Americans playing its cards right, they have increased their standing with other ASEAN member states.
Also Taiwan deserves to be recognised as a nation, it has been forged in 'blood & fire' and has developed it's own unique Taiwanese identity. Most of the world only don't recognise Taiwan simply to appease the PRC and keep doing business.
14. Really?

(i) The Democratic Progressive Party (DJP) of Taiwan cannot be trusted by the great powers. The recent election of Tsai Ing-Wen of the DJP, as President, spells trouble for Sino-American relations going forward and placed Washington in a difficult position: continue rejecting the island democracy as a nation-state and bow to China’s demands that the US abide by its “one China policy,” or recognize a sea change has occurred in the relationships among Taipei, Beijing and Washington.

(ii) Since winning the election, Tsai has made it clear that military modernization will be a priority in her administration, including a shift from foreign procurement to domestic development and manufacturing of weapons. Priorities include a plan to build eight attack submarines and advanced fighter trainers. I would say that you don't understand Taiwan, the toxic Taiwanese domestic politics relating to the DJP and KMT, and I don't want to derail this thread with further discussion on Taiwanese politics. Please accept my apologies for such an incomplete and late reply to your post.​
Whatever the US does, it needs to do something differently, if it is to protect the principle of the sea as a global commons with rights of free passage, because fundamentally PRC actions would seem to be an attack on that principle.
15. Read paragraph 6 above (post 2 of 3) for prior details provided on FON conducted by the US Navy. FON for military vessels does not have widespread support from other ASEAN claimants or with Indonesia.

16. The greatest threat to the freedom of commercial navigation arises out of the ungoverned spaces that tri-border area of the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. We should note that in relation to the recent kidnapping incidents, Indonesia does not share a maritime border with Philippines in the Sulu Sea but Malaysia does. Indonesia shares a maritime border with Malaysia in Sulawesi Sea. However, this may be complicated by outstanding territorial and other disputes between (a) Indonesia and Malaysia, and (b) Philippines and Malaysia.

(i) It was also reported on 18 April 2016 that Indonesia plans to establish military cooperation with the Philippines and Malaysia to address the rising threat of piracy through joint patrols. Coordinating Political, Legal and Security Affairs Minister Luhut Binsar Panjaitan said Jokowi had personally asked him to prepare for the cooperation with Kuala Lumpur and Manila, as he saw the protection of trade in the area as a top priority. "I am scared that the area will become like the Somalian waters," Luhut said, referring to the area in which hijackings and kidnapping for ransom is relatively common.

(ii) Ten Indonesian sailors who had been held hostage by Islamist militant group Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines were released, Indonesia's President Joko Widodo announced in a televised statement. The hostages, who had been held since March 26, were in "good condition," and were expected to arrive in Jakarta on 1 May 2016, he said. Widodo thanked the Philippines government and the various parties who helped secure the release of the hostages. Four Indonesians were still being held, and the Indonesian government would continue to work to secure their release, he said.​
...On to the selling of weapons in general, especially to the SCS claimant states. My thoughts: maybe, maybe it might work if there is a NATO-type alliance in South East Asia, where nations can be assured that the weapons and capabilities that they are acquiring will not someday be used against each other. However, presently I am not confident of that happening...

...It might be a great idea if ASEAN somehow becomes a NATO of the South East. Otherwise...(and I'll admit I'm more than a little paranoid here) this very action might be the catalyst for ASEAN to implode. In that sense, I'm more than a little glad that China's just playing the 'soft power' card for now.
17. Changing the balance of power in the region will have an adverse consequence on the security of the region. Intra-ASEAN conflict is not only possible but likely, if these nationalist tendencies are not moderated - the Pinoys have scores to settle with the Malaysians over Sabah, which they claim. The Indonesians are still sore with the Malaysians over a range of other issues and are keen to demonstrate their resolve. Disputes in the South China Sea has already result in deaths, shootings at sea and destruction of property of innocent parties on land, if you read prior posts on what has happened to Taiwanese fishermen, and the riots in Viet Nam over China's placement of a rig in disputed waters.

its the reason why the french, germans, dutch, danes and swedes never sold their subs to Taiwan

when I was contracting in 2000-2002 the taiwanese approached the company I was working with to see if we could facilitate access to Collins tech or the subs themselves

rebuffed for the same reason
18. Agreed.
 
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gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro

and believe me, they turned on the charm. drinking chinese wine with the equiv of their Chief of Navy, their equiv of NAVSEA/DARPA and far too many attractive young girls giggling or looking cow eyed at us for us to think that it was just due to our good looks and charm
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
On 2 May 2016, it was reported that the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) and Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) are co-hosting the ASEAN Defence Ministers' Meeting (ADMM)-Plus Maritime Security and Counter-Terrorism Exercise in Brunei and Singapore from 2 to 12 May 2016. The exercise opening ceremony was held at Muara Naval Base in Brunei. In this one multi-lateral exercise, 18 militaries begin an 11-day Maritime Security and Counter-Terrorism Exercise. Co-organised by Australia, Brunei, Singapore and NZ, this large scale exercise involves militaries from the ten ASEAN countries and the “Plus” countries - Australia, China, Japan, India, Korea, NZ, Russia and the US. In all, about 3,500 personnel, 18 naval vessels, 25 aircraft and 40 Special Forces teams will be involved.

Today, on 5 May 2016, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are expected to finalise plans for joint patrols in piracy-prone tri-border area (TBA) of three states – the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia – in the Sulu Sea and the Celebes Sea, at a trilateral meeting in Yogyakarta. The gathering of foreign ministers and armed forces chiefs from the three countries comes after recent kidnappings in the waters off southern Philippines and north of Borneo, where Indonesia shares a border with Malaysia.

In the past five weeks, 14 Indonesian and four Malaysian seamen were abducted from their boats by gunmen believed to have ties with the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group. Ten Indonesians seized at the end of March were released on May 1 and have since returned home. Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Luhut Pandjaitan had said that more needs to be done to deter piracy before the kidnappings become a booming business as it has evolved into in Somalia. The joint patrols may take the form of the successful Malacca Straits Patrol, which was established on April 21, 2006, by the navies of Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia.

The only network applicable to the TBA is the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP), which entered into force on September 4, 2006 and which currently has 20 signatories: Australia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Sri Lanka, the United Kingdom, the United States, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Notably, Indonesia and Malaysia are not parties to the ReCAAP. Indonesia refused to join over concerns that the agreement would compromise its sovereignty. On the other hand, Malaysia objected to the fact that the ReCAAP Information Sharing Center (ISC), the facility through which the agreement would be operationalized, would be located in Singapore. It felt that doing so would undermine the International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Center in Kuala Lumpur.
I thought OPSSG made a really good point about it being a clash of perspectives almost. That China perceives the U.S. as a potential adversary seeking to contain it, while the U.S. perceives China as not realizing their actions are forcing American actions since this issue could be said to be a core interest to the United States, that being freedom on the seas.
Thank you for this observation.

Sadly, in international politics involving great powers, like China and the US, there is no right or wrong, only whose interests does a particular act serve.

We are one of the very select few, amongst the defence forum flora, where our discussions on issues relating to the South China Sea that is not intellectually dominated by nationalism, or grievance-pandering.

Our focus in the last three pages of this thread is on observed geo-political reality over the last five years, from 2012 to 2016 and informed by history (round 1), action and reaction of the players and with a focus on the hard choices available to smaller players (i.e. the claimant states), middle powers (i.e. Australia and Indonesia) and relevant regional powers (i.e. Japan) in the next five year time frame from 2017 to 2021 (round 2) against the backdrop of great power rivalry and cooperation (i.e. China and US) that extends from 2022 to 2026 (round 3).

IMO, US and China are both prestige-seeking, and their demands for recognition create a number of issues and opportunities for Brunei, the Philippines, Malaysia and Viet Nam as rival claimant states; and vice versa.
 
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ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Japan is leasing up to five JSDF Beechcraft TC90 training aircraft to the Philippines for training and surveillance purposes. This is a result of the deepening Japanese - Philippino defence relationship and the relaxation of Japans ban on military exports.
 

Boatteacher

Active Member
The BBC is reporting another FON exercise by the USN this week and a furious "breech of sovereignty" claim by the Chinese in reply. This raises an issue I hoped the better informed would have discussed here by now.

How often should FON's be conducted to be optimally effective. My view, which may be poorly informed, is that they should happen so often it is almost the case of "nothing to see here", rather than have a very occasional highly publicized one.

But that raises a second issue. How does one respond if an over zealous officer (whether encouraged from higher up or not) decides that a perceived breech of sovereignty should be defended against and pushes a button with ship damaging/ destroying consequences.

Again in ignorance (and to promote maybe more informed discussion) it seems to me you either instantly retaliate against the offending installation (which is something you have to be ready to react with if things go wrong) or your stuck with merely calling in the ambassador. A delayed military response would be nothing more than a declaration of war.

Which is one reason I'm wary of suggestions middle powers like Australia should participate in the most provocative FON activities. The Chinese would be aware they could suffer an officer with an itchy finger without fear of instant reprisal; which might tempt that reaction in the first place.
 

gf0012-aust

Grumpy Old Man
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
The BBC is reporting another FON exercise by the USN this week and a furious "breech of sovereignty" claim by the Chinese in reply. This raises an issue I hoped the better informed would have discussed here by now.

How often should FON's be conducted to be optimally effective. My view, which may be poorly informed, is that they should happen so often it is almost the case of "nothing to see here", rather than have a very occasional highly publicized one.

But that raises a second issue. How does one respond if an over zealous officer (whether encouraged from higher up or not) decides that a perceived breech of sovereignty should be defended against and pushes a button with ship damaging/ destroying consequences.

Again in ignorance (and to promote maybe more informed discussion) it seems to me you either instantly retaliate against the offending installation (which is something you have to be ready to react with if things go wrong) or your stuck with merely calling in the ambassador. A delayed military response would be nothing more than a declaration of war.

Which is one reason I'm wary of suggestions middle powers like Australia should participate in the most provocative FON activities. The Chinese would be aware they could suffer an officer with an itchy finger without fear of instant reprisal; which might tempt that reaction in the first place.
Australia has participated or engaged in over 30 FON in the last 2 years. The chinese know, and despite the intermittent need to become bolshie about it, have not made a ruckus in public about it
 

Boatteacher

Active Member
"Australia has participated or engaged in over 30 FON in the last 2 years. The chinese know, and despite the intermittent need to become bolshie about it, have not made a ruckus in public about it"

Being aware of that (to some extent) is why I referred to the "most provocative" FON's; those that pass within 5 nm of the man made islands and as a result challenging both the claim to sovereignty of the SCS and also whether the constructed islands themselves are sovereign territory (which my understanding of International Law say they clearly are not)
 

swerve

Super Moderator
China agrees with your understanding of international law - in the case of Okinotorishima, which isn't claimed by China but is in an area which China would like to keep Japan out of.

It doesn't agree when it concerns rocks, reefs & shoals claimed by China in the South China Sea.

Hypocrisy? Of course!
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
China Scrambles Fighters Against US Warship From Its South China Sea Air Base For The First Time
[Tyler Rogoway]
May 11, 2016


Earlier today the Arleigh Burke class destroyer USS William P. Lawrence was executing a freedom of navigation drill near Fiery Cross Reef, where China has built a 10,000-foot-long runway along with maritime and other military facilities. During the destroyer’s approach to the island, a pair of Chinese J-11 fighters, an indigenous variant of the Su-27 Flanker, along with a Y-8 surveillance aircraft, were scrambled from the island outpost. It is not clear at this time if the Y-8, which has been adapted for many missions, was a maritime patrol, airborne early warning and control (AEW&C), electronic intelligence collection, electronic warfare or a command and control variant.
More at https://www.yahoo.com/news/china-scrambles-fighters-against-us-201500626.html

If im not wrong China claimed in the past that the infrastructure they were building on the islands were purely civilian installations.... :D;)
 
Something the Philippines Govt lodged with UN arbitration tribunal back in 2013. Resolution is soon to be released relating to the rules within UNCLOS (both of which Philipines and China are signatories)

Early Chinese response would seem to indicate the pending report , will rule in favour of the Philippines claim..
 

Boatteacher

Active Member
they did, but its not the first country nor the last do the same, I think Vietnam or Taiwan did the same many years ago, just not on the scale as china. we can sail there, but china can also fly there since its international water. but are we gonna sail through island control by Vietnam/Taiwan or only china claimed island?
The SCS would seem to me to be one of the more dangerous potential flashpoints at the moment. Essentially you have a country trying to directly challenge everyone else's fundamental understanding of the Law of the Sea. This goes well beyond competing claims for economic zones; on which the West has tended to be neutral however optimistic China's nine dash line looks on the map. It goes to the question of what constitutes Sovereign territory.

I'm sure there are others I've forgotten or overlooked, but the closest previous example I can think of is Libya's claim over the Gulf of Sidraj. The USN's FON challenge to that was met by an attack by Libyan jets that were shot down. And yet the Libyan event looks like a storm in a tea cups compared to contest of interests in the SCS.

That's part of the reason I was trying to prompt a discussion on the most effective form of FON and the appropriate reaction to a kinetic event against a ship exercising that.

It seems there may not be a widespread background held by some readers as to the historical events leading to the present situation and the LOTS under dispute. I found Bill Hayton's "The South China Sea - The Struggle For Power In Asia" a useful starting point to acquire such an understanding.

I'd need to reread that book to make certain of my next comment, but my recollection is that until China started building the current group of islands (on reefs that didn't previously break the surface), most of the artificial habitats consisted of shanties built on poles over exposed rocks and wreaked ships converted to crude living quarters.
 

bdique

Member
SCS isn't a Gulf of Sidra. Nobody has declared any 'zones of death'. Presently, the PLA has no serious A2/AD capabilities in the area that can help them enforce such a claim, especially against the USN.

For now, militarily escalating the situation will not be in China's favour.
 

Boatteacher

Active Member
SCS isn't a Gulf of Sidra. Nobody has declared any 'zones of death'. Presently, the PLA has no serious A2/AD capabilities in the area that can help them enforce such a claim, especially against the USN.

For now, militarily escalating the situation will not be in China's favour.
I agree. But I suppose its the "for now" bit that worries me. A situation is being set up where one side is going to suffer an enormous loss of face (and possibly - depending on which way things go - an enormous disturbance to the 'force' in an international relations sense).

What happens in, say, five or ten years time when China decides its strong enough to arm the islands to the teeth and declare the zone of death. Its just really hard to see any other end play for this game.

Its why I just feel that FON's that become so regular they establish a new normality are so important and those backed up by a clear ability for instant retaliation against an itchy trigger. But as I've said from the start, those views don't come backed by a degree in international relations.
 
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weaponwh

Member
I agree. But I suppose its the "for now" bit that worries me. A situation is being set up where one side is going to suffer an enormous loss of face (and possibly - depending on which way things go - an enormous disturbance to the 'force' in an international relations sense).

What happens in, say, five or ten years time when China decides its strong enough to arm the islands to the teeth and declare the zone of death. Its just really hard to see any other end play for this game.

Its why I just feel that FON's that become so regular they establish a new normality are so important and those backed up by a clear ability for instant retaliation against an itchy trigger. But as I've said from the start, those views don't come backed by a degree in international relations.
china claim of the island is mainly establish their influence in the area, and secure sea lane for themselves in the event of war between Vietnam or lesser capable adversary. I don't think they will destabilize trade route since they will hurt the most, been the largest export/import of goods in the region. as for their island claim its disputable, the Fiery cross we conduct FON few days ago was under china control since 80s.

In 1987, following a UNESCO (IOC/UNESCO) meeting in March, it was agreed that the PRC would build weather stations in the South China sea as part of the Global Sea Level Observing System (GLOSS) survey.[8]


In April 1987, the PRC chose to build a weather station on Fiery Cross reef as the reef was large enough for the purpose, and it was isolated from other disputed islands and reefs.[12] However, this caused further skirmishes with Vietnam when, in January 1988, some Vietnamese ships with construction materials tried to approach the reef in a bid to construct Vietnamese structures.

The weather station was commissioned by UNESCO's Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission(IOC). Construction was commenced in February 1988 and completed in August 1988
also note during high tide, the reef does not complete submerge(2 rock showing), which by UNCLOS definition give the territorial right but not EEZ right. this is similar to Rockall island uk, which I think china use it as argument for its territorial claim.

as for the 9 dash line, I'm not sure what china stance on those, since they inherit the claim from ROC aka Taiwan after the CCP taking power and to this day they are ambiguous about it.
 

Ranger25

Active Member
Staff member
SCS isn't a Gulf of Sidra. Nobody has declared any 'zones of death'. Presently, the PLA has no serious A2/AD capabilities in the area that can help them enforce such a claim, especially against the USN.

For now, militarily escalating the situation will not be in China's favour.
The PLA has deployed their HQ9 there as well as the Aforementioned J-11s. Hard to confirm or deny if they've also deployed ASHMs there as well.

So perhaps not a impenetrable A2D2 but they've at least started.

And this is after they had previously stated the island building was for purely oceanographic research etc etc etc


https://www.washingtonpost.com/news...apparently-deployed-into-the-south-china-sea/
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Its clearly that the ASEAN members lack unity. With such political steps ASEAN looks weaker and backbone-less than ever.
What a Retracted Statement Says About China’s Growing Power in the South China Sea
[Hannah Beech / Shanghai]
June 15, 2016

It was there—and then it wasn’t. On Tuesday evening, foreign ministers from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) performed a diplomatic magic trick.
Complete article at https://www.yahoo.com/news/retracted-statement-says-china-growing-104920652.html
 
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