Hi guys,
1. Can I invite you to bring the discussion back to ASEAN, it’s geopolitical and military relevance to disputes in the South China Sea, the Natuna Sea and the trajectory of ADMM Plus?
2. ASEAN’s economic, cultural, political, and historical diversity means that these 10 countries do not share similar security perceptions and concerns.
(a) Singapore is attuned to the domestic sensitivities of its neighbors and can provide contextual intelligence or “an accurate assessment of the circumstances” to be a barometer for regional inclinations.
(b) Partnership between the U.S. and Singapore in cybersecurity and digital connectivity is most substantially demonstrated through existing technical assistance programs — to that end, Singapore has established the ASEAN-Singapore Cybersecurity Centre of Excellence.
(c) 5 decades after diplomatic ties began, Singapore is America’s primary security partner in ASEAN. In the words of former INDOPACOM Commander Admiral Philip Davidson, ‘no other Southeast Asian country has done more to facilitate U.S. presence than our partners in Singapore.’ The U.S.–Singapore security relationship was founded on the cornerstone of maritime security cooperation.
3. Support by Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia for an open and inclusive regional security order and institutional cooperation within ASEAN Plus groupings, like the East Asia Summit (a pan-Asian forum of 18 countries), the powerless 27 member ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the useless ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting (ADMM) Plus, will also be critical to give the appearance of action, when there is no real movement. These serve as multilateral talk-shop platforms to keep Team Biden engaged with ASEAN. Though I must say:
(i) with Cambodia as ASEAN Chairman from 28 Oct 2021, not much is expected in the way of progress in 2022;
(ii) the bigger problem is the coup in Myanmar; and the loss of ASEAN centrality over time. In Oct 2021, the ASEAN summit opened without a representative from Myanmar following its top general's exclusion for ignoring peace proposals. Cambodia’s Hun Sen defended this step in surprisingly strong terms,
saying, “ASEAN did not expel Myanmar from ASEAN’s framework. Myanmar abandoned its right... Now we are in the situation of ASEAN minus one. It is not because of ASEAN, but because of Myanmar”; and
(iii) the minor irritation of 2022 Philippine elections, possibly affecting security in Sabah — that I hope will not materialise as explained by others in this thread.
4. The post-World War II Cambodian government was first a French-centric colony, followed by a US-centric period, then a China-centric period, then a Vietnam-centric period, and now arguably is reverting back to a China-centric period. It is like a ping-pong ball.
(a) In 1992, the US ended an economic embargo of Cambodia and, in 1994, opened a diplomatic mission in Phnom Penh.
(b) On 12 Nov 2021, Team Biden announced an illogical arms embargo against Cambodia because of allegations of growing Chinese military influence and Beijing’s “refurbishment” of the Ream Naval Base.
(c) With new sanctions, America’s up-and-down relationship with Cambodia has taken another backward step. In 1970, the US supported the coup against Sihanouk, who fled to Beijing and later supported the Khmer Rouge, and the post-coup Khmer Republic under Lon Nol. The US made a loan of US$278 million to the Lon Nol government, an amount Washington is now claiming has doubled to US$500 million. Recently, the Biden administration demanded repayment of this loan.
5. None of this ping-ponging of Cambodia was or is inevitable and reflects on the American misunderstanding of Cambodian politics.
6. Indonesia, and the rest of the ASEAN countries lack the military capability required to confront China much outside of their sovereign jurisdictions, and often even from within them.
(a) ASEAN countries, as a result, are neither suited nor inclined to participating in a classical concert of powers in the Indo-Pacific. However, their ability to navigate between the US and China by not choosing sides also faces growing challenges.
(b) Power politics and internal weakness have steadily eroded the ability of ASEAN to uphold a degree of regional order capable of tying both superpowers to the region. This has contributed to a rise in ‘minilateral’ coalition building and the steady decline in the multilateral influence of ASEAN organised meetings like ARF and ADMM Plus or even the East Asia Summit.
7. As usual, your discussion on Indonesia is very interesting but until the politically driven military procurement trajectory is fixed, the TNI is going to be too weak to make a difference in the 2021 to 2026 period — in the face of the Chinese challenge. Keeping in mind that TNI AL vessels are sinking on their own — for example, KRI Nanggala (Apr 2021), a TNI AL old refurbished submarine, and, KRI Teluk Jakarta, a Frosch I landing craft (July 2020) sank on their own. A new built KRI Rencongor caught fire (Sep 2018), for a total loss. As such, I am not very optimistic on the design or material condition of Indonesian naval vessels.
8. Fortunately, not all ASEAN members are not standing still. The SAF is effectively modernising with the introduction or operationalisation of 12 F-35Bs, 4 Type 218SGs, 16 H225Ms and 16 CH-47Fs by 2026. In counter-terrorism and special forces area:
(a) the Singapore Navy’s NDU Special Boat Group will raise, train and sustain all maritime specialised craft, including the Combatant Craft Large (CCL) and Combatant Craft Medium (CCM) which supports a common maritime situational awareness for the delivery of quick and effective responses during operations; and
(b) the CCL is an effective NDU team extraction boat, from hostile beaches or river banks — enabling the navy to compete with the Singapore Army’s commando boat teams and their very slim vessels for some overlapping mission sets.
| S/N | DESCRIPTION | PARAMETERS |
| 1. | Length | 26m |
| 2. | Breadth | 5m |
| 3. | Speed | In excess of 35 knots |
| 4. | Range/Endurance | In excess of 400nm |
| 5. | Complement | 4 Crew (Boat Commander, Coxswain, Navigator and Engineer) |
| 6. | Hull Material | Aluminium |
| 7. | Propulsion | 2 x MTU Engines
2 x Rolls Royce Kamewa Waterjets |
| 8. | Electro Optical (EO) System | 3rd Generation EO with Eye-safe laser |
| 9. | Navigation Systems | Radio Detection and Ranging (Radar), Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS), Maritime Automatic Identification System (MAIS), Gyro Compass |
| 10. | Communication Suite | Radio Communications, C2 System |
| 11. | Weapon | 12.7mm OTO Melara Remote Weapon System |
