Post 2 of 3: Geopolitical context of the 1st ASEAN-Russia Naval Exercise
Within Indonesia, eventough there's significant Political faction that want to increase engagement with Russia, but the ones that want to increase engagement with US and West is actually much larger. However within Indonesia Political tradition, in the end some balance must be achieved.
8. Agreed. 23 Nov 2021, marked the 19th Indonesia-U.S. Security Dialogue, with the next meeting to be held in Jakarta. I look forward to substantive outputs in 2022 and 2023 — with Team Biden trying to use carrots to lobby hard for US interests (by working with Indonesian decision makers). Compared to Russia, US access to decision makers is not to be underestimated.
9. Under the theme “Together We Can,” the TNI AD hosted a thousand U.S. Army troops from the 82nd Airborne Division from Fort Bragg North Carolina, and the 25th Infantry Division out of Schofield Barracks Hawaii, for Exercise Garuda Shield in Aug 2021.
10. The two-week Garuda Shield joint-exercise continues to solidify the U.S. – Indonesia Major Defense Partnership and advances cooperation in support of a free and open Indo-Pacific region. "The most powerful thing that’s happening at Garuda Shield is relationships," said Col. Neal Mayo, commander of Task Force Warrior, 2nd Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division.
This kind of engagement with Russia in Naval exercise is that kind of balance. However if we compared with US-Indonesian recent Garuda Shield exercise, this ASEAN-Russian naval is relatively pale in comparison. Shown the level of engagement between TNI and US Armed Forces is far larger then Russia. This's the subtlety of diplomacy tone are.
This exercise is between ASEAN and Russian Navy. I don't have latest information yet on whose asside Indonesia and Vietnam that will send ships in this exercise. However anyone else that going to participate, will done so not due Indonesia setting the tone, but due to their own balancing act. Despite Indonesia influence with ASEAN, I don't think any members no matter who can independently set the tone by without some kind of consensus.
11. Yes, given Indonesia’s desire to burn fishing boats of other ASEAN nations fishing in disputed EEZ waters and the ramming of TNI AL vessels by Vietnamese vessels, the ASEAN consensus is every country acting for itself. This is a failure of leadership and vision but that is to be expected given Indonesian domestic politics.
12. In 1993, Russia and Vietnam signed a contract to ensure the continued use of SIGINT facilities in Cam Ranh Bay. Russia wanted to continue using the electronic eavesdropping base to monitor Chinese communications in the South China Sea. The facility at Cam Ranh Bay is well placed to monitor communications around Hainan Island. It is important that we should keep in mind that Russia under Putin decided to abandon Cam Ranh Bay between 2001 —2004, never to return to Vietnam.
13. At this stage, communist Vietnam is eager for any engagement, as a counter weight to both China and the U.S. — given the Russia is the main arms supplier for Vietnam’s dated military.
(a) The Vietnamese Navy is taking tiny ineffective steps in its modernisation efforts as it cannot buy top-of-the-line Western weapons. Vietnam’s 4 Gepard-class frigates (Project 1166.1) and 6 Kilo class submarines are hopelessly over-matched in the South China Sea, should shooting erupt over EEZ claims viz a viz China.
(b) For some strange reason, some fanboys in Vietnam and Indonesia hold the mistaken impression that Russian weapons will work against the PLA(N), when the Chinese have access to the same Russian tech. Vietnam has no choice but to learn from the Russians, whose CONOPS is out-dated and ineffective against the rapidly modernising PLA(N). In the Indo-Pacific, only the JMSDF and the USN are a match the Chinese efforts in naval power projection.
In the end getting the consensus is the ASEAN game, and so far the balancing act still have to be done. Whether the balance shift toward more US and West, I can see it already happen but done so gradually. Still diplomacy voices must see in my opinion on ASEAN case on subtle language.
14. IMO, China’s geopolitical heft (in the military and economic spheres) will tilt any future attempt at balancing by Indonesia. China’s belt & road is a powerful tool to whip Indonesia (if your political elites miscalculate).
15. I am not sure simple balancing is a viable strategy from 2031 onwards, for Indonesia or for ASEAN. This is why, in recent years, Singapore has invested a stronger defence relationship with the Australians, the Americans, the French and the Germans and also in hard power with a range of new network centric weapon platforms and military tech from these countries that include: 4 Type 218SGs, 8 LMVs, 8 Seahawks, 16 H225Ms, 10 CH-47Fs, up to 12 F-35Bs and the up-coming 5,000+ ton MRCV (to replace the Victory class).
(a) Platform investments ensure that the RSN has 12 first line fighting frigates and air power, to enable the SAF to project power into islands nearby. The 130 metre long MRCVs, under development by ST Marine (as the
Vanguard 130 design), is much more interesting, to me, than the JMMS. Each of the 12 Singapore frigates will significantly extend the power projection range of SAF helicopters, with the H225Ms able to fly 700km before refuelling.
(b) The central role of helicopters, UAVs and USVs in distributed naval war fighting CONOPS of the Singapore Navy will be facilitated through Q-LARS 2.0 (a motion stabilised & heave compensated handling system for LAR for RHIBs and USVs) and ASIST. Q-LARS 2.0 will be used on the MRCV, to enable seamless launch and recovery of USVs and RHIBs at rough sea states. And ASIST will be used in the Formidable class/MRCVs to recover helicopters up to sea state 5. There is a growing range of
tiny sensor pods that are COTS, for UAVs and helicopters that are superbly capable for their weight & size.
(c) To augment and extend the Singapore Navy’s organic over-the horizon targeting capability (via Scaneagle UAVs on the soon to be retired Victory class corvettes), ST also makes its own
Veloce 60 UAV that has a 5 m wingspan and a MTOW of up to 70 kg, while flying at payload-dependent speeds of between 50-70 kt and staying aloft for 12-14 hours.
(d) At some point in the future, 7SIB will conduct an exercise in which H225Ms and CH-47Fs will move a vertical launch & recovery UAV system, and it’s associated equipment from a ship to shore to demonstrate an over the horizon targeting ability for the Singapore Army’s HIMARS system.
