The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
There are reports that a composite btln of Wagner fighters has broken through the Ukrainian front line south of Artemovsk/Bakhmut, and has taken a series of villages. Note this is dead north of Mayorsk that apparently recently fell to DNR forces, and dead south of Ivangrad, the last village/hamlet/suburb that Wagner forces took south of Artemovsk/Bakhmut. Reportedly Ukrainian reserves are being rushed from Chasoviy Yar to counter this.

I think it's unlikely that Wagner will be able to exploit this breakthrough, if it is in fact real. Presumably, if this is an attempt to threaten Artemovsk/Bakhmut with encirclement, a Russian regular mechanized/armored formation would have to be used to exploit. It remains to be seen if this is the intent. Up to this point Wagner has essentially been waging their own war around Artemovsk/Bakhmut and it's plausible that this advance is an opportunistic exploit of a weak spot to gain some ground rather then part of some greater plan.

Overall this is part of a pattern of Russian forces gaining ground across various sections of the Donbas, though all the advances are minor. The ground should be freezing soon, opening up opportunities for maneuver. Ukraine is reportedly moving units from Kherson to the Donbas, so we should be seeing a pretty major winter campaign.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
There are reports that a composite btln of Wagner fighters has broken through the Ukrainian front line south of Artemovsk/Bakhmut, and has taken a series of villages. Note this is dead north of Mayorsk that apparently recently fell to DNR forces, and dead south of Ivangrad, the last village/hamlet/suburb that Wagner forces took south of Artemovsk/Bakhmut. Reportedly Ukrainian reserves are being rushed from Chasoviy Yar to counter this.

I think it's unlikely that Wagner will be able to exploit this breakthrough, if it is in fact real. Presumably, if this is an attempt to threaten Artemovsk/Bakhmut with encirclement, a Russian regular mechanized/armored formation would have to be used to exploit. It remains to be seen if this is the intent. Up to this point Wagner has essentially been waging their own war around Artemovsk/Bakhmut and it's plausible that this advance is an opportunistic exploit of a weak spot to gain some ground rather then part of some greater plan.

Overall this is part of a pattern of Russian forces gaining ground across various sections of the Donbas, though all the advances are minor. The ground should be freezing soon, opening up opportunities for maneuver. Ukraine is reportedly moving units from Kherson to the Donbas, so we should be seeing a pretty major winter campaign.
War Mapper reported four hours ago that Russian forces have captured the settlement of Ozarianivka. The settlements of Kurdyumivka and Andriivka are now contested.

Confirmation of the Su-34 shot down a month ago by the Ukrainians.

Ukrainian forces firing a Javelin from inside a building.

Latest Oryx update on Russian vehicle and heavy weaponry losses, damage etc. Of the 5,000 vehicle and heavy weaponry losses, Ukraine captured over 2,500. That says a lot.

Oryx has started a new list.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update Nov 13th-15th

Kherson-Nikolaev-Odessa.


Ukrainian forces at the Novaya Kahovka sign, right side of the Dnepr.


Ukraine's 35th MarBde riding Kipri MRAPs in Kherson region.


Russian forces leaving Kherson area.


Ukrainian in Kherson throwing a Zieg Heil on western television. Reportedly Ukraine kicked out 6 western reporters from Kherson after this aired.


More footage from Zelenskiy visiting Kherson.


Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk.

Russian EW unit with anti-UAV weapons and a Borisoglebsk complex, Zaporozhye region.


Oskol Front.

Allegedly Ukrainian tank getting taken near Novoselkovo, Svatovo area.


Russian helo strikes near Svatovo, allegedly against a Krab and a BTR-4.


Russian super-heavy artillery operating in Kharkov region.


LDNR Front.

Some combat footage from Wagner around Artemovsk/Bakhmut. The fighting there remains primarily positional, with artillery typically playing first fiddle.


Near Artemovsk/Bakhmut a Ukrainian BMP takes an ATGM hit, doesn't get destroyed, dismounts return to the vehicle, after which a second missile hits it, and it goes up in flames. Allegedly Wagner fighters firing.


Ukrainian military cars getting hit by artillery, allegedly Wagner near Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


Rebel forces in Zaytsevo, outskirts of Gorlovka. The town was contested for years, since the '14 war. Rebel forces now control all of it, namely the DNR 3rd Bde. Despite the years of war, a few residents still remain.


DNR 3rd Bde in Mayorsk.


Russian Marines, 155th MarBde, Pavlovka.


Allegedly Russian and DNR forces taking a Ukrainian POW in Pavlovka. To me the scene looks staged. It's entirely plausible that this is a POW taken in Pavlovka, but to me this looks like a show for the cameras.


Civilians in Mariupol' are writing graffiti on the walls to indicate they are freezing. As temperatures drop, most of the city is still in ruins. The fancy new housing complex notwithstanding, I suspect almost all of the remaining residents are living in the pre-war buildings.


DNR 1st Bde using a captured T-64BM Bulat.


The West.

Several Rosomak-based armored vehicles moving around in L'vov.


Russia.


Russia has reportedly captured a team of Ukrainian infiltrators in Belgorod region.


Mobilized personnel training. All the problems notwithstanding, Russia has managed to mobilized hundreds of thousands, equip them, arm them, and they are now arriving at the front.


Old MAZ fuel trucks pulled from storage, in Moscow.


Misc.

Two cases of Ukrainian tanks hitting land mines. I think this illustrates the realities of this war. While more modern tanks are nice, many of the ways tanks are lost don't depend very much on what the tank is.


Russian UAV-directed mortar fires in Ukraine. According to them they show up, set up, fire, and withdraw, using UAVs and counter-battery radars.


A destroyed Zuzana-2 in Ukraine. Only a handful of these have been supplied, and one has been destroyed.


Allegedly fragments of a Lancet loitering munition that was shot down. Of course it's also quite possible that these are fragments picked up after a successful impact.


NATO/EU.

Excalibur Arms is apparently planning to produce technicals carrying the ZPU-2 for air defense against the Shahed strikes.


Howitzers heading from Slovakia to Ukraine. Type of gun unknown.


Lithuania has transferred a party of 10 SP mortars and 2 fire control vehicles to Ukraine.


Yugoslav M75 20mm AA guns have shown up in Ukraine. While not the most useful weapons, it's far from the worst system provided to Ukraine.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
War Mapper reported four hours ago that Russian forces have captured the settlement of Ozarianivka. The settlements of Kurdyumivka and Andriivka are now contested.
The situation remains fluid. It's not clear if Russian reporting of them being captured is premature or if this is a Ukrainian counter-attack that has pushed back into the villages.

That awkward moment when your allies are Belarus and Iran (and maybe North Korea) but even China isn't helping.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Latest Oryx update on Russian vehicle and heavy weaponry losses, damage etc. Of the 5,000 vehicle and heavy weaponry losses, Ukraine captured over 2,500. That says a lot.
The tally shows 5,000 AFV destroyed AND 2,600 captured for a total of over 8,100 losses. Not 2600 captured out of a total 5000.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
I wouldn’t be surprised if we started seeing a cooling of relations between China and Russia. If not a cooling then certainly a reset.
Russia is the only country that China has not tried to dominate politically. I suspect this is because they saw them as a potential ally. They probably also assessed Russia’s military as being much more powerful than it really is.

Now they probably view Russia as yet another middle power against whom they have had territorial claims in the past.
 

STURM

Well-Known Member
I wouldn’t be surprised if we started seeing a cooling of relations between China and Russia. If not a cooling then certainly a reset.
Why? The present arrangement benefits them both. China still relies on Russia for various military related tech it can't get elsewhere; there is extensive joint cooperation in non military areas and there is significant trade between them. Both also share common concerns and interests.

INow they probably view Russia as yet another middle power against whom they have had territorial claims in the past..
They still view Russian as a significant European power and one keeps the U.S. distracted in Europe.


'There is no question that since China and Russia see each other as the strategic assets, people wonder what Russia can expect from China during the ongoing war and its aftermath, and then how Beijing can offer to Moscow which has actually fought alone against the NATO driven by the Anglo-American axis since the crisis broke out. Recently, U.S. President Joe Biden claimed that China has been “keeping their distance” from Russia, yet, China instantly refuted it by saying that China and Russia strategic relations “are rock-solid”. As the largest neighbors to each other and comprehensive strategic partners of coordination for a new era, Beijing and Moscow have the common interests which are primarily built on a high degree of mutual trust and strong internal dynamics. In October, China reiterated that given the mutual trust and firm mutual support to each other’s core interests, China will firmly support Russia in rallying and leading the Russian people under their current leadership to achieve strategic development goals against all the odds and disturbance, and to further establish Russia’s status as a major country on the international stage.'

'For sure, China grasps the consequences if it losses Russia as the most effective strategic partner in the international arena since it is the rationale behind China’s “back-to-back” strategic coordination with Russia.'



'As the United States strengthened alliances against China, Beijing pursued so-called “New-Type Big Power Relations,” underscoring sovereignty, cooperation, and respect for the UN system, and called this type of relationship a “partnership without alliance-making.” The only “big power” that shares China’s policy preferences is Russia. Militarily, China and Russia’s insecurity and strategic objectives deeply aligned after the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and the Arms Trade Treaty in 2019. Russia, concerned about NATO expansion and missile deployment close to its borders, found similar concerns with China, who felt threatened in maritime Asia and by U.S. strategic positioning in the Taiwan Strait. In June 2021, Beijing and Moscow jointly announced that “some countries use ideology to separate nations and interfere into others’ domestic affairs, customarily adopt one-sided sanctions, and destroy multilateral international systems, including those on military controls.'
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
Gustav Gressel just came back from Ukraine, with a simple message:
Germany got the message:
In other news, France has finally shipped LRU:
And the US is pledging $53 million in support to help repair the Ukranian infrastructure: U.S. To Grant $53 Million To Ukraine For Power Transmission

Ukraine is establishing new production line of 152 and 122 mm: The first 152-mm shells of Ukrainian production • Mezha.Media
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
2. Watling: Ukr entered war with 1,178 barrel artillery pieces, 1,680 MLRS, 60 divisions of air defences & 900 tanks—more air defence and artillery systems "than vast majority of European NATO combined".
Thanks for your comment below.

Not to nitpick but not 60 divisions. 60 дивизиона. Not to be confused with дивизия. The first is an artillery btln, the second is a division. Ukraine definitely didn't have 60 divisions of air defenses. 60 btlns is 20 rgts, which is still a ton.
The author has explained his choice in use of words.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
A new great RUSI report is out: Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022

Some observations:

Many Russian soldiers arrived in towns [in the north] without their weapons loaded. They were – for the most part – not anticipating heavy fighting.

Average life expectancy of fixed-wing drone was six flights; quadcopter three flights(!)

HIMARS and M270 ended the Russian offensive and marked a turning point in the war.

At the height of the fighting in Donbass, Russia used more ammunition in two days than the total UK stock.. With Ukranian usage, the UK stock would last roughly a week.

Some conclusions:

There is no sanctuary in modern warfare. The enemy can strike throughout operational depth. Survivability depends on dispersing ammunitions stocks, command and control, maintenance areas and aircraft. Ukraine successfully evaded Russia’s initial wave of strikes by dispersing its arsenals, aircraft and air defences. Conversely, the Russians succeeded in engaging 75% of static defence sites in the first 48 hours of the war. Nor is setting up a headquarters in a civilian building sufficient to make it survivable.

Warfighting demands large initial stockpiles and significant slack capacity. Despite the prominence of anti-tank guided weapons in the public narrative, Ukraine blunted Russia’s attempt to seize Kyiv using massed fires from two artillery brigades. The difference in numbers between Russian and Ukrainian artillery was not as significant at the beginning of the conflict, with just over a 2:1 advantage: 2,433 barrel artillery systems against 1,176; and 3,547 multiple-launch rocket systems against 1,680. Ukraine maintained artillery parity for the first month and a half and then began to run low on munitions so that, by June, the AFRF had a 10:1 advantage in volume of fire. Evidently, no country in NATO, other than the US, has sufficient initial weapons stocks for warfighting or the industrial capacity to sustain largescale operations.

Uncrewed aerial systems (UAS) and counter-UAS (CUAS) are essential across all branches and at all echelons. Although critical to competitiveness by providing situational awareness, 90% of UAS employed are lost. For the most part, UAS must be cheap and attritable. For land forces, they must be organic to units for the purposes of both situational awareness and target acquisition. The primary means of CUAS is EW. Another critical tactical requirement is to be alerted to the presence of UAS.

The force must fight for the right to precision. Precision is not only vastly more efficient in the effects it delivers but also allows the force to reduce its logistics tail and thereby makes it more survivable. Precision weapons, however, are scarce and can be defeated by EW. To enable kill chains to function at the speed of relevance, EW for attack, protection and direction finding is a critical element of modern combined arms operations. Sequencing fires to disrupt EW and create windows of opportunity for precision effects is critical and creates training requirements. In modern warfare, the electromagnetic spectrum is unlikely to be denied, but it is continually disrupted, and forces must endeavour to gain advantage within it.

For land forces, the pervasive ISTAR on the modern battlefield and the layering of multiple sensors at the tactical level make concealment exceedingly difficult to sustain. Survivability is often afforded by being sufficiently dispersed to become an uneconomical target, by moving quickly enough to disrupt the enemy’s kill chain and thereby evade engagement, or by entering hardened structures. Shell scrapes and hasty defences can increase immediate survivability but also risk the force becoming fixed by fire while precision fires and specialist munitions do not leave these positions survivable. Forces instead should prioritise concentrating effects while only concentrating mass under favourable conditions – with an ability to offer mutual support beyond line of sight – and should give precedence to mobility as a critical component of their survivability.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Thanks for your comment below.


The author has explained his choice in use of words.
In my opinion it creates confusion. They're not organized like NATO btlns, but they're even less organized like NATO divisions. An S-300 "btln" is close to a Patriot battery. You can use the correct translation of the term, or you can use a logical equivalent, ideally with some explanation. Calling it a division is misleading in the extreme. For comparison, an air defense division is multiple regiments, of multiple btlns.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
"Warfighting demands large initial stockpiles and significant slack capacity."

This should be obvious, but some western countries have long been ignoring it. Here in the UK, for example, Treasury rules create incentives for government bodies of all sorts to keep minimum stocks. This has a certain logic for businesses, where it's financially inefficient to keep excess stock (but see below), but applying that principle to the armed forces is conceptually wrong. They operate on different cycles, where a piece of equipment can do its job by never being used, some types of equipment can go for years without being used (except a few for training) & then we need a million at once, & need to start making more - fast.

A shell or missile which sits in storage until it passes its use by date & then has to be scrapped or refilled/refurbished can have served its purpose, but it's hard to convince accountants of that.

I recall a conversation with a colleague on the train home, over 10 years ago. He looked worn out, so I asked him if he was OK, & he told me about his day. He'd been frantically busy chasing around to get a lot of old equipment from being sold as electronic scrap. It was sitting in a warehouse, & had a very low depletion rate, so bean counters decided that by their financial rules, it was surplus. [Edit] Just remembered: stores manager had targets, which included not keeping stock for more than a certain time. A too-simple rule which didn't allow for all circumstances.

It was spare parts for the biggest mobile phone network in the UK, bought in bulk just before they went out of production so that the network could be kept operational until the base stattons, etc. those parts were spares for were replaced on schedule. Disposing of them could potentially cost tens or hundreds of times what they'd cost, because it would necessitate early (& unplanned) retirement of major parts of the network.


I think the armed forces are like that, in spades.

P.S. He'd managed to get a block put on disposal of the stocks without the approval of the right people (i.e. network engineering), but it had been a struggle.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
I wonder if pollies actually believe JIT inventory works for military kit, especially when sufficient sea and airlift capacity is lacking for many countries as well. Apathy by electorates wrt defence do make it easier for pollies to ignore reality.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
I can understand the requirement to change artillery tubes because of barrel life in many armies a count would be kept of how many rounds used etc. with monitoring of barrel before their changing ,it would be difficult to do this in Ukraine with the tanks whose barrels also have a limited life , obviously a tank barrel bursting can be dangerous


Two Army personnel killed in tank barrel burst
The tank was manned by a crew of three personnel. The incident is under further investigation, sources added.


Perhaps some of the writers here can provide some idea of how long some of these old tanks may continue their combat without barrel maintenance

Pleasant surprise: The tank cannon barrel life is only 6 seconds
With tanks that can last for 30 years or more, there are few people who would believe that a tank cannon has a lifespan of only 6 seconds...
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
This article" Artillery and consumption of shells" suggests some of the number of ammunition held and used by Russia in this war , it goes onto to state that Russia's usage of shelling in Ukraine surpasses Nazi Germany's,
This article cites Russia having a stockpile of some fifteen million shells at the commencement of this conflict , even provides estimates of depreciation of barrels of the artillery
Volodymyr Dacenko on Twitter: "1/17 A war that the world has not seen for a long time... #RussianUkrainianWar #ATACMSForUkraine #OSINT @TheStudyofWar @McFaul @AlexKokcharov @KofmanMichael @shashj @general_ben @apmassaro3 #Oryx https://t.co/sXwLXYiS09" / Twitter
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Bakhmut meat grinder, other updates & my reply

1. In many ways, the Russian way of war in Ukraine does not make tactical sense. I am sick of seeing Russian troops being killed in the Bakhmut meat grinder, because of the imperial dreams of Putin. The videos of Russian lives thrown away for no reason at all, lost to drones, artillery and mortars.

2. The trenches near Bakhmut tell the story of the struggle, smell, cold, mud, dirt, and blood.
(a) Supported by Russian T-90Ms and BMP-3s, Wagner have continually expended their combat strength on small settlements around Bakhmut since the end of May; in the following six months, they have only secured gains on the order of a few kilometers at a time.​
(b) The Battle of Bakhmut will not go down as a pivotal strategic event, but as a symbol of the war's ferocity and futility. At the cost of a river of blood, Russian forces have taken the village of Andrivka (not to be confused with Avdiivka, which is critical for Ukrainian lines of communications) and are attempting to take the West bank of Bakhmutka River. They also conducted multiple close air support sorties in support of this assault.​
(c) Alexander Khodakovsky says that Russian offensives end when their advance units sustain ~20% casualties — the loss of 2-3 in an assault group of 15 makes any further advance impossible. He says that soldiers focus on evacuating their wounded. Even if Russian troops continue to advance toward and within Bakhmut, and even if they force a controlled Ukrainian withdrawal from the city (as was the case in Lysychansk), Bakhmut itself offers them little operational benefit.​

The U.N has I understood to have passed a number of resolutions condemning Russia's actions in Ukraine it is not just the hypocritical west condemning Russia . It's very easy to be taken in by Russia s deliberate tactics of misinformation to justify their actions
3. Agreed. This is not an easy discussion, given the amount of Russian misinformation that has been amplified by some sectors — Putin wrote his famous essay (asserting that Ukrainians and Russians were one people) in July 2021. That same month, the report says, the FSB was tasked with surveying Ukrainians. The result of their work seems to have been shaped by confirmation bias.

4. Putin’s core group had planned to “subjugate” Ukraine and control it but this did not go to plan. Beyond the 2021 Putin essay, simplistically, Russian aggression against Ukraine could be broadly broken down into three phases:

(a) Hybrid warfare phase, 2009 to Feb 2014​
(b) "Plausible" deniability invasion, Feb 2014 to Feb 2022​
(c) Full-scale invasion, Feb 2022-ongoing​
 
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tl1000r

New Member
In many ways, the war in Ukraine does not make tactical sense
In my opinion every war make sense at least for one of the side of conflict and does not make sense for the other (obviously not all sides do the same). By the way Ukraine is not only war where 3rd party froces involved. Every war is the business at first. We shouldn't try to find the direct sense and benefits to the people (they are just consumable like the bullets or landmines in every war). Imperial dreams of Putin (we all know here that Putin is not decision maker and he is not alone) is only 10th in the line of causes of war in Ukraine.

Yes i followed the link and watched video and can not find the clue, why the autor post it? Its a proove that war is killing? Its not TV show.

2. The trenches near Bakhmut tell the story of the struggle, smell, cold, mud, dirt, and blood.

(a) Supported by Russian T-90Ms and BMP-3s, Wagner have continually expended their combat strength on small settlements around Bakhmut since the end of May; in the following six months, they have only secured gains on the order of a few kilometers at a time.​

(b) The Battle of Bakhmut will not go down as a pivotal strategic event, but as a symbol of the war's ferocity and futility. At the cost of a river of blood, Russian forces have taken the village of Andrivka (not to be confused with Avdiivka, which is critical for Ukrainian lines of communications) and are attempting to take the West bank of Bakhmutka River. They also conducted multiple close air support sorties in support of this assault.​
Its time to put in the game ATACMS? Or too early?

4. Putin’s core group had planned to “subjugate” Ukraine and control it but this did not go to plan. Beyond the 2021 Putin essay, simplistically, Russian aggression against Ukraine could be broadly broken down into three phases:

(a) Hybrid warfare phase, 2009 to Feb 2014​
(b) "Plausible" deniability invasion, Feb 2014 to Feb 2022​
(c) Full-scale invasion, Feb 2022-ongoing​
all got started much much more sooner

 
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tonnyc

Well-Known Member
Imperial dreams of Putin (we all know here that Putin is not decision maker and he is not alone) is only 10th in the line of causes of war in Ukraine.
Underlining mine.

I grant you that Vladimir Putin is not alone and that 10th in line of causes of war in Ukraine is just a figure of speech, but are you sure you didn't make a typo when you say Putin is not decision maker? That is a bold claim.

Anyway, if it was a typo, what was supposed to be the correct sentence?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Bakhmut meat grinder, other updates & my reply

1. In many ways, the Russian way of war in Ukraine does not make tactical sense. I am sick of seeing Russian troops being killed in the Bakhmut meat grinder, because of the imperial dreams of Putin. The videos of Russian lives thrown away for no reason at all, lost to drones, artillery and mortars.
Artemovsk/Bakhmut seems to be Prigozhin's private war. Not in the sense that he has a grudge, but in the sense that his organization has decided that they're going to own that section of the front line. From what I've read they're considerably more competent then the average mobilized soldier, better trained and better equipped.

2. The trenches near Bakhmut tell the story of the struggle, smell, cold, mud, dirt, and blood.
(a) Supported by Russian T-90Ms and BMP-3s, Wagner have continually expended their combat strength on small settlements around Bakhmut since the end of May; in the following six months, they have only secured gains on the order of a few kilometers at a time.​
(b) The Battle of Bakhmut will not go down as a pivotal strategic event, but as a symbol of the war's ferocity and futility. At the cost of a river of blood, Russian forces have taken the village of Andrivka (not to be confused with Avdiivka, which is critical for Ukrainian lines of communications) and are attempting to take the West bank of Bakhmutka River. They also conducted multiple close air support sorties in support of this assault.​
(c) Alexander Khodakovsky says that Russian offensives end when their advance units sustain ~20% casualties — the loss of 2-3 in an assault group of 15 makes any further advance impossible. He says that soldiers focus on evacuating their wounded. Even if Russian troops continue to advance toward and within Bakhmut, and even if they force a controlled Ukrainian withdrawal from the city (as was the case in Lysychansk), Bakhmut itself offers them little operational benefit.​
What makes you think the casualties are exceptionally large here? To be clear, I'm not saying that's not the case, but what I've seen from that section of the front doesn't differ all that much from other segments. And Russian infantry presence seems to be much denser then Kharkov region was.

3. Agreed. This is not an easy discussion, given the amount of Russian misinformation that has been amplified by some sectors — Putin wrote his famous essay (asserting that Ukrainians and Russians were one people) in July 2021. That same month, the report says, the FSB was tasked with surveying Ukrainians. The result of their work seems to have been shaped by confirmation bias.
The trouble with that argument is that the word he used "народ" has no precise meaning. It could even be used to refer to humanity as a whole if one desired. So he's not technically wrong, he's just not saying much. Russian and Ukrainians are definitely not one ethnicity. They missed the chance of forming one nation over the past ~150 years. So they're definitely two nations now even if in ~1875 there might have been some question.

4. Putin’s core group had planned to “subjugate” Ukraine and control it but this did not go to plan. Beyond the 2021 Putin essay, simplistically, Russian aggression against Ukraine could be broadly broken down into three phases:

(a) Hybrid warfare phase, 2009 to Feb 2014​
(b) "Plausible" deniability invasion, Feb 2014 to Feb 2022​
(c) Full-scale invasion, Feb 2022-ongoing​
I think it was an attempt to undo the mistakes and failures of '14. An attempt that was fundamentally misguided, i.e. it could not succeed. Russia needed to extricate itself from the Donbass war, not just militarily but politically in terms of relations with the EU. "Winning" a conventional fight wouldn't do that. Losing it might, but at a very high cost. Getting stuck in a meatgrinder for 1-3 years is probably the worst case scenario.
 
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