The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[OPSSG]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1572213398846246912

1. War going poorly? The Duma vote is designed for domestic consumption in Russia.

2. A new law passed is introducing concepts of mobilisation and martial law, bring Russia much closer to full mobilisation. It stipulates harsh penalties for failing to report for military duty, surrendering, or refusal to fight. The Duma vote and referendum announcement is part of a new Russian contingency planning to gear up for an all-out war, unless Ukraine and the West back down — but Ukraine cannot back down as they are entirely within their own territory.

3. Putin is taking some heat for the recent rout of the Russian military — this new law seems to be Putin’s plan to lose harder.

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(a) Russian President Putin has suffered “epic fails” on all his war aims, namely, removing Ukrainian President Zelenskyy, capturing Kyiv, dividing NATO and holding onto Kharkiv. In Feb to Apr 2022, the Russians had an advantage in resources; with the early view that the quantity of their force provides a quality all its own, their equipment while not great, could work in theory, their artillery and long range fires are devastating.​

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(b) After months of fighting with Spetsnaz, Airborne, 190 plus BTGs, the Russians failed to achieve their tactical objectives. To make matters worse, from May to Aug 2022, this advantage in resources slowly evaporated as Western arms delivery stepped up.​

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https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1572242449036201984

(c) As Major Gen. (retired) Mick Ryans said the Ukrainians have adopted what he has described elsewhere as a strategy of corrosion. They have attacked the Russians at their weak points constantly, destroyed their logistics, and slowly killed as many Russian battlefield leaders as possible; and this finally led to the central question of the Russo-Ukraine War:​

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Q: Can Ukraine undertake the offensives required to liberate their people & reoccupy their territory?​

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The Ukrainians have answered this question with their Kharkiv offensive. In a blunt assessment of Russia in Ukraine, Richard Moore of MI6 tells CNN Russia is “about to run out of steam” and “over the next few weeks, they will have to pause in some way and that will give the Ukrainians opportunities to strike back.”​

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(d) On the performance of Russian intelligence, Moore was critical. “If I reflect on our Russian counterparts, like the Russian military, I don’t think they’re having a great war. They clearly completely misunderstood Ukrainian nationalism.”​

(e) It seems that Putin wants to prolong the agony of Ukrainians without providing any real chance of a Russian victory.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1572213209951768576

4. SEAD done — as a result Ukraine conducted 15 Close Air Support missions against Russian troop concentrations in the Kherson.

 

[Feanor]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1572213398846246912

1. War going poorly? The Duma vote is designed for domestic consumption in Russia.

I think it's beyond that. Russia needs some sort of plan for administering the occupied areas. Annexation has been the declared plan for months now.

2. A new law passed is introducing concepts of mobilisation and martial law, bring Russia much closer to full mobilisation. It stipulates harsh penalties for failing to report for military duty, surrendering, or refusal to fight. The Duma vote and referendum announcement is part of a new Russian contingency planning to gear up for an all-out war, unless Ukraine and the West back down — but Ukraine cannot back down as they are entirely within their own territory.

3. Putin is taking some heat for the recent rout of the Russian military — this new law seems to be Putin’s plan to lose harder.

Remember until recently Russia had situations with soldiers refusing a deployment and the result was a discharge, and possibly some prosecution. But it was complicated to even go after them for it. This really just brings some basic expectations to the table. A better question is this, why until now was it possible for soldiers to refuse deployments? There are a lot of strange elements to Russia's contract soldier program. For example contract soldiers are routinely given certain guarantees about housing options when serving. If those options aren't provided, they are able to break their contract and leave the military. Other examples include soldiers signing a contract not with the MoD but this a specific unit. In other words, you can't just transfer them from unit to unit, at least not easily. Often you have to offer them the option of resigning.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1572213209951768576

4. SEAD done — as a result Ukraine conducted 15 Close Air Support missions against Russian troop concentrations in the Kherson.

This is just a statement for now. Let's see if any evidence surfaces. So far all of Ukraine's sorties that we've seen are helos and planes flying very low, lobbing some rockets and then rapidly withdrawing. Ukraine also lost an Su-25 recently.

 

[STURM]

So far all of Ukraine's sorties that we've seen are helos and planes flying very low, lobbing some rockets and then rapidly withdrawing. Ukraine also lost an Su-25 recently.

We have a situation where both sides are clearly unable to achieve air superiority and because of that are unable to deploy air power in the manner they would like to [even taking into account that Russia does not deploy air power the way the West does]. As such both are contend to achieve limited air denial.

We know that Stinger and Starstreak accounted for some Russian aircraft but the fact remains that Russian aircraft are still flying regularly still mostly at low level [well within range on MANPADs]. Will NASAMs; capable as it is with superior range and altitude compared to MANPADs; really make a difference?Are Ukraine's backers providing anything another than NASAMs to keep Russian aircraft at bay? Another question is why isn't Russia targeting Ukrainian airfields or areas where they think the Ukrainians are operating aircraft from with long range missiles?

Many aspects of this war have been widely reported on or are well known but next to nothing has been released on air to air kills apart from the fact that several kills were reported and generally accepted to have actually occurred during the early phases of the war by R-77s.

 

[Feanor]

We have a situation where both sides are clearly unable to achieve air superiority and because of that are unable to deploy air power in the manner they would like to [even taking into account that Russia does not deploy air power the way the West does]. As such both are contend to achieve limited air denial.

We know that Stinger and Starstreak accounted for some Russian aircraft but the fact remains that Russian aircraft are still flying regularly still mostly at low level [well within range on MANPADs]. Will NASAMs; capable as it is with superior range and altitude compared to MANPADs; really make a difference?Are Ukraine's backers providing anything another than NASAMs to keep Russian aircraft at bay?

IRIS-Ts from Germany, reportedly.

Another question is why isn't Russia targeting Ukrainian airfields or areas where they think the Ukrainians are operating aircraft from with long range missiles?

They are. However Ukraine has very many airfields and very few aircraft. It's a game of whac-a-moel. And to top it off, despite the steady stream of Russian missile strikes, Russia does have finite missiles. Expending them on every single runway doesn't appear to be viable. Russia has attempted to hit aircraft on the ground, in some cases apparently successfully.

Many aspects of this war have been widely reported on or are well known but next to nothing has been released on air to air kills apart from the fact that several kills were reported and generally accepted to have actually occurred during the early phases of the war by R-77s.

We don't know if some of the later Ukrainian Su-25 downing are air to air or SAM.

 

[Ranger25]

We have a situation where both sides are clearly unable to achieve air superiority and because of that are unable to deploy air power in the manner they would like to [even taking into account that Russia does not deploy air power the way the West does]. As such both are contend to achieve limited air denial.

We know that Stinger and Starstreak accounted for some Russian aircraft but the fact remains that Russian aircraft are still flying regularly still mostly at low level [well within range on MANPADs]. Will NASAMs; capable as it is with superior range and altitude compared to MANPADs; really make a difference?Are Ukraine's backers providing anything another than NASAMs to keep Russian aircraft at bay? Another question is why isn't Russia targeting Ukrainian airfields or areas where they think the Ukrainians are operating aircraft from with long range missiles?

Many aspects of this war have been widely reported on or are well known but next to nothing has been released on air to air kills apart from the fact that several kills were reported and generally accepted to have actually occurred during the early phases of the war by R-77s.

Sturm

In August the Pentagon annouced another drawdown that included the direct purchase of another 6 NASAMS and associated missiles for Ukraine.



total so far

On 1 July 2022, the United States through the Pentagon announced, as part of an $820 million military aid package to Ukraine, the delivery of NASAMS air defense systems through the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI) during the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine.[48] A US defence official said the existing Ukrainian air defense systems are Soviet-type systems, so over time it will be harder to sustain them. This is part of updating Ukrainian air defence from Soviet-era to a modern one.[49] The systems being supplied may come from Norwegian stocks and may be retired units.[50]

On 29 July 2022, the US DoD disclosed that it had started the formal process of acquiring the NASAMS for Ukraine. It will be two batteries, which is 12 mobile launchers, each having six missiles.[51] On 24 August 2022, the US DoD announced that it would provide 6 additional NASAMS units "with additional munitions" to Ukraine under the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative (USAI).[52]

U.S. Announces $2.98 Billion in Aid to Ukraine

On the 31st anniversary of Ukraine's independence, the United States is reinforcing its long-term commitment to the nation with $2.98 billion to train and equip the Ukrainian armed forces for their

www.defense.gov

 

[Ranger25]

They are. However Ukraine has very many airfields and very few aircraft. It's a game of whac-a-moel. And to top it off, despite the steady stream of Russian missile strikes, Russia does have finite missiles. Expending them on every single runway doesn't appear to be viable. Russia has attempted to hit aircraft on the ground, in some cases apparently successfully.

Agreed with the lack of ability to hit them all with PGMs. So why waste them on civilian infrastructure? Makes no military logic. Sort of the way the Wehrmacht shifted from hitting military targets in Britain to the London Blitz and we all know how that worked out

 

[SolarWind]

On the subject of air superiority in Ukraine, one must consider the amount of saturation of both sides with decentralized air defense systems. Decentralized SAM systems scattered about in a way that is difficult to predict make CAS risky if not downright suicide, knock UAVs out of the sky, and deny access to high-cost fighter and bomber aircraft. I am not inclined to think Russia's lack of air dominance is the product of some weakness of their air forces but rather the inability to synchronously locate and destroy air denial systems operated by UAF.

 

[seaspear]

The timing may be co incidental but America and other N.A.T.O countries withdrawal from Afghanistan not long after Russia started building up its forces on Ukraine's borders and just a few months before its invasion seemed to put America in a position to aid Ukraine ,I'm not sure America and other countries could of supplied the high levels of aid if still committed to Afghanistan

 

[Feanor]

Some thoughts on this subject. I don't think the issue is Russia's will to fight. I think the issue is that Russia just doesn't have the troops. In Balakleya Russia had SOBR units holding a strategic town. Right now in Liman Russian BARS and LNR reservists are desperately holding the town from repeated Ukrainian assaults. Where are line Russian Army units? In the recent offensive smaller Ukrainian groups simply passed right through the Russian front line, and then proceeded to attack rear elements, causing a rapid withdrawal. If Russia literally doesn't have the infantry to hold the line, river or no river, Ukraine can get across. Especially if Russian recon is failing. In my opinion this is the real issue. Despite its vast size, the Russian Army expends most of its contract soldiers on jobs that require skill and training. Which leaves a lot of riflemen as conscripts. And Russia remains unwilling to commit them to the fight. Which means that not only is Russia short on total troops, but also doesn't have replacement units to rotate units with.

You mentioned earlier Russian counter-battery fires. I don't think that this is necessarily the issue. Russia has a solid advantage in artillery fires. However poor recon, and lack of infantry to hold the front line means that bringing this advantage to bear is hard. When Russian recon identifies Ukrainian offensive movements, they get pounded and are unsuccessful. When Ukraine can avoid this, Russia is having a hard time fighting the front line fight.


EDIT: Case in point. Russia has gone from volunteer and composite btlns to sending composite companies to the front line. And remember Russian companies are far smaller then their western counter-parts, frequently 70-100 strong.

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Уголок Ситха

В Североморске (Мурманская область) проводили сборную роту Ненецкого автономного округа, которая отправляется в зону проведения специальной военной операции на территории Донбасса и Украины.

t.me

Some follow up thoughts on this. Russia has recently passed some language that implies some sort of mobilization preparation. However many in Russian military blogosphere have voiced opinions that Russia can't effectively train or equip hundreds of thousands of troops, and rather Russia's ability to train and deploy troops is nearly at a maximum just training the current volunteer btlns. It's generally known that conscripts are significant worse trained in Russian units and many brigades and regiments field a BTG that's made of of contract soldiers in its entirety, and that also receives the bulk of the training budget. Meaning the tankers for the tank company that supports the BTG get to fire ~60-80% of the rounds, same for the artillery element that's part of it. The rest get the remainder and are often spending more time on nonsense and show-training rather then real combat preparedness. This could be turned around in theory, but it would require more training resources and a significant effort. Training mobilized personnel from scratch would take even more. Additionally Russia has resorted to BMP-1s and T-62Ms from storage, as well as mass-produced armored trucks, instead of proper APCs. The rebels have already received D-20s, and Russia has reactivated the Giatsint inventory. Are there additional artillery resources to pull in sufficient quantities to support a major troop increase? Russia doesn't even have UAVs for it's current forward deployed forces. Where will they come from for additional troops?

So realistically can Russia mobilize? Probably not. At least not without moving the economy in a whole different direction. Some things can be mass-produced relatively easily, including things like body armor, primitive UAVs, and armored vehicles. Some things are harder, like mass production of artillery and modern IFVs/MBTs. Kurganmash already mentioned that they were approached about restarting "earlier model IFV" production, presumably in an attempt to get a mass-production IFV. They stated this would actually be slower and be expensive (unsurprisingly). AMZ can mass-produce BTR-82s to the tune of several hundred a year, and the Tigr-M to the tune of ~200-300 a year. Kamaz and Ural can put out large numbers of armored trucks and MRAPs. And presumably production of small arms and crew-served weapons would be doable. But we would be looking at a force closer to Ukraine's territorial defense formations. Not the type of army you want to launch a major offensive with. And again this is a best case scenario, where Russia does successfully produce what it can, and the political issues of mobilizing and sending conscripts into battle don't shake the foundations of government authority.

Can Russia train enough additional infantry to plug the gaps, shore up the deficiencies of the existing force structure, and get their war effort back on track, in the form of a slow but steady offensive into Ukraine? Maybe. But that probably wouldn't require mobilizing on the one hand, and is likely what Russia is already trying to do with the all-out recruiting effort of both volunteers, and mercenaries. Can Russia source enough UAVs to correct that particular gap? I don't know. I suspect it depends on Iran and China being able/willing to fill the gap as Russia ramps up domestic production. But I don't think the Russian military is near the end of its rope. I do think their approach to the war effort after the failure of the original offensive has in turn failed. It wasn't completely disasterous, and not nearly as disasterous as the initial drive into Ukraine. They've gained some ground in the Donbass, and basically cleared out Lugansk region. But that card is played. Russia will have to shift their focus and commit serious additional resources to the fight, or it will face setbacks similar to the Izyum-Balakleya debacle in other sections of the front.

 

[vikingatespam]

Given how poorly the current batch of troops in UKR are equipped (barring the 3rd Corps), I would be shocked if they field another 50K soldiers with proper equipment. (at least in the short term)

We shall see what Putin declares, but I am now finally getting concerned about the possible escalations.

• Rationally, Putin should know he is not meeting his goals.
• Rationally, trying to raise more poorly trained irregular forces wont get you anywhere.
• Rationally, continued attacks at Bahkmut while your other fronts suffer, is not a winning strategy
• Rationally, calling for total mobilization isnt going to solve your short (and maybe long) term problems.

Are we past rational behavior ?

 

[Feanor]

Given how poorly the current batch of troops in UKR are equipped (barring the 3rd Corps), I would be shocked if they field another 50K soldiers with proper equipment. (at least in the short term)

Poorly equipped in what way? Russian regulars in general appear to be reasonably well equipped, what we would expect from the Russian military. Russian irregulars are more of a mixed batch but the same Don Cossack Bde that rides around in T-62Ms also got BMP-2Ms with Berezhok modules straight off of the factory lines. Given that Russian volunteer organizations have been purchasing them things like quadcopters and modern gear, I wouldn't be surprised if their equipment over all was no worse the the regulars. The use of BMP-1s raises questions, but overall it seems they're a function of what's readily available rather then limitations on total stocks.

LDNR reservists were equipped atrociously badly but Russia basically distanced itself from equipping them while essentially expecting the LDNR governments to mobilize. A poor decision? Sure. Indicative of Russia's ability to equip additional infantry units? Not really.

We shall see what Putin declares, but I am now finally getting concerned about the possible escalations.

• Rationally, Putin should know he is not meeting his goals.
• Rationally, trying to raise more poorly trained irregular forces wont get you anywhere.
• Rationally, continued attacks at Bahkmut while your other fronts suffer, is not a winning strategy
• Rationally, calling for total mobilization isnt going to solve your short (and maybe long) term problems.

Are we past rational behavior ?

Rationally this entire war is a no-win scenario for Russia. By that logic we've been past rational behavior. Then again rationality and logic aren't the same thing. People can disagree.

 

[STURM]

I am not inclined to think Russia's lack of air dominance is the product of some weakness of their air forces but rather the inability to synchronously locate and destroy air denial systems operated by UAF.

The lack of dominance is largely due to how the Russian air force is structured and what it is trained to do. We assumed that like Western air arms the Russians were trained for air superiority and would conduct a systematic campaign to degrade the Ukraine's AD network but this wasn't the case.

 

[vikingatespam]

Poorly equipped in what way? Russian regulars in general appear to be reasonably well equipped, what we would expect from the Russian military. Russian irregulars are more of a mixed batch but the same Don Cossack Bde that rides around in T-62Ms also got BMP-2Ms with Berezhok modules straight off of the factory lines. Given that Russian volunteer organizations have been purchasing them things like quadcopters and modern gear, I wouldn't be surprised if their equipment over all was no worse the the regulars. The use of BMP-1s raises questions, but overall it seems they're a function of what's readily available rather then limitations on total stocks.

LDNR reservists were equipped atrociously badly but Russia basically distanced itself from equipping them while essentially expecting the LDNR governments to mobilize. A poor decision? Sure. Indicative of Russia's ability to equip additional infantry units? Not really.

Rationally this entire war is a no-win scenario for Russia. By that logic we've been past rational behavior. Then again rationality and logic aren't the same thing. People can disagree.

Heavy equipment. AK, LMG, mortars, RPG, sure probably no problem. AFV, tanks and air defense ? RU is moving MT-LB, T-62 out of storage and has been withdrawing air defense equipment from out of theatre. How about logistics ? Isnt RU already using all their logistic brigades ? Simple things like uniforms and boots.

Your Don Cossack example brings up another point - lack of standardization. if each unit has its own crazy TO&E, that has to affect servicing rates. Imagine being a logistics guy who comes across a crate of BTR-82 spare parts. Where does he send them ? The Don Cossack Brigade, or the BARS-13 unit nearby, or the 132nd Secret NKVD Latrine Platoon ? Nobody knows because each unit is equipped like a Frankenstein monster.

RU also has a lot of tanks in storage, but how many are you going to get working in the short term. Didnt Ru industry just sign a contract to refurb 150 tanks from storage this year ? They lost that many tanks in the last few weeks alone (Oryx).

We shall see what Putin says. I am tempted to stay up late for the announcement.

 

[Feanor]

Heavy equipment. AK, LMG, mortars, RPG, sure probably no problem. AFV, tanks and air defense ? RU is moving MT-LB, T-62 out of storage and has been withdrawing air defense equipment from out of theatre. How about logistics ? Isnt RU already using all their logistic brigades ? Simple things like uniforms and boots.

Are there any signs that Russian forces are short on uniforms and boots? MT-LBs were in service before the war. And while Russia has replacement platforms in principle, in practice the MT-LB won't be phased out for at least 20 years more, short of something drastic.

Your Don Cossack example brings up another point - lack of standardization. if each unit has its own crazy TO&E, that has to affect servicing rates. Imagine being a logistics guy who comes across a crate of BTR-82 spare parts. Where does he send them ? The Don Cossack Brigade, or the BARS-13 unit nearby, or the 132nd Secret NKVD Latrine Platoon ? Nobody knows because each unit is equipped like a Frankenstein monster.

He sends them anywhere. The BTR-82 is ubiquitous and common with the BTR-80, which is also the basis of a series of other vehicles including command and control vehicles, a SP mortar, and an armored evacuator. It's a poor example. But in principle your point is not completely wrong. It's just that... this isn't news. Maybe you haven't seen it, but discussions about lack of standardization have been going on around Russian Land Forces for at least the past 15 years, and frequently on this forum. On the flip side it's not all bad either. For the Land Forces, wheeled APCs are all BTR-80/82 with high commonality. IFVs are BMP-1/2 with high commonality and the new BMP-3 which is different but the basis for a set of platforms all on its own. In theory the BMP-3 would phase out the older ones, but not any time soon. Again, not news, nor particularly surprising. It's not great but it's not a trainwreck either.

RU also has a lot of tanks in storage, but how many are you going to get working in the short term. Didnt Ru industry just sign a contract to refurb 150 tanks from storage this year ? They lost that many tanks in the last few weeks alone (Oryx).

We shall see what Putin says. I am tempted to stay up late for the announcement.

Yes, this is one of the problems. How many MBTs can be pulled out of storage and how quickly? What category of reserve storage are the vehicles in? 1st? Fuel them up, add some oil and anti-freeze, you're good to do. 2nd? Basic repairs, and get them back on line. 3rd? Time to ship them to the repair plant. 4th? It's a hull.

What I'm gathering is that you're not up to speed on the state of the Russian Land Forces.

 

[vikingatespam]

Are there any signs that Russian forces are short on uniforms and boots?

Net necessarily short, but using different types and some soldier are in shoes (various mobilization pictures across the internet). AR670-1 exists for a reason in the US Army. The appearance of each soldier should be the same, to help build unit cohesion.

What I'm gathering is that you're not up to speed on the state of the Russian Land Forces.

Maybe I was ....too optimistic ?

 

[vikingatespam]

About 0200 EST, Project Owl is reporting that Putin is declaring partial mobilization, with priority to those of prior service. They are aiming for another 300K. Terms of service are indefinite. At the same time they claim only 5900 RU KIA, and 60000 UKR KIA.

Additional nuclear sabre rattling.

 

[SolarWind]

The lack of dominance is largely due to how the Russian air force is structured and what it is trained to do. We assumed that like Western air arms the Russians were trained for air superiority and would conduct a systematic campaign to degrade the Ukraine's AD network but this wasn't the case.

Russian war planners stocked large quantities of ballistic and cruise missiles for this war. Their problem with degrading Ukraine's AD is that it is decentralized and concealed.

 

[Dead Money]

Some follow up thoughts on this. Russia has recently passed some language that implies some sort of mobilization preparation. However many in Russian military blogosphere have voiced opinions that Russia can't effectively train or equip hundreds of thousands of troops, and rather Russia's ability to train and deploy troops is nearly at a maximum just training the current volunteer btlns. It's generally known that conscripts are significant worse trained in Russian units and many brigades and regiments field a BTG that's made of of contract soldiers in its entirety, and that also receives the bulk of the training budget. Meaning the tankers for the tank company that supports the BTG get to fire ~60-80% of the rounds, same for the artillery element that's part of it. The rest get the remainder and are often spending more time on nonsense and show-training rather then real combat preparedness. This could be turned around in theory, but it would require more training resources and a significant effort. Training mobilized personnel from scratch would take even more. Additionally Russia has resorted to BMP-1s and T-62Ms from storage, as well as mass-produced armored trucks, instead of proper APCs. The rebels have already received D-20s, and Russia has reactivated the Giatsint inventory. Are there additional artillery resources to pull in sufficient quantities to support a major troop increase? Russia doesn't even have UAVs for it's current forward deployed forces. Where will they come from for additional troops?

I was, an are still surprised that the Russian plan seems to involve so many additional units. My understanding is that the BTG as a formation is already anaemic from a front line soldiers perspective - exacerbated by under manning, due to low contract soldier numbers and absence of conscripted troops in a hybrid army.

I would think the logical thing to do is to fill out the existing force structure to be fully manned - thus maximising the effectiveness of existing heavy equipment. But I'm an amateur not a professional, so I'm probably missing something. Feanor - penny for your thoughts?

 

[STURM]

Russian war planners stocked large quantities of ballistic and cruise missiles for this war. Their problem with degrading Ukraine's AD is that it is decentralized and concealed.

That is indeed an issue but the main issue is that the Russians don't operate air power the way the West does; not during WW2, nor in Chechnya, Syria and Georgia. The Russian air arm is not structured or equipped for a strategic air campaigns which call for the establishing of air superiority and systematic degrading of an enemy's GBAD.

 

[swerve]

Russian war planners stocked large quantities of ballistic and cruise missiles for this war. Their problem with degrading Ukraine's AD is that it is decentralized and concealed.

Why do you say they stocked large quantities of missiles for this war? Preparation seems to have assumed a quick roll in, bugger-all fighting, take over. A lot of the invaders didn't even have enough fuel & food to cope with fighting, & were abandoning vehicles & scavenging for food.

Also, a lot of the missiles being used are old Soviet types, some re-purposed SAMs & anti-ship missiles, with reportedly quite a lot of misfires. That hardly suggests large new stocks. It looks more like large numbers of old missiles that have been sitting in storage deteriorating for many years being used up.