The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[hauritz]

Given how poorly the current batch of troops in UKR are equipped (barring the 3rd Corps), I would be shocked if they field another 50K soldiers with proper equipment. (at least in the short term)

We shall see what Putin declares, but I am now finally getting concerned about the possible escalations.

• Rationally, Putin should know he is not meeting his goals.
• Rationally, trying to raise more poorly trained irregular forces wont get you anywhere.
• Rationally, continued attacks at Bahkmut while your other fronts suffer, is not a winning strategy
• Rationally, calling for total mobilization isnt going to solve your short (and maybe long) term problems.

Are we past rational behavior ?

Ukraine mobilised almost as soon as the war started and I expect that they spent a lot of the last 6 months training, planning and re-arming. Unless the Russians are just planning on providing more cannon fodder for the Ukrainians I don't imagine we will see anything much happen until next year.

The hardest thing Putin needs to do is convince the already suffering Russian population that this war is even worth it. If he can't do that then I can't see the Russians being able to raise a military force capable of reversing their fortunes against the better equipped, better trained, better lead and more motivated Ukrainians.

 

[SolarWind]

Why do you say they stocked large quantities of missiles for this war? Preparation seems to have assumed a quick roll in, bugger-all fighting, take over. A lot of the invaders didn't even have enough fuel & food to cope with fighting, & were abandoning vehicles & scavenging for food.

Also, a lot of the missiles being used are old Soviet types, some re-purposed SAMs & anti-ship missiles, with reportedly quite a lot of misfires. That hardly suggests large new stocks. It looks more like large numbers of old missiles that have been sitting in storage deteriorating for many years being used up.

I saw some comments, maybe about a year ago, that some of the Russian military industrial factories including those that make the kalibr missiles were working around the clock. In retrospect, it seems they were preparing for something.

 

[STURM]

There was mention somewhere [forgot where] of China buying up vast stocks of food because apparently because they were notified by Russia.

 

[STURM]

The hardest thing Putin needs to do is convince the already suffering Russian population that this war is even worth it.

He needs to convince himself; not the people.

If he can't do that then I can't see the Russians being able to raise a military force capable of reversing their fortunes against the better equipped, better trained, better lead and more motivated Ukrainians.

Never mind what we see on paper; in reality we shouldn't write the Russians off yet.

 

[Feanor]

I was, an are still surprised that the Russian plan seems to involve so many additional units. My understanding is that the BTG as a formation is already anaemic from a front line soldiers perspective - exacerbated by under manning, due to low contract soldier numbers and absence of conscripted troops in a hybrid army.

I would think the logical thing to do is to fill out the existing force structure to be fully manned - thus maximising the effectiveness of existing heavy equipment. But I'm an amateur not a professional, so I'm probably missing something. Feanor - penny for your thoughts?

I honestly don't know what to say. The volunteer btlns are often being formed in association with existing units, for example the Tigr volunteer btln from Primor'ye is for all intents and purposes a 4th Marine Btln from the 155th MarBde. On the other hand many are being trained by association with MVD or even DOSAAF and are being formed by the regional government. To me it would make sense to increase squad size for existing units and add a 4th rifle platoon to line companies. Most of the volunteer formations that are being formed are called btlns, though I suspect many are somewhere between a large company and an understrength btln.

Some follow up thoughts on this. Russia has recently passed some language that implies some sort of mobilization preparation. However many in Russian military blogosphere have voiced opinions that Russia can't effectively train or equip hundreds of thousands of troops, and rather Russia's ability to train and deploy troops is nearly at a maximum just training the current volunteer btlns. It's generally known that conscripts are significant worse trained in Russian units and many brigades and regiments field a BTG that's made of of contract soldiers in its entirety, and that also receives the bulk of the training budget. Meaning the tankers for the tank company that supports the BTG get to fire ~60-80% of the rounds, same for the artillery element that's part of it. The rest get the remainder and are often spending more time on nonsense and show-training rather then real combat preparedness. This could be turned around in theory, but it would require more training resources and a significant effort. Training mobilized personnel from scratch would take even more. Additionally Russia has resorted to BMP-1s and T-62Ms from storage, as well as mass-produced armored trucks, instead of proper APCs. The rebels have already received D-20s, and Russia has reactivated the Giatsint inventory. Are there additional artillery resources to pull in sufficient quantities to support a major troop increase? Russia doesn't even have UAVs for it's current forward deployed forces. Where will they come from for additional troops?

So realistically can Russia mobilize? Probably not. At least not without moving the economy in a whole different direction. Some things can be mass-produced relatively easily, including things like body armor, primitive UAVs, and armored vehicles. Some things are harder, like mass production of artillery and modern IFVs/MBTs. Kurganmash already mentioned that they were approached about restarting "earlier model IFV" production, presumably in an attempt to get a mass-production IFV. They stated this would actually be slower and be expensive (unsurprisingly). AMZ can mass-produce BTR-82s to the tune of several hundred a year, and the Tigr-M to the tune of ~200-300 a year. Kamaz and Ural can put out large numbers of armored trucks and MRAPs. And presumably production of small arms and crew-served weapons would be doable. But we would be looking at a force closer to Ukraine's territorial defense formations. Not the type of army you want to launch a major offensive with. And again this is a best case scenario, where Russia does successfully produce what it can, and the political issues of mobilizing and sending conscripts into battle don't shake the foundations of government authority.

Can Russia train enough additional infantry to plug the gaps, shore up the deficiencies of the existing force structure, and get their war effort back on track, in the form of a slow but steady offensive into Ukraine? Maybe. But that probably wouldn't require mobilizing on the one hand, and is likely what Russia is already trying to do with the all-out recruiting effort of both volunteers, and mercenaries. Can Russia source enough UAVs to correct that particular gap? I don't know. I suspect it depends on Iran and China being able/willing to fill the gap as Russia ramps up domestic production. But I don't think the Russian military is near the end of its rope. I do think their approach to the war effort after the failure of the original offensive has in turn failed. It wasn't completely disasterous, and not nearly as disasterous as the initial drive into Ukraine. They've gained some ground in the Donbass, and basically cleared out Lugansk region. But that card is played. Russia will have to shift their focus and commit serious additional resources to the fight, or it will face setbacks similar to the Izyum-Balakleya debacle in other sections of the front.

Well Putin sure contradicted me in a hurry... I think most if not all of the salient facts are still correct. For some reason Russian leadership would rather mobilize reservists instead of up-training conscripts, stop-gapping their service time, and increasing their pay. It doesn't make much sense to me, especially since the conscript-manned units at least have professional officer and in most cases professional NCOs and technical specialists. Perhaps the mobilized personnel will be used as replacements for casualties? Unclear. I don't see Russia succesfully training and equipping hundreds of thousands of additional troops without something crazy being done to the economy.

Why do you say they stocked large quantities of missiles for this war? Preparation seems to have assumed a quick roll in, bugger-all fighting, take over. A lot of the invaders didn't even have enough fuel & food to cope with fighting, & were abandoning vehicles & scavenging for food.

Also, a lot of the missiles being used are old Soviet types, some re-purposed SAMs & anti-ship missiles, with reportedly quite a lot of misfires. That hardly suggests large new stocks. It looks more like large numbers of old missiles that have been sitting in storage deteriorating for many years being used up.

I would agree with this assessment but add one important point. Russia has turned out to have more missiles then many observers expected. Neither Kalibr nor Iskander stocks ran out as quickly as people repeatedly predicted. Russia prepared for some kind of war. Not this one though, that's for sure.

 

[Ananda]

Unclear. I don't see Russia succesfully training and equipping hundreds of thousands of additional troops without something crazy being done to the economy.

Some argue wartime economy is good thing to increase productivity when the economy facing recession. That's not following any known mainstream theoritical economic thinking. However the thinking is there whether on West or East. It is a thinking of mobilisation base economy.

 

[SolarWind]

Some argue wartime economy is good thing to increase productivity when the economy facing recession. That's not following any known mainstream theoritical economic thinking. However the thinking is there whether on West or East. It is a thinking of mobilisation base economy.

The use of production subsidies to prevent a recession is typically referred to as stimulus, but I don't think Putin's immediate concern is preventing a recession or improving the standard of life. I also doubt any gains in productivity will be achieved without losing quality.

 

[Feanor]

About 0200 EST, Project Owl is reporting that Putin is declaring partial mobilization, with priority to those of prior service. They are aiming for another 300K. Terms of service are indefinite. At the same time they claim only 5900 RU KIA, and 60000 UKR KIA.

Additional nuclear sabre rattling.

The number isn't credible in general, but even when taken at face value the number excludes MVD service members, volunteer formations, and LDNR forces. I'd say multiplying the number by 3 would give us Russia's "official KIA" numbers for all involved. One can speculate upwards from there.

EDIT: We finally have footage out of the Sukhoi Stavok salient. This is recon footage from Russia's 76th VDV. We see a number of destroyed vehicles. At start there's a destroyed MBT that I suspect is a T-72B3 based on the clamshell looking ERA with gaps. Above that we see a M113, Ukrainian with the white strip tactical marking. Next to it is a burning BMP, attribution unclear. Above that is a Ukrainian BMP-1. Next, past the burning BMP we see two M-113s, and a destroyed truck. The vehicles appear abandoned. Next we have a vehicle of some type, can't make out what it is. After that we see some Ukrainian infantry hiding in the trees. The machinegun looks like maybe a 240. At the 2:15 mark we have another burned out vehicle, type unclear. At the 2:49 mark we have what appears to be a knocked out Ukrainian MBT. The video says these are all abandoned and destroyed Ukrainian vehicles but I suspect the M-113 column is not abandoned, but rather are the transports for the infantry we saw. It's hard to attribute the destroyed vehicles for sure, they're burned badly. The destroyed MBT early on could I guess be Ukrainian, a captured T-72B3 being used, but I would assume it's Russian unless more evidence emerges.

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Colonelcassad

Уничтоженная и брошенная техника ВСУ в районе поселка Сухой Ставок. Источник видео: https://t.me/ChDambiev

t.me

 

[hauritz]

https://www.news.com.au/world/europe/sky-high-airfares-queues-at-borders-and-thousands-arrested-following-putins-partial-mobilisation/news-story/6d51dc2fcd800b5c634b70e947e7948d

This is where things start to get a lot trickier for Putin. People aren’t as gullible as Putin would like to believe they are. Threatening imprisonment or fines isn’t a big deterrent when measured against the prospect of sending off your children to die in a trench fighting in some completely unnecessary war.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 2: Interesting threads & discussions on Ukraine

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1572603347089203202

1. I do recommend following James Vasquez (an American fighting in Ukraine), to get an idea of the human cost of fighting in a war with mines, without air superiority and without fires superiority against Russian artillery and MLRS — which is why I agree with the Ukrainian strategy of corrosion (described in previous posts). The funeral he is talking about is for Viktor (a former British soldier), who died in a mine blast. James Vasquez raised money to purchase 79 mine detectors, cold weather gear and a truck full of Kevlar helmets.

2. Guy Plopsky explains part of the reason why so much of the Ukrainian Air Force has survived to continue fighting. This is beyond the repairs and maintenance for Ukrainian fighters trucked to Poland and then trucked back into Ukraine.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1572572241275256838

3. Russia’s use of air capabilities has been so limited in part because of Ukrainian SAMs but more importantly, there are Ukrainian fighters to contest air superiority.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1572716803645902848

4. In contrast, Russian SAMs within 60km of the forward edge of battle area (FEBA) are getting hit — American supplied M31A2 rockets have a range of over 80km. These high value Ukrainian assets are not going to be pushed all the way to the front (15km to 20km from FEBA), instead they are being fired from areas with Ukrainian SAM coverage.

5. The Angolan Bush War (from Aug 1966 to Mar 1990) in Namibia (then South West Africa), Zambia, and Angola, is a good model for what it means to fight without air superiority for Ukraine. Angola turned to the Soviets for aid and acquired a first batch of MiG fighters, which were delivered by mid-Dec 1975.

​

(a) Cuba reinforced its contingent in Angola with a squadron of MiG-21MFs. In 1984, the Cuban contingent was equipped with 12 MiG-23ML fighters and 2 MiG-23UB conversion trainers, which gave Angola fighters that was superior to the Mirage F.1 of South Africa.​

​

(b) South African ground forces limited their activity during daylight hours. In addition, their Air Force began a crash programme to obtain advanced Python IIIs from Israel in order to counter the MiG-23MLs. Due to the large-scale deployment of improved air defences, the South African and their proxy inflicted heavy losses on the Angolan and Cubans, claiming kills against MiGs, at least a third of which were con-firmed. Intense ground fire often forced Angolan and Cuban pilots to fly high, in turn reducing the precision of their attacks.​

6. Ireland has filed a declaration of intervention under Article 63 of the International Court of Justice, accusing Russian of genocidal actions during the course of the Ukraine War. I don’t know whether to laugh or cry over Ireland’s intervention.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1572276000792379392

 

[Ananda]

Ukraine urged to take ‘humane’ approach as men try to flee war

UN calls for ‘compassionate’ approach to martial law, as aid workers report many men trying to leave were not born in Ukraine

www.theguardian.com

Some Ukranian also fleeing conscription, so it is bound that some Russian doing the same. US citizen are known dodging draft during Vietnam war to Canada.

Conscription whereever it is going to get negative reaction from some part of population in every countries. Thus some Russian fleeing the country to dodge conscription is more or less expected and not unussual.

I also doubt any gains in productivity will be achieved without losing quality.

Considering what any wartime economy productivity doing in historical trend, increasing quantities is the aim and not the qualities.

 

[Feanor]

Update.

Kherson-Nikolaev-Krivoy Rog.

Ukrainian strikes against the Kahovskaya dam.

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Russian strikes on Nikolaev.

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Военный Осведомитель

Из Херсонской области ВС РФ запускают ракет. В Николаеве звучат взрывы.

t.me

Russian strikes on Krivoy Rog.

Colonelcassad

Взрыв в Кривом Роге. Также украинские источники сообщают о взрывах в районе Умани и Винницы.

t.me

Apparently a Ukrainian BRM-1K getting destroyed with a roof-dropped grenade.

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Военный Осведомитель

Уничтожение украинской БРМ-1К при помощи дрона с нехитрым приспособлением для сброса гранаты Ф-1, Херсонское направление. Эксклюзив от воинов-подписчиков. @milinfolive

t.me

HARM fragments, Kherson region. Unclear if downed or fell on its own.

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Военный Осведомитель

Обломки сбитой американской противорадиолокационной ракеты АGM-88 HARM в Херсоне.

t.me

Zaporozhye-Dnepropetrovsk.

Allegedly footage of Russian K-52s sinking a barge with troops from Nikopol' heading to Energodar. This is in regards to the earlier Russian claim of a Ukrainian landing attempt. Note, while we can see a barge getting shot up, there's no sign of troops on it.

Colonelcassad

Уничтожение баржи с десантом вышедшей из района Никополя в направлении Энергодара. Отработал ударный вертолет Ка-52.

t.me

Минобороны показало кадры уничтожения баржи с украинским десантом в районе Запорожской АЭС

Министерство обороны продолжает публикацию видео о работе российских военных в рамках специальной военной операции на Украине. На этот раз военные показали кадры уничтожения баржи с украинским десантом, пытавшимся высадиться в районе Запорожской АЭС и захватить станцию. Как сообщили в Минобороны,

topwar.ru

Reportedly a failed Ukrainian attack near Orekhovo. We have a knocked out T-64BV.

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Oskol Front.

Russia apparently lost another BMO-T on the Oskol front.

ВС РФ в Украине потеряли еще один БМО-Т

gurkhan.blogspot.com

LDNR Front.

Shelling of Donestk continues.

ГРИГОРЬЕВ

Обстрел улицы 50-летия СССР, дом 24 Ворошиловского района Донецка два часа назад - один человек поиб. Объективная информация, встречи с очевидцами и участниками событий, аналитика - подписаться на канал Максима Григорьева.

t.me

LNR 4th Bde using 2S4s to hit Ukrainian positions. We can then see a Ukrainian CASEVAC on a BMP-1. It's an interesting question why they didn't hit the BMP-1.

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Allegedly Kaskad btln dropping improvised munitions on a Ukrainian Osa SAM and ZU-23-2 position. I can't really make out what they're hitting.

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Russian strikes, allegedly Krasnopol', against a Ukrainian howitzer near Ugledar.

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Репортёр Руденко V

Два выстрела, две цели. И всё благодаря корректировки с воздуха. Первая цель пушка, а вторая личный состав и бк спрятанное в лесопосадке. Угледарское направление

t.me

DNR forces have reportedly taken Mayorsk, near Gorlovka.

MilitaryMaps | Z

❗️#Майорск | #ДНР ★ 15.09.2022 Группировка войск ДНР и ЛНР при огневой поддержке ВС РФ освободила Майорск ⇢ https://t.me/TRO_DPR/7548 @militarymaps: militaryMaps.info/mark/id680065 https://militaryMaps.info?lat=48.3930803&lng=37.9767413&z=12&t=3

t.me

Battle damage in Krasniy Liman.

Kotsnews

Глава Красного Лимана Александр Петрикин показал свежие разрушения в городе в результате обстрелов ВСУ. @sashakots

t.me

Russian Wagner mercenaries doing mine/UXO clearing on former Ukrainian positions near Artemovsk/Bakhmut.

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Russian regulars have reportedly joined BARS Kuban', and LNR units in Krasniy Liman.

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Russia.

Krasniy Hutor, Belgorod region, got hit. Reportedly locals are getting evacuated.

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A Russian border checkpoint in Nekhoteevka, Belgorod region got hit.

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Colonelcassad

Пожар в здании таможенного терминала в приграничной Нехотеевке после обстрела ВСУ.

t.me

It appears Russia is either pulling T-90As out of storage (some were in reserves) or pulling T-90S from an export contract. Or pulling the T-90S prototypes and putting into service.

ВС РФ реквизировали танки Т-90S у неназванного инозаказчика? (фото, видео)

gurkhan.blogspot.com

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Russian volunteers heading from Chechnya to Ukraine.

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Misc.

Russia hitting a Ukrainian pontoon crossing with a LMUR, possibly the Ingulets crossing in Kherson.

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Allegedly a breakdown of western artillery systems across Ukrainian units.
Artillery Bdes:
26th Bde: Krab – 53.; PzH2000 – 18. 40th Bde: М777 – 22. 44th Bde: М777 – 3.; FH-70 – 24. 45th Bde: М777 – 7. 55th Bde: М777 – 24.
Mech Bdes: 53th Bde: Caesar – 18. 14th Bde: М109 – 14. 28th Bde: М109 – 12. 72nd Bde: М109 – 2. 92nd Bde: М109 – 6.
Tank Bdes: 17th Bde: М109 – 12 ед.
4 М777 in the 184the Training Center.

Распределение иностранных артиллерийских систем по бригадам ВСУ

gurkhan.blogspot.com

A look at how Ukraine is mounting their HARM missiles.

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Ukraine's Kovcheg mobile hospital has been sighted recently.

(no title)

Мобильный госпиталь ВСУ Ковчег засветился на свежем видео За музыку извините :)

shusharmor.livejournal.com

A Russian Cossack volunteer unit (likely the Don Cossack Bde) with at least 15 BMP-2Ms and T-80BVs.

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Russian S-300V operations, Ukraine. Location and context unclear.

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NATO/EU.

Germany is reportedly supplying more 2 more MARS (M-270) MLRS, 4 more Gepards, 16 Biber bridge layers, and 50 Dingo armored cars.

ВС РФ в Украине потеряли еще один БМО-Т

gurkhan.blogspot.com

Германия передала Украине ещё 4 самоходные артиллерийские установки Gepard

gurkhan.blogspot.com

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Finland apparently supplied XA-180/185 APCs to Ukraine.

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First confirmation of Ukrainian Dana-M2 howitzers.

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[ngatimozart]

There was mention somewhere [forgot where] of China buying up vast stocks of food because apparently because they were notified by Russia.

You might find that is because the Chinese 2022 harvest is down the gurgler due to Xi's COVID-19 virus extermination policy and the grain in the grain reserve being useless due to corruption. Farmers have been forbidden to harvest crops by over zealous Party regional and local officials, hence the vast majority of the crop left to rot in the ground. This covers grains, fruits and vegetables.

What was supposed to held in the grain reserves, what was on record as being held and what is physically held are light years apart. The actual grain in the reserves is rubbish because all the good stuff was sold off by corrupt officials. Apparently some have been held accountable but many others have managed to escape responsibility so far. Last year they had trouble with the harvest too, but nowhere as bad as this year. From the looks of it the possibility is high that there will be starvation in the PRC this northern winter.

 

[ngatimozart]

ISW Update. Part 1.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
September 21, 9:30 pm ET
Full article: The pdf can be downloaded here.

Main Points.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announced “partial mobilization” will not materially affect the course of the war in the coming months.
• Putin did not explicitly threaten to use nuclear weapons if Ukraine continues counter-offensive operations to liberate occupied areas after Russian annexation.
• Ukrainian forces likely continued offensive operations around Lyman.
• Ukrainian forces conducted strikes north and east of Kherson City as part of an operational-level interdiction campaign against Russian logistics, military, and transportation assets in Kherson Oblast.
• Ukrainian and Russian sources identified three areas of kinetic activity on September 21: northwest of Kherson City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border around Vysokopillya.
• Russian federal subjects (regions) are continuing crypto-mobilization efforts regardless of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s declaration of partial mobilization.
• Russian-appointed occupation administrators are likely increasing law enforcement and filtration measures in occupied areas of Ukraine in preparation for Russia’s sham annexation referenda.

Click here to see ISW’s interactive map of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This map is updated daily alongside the static maps present in this report.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement of “partial mobilization” on September 21 reflected many problems Russia faces in its faltering invasion of Ukraine that Moscow is unlikely to be able to resolve in the coming months.[1] Putin’s order to mobilize part of Russia’s “trained” reserve, that is, individuals who have completed their mandatory conscript service, will not generate significant usable Russian combat power for months. It may suffice to sustain the current levels of Russian military manpower in 2023 by offsetting Russian casualties, although even that is not yet clear. It will occur in deliberate phases, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said in an interview on September 21, likely precluding any sudden influx of Russian forces that could dramatically shift the tide of the war.[2] Russia’s partial mobilization will thus not deprive Ukraine of the opportunity to liberate more of its occupied territory into and through the winter.

Putin and Shoigu emphatically said that only reservists who have completed their initial military service will be mobilized, making clear that Russia will not be expanding conscription. Shoigu also declared that students will not be affected and told them to go about their studies without concern.[3] These comments were clearly intended to allay fears among the Russian population that “partial mobilization” was code for general conscription.

It is not clear how much of the Russian reserve has already been deployed to fight in Ukraine. Western intelligence officials reportedly said in November 2021 that Russia had called up “tens of thousands of reservists” as part of its pre-war mobilization.[4] Ukrainian military officials reported in June 2022 that Russian forces had committed 80,000 members of the mobilized reserve to fight in Ukraine.[5] The Russian military likely called up the most combat-ready reserves in that pre-war mobilization effort, which suggests that the current partial mobilization will begin by drawing on less combat-ready personnel from the outset.

Russian reserves are poorly trained to begin with and receive no refresher training once their conscription period is completed. Russian mandatory military service is only one year, which gives conscripts little time to learn how to be soldiers, to begin with. The absence of refresher training after that initial period accelerates the degradation of learned soldier skills over time. Shoigu referred to the intent of calling up reservists with “combat experience,” but very few Russian reservists other than those now serving in Ukraine have any combat experience.[6]

Reports conflict regarding how much training reservists called up in the partial mobilization will receive. Shoigu described a deliberate training process that would familiarize or re-familiarize mobilized reservists with crew, team, detachment, and then platoon-level operations before deploying them to fight. That process should take weeks, if not months, to bring reservists from civilian life to war readiness. Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security head Viktor Bondarev reportedly said that mobilized reservists would train for over a month before being deployed.[7] A military commissariat in Kursk Oblast, on the other hand, reportedly announced that reservists under 30 would deploy immediately with no additional training.[8]

Putin emphatically did not say that the Russian nuclear umbrella would cover annexed areas of Ukraine nor did he tie mobilization to the annexation. He addressed partial mobilization, annexation referenda in Russian-occupied areas of Ukraine, and the possibility of nuclear war in his speech—but as separate topics rather than a coherent whole. The fact that he mentioned all three topics in a single speech was clearly meant to suggest a linkage, but he went out of his way to avoid making any such linkage explicit.

Putin framed his comments about the possibility of Russian nuclear weapons use in the context of supposed Western threats to use nuclear weapons against Russia. He claimed that Western officials were talking about “the possibility and permissibility of using weapons of mass destruction—nuclear weapons—against Russia.” He continued, “I wish to remind those who allow themselves such statements about Russia that our country also has various means of attack...” His comment on this topic concludes by noting that Russia would use all means at its disposal in response to a threat to “the territorial integrity of our country, for the defense of Russia and our people.” That comment could be interpreted as applying in advance to the soon-to-be annexed areas of occupied Ukraine, but its placement in the speech and context do not by any means make such an interpretation obvious. Nor is Putin’s language in making this comment different from formal Kremlin policy or from previous statements by Russian officials. Putin’s speech should not be read as an explicit threat that Russia would use nuclear weapons against Ukraine if Ukraine continues counter-offensives against occupied territories after annexation.

Putin did not connect annexation with the partial mobilization either, defending the need for partial mobilization by referring to the length of the lines along which Russian forces are now fighting and Western assistance to Ukraine. He noted that the front lines now stretch for more than a thousand kilometers to explain why more Russian forces are needed. He and Shoigu also heavily emphasized the false narrative that Russia is fighting not Ukraine but NATO and the West. This narrative is not new. It is not even markedly different from the initial false justifications Putin offered before ordering the invasion in February.[9] The formal Kremlin position has long been that NATO was pushing Ukraine to war with Russia, that NATO was preparing to give Ukraine nuclear weapons, and that NATO forces were taking up or preparing to take up positions in Ukraine. Putin’s and Shoigu’s repetitions of that line do not reflect an escalation in their rhetoric.

Russia’s partial mobilization will not transform the war this year and may or may not have a significant impact on Russia’s ability to continue operations at their current level next year. Ukraine and the West should neither dismiss it nor exaggerate it.

Eastern Ukraine: (Vovchansk-Kupyansk-Izyum-Lyman Line)


Ukrainian forces likely continued counteroffensive operations toward Lyman on September 21. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces attempted to break through Russian defenses around Yampil (just southeast of Lyman) and in Lyman itself.[10] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian and Ukrainian troops are actively fighting in Drobysheve (just northwest of Lyman). While ISW cannot independently verify these claims, they are consistent with previous visual evidence of Ukrainian counteroffensive operations along the Lyman-Yampil-Bilohorivka line. The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Ukrainian troops repelled an attempted Russian attack near Kupyansk, eastern Kharkiv Oblast, along the Oskil River.[11] This report indicates that Russian troops are likely engaged in limited attempts to threaten newly recaptured Ukrainian positions along the right bank of the Oskil River.

 

[ngatimozart]

ISW Update. Part 2.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
September 21, 9:30 pm ET
Full article: The pdf can be downloaded here.

Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)
View attachment 49674

Ukrainian military officials maintained operational silence regarding Ukrainian ground attacks in Kherson Oblast on September 21 and reiterated that Ukrainian forces are conducting an operational-level interdiction campaign in Kherson Oblast. Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command and the Ukrainian General Staff both noted that Ukrainian strikes targeted Russian equipment, logistics, transportation, and command and control assets in southern Ukraine throughout the day.[12]

Social media footage provided visual evidence of the continuing Ukrainian interdiction campaign against Russian positions north and east of Kherson City on September 20 and 21. Geolocated footage showed the aftermath of Ukrainian strikes on Kherson City that reportedly hit a factory, a semiconductor plant, a Russian base, and a ferry crossing near the Antonivsky Bridge.[13] Ukraine’s Southern Operation Command noted that Ukrainian troops hit Russian equipment and manpower concentrations and a command post of the 7th Guards Air Assault Division just north of Kherson City in Chornobaivka.[14] Social media footage from September 20 also showed that Ukrainian forces struck Russian positions in Nova Kakhovka, about 60km east of Kherson City, corroborating Ukrainian claims of Ukrainian strikes on Russian positions in Nova Kakhovka.[15] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command additionally stated that Ukrainian troops hit Russian command posts in Beryslav Raion (65km east of Kherson City).[16]

Ukrainian and Russian sources identified three areas of kinetic activity on September 21: northwest of Kherson City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast border around Vysokopillya. The Russian Defense Ministry and Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces are continuing to strike Ukrainian military equipment in Pravdyne (around 30km northwest of Kherson City).[17] The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Russian forces shelled Pravdyne.[18] Geolocated footage showed Ukrainian forces striking Russian military equipment in Davydiv Brid.[19] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command noted that Ukrainian forces destroyed Russian drones when they were conducting aerial reconnaissance over Kostyrka (southeast of Vysokopillya) and Novodmytrivka on the eastern bank of the Inhulets River along the T2207 highway.[20] An uptick in Russian aerial reconnaissance in these areas may indicate that Russian forces have shifted forces away from this sector of the front.

Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)


Russian forces continued ground attacks on the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut and against Avdiivka and continued routine fire along the frontline in Donetsk Oblast on September 21.[21] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks against Vesele, just northeast of Soledar; Zaitseve and Kurdyumivka, south of Bakhmut; and Bakhmutske, northeast of Bakhmut.[22] Geolocated footage confirmed Ukrainian forces maintain positions on the eastern outskirts of Bakhmut, reportedly on the grounds of the Champagne Wine Factory.[23] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces shelled but did not inflict any damage against the Slovyansk Thermal Power Plant, likely as part of Russia’s continuing campaign to degrade Ukrainian critical infrastructure.[24] Russian forces conducted airstrikes against infrastructure facilities in Bakhmut, indicating that Ukrainian forces still hold fortified positions in the city.[25]

Russian forces conducted routine shelling in western Donetsk Oblast and eastern Zaporizhia Oblast, and additional Russian forces deployed to the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline. Ukraine’s General Staff reported continued shelling along the frontline in the area.[26] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted a failed ground attack near Pavlivka, just north of Vuhledar.[27] A Russian source claimed that Russian forces are conducting artillery strikes on an unspecified road towards Vodyane, likely either the T0524 or T0509 highway or the Slavne-Vodyane road.[28] The Russian source also claimed that Ukrainian forces are deploying large quantities of equipment in the Vuhledar direction, though ISW cannot independently confirm this report.[29] A Ukrainian source stated that elements of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division are deployed on the Zaporizhia Oblast frontline and that several armored personnel carriers of the 35th and 74th Motorized Rifle Brigades traveled through Rozivka, Zaporizhia Oblast, likely to positions along the front line.[30]

 

[ngatimozart]

ISW Update. Part 3.
These are deliberately posted without comment in order for members to reach their own conclusions.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment
September 21, 9:30 pm ET
Full article: The pdf can be downloaded here.

Supporting Effort—Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)

Russian forces did not conduct any ground assaults in western Zaporizhia Oblast and continued routine fire against Ukrainian frontline positions and rear areas in Mykolaiv Oblast on September 21.[31] Official Ukrainian sources reported that Russian forces struck unspecified infrastructure facilities in Zaporizhzhia City, Zaporizhia Oblast; Synelnykove Raion, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast; and Shevchenkove and Ochakiv, Mykolaiv Oblast.[32] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 21 that Ukrainian strikes inflicted severe casualties on Russian forces in Zaporizhia Oblast on September 19, including killing 50 personnel and destroying 15 units of military equipment and an ammunition depot in the Melitopol and Polohy administrative districts as well as in the area of Kamianka.[33]

Russian and Ukrainian sources traded accusations of striking the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on September 21, damaging one of the power units. Ukrainian state nuclear agency Energoatom stated that Russian shelling damaged the communication equipment and a transformer for reactor number 6.[34] Energoatom reported that the damaged transformer cut power to the reactor, forcing two emergency diesel generators to kick in to provide power to the reactor’s cooling pumps. ZNPP employees reportedly enabled an alternate power supply and shut down the emergency generators within an hour of the attack. The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that a Ukrainian large-caliber projectile damaged a water pipe of reactor number 5’s safety system and shelling damaged a power line to reactor number 6.[35] An image circulated by social media users on September 21 shows a burst water pipe at the ZNPP near the reactor buildings.[36] Russian forces continued routine fire against Ukrainian positions on the opposite side of the Kakhovka Reservoir from Enerhodar.[37]

Russian and Ukrainian sources reported explosions in the Black Sea near Sevastopol, Crimea on September 21.[38] The Russian-appointed occupation governor of Sevastopol, Mikhail Razvozhayev stated that Russian authorities discovered an unmanned water surface vehicle on Soldatskyi Beach and detonated the vehicle, causing the explosion.[39]

Mobilization and Force Generation Efforts (Russian objective: Expand combat power without conducting general mobilization)

Russian federal subjects (regions) are continuing crypto-mobilization efforts regardless of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s declaration of partial mobilization on September 21. Novosibirsk Oblast Governor Andrey Travnikov announced that the oblast will form one or two more volunteer battalions if necessary for the Russian special military operation in Ukraine.[40] The Ukrainian General Staff added that the ”self-mobilization” campaign is ongoing simultaneously with partial mobilization, noting that Cossacks are recruiting candidates to serve in Rosgvardia.[41] The Ukrainian General Staff added that the Kuban Cossack Army is forming additional volunteer units and training them at the Cossack bases in Krasnodar Krai. The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Russian forces are misleading men into entering military service by offering them “construction” jobs in Ukraine. Russian federal subjects will likely continue advertising volunteer service and promising large bonus payments to incentivize more men to volunteer for contract service rather than waiting to be mobilized.

Russian forces are also continuing to replenish personnel with prisoner recruits and forcibly mobilized men from proxy areas. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are still detaining men of conscription age in occupied Luhansk and Donetsk Oblast.[42] The Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence Directorate (GUR) stated that Russian forces established a training camp in occupied Torez (about 62km due east of Donetsk City) for Russian prisoners.[43] The GUR added that Russian forces also began to recruit prisoners serving time in the Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) into the DNR 100th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade and “Somali” Battalion as well as the Russian 9th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment. The GUR noted that recruiters select prisoners based on their physical characteristics and previous military experience, regardless of the severity of their crimes. The DNR leadership also reportedly revoked previously issued exemptions from mobilization and is continuing to mobilize industrial workers for combat service.

Activity in Russian-occupied Areas (Russian objective: consolidate administrative control of occupied areas; set conditions for potential annexation into the Russian Federation or some other future political arrangement of Moscow’s choosing)

Russian-appointed occupation administrators are likely increasing law enforcement and filtration measures in occupied areas of Ukraine to maintain control of Ukrainian populations and preempt partisan attacks ahead of Russia’s sham annexation referenda, currently scheduled for September 23-27.[44] The Ukrainian head of Kherson Oblast, Yaroslav Yanushevich, stated on September 21 that Russian forces are escalating filtration measures and inspections of private property throughout occupied Kherson Oblast.[45] Russian-backed authorities have also increased restrictions on movement out of occupied territories, likely to prevent large portions of the population in occupied territory from fleeing to Ukrainian-held territory ahead of Russia’s illegal annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory and Russian “partial mobilization.” Ukrainian Mariupol Mayoral Advisor Petro Andryushchenko claimed that the Russian-backed commandant’s office in Mariupol will stop issuing passes to civilians who wish to leave occupied parts of Donetsk Oblast on October 1.[46] Andryushchenko also noted that Russian forces at the checkpoint in Vasylivka, Zaporizhia Oblast, are introducing special passes and increased restrictions for those who want to leave occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[47]

NG's notes: This is the first time that I have posted one of these in full, but I thought it necessary because it gives a reasonably good coverage with maps of what the current situation is. It also discusses Putin's partial mobilisation and the so called "referendums" in Russian occupied areas of Ukraine. These "referendums" have no standing, recognition, nor legality under international law because they are being held by an occupying power after an illegal invasion. The referendums would not be free or fair, nor open to all legal residents of the occupied areas. Putin's partial mobilisation isn't going to solve any of his problems in the short term nor is it going to solve any of his equipment problems. He's just going to send poorly trained and equipped reservists to the frontline as cannon fodder. They may have reliable rifles and other infantry weapons, but their body armour, if they have any, is very poor and they don't rate night vision gear. Any NVG that the Russians do field is well below the standards of equivalent western or Chinese gear. I really feel sorry for the poor buggers.

 

[Kutschera]

The following link show a German documentary that follows german volunteer "fighters" on their way (early days in march).

The second link is an interview after the return.

The following link documents a prisoner exchange between Ukraine and the RF. Apparently, foreign participants in the conflict (some of them already sentenced to death) and Azov fighters were exchanged.

Ukraine: Azovstal commanders released in prisoner exchange – DW – 09/22/2022

Russia and Ukraine exchanged hundreds of prisoners of war after a prisoner exchange was brokered by Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Among them were fighters from the Azovstal plant.

www.dw.com

 

[Señor Pomidor]

Interesting article from the guardian. It claims the mobilization it’s bigger than then 300.000 announced by Shoigu and could be 3 times more.
It seems it’s happening faster than expected too.

‘It’s a 100% mobilisation’: day one of Russia’s drive to build its army

Reports ethnic minorities may be disproportionately affected while protesters in Moscow drafted on arrest

www.theguardian.com

 

[SolarWind]

Vladimir Putin’s Nuclear Threats Work, but Using the Weapons Probably Wouldn’t

The use by Russia of a nuclear weapon on the battlefield, in the view of one analyst, would yield a ”very big bang,” but few military advantages.

www.wsj.com

The assessment is nuclear weapons would serve no useful military purpose for Russia in Ukraine and may alienate the few remaining states that continue to back Russia. But western governments are taking the threats seriously.

Western governments have said in recent months that they haven’t identified any Russian actions to suggest Moscow is preparing to use nuclear weapons. But they say they have to take Mr. Putin’s threats seriously because there is a nonzero chance that he will act on them.

 

[vonnoobie]

Interesting article from the guardian. It claims the mobilization it’s bigger than then 300.000 announced by Shoigu and could be 3 times more.
It seems it’s happening faster than expected too.

‘It’s a 100% mobilisation’: day one of Russia’s drive to build its army

Reports ethnic minorities may be disproportionately affected while protesters in Moscow drafted on arrest

www.theguardian.com

Have heard this around as well but won't make a lick of difference. It's too little too late. They simply don't have the heavy equipment to outfit them and even less the logistics to supply them. Industry is not what it once was so they won't be able to ramp out massive amounts of assets to outfit them, the forces used to train them have been sent into combat so any training will be minimal and even less so if they are trying to amass more then the 300,000.

Be it logical or in hindsight they should have done a partial mobilisation from the start concentrated largely around logistics to increase a steady amount of supplies reaching the main combat forces when they where largely intact. Now the main force is either destroyed, broken or isolated and they have been put into a reactive position forced to respond to battlefield situation rather then be the ones leading the changes.

If Russia goes nuclear then they lose more global support, perhaps even from china and India. It won't change the battlefield in any meaningful way but it will give reason for the west not to hold back on certain weapons and munitions.

Russia is in a no win situation.