The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Russia has clearly decided to escalate the conflict. Russia struck the Karachun dam, and the water level in the Ingulets river is rapidly rising. There are some reports of local flooding from Krivoy Rog, unclear how bad it will get. From a military standpoint this could wash away Ukraine's pontoon crossing next to Sukhoi Stavok, and would certainly make the crossing more difficult.


EDIT:

More footage of flooding.


Prigozhin, aparently not killed in the strike, is trying to recruit prisoners to fight for Russia in Ukraine.


EDIT2: According to Rozhin, flood in Krivoy Rog could cover as much as 70 sq. km., with allegedly water rising as high as the third story in some sections of the city. Right now these are all predictions, but the situation is quite serious. For context, Krivoy Rog is a city in ~650k inhabitants, and a major transportation hub in central Ukraine. Evacuating that many people is no joke under the best of circumstances. During a war, it's going to be bad. Additionally, this has the potential for disrupting communications between Nikolaev-Odessa area and Zaporozhye. Lastly, if this works out for Russia, it could set a very dangerous precedents of strikes against other pieces of vulnerable infrastructure.


EDIT3; More footage of the dam situaiton.

 
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vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
Wow, so your bias is not clear?
The operations in Kherson and at almost stalemate. There were many reports of big casualties in Kherson. Routed? No unless you are using BBC terms.
However i found interesting post by Washington Post : https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/07/ukraine-kherson-offensive-casualties-ammunition/

In Donest, the UA make some gains, but not now , even the Russian are advancing and occupying some territories in Bakhmut, but never reported by western media. I am picking up BBC as the worst propaganda machine, perhaps like what CNN did in WMD reporting.
We all have biases, but it is incumbent on each of us to put those aside as much as possible and examine the information available as cooly as possible.

Kherson: I fully expect the UKR to have taken greater casualties than the RU in this sector, as they are attacking along most of the line. However, neither side is casualty insensitive (QJM) and neither has the logistics to run a full tempo set of operations for several weeks (IMHO). I suspect this moderates casualties on both sides, and I would be very surprised to see KIA totals for more than 1000 for either for this time period.

It cannot be denied that the RU there are in a bad spot. With no permanent bridging over the Dnepr there, and only intermittent ferrying operations, it is quite likely that the RU are unable to fully supply those troops on the N side of the river. That spells more trouble each day for the RU. I expect, at some point in the relatively near future, for RU opposition to collapse. Surrender, Swim, or Die.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
On the season weather:

For what I understood spring and fall are the worst because the rain and thus the mud blocks everything and life in the trench must be hell.

Winter is still miserable for infantryman but armor can move better because frozen terrain>mud terrain.
Non battle casualties tend to be more in the fall and rainy season (sickness, trenchfoot). Numbers, Predictions, War (DuPuy).
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 3 of 5: Ukrainian successes in Kharkiv Oblast & attempts to advance elsewhere

Wow, so your bias is not clear?



In Donest, the UA make some gains, but not now, even the Russian are advancing and occupying some territories in Bakhmut, but never reported by western media. I am picking up BBC as the worst propaganda machine, perhaps like what CNN did in WMD reporting.
10. Please rethink your approach to learning more from others in this forum.
(a) News and forum discussions tend to focus on tactically or operationally significant events — I understand your concerns on news bias but it is also undeniable that Russian forces are conducting retrograde operations in the Kharkiv region, in an uncontrolled manner. Good armies can learn but the Russian Army is not a learning one. It has serious equipment and leadership problems that is not fixable in even the medium term.​
(b) The forum remains interested in Russian activities in the Dnipro near Kherson. On the Kherson front, Russian missiles hit the dam of Karachunivske Reservoir on the Inhulets river near Kryvyi Rih. The latest Russia bombing the Inhulets dam in the hope the water will wash away Ukraine's pontoon bridges 100 km downstream is simple desperation. Russia has no precision weapons to hit these mobile bridges. At a tactical level, Russia is slowly losing the battle in Kherson — it may take weeks but the trend is clear.​
(c) I suspect morale might be an issue for Russian forces trapped North of the Dnipr. Surrender, swim, or die are the only options that should be given to Russian troops in Kherson. Even the Chinese social networks are having a field day commenting on Russia, including on the Russian troops’ upcoming triathlon and how they’re going to have to swim in the cold rivers.​
(d) Ukraine certainly has a scare with President Zelenskyy.​
(e) Ukraine was signalling openly and strongly in the month before the war (which escalated in Feb 2022), that it was open to some sort of neutrality. President Zelenskyy said as much but Russia explicitly rejected a decades-long moratorium on NATO membership. IMHO, the Kremlin more worried about Ukraine's military integration with the West more broadly than just the issue of joining NATO. Over the years, the Ukrainian Army has changed for better, at multiple levels, that is why they have out performed expectations for many but it is no surprise for the Ukrainians themselves.​
There are reports coming in of Ukrainian attacks on the Seversk area, as well as continuing attempts to push into Liman. Also there are reports of Ukrainian troops preparing for an offensive in Zaporozhye and Ugledar area. It remains to be seen how this plays out. Russian forces are still trying to push on Artemovsk/Bakhmut from the south.
11. Meanwhile, the city of Izyum in Kharkiv region has been liberated! The Ukrainian flag flies over the city again.

12. Where is the Russian Air Force & Russian counter battery fire in this battle?
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
11. Meanwhile, the city of Izyum in Kharkiv region has been liberated! The Ukrainian flag flies over the city again.

12. Where is the Russian Air Force & Russian counter battery fire in this battle?
Getting captured apparently... it's hard to organize competent counter-battery fires across multiple units when you're busy forming new tank divisions that don't have UAV units in them. Even if you do have 8 years to prepare.

 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 4 of 5: Ukrainian successes in Kharkiv Oblast & attempts to advance elsewhere

13. During a working trip to the Kharkiv region, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy took part in the ceremony of raising the State Flag of Ukraine in the city of Izyum, which was liberated by the Ukrainian military from the Russian invaders. This is inspired leadership by President Zelenskyy.

14. Expert commentary on the visit — purpose is the most important thing a leader can provide.
 
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sdin

New Member
Posting Russian misinformation (even after it was explained)
We all have biases, but it is incumbent on each of us to put those aside as much as possible and examine the information available as cooly as possible.

Kherson: I fully expect the UKR to have taken greater casualties than the RU in this sector, as they are attacking along most of the line. However, neither side is casualty insensitive (QJM) and neither has the logistics to run a full tempo set of operations for several weeks (IMHO). I suspect this moderates casualties on both sides, and I would be very surprised to see KIA totals for more than 1000 for either for this time period.

It cannot be denied that the RU there are in a bad spot. With no permanent bridging over the Dnepr there, and only intermittent ferrying operations, it is quite likely that the RU are unable to fully supply those troops on the N side of the river. That spells more trouble each day for the RU. I expect, at some point in the relatively near future, for RU opposition to collapse. Surrender, Swim, or Die.
Russian in bad spot? Too bad it is the other way now.

They just destroyed a bridge and dam. The Russians have been eyeing off the dam at Krivoy Rog and waiting for the moment the UA army committed the bridge head. Now the river level is rising and current are very strong. Goodbye to pontoon bridge operation. No idea how many UA troops and equipment wlll be trapped.




'Brilliant Great UA Counter attack', unless you reading different news now.
 

Boatteacher

Active Member

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
They just destroyed a bridge and dam. The Russians have been eyeing off the dam at Krivoy Rog and waiting for the moment the UA army committed the bridge head. Now the river level is rising and current are very strong. Goodbye to pontoon bridge operation. No idea how many UA troops and equipment wlll be trapped.
@sdin, the low quality of your posts is a concern. This is your final warning not to post Russian misinformation — there are times when people are honestly misled. This is an instance where I have told the forum that the information you are citing is wrong and yet you insist on repeating the deliberate misinformation without qualification.

No reply to this warning is necessary — if you don’t like or heed this warning, a ban can be arranged.


1. As I said earlier, the latest Russia bombing the Inhulets dam in the hope the water will wash away Ukraine's pontoon bridges 100 km downstream is simple desperation.
(a) Yes, the water levels will rise but logistics routes will be back to normal in 3 days or less — other than localised ponding effects, which may take longer. This has also caused flooding along the Inhulets river and could be a threat to both Ukrainian and Russian supply routes that cross the river.​
(b) Without knowing the parameters of the Inhulets river banks (i.e. how much water they can absorb) and the exact damage to the dam we should not attempt to estimate how far the flooding will extend. Given how dry it is down south in summer, a lot of water may be absorbed quickly. There is an interplay between absorption rate, capacity (i.e. how wide is the flood plain downstream), riverbed geometry and the extent of dam damage.​
(c) While the Ukrainian bridgehead Southwest of Davydiv Brid is affected, it affects civilians more. All it does is cause re-routing of lines of communications for a period. I understand that the banks of Inhulets downstream are quite porous, so at this time of the year they may have both high capacity and rate of absorption. But that is just speculation.​
2. In contrast to Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF), Russia has no precision weapons to hit these mobile bridges. UAF in the region have sufficient ammo and they will just build a pontoon over obstacles or conduct limited resupply or even air assault by helicopter.
3. While Ukrainian will lose armoured vehicles and tanks (as with this BMP-1 IFV that was lost in the above video), in their offensive operations, this is not unexpected.
(a) The Russians had deployed around 25 BTGs to Kherson, including some of their best troops). These Russian troops were not only placed in a more vulnerable area, Kherson, their movement there thinned the line elsewhere.​
(b) At a tactical level, Russia is slowly losing the battle in Kherson — it may take weeks but the trend is clear.​
 
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vonnoobie

Well-Known Member
Russian in bad spot? Too bad it is the other way now.

They just destroyed a bridge and dam. The Russians have been eyeing off the dam at Krivoy Rog and waiting for the moment the UA army committed the bridge head. Now the river level is rising and current are very strong. Goodbye to pontoon bridge operation. No idea how many UA troops and equipment wlll be trapped.




'Brilliant Great UA Counter attack', unless you reading different news now.

Before you anger the admins I would advise reining in the attitude. This is a civilized forum representing global views where we discuss, facts, opinions and possibilities in a friendly manner

There is at present zero evidence that the pontoons have been washed away it is entirely speculative that they will or won't be washed away.

All they have achieved so far with this attack is to flood civilian homes and harden the resolve not to surrender. Soldiers understand their mates dying in battle, but children, the old etc getting attacked will just piss them off.

That aside in the off chance these pontoons are washed away -
A) are the Russian forces in Kherson in a position to launch an attack and wipe the bridgehead out?
B) are the Ukrainian forces so lacking in supplies that they couldn't hold their until new pontoons are built across the river?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Russian in bad spot? Too bad it is the other way now.

They just destroyed a bridge and dam. The Russians have been eyeing off the dam at Krivoy Rog and waiting for the moment the UA army committed the bridge head. Now the river level is rising and current are very strong. Goodbye to pontoon bridge operation. No idea how many UA troops and equipment wlll be trapped.




'Brilliant Great UA Counter attack', unless you reading different news now.
In principle strikes against Ukrainian powerplants and dams are not a bad idea, but they would have made sense as part of the initial invasion. They are significantly less effective now. It would also require weeks of consistent pounding to cause long term effects against a wide range of such targets. It's not clear how these strikes help Russia regain territory or cause Ukraine significant casualties. Loss of power and resources being spent dealing with flooding do matter, but not much in the short term, and only somewhat in the medium term.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
It's not clear how these strikes help Russia regain territory or cause Ukraine significant casualties.
1. In the South for the battle in Kherson, the Russians are able to move with agility to block advances. In Kharkiv oblast, the Russians are been unable to do that.

2. At the start of war in Feb 2022, Ukraine had a manpower advantage but these raw manpower were mostly poorly trained. By Sep 2022, NATO has build a replacement solider pipeline for Ukraine.

3. There is a false narrative that UAF success in the Kharkiv oblast is because of NATO training. While the UAF aspired to have a professional NCO corps it was very nascent. Nor was the exact role of these personnel consistent across formations given a lack of institutional culture.

4. NATO training helped but not as much as it appears to be. UAF commanders kept rollerdexes of old comrades with specialist skills in areas like signals and logistics and when their unit was rotated into the JFO - for example - would call them up and issue short term contracts. The Ukrainian model has proven successful, but resembles Finland's approach more than the US.
 
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ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Wow, so your bias is not clear?
The operations in Kherson and at almost stalemate. There were many reports of big casualties in Kherson. Routed? No unless you are using BBC terms.
However i found interesting post by Washington Post : https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/07/ukraine-kherson-offensive-casualties-ammunition/
Doesn't really support your argument. Casualties happen in war and in the Kherson Oblast the Russian Army had concentrated the bulk of their remainder of their best formations. As a general rule an attacking force in an offensive operation should have a minimum of a 3:1 advantage in men and material over the defending force.

The Russians knew that the Ukrainians were massing near Kherson but the didn't know the details and they didn't accept that it was a possible feint, so the Ukrainian deception worked and they mounted an attack in the east routing the Russian forces there. However the possibility also exists that Kherson deception could be a deception within a deception too so have the Russian General Staff thought about that. They've already made one more of many bad mistakes in this war, are they about to make another?

Put it this way, if Stalin was running the show there would be a lot of Russian Generals and mid level officers with bullet holes in the back of their heads. Stalin was very intolerant of failure and incompetence.
In Donest, the UA make some gains, but not now, even the Russian are advancing and occupying some territories in Bakhmut, but never reported by western media. I am picking up BBC as the worst propaganda machine, perhaps like what CNN did in WMD reporting.
You quoted BBC, lol. This western propaganda machines surely will project Russian army in bad conditions. Whose line of communication has been severely attacked? Just like they trumpeted the UA 'rout' in emptied Kharkiv front but kept quite about the severe losses in Kherson and Donest front.
Your posting quality is substandard as already pointed out by one of my colleagues.

You accuse others of being biased yet you are doing exactly the same thing and make unsubstantiated claims. So regarding your claims about severe Ukrainian losses in Kherson and Donetsk, you are required to provide valid and reliable sources to support those claims. For your information, any Russian sources are unacceptable because they have proven to unreliable. Likewise we do not accept Ukrainian claims without verification either.
 
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ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Russia has clearly decided to escalate the conflict. Russia struck the Karachun dam, and the water level in the Ingulets river is rapidly rising. There are some reports of local flooding from Krivoy Rog, unclear how bad it will get. From a military standpoint this could wash away Ukraine's pontoon crossing next to Sukhoi Stavok, and would certainly make the crossing more difficult.


EDIT:

More footage of flooding.


Prigozhin, aparently not killed in the strike, is trying to recruit prisoners to fight for Russia in Ukraine.


EDIT2: According to Rozhin, flood in Krivoy Rog could cover as much as 70 sq. km., with allegedly water rising as high as the third story in some sections of the city. Right now these are all predictions, but the situation is quite serious. For context, Krivoy Rog is a city in ~650k inhabitants, and a major transportation hub in central Ukraine. Evacuating that many people is no joke under the best of circumstances. During a war, it's going to be bad. Additionally, this has the potential for disrupting communications between Nikolaev-Odessa area and Zaporozhye. Lastly, if this works out for Russia, it could set a very dangerous precedents of strikes against other pieces of vulnerable infrastructure.


EDIT3; More footage of the dam situaiton.

That's interesting because it could be construed as a war crime:

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.

PROTECTION OF WORKS AND INSTALLATIONS CONTAINING DANGEROUS FORCES

Article 56 -- Protection of works and installations containing dangerous forces
1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the
release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among
the civilian population.
2. The special protection against attack provided by paragraph 1 shall cease:
(a) for a dam or a dyke only if it is used for other than its normal function and in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support;
(b) for a nuclear electrical generating station only if it provides electric power in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support;
(c) for other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations only if they are used in regular, significant and direct support of military operations and if such attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support.
3. In all cases, the civilian population and individual civilians shall remain entitled to all the protection accorded them by international law, including the protection of the precautionary measures provided for in Article 57 [ Link ] . If the protection ceases and any of the works, installations or military objectives mentioned in paragraph 1 is attacked, all practical precautions
shall be taken to avoid the release of the dangerous forces.
4. It is prohibited to make any of the works, installations or military objectives mentioned in paragraph 1 the object of reprisals.
5. The Parties to the conflict shall endeavour to avoid locating any military objectives in the vicinity of the works or installations mentioned in paragraph 1. Nevertheless, installations erected for the sole purpose of defending the protected works or installations from attack are permissible and shall not themselves be made the object of attack, provided that they are not used in hostilities except for defensive actions necessary to respond to attacks against the protected works or installations and that their armament is limited to weapons capable only of repelling hostile action against the protected works or installations.
6. The High Contracting Parties and the Parties to the conflict are urged to conclude further agreements among themselves to provide additional protection for objects containing dangerous forces.
7. In order to facilitate the identification of the objects protected by this article, the Parties to the conflict may mark them with a special sign consisting of a group of three bright orange circles placed on the same axis, as specified in Article 16 [ Link ] of Annex I to this Protocol [Article 17 [ Link ] of Amended Annex]. The absence of such marking in no way relieves any Party to the conflict of its obligations under
This is on the International Committee of the Red Cross web site and is administered by them.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
There are reports of an assassination attempt in Putin.
I realise the untimate report is traced to the Sun, which might not be the most reliable source, but there seems to be enough detail to make it sound credible; including some of his protection group suffering 'consequences' for their failure (or possible betrayal).
I wouldn't put to much stock in it. I actually follow General SVR on Telegram and treat his posts with a great deal of caution.
 

Kutschera

New Member
The evaluation of this conflict will always be made politically by the participants in the conflict.

The moral principle "Do not do to others what should not be done to you" would make a simple evaluation of the situation possible.
But only a few follow this principle, the Yanomami etc. are not interested in the current conflict. From their point of view, civilisation means mental illness.

Personally, as a German citizen, I have a pro-German attitude, which unfortunately is not shared by the government of my country. Pro-German, however, is often portrayed in the media as pro-Russian. The political dressage tries to make the formation of one's own opinion "unattractive" through repression. How could I care about the occupation of Ukraine when there are still foreign troops stationed in Germany, operating abroad from here?

Without going back too far in time, the conflict is condensed for me as follows.
The development of the situation in Ukraine since 2014 threatens the security of the Russian Federation. The Russian reaction took place in 2022 and continues to this day.
Why the RF did not act earlier would be an interesting question. Could it not or did it not consider it necessary? The latter would be naivety in the sense of Gorbachev.
The Ukrainian offensive at Kharkov is overrated in my view. According to my sources, the territory was abandoned by the Russian army rather than offer a battle on unfavourable terms. The ones who suffer are definitely the civilians there (anyone who has followed the behaviour of the Ukrainian "security organs" since 2014 in the Donbass and Luhansk knows what I am talking about).
In principle, it was a short, temporary war of movement in which land was exchanged for time.

In order to realistically assess the decisions of the Russian army, one would have to know its plans. Then one could measure them by the result.
Did they want quick success? Then the situation was misjudged. Is a longer duration of the conflict desired (exhausting NATO resources, economic pressure on the EU, etc.)? Then the RF has been successful so far.
In any case, there was no discernible preparation for a blitzkrieg (manpower, etc.). Or the Ukrainian capabilities were underestimated. That would not be a good thing either.
Was the support for Ukraine realistically calculated?
Money, weapons and support in communication and reconnaissance have definitely supported Ukraine.
In this context:
How would the US react if satellites and reconnaissance drones were targeted?
How would the US react if one of its potential adversaries were to receive such support?
Putin has threatened to react accordingly in the event of interference, but has not yet done so. That would probably also be the escalation to World War III.

In order to possibly pre-empt the administrators, I would like to make it clear that I am aware of the importance of the conflict assessment for the further shaping of the conflict and that it is to be considered as part of the warfare.
This definitely complicates communication and the exchange of knowledge and facts, just as with believers and atheists.

What I would be particularly interested in at the moment:
Urban warfare 2022
I think that also explains the complexity in the Donbass, if you don't Shock and Awe and have a decent size of attacking force.
Right now, drones are making the infantryman's daily life hell.

An older film shows how the East German NVA would have acted in Warsaw Pact times.
Unfortunately, this NVA instructional video is only available in German; I cannot evaluate the quality of the Youtube subtitles in English.
However, some of the weapons systems can also be seen in the conflict today, mostly in the territorial defence and the militias in Donbass and Luhansk. The air force also plays no role in this educational film.
Now, of course, there are completely different means of communication, weapons and reconnaissance.

An even older educational film shows mountain troops of the Wehrmacht fighting in the Soviet Union in 1941 for a settlement.

Are there NATO educational films on this topic or studies of current experiences in Ukraine?
Falludja, for example, was sealed off, the civilian population was given a deadline to leave and then anyone who remained was a legitimate target. But what about spaces with a high settlement density and many villages?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
1. Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the
release of dangerous forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among
the civilian population.
By that logic, wouldn't any proven Ukrainian strikes against the Zaporozhskaya NPP qualify as well? Note the language in your quote says "may". In other words, actual release of dangeours forces and severe losses among the civilian population are not needed to meet this definition. Obviously there's a difference between Russia's strike here, which in my assessment is intentional and aimed at actually doing it, and Ukraine hitting Russian troops inside the powerplant. However the quote also says "other military objectives".

It will be interesting to see if the international community reacts this way, and I suspect the reaction will depend on the actual damage this causes.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Posting here as well because it's relevant.

Israeli company sold anti-drone systems to Ukraine via Poland. Israeli MoD reportedly knew about it but turned a blind eye.
Interestingly coincides with new evidence of Iranian drones in Ukraine.
Iranian UAVs seem to be hitting the front line in multiple areas. I'll post more materials on it as my updates continue.

 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 5 of 5: Ukrainian successes in Kharkiv Oblast & attempts to advance elsewhere

A data analyst has built a dashboard that uses Oryx data in charts allowing easy data analysis. The links below show the data for the recent offensive on losses for Ukraine and Russia.

Losses_Ukraine: Tracking Russia's losses in Ukraine

Losses_Russia: Tracking Russia's losses in Ukraine

Analyzed by: @ragnarbjartur on Twitter
15. Thanks for the links to track Russian losses in equipment. IMO, there a reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance fight ongoing in Ukraine. In other words, the side that can see more and prevent the adversary from seeing them actually adds to their fighting capability.

16. Thanks to American supplied intelligence, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) are choosing the time and place to strike by inserting forces by helicopter.

17. As I said earlier, by Sept 2022 the Russians no longer have the initiative in this war — the Russians are losing the reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance fight — the place and time of future fights in this war will be dictated by Ukraine going forward. As you know, all battles have a tempo.

(a) One key element to the tempo of victory is the consistent solider production that enables Ukraine to send more troops through the hole in Russia’s defenses in Kharkiv to ensure superiority in relative combat power (a concept I previously discussed).​

(b) The 2nd key element to the tempo of victory at Kharkiv is the fusion of intelligence and wargaming to better predict outcomes — enabling Ukraine to make better decisions on the battlefield — battlefield geometry matters. "One critical moment this summer came during a war game with U.S. and Ukrainian officials aimed at testing the success of a broad offensive across the south.”​
  • The exercise, reported earlier by CNN, “suggested such an offensive would fail." Instead of one large offensive, the Ukrainian military proposed two. One, in Kherson, would most likely take days or weeks before any dramatic results because of the concentration of Russian troops. The other was planned for near Kharkiv... Britain, the United States, and Ukraine... assess(ed) the new plan, trying to war game it once more.
  • This time officials from the three countries agreed it would work. Together Britain, the United States and Ukraine conducted an assessment of the new plan, trying to war game it once more. This time officials from the three countries agreed it would work — and give Mr. Zelensky what he wanted: a big, clear victory.”
(c) The 3rd key element is the Russian Army’s poor performance in Kharkiv is the result of gross mistakes and it’s unresolved problems and these are, as follows:​
  • Lack of an unified command at the start
  • Supply failure
  • No replenishment
  • Tactical mistakes
18. The loss of initiative is illustrated by this video of Ukrainians clearing a building occupied by Russian troops in Donetsk Oblast. This video was geolocated to Dibrova village at 48.91219, 37.84959. In other words, the UAF dictate the tempo of operations, which means they can speed up or slow down — in view of what I said, I really don’t understand the logic in @sdin posts — if you can understand, please feel free to jump in to help out this new member.

19. US support has been key to Ukraine’s fight for survival against the Russian invasion.

(a) Ukraine has asked the US Congress for 29 types of weapons systems and ammunition to continue the offensive in 2023. The fact that Ukrainian officials are emphasizing the need for tanks and infantry fighting vehicles right after conducting a highly successful ground offensive is another indication that armor was critical to last week's successes and, in their view, any future successes.​

(b) While the US is not directly involved in the war, it is nevertheless engaged in economic warfare with Russia over Ukraine, through the State Department. The scale of the economic warfare has been extended and tightness of sanctions imposed increased.​

20. The Ukrainian successes in liberating 8,500 km², 388 settlements and 150,000 Ukrainians in Kharkiv will have significant implications for Russia. The majority of Russian forces in Ukraine are being forced to prioritise emergency defensive actions. Russia's 4th Tank Division has two tank regiments, which each have ~93 T-80U variant tanks. With the most recent losses in Izyum, it has lost nearly a full regiment of T-80U variant tanks in Ukraine, or half its total that weren't in storage.
 
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