The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Izyum Salient.

Russian strikes near Liman.


Ukrainian ATGM team knocked out, Izyum Salient. Warning footage of corpses.


Destroyed GAZ-66, Kozak armored car, and armored Humvee, Izyum Salient, road towards Slavyansk. Note we've seen this destroyed Humvee before.


Russian TOS-1 in the Izyum salient.


Ukrainian forces blew a bridge near Krasniy Liman when retreating.


Ukrainian munitions and weapons captured near Liman.


Western and Russian RPGs captured in the Izyum Salient.


A number of Ukrainian soldiers from allegedly the 79th Airborne surrender near Yampol'.


Rare Ukrainian T-64 based mine clearing vehicles seen near Slavyansk.


Large Russian T-72B3 and BMP-2 column, Izyum Salient.


LDNR Front.

LNR forces fighting in Popasnaya.


DNR artillery strikes.


Air defenses firing over Donetsk.


Russian Su-25s over Donetsk.


Destroyed Grads, allegedly Ukrainian, near Severodonetsk.


Weapons and documents of an alleged Ukrainian recon team taken out in Kremennaya.


Russian SpN captures Ukrainian vehicles near Severodonetsk.


Stockpile of captured Ukrainian weapons, LNR area.


LNR forces have taken Novotoshkovskoe village. The village is in ruins, only a handful of locals remain. Warning footage of corpses.


Russian Msta-SM column, LNR area.


Mariupol'.


DNR Interior Troops, near Azovstal'.


Old combat footage (right before the assault on Azovstal' was cancelled). Russian troops using a Fara ground-ground radar to identify targets for BMP-3s and T-80BVs to engage. These are outskirts of Azovstal'.


Allegedly photos of Ukrainian fighters inside Azovstal'.


Russian troops bringing drinking water to Mariupol'.


Civilian life is slowly returning to Mariupol'. Work on street clearing continues.


The West.

The Kremenchug oil refinery got hit.


Russia has begun strikes against Ukrainian rail infrastructure in western Ukraine. They currently hit a network for electric substations that provide power to the railways.


A rail station near L'vov got hit.


NATO/EU.

Well technically not NATO or EU, but Australian Bushmasters have arrived.


US and Czech sourced munitions, in Ukraine.


Transnestria.

Broadcast towers blown up in the PMR.


Ukrainian border guards have put up fortifications on the border with Transnestria.


There is a mass exodus of cars leaving Transnestria for Moldova. It's important to highlight that unlike Georgia or Ukraine, Moldova has done a much better job handling their separatists. Consequently the border between the PMR (Transnestria) and Moldova isn't particularly militarized, and people routinely cross back and forth. Many live in one and work in the other. So it's relatively easy for the population to head into Moldova proper, and there is very little (if any) hostility or serious dislike among the regular population.


Russia.

Allegedly a Ukrainian UJ-22 UAV shot down in Kursk region.


The recent strike in Bryansk. Apparently two targets were hit, one of them a fuel storage facility.


Golovchino, Zhuravlevka, and Nehoteevka villages in Belgorod region, Russia, got hit.


Russian security forces arrest alleged saboteurs in Belgorod who are accused of planning to blow up rail roads.


Misc.

Ukrainian MiG-29 taking off, literally as the impact lands. Location unclear.


Ukrainian ATGM team in action, location and context unclear.


Russian strikes, location and context unclear.


East MD airgroup operating over Ukraine.


Ukraine has put what appears to be a captured T-80BVM back in service.


Captured NLAWs, Milan-2 ATGMs and other weapons, location and context unclear.


German PARM DM-22 anti-tank mines captured in Ukraine.


A dummy fighting position set up by Ukraine to serve as a decoy. OId anti-tank guns, mannekins, and


Allegedly Ukrainian and British fighters, Ukraine.


Russian SpN with BMP-1AM, likely in the Izyum Salient.

 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
How are commentators certain that the Russian executions are mostly committed by their army (through indiscipline and brutality) but instead are of a more organized nature and mostly committed by the police and paramilitary units ( FSB and National Guard) accompanying them, acting like their predessors the Soviet KGB/NKVD and deploying centuries old/traditional Russian means of pacifiying occupied areas & eliminating all potential resistance/dissidents.
Witness accounts mostly.
I have heard that the Russian conscription class of 2021-2022 has drawn approx. 25,000 volunteers for the Ukraine. (These have completed their training and are useable).
Sources please. You have been here long enough to know that sources are required. This is even more important for this topic because of the propaganda and misinformation both sides are putting out.
A while back there was also a claimed XX,XXX reservist figure. Any Russian sources and reliable figures on this?

It looks like the probability of Russia declaring war on Ukraine is increasing by the day.
Haha, you've got to be joking.

It is a war and it was declared as soon as the Russians started their unprovoked invasion. In fact it's an action as despicable and infamous as the Imperial Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, Philippines, Malaya, Dutch East Indies, and Hong Kong, Nazi Germany's attack on Russia in 1941, or Stalin's attack on Finland in 1939. I am starting to wonder about you.
 
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Ananda

The Bunker Group
is a war and it was declared as soon as the Russians started their unprovoked invasion
Perhaps he means the changes definition in Internal Russian politics from "special military operation" to all out war. Some analysts already argue that reason so far Putin call this war as special military operation and not war, because war means the state (in here Russia) can conduct nation wide level conscription and used all strategic reserve.


Seems if we follow Putin's logic from Russian perspective he still argue this is still limited operation, thus the nation will not be in all out war with Ukraine yet. Perhaps this will be unpopular with overall Russian domestic mode (declaring War).

I do hope @Cult Icon to shown source on increasing level of conscription in Russia. So far the conscription level information within Russia still maintain on normal pace. Thus Putin seems still want to keep the illusion of Special Military Operation instead all out war domestically.

Yes some analysts in West already argue that Russia need more man and resources commited in the ground. However that's mean Russian doing mass mobilisation and domestically acknowledge the Ukraine conflict already move from Special Operation stage toward War stage. I don't see so far Putin want to do it, cause it means he is agreeing domestically his special operation's not working as plan. This will contradict on his stance with Russian domestic constituence.

Putin might be does not care what US and West think of him, however seems indication so far shown he cares on his image with Russian domestics. Change the war status from Special Operation to All out War on domestics audience, perhaps can change his personafication image domestically.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Pinch of salt for some Pro-Russian & Pro-Ukraine sources — Part 2

C4A3F8C6-F00D-43F2-9C1C-D8AE8B482C9A.jpeg
7. Pro-Russian sources have been caught telling lies again

It looks like the probability of Russia declaring war on Ukraine is increasing by the day.
8. As part of my care for new member service — let me tell you — change your attitude and cite sources — while you still can.

9. A discussion on general conscription may be your concern but from my point of view it is not a factor at all in 2022, and Putin’s domestic politics issue is not a concern for this thread.

10. Let me explain. It will take quite a while to train raw conscripts or new contract soldiers, to be able to fight effectively — this time scale is measured in months — those Russians that enlist in end-May will not be relevant till Feb or Mar 2023. Basic infantry training takes 2 to 3 months. Advanced infantry training takes even longer about 4 months before they proceed to unit level training; which is needed for an attacker. Let me add a few pointers on other concurrent activities, while the fighting is occurring in Donbas:
One, if an army sends troops with only basic training to invade another country, they are essentially sending canon fodder. The goal in DefenceTalk is not to engage in presenting both sides — when the Russian side is only interested in lying. The main goal is to help forum members learn about some relevant military concepts and gain a sense of realistic to timelines, to aid understanding and to debunk obvious lies on both sides;​
Two, 141 countries are of the view that Russia has invaded Ukraine without just cause — no one cares if Russia declares war on Ukraine — with the tap of Western arms supply fully on, Ukraine will not be defeated. On day 64, the Bundestag voted overwhelmingly to send German heavy weapons to Ukraine to kill Russian soldiers. But there are some interim problems that need to be solved with the Ukrainians in 2 to 3 weeks after each weapons delivery (especially training).​
Three, it has been said by US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin that keeping Ukraine armed with air defenses is a "work in progress." He added long-range systems like S300 are "critical. If those are taken out we'll make sure we're working with our allies and partners to" provide replacements. Long-range fires the most important thing in next phase of war, Austin says. He notes that the howitzer transfer was signed out on Thursday and the first arrived in Ukraine on Saturday.​
Four, I note that Russia has used its veto 22 times in the last 10 years — to block aid to civilians and defend war crimes. The human cost of those vetoes is immeasurable. As I wrote earlier (along with providing the source), adoption of resolution A/76/L.52 (aka #VetoInitiative) is good news, not only for examining Russian vetoes but for pressuring China, UK, US and France to table and support UNSC initiatives. The resolution A/76/L.52, was co-sponsored by 82 countries.​

Bushmasters being used.
11. Posted earlier. You are posting the same video, with lesser context placed in your discussion.

12. While Ukrainian Army (UA) operate 152 mm howitzers and are receiving over 155 mm howitzers from the US and NATO — there are 2 interim problems to be solved over the next 2 weeks:

(i) UA is running low on 152 (Russian) ammo; and​
(ii) UA needs time to pull back experienced gun crews to train on the new 155mm howitzers; and time to distribute the newly sourced 152 mm ammo to units on the front that are going to keep using the old Soviet era howitzers.​
 
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jref

Member
Perhaps he means the changes definition in Internal Russian politics from "special military operation" to all out war. Some analysts already argue that reason so far Putin call this war as special military operation and not war, because war means the state (in here Russia) can conduct nation wide level conscription and used all strategic reserve.


Seems if we follow Putin's logic from Russian perspective he still argue this is still limited operation, thus the nation will not be in all out war with Ukraine yet. Perhaps this will be unpopular with overall Russian domestic mode (declaring War).
I am wondering if recent events in Transnistria could be part of the push to prepare Russia's public for a more... demanding conflict (as in, mass mobilization conflict). We did have Russia's Central Military District Maj. Gen. Rustam Minneka recently stating that "gaining control over southern Ukraine would help Russia link up with Transnistria" which was later explained it was lost in translation and that he didn't mean an actual land bridge to Transnistria.

It's all speculation at this point and I'm not aware of any signs of mass mobilization or preparation for mass mobilization in Russia.
 

swerve

Super Moderator
Pinch of salt for some Pro-Russian & Pro-Ukraine sources — Part 2
....

12. While Ukrainian Army (UA) operate 152 mm howitzers and are receiving over 155 mm howitzers from the US and NATO, there are 2 interim problems to be solved over the next 2 weeks:

(i) UA is running low on 152 (Russian) ammo; and​
....​
Given that the governments of East European countries with 152mm production lines have been supplying weapons & other munitions to Ukraine for some time, I wouldn't be surprised if their lines are now running full tilt to make shells for Ukraine.

I'm pretty sure Ukraine makes (or made) 152mm shells, but their manufacturing facilities may have been damaged or even lost.
 
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Rafael Henrique

New Member
A 58-year-old resident of the village of Vasishchevo transmitted via mobile phone to her brother, who is in the territory not controlled by Ukraine and cooperates with the Russian Federation, the coordinates of the location of military equipment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and information about its movement. This was reported to the press center of the GUNP in the Kharkiv region.The woman was detained. Criminal proceedings were initiated under Part 3 of Art. 114-2 (“unauthorized dissemination of information about the direction, movement of weapons, weapons and ammunition in Ukraine, the movement, movement or deployment of the Armed Forces of Ukraine or other military formations formed in accordance with the laws of Ukraine, committed in a state of martial law or a state of emergency”). The sanction of the article provides for punishment up to 12 years.


Ukraine recently bought easy reconnaissance software, and I never believed it was for reconnaissance of Russian soldiers' bodies. Does anyone think the software could be related to future reprisals against Russian collaborators?

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I am wondering if recent events in Transnistria could be part of the push to prepare Russia's public for a more... demanding conflict (as in, mass mobilization conflict). We did have Russia's Central Military District Maj. Gen. Rustam Minneka recently stating that "gaining control over southern Ukraine would help Russia link up with Transnistria" which was later explained it was lost in translation and that he didn't mean an actual land bridge to Transnistria.

It's all speculation at this point and I'm not aware of any signs of mass mobilization or preparation for mass mobilization in Russia.
There could be another reason. The PMR has giant stockpiles of Soviet-era munitions, and Ukraine is running short on those. The PMR is also home to ~3 btlns of Russian troops. That's a very small defense force for a very valuable arms stockpile, and with the defeat of Russian forces in the PMR, it could open the door on Moldova getting to forcibly reunify with it's breakaway province. So far Moldova seems to be hesitant, and with good reason. The fighting could have a significant human cost, if the PMR chooses to fight, and unlike Georgia and Ukraine where the breakaway republics are truly separate entities in open rebellion against the government, the PMR is semi-integrated into Moldovan society and the hostility/tension isn't really there (not that there isn't any but it's significantly less). The current trajectory of the PMR is mostly inertial and it's very likely that the region will end up as part of Moldova again sooner or later. Now might even be a good time to do that, with Russia distracted. But doing so by force of Ukrainian arms is problematic, and fighting Russia openly might not go over well either.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
There seems to be some speculation that Putin might declare WW3 on May 9th.


If it were to happen it would be an interesting strategy and a potentially dangerous one. They say that war is diplomacy by other means so it doesn’t necessarily mean missiles will start raining down over Europe, or at least not immediately.

What it could mean however is that the will of the rest of the world will be tested and negotiations between Russia and NATO would almost certainly take place almost immediately.

My belief is that Putin cannot win in the Ukraine while the West continues to pour arms and money into the conflict. By upping the ante Putin might hope that NATO will blink or that he might be able to negotiate better terms in the Ukraine war.

it could be a dangerous escalation however reminiscent of the phoney war that preceded the full outbreak of war in WW2
 

Larso66

Member
"What it could mean however is that the will of the rest of the world will be tested and negotiations between Russia and NATO would almost certainly take place almost immediately." hauritz

Escalation is clearly an option for Putin, however it would be true to say most of Europe is utterly sick of him. If he made a threat I believe he'd be told to 'stick it where the sun doesn't shine'. Partly because it'd be hard to believe he'd truly follow through on a course of action that would see his own destruction but again, tolerance for his bullying has evaporated. The fact that many European nations have been openly sending weapons to Ukraine proves this. Indeed, I've been surprised it has happened to the extent that it has, as it is pretty much an act of war in itself.

On the delivery of weapons like tanks, self-propelled artillery, and infantry vehicles like M113s and Bushmasters, I wonder how much of it will reach the combat zones? It is a long way to drive and transport very detectable vehicles. Surely the Russian airforce will do better in destroying these on their way to the front?
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 1 of 3: Understanding dynamic targeting and delay battles

On the delivery of weapons like tanks, self-propelled artillery, and infantry vehicles like M113s and Bushmasters, I wonder how much of it will reach the combat zones? It is a long way to drive and transport very detectable vehicles. Surely the Russian airforce will do better in destroying these on their way to the front?
1. Can you stop falling for improbable propaganda?
(a) Russia does not have the ability to conduct dynamic attacks on moving targets, as long as both long range and short range SAMs in Ukraine exists.​
(b) To conduct indirect fires and air strikes on moving targets defended by Ukrainian operated S300s (high level) and Stingers (low level), Russia would need to conduct SEAD to open air corridors, to drop smart bombs, with current generation targeting pods. To do what we call dynamic targeting, Russia would need to aided by a sense and strike complex that provides targeting support by data exchange. Dynamic targeting means the pilots take-off not knowing what targets will be assigned to them.​
(c) Every time a Russian fighter takes off, NATO is aware of the new sortie. On the other hand, the Russians struggle to know where the Ukraine’s fighters and helicopters are, as they keep moving them around. That should tell you all you need to know about the Russian inability to conduct dynamic targeting.​
(d) Only a few non-NATO countries can do dynamic targeting on moving targets (eg. South Korea, Singapore and Israel). Russia is not capable of fixed wing dynamic targeting except via attack helicopters.​
(e) But these attack helicopters are not able to fire rockets effectively because they are scared of Stinger missiles. Ukraine has mastered the art of deploying scarecrows (against Russian helicopter pilots). The Russian pilot is deterred by a dummy in uniform, with a fake stinger tube and that’s all it takes to make sure the Russian attack helicopters start firing rockets in an upwards elevation, instead of straight at a target.​
2. Guess what? The Russians are mainly dropping dumb bombs on fixed targets and doing it poorly — as the above video shows, Ukrainian strong points in the Donetsk are well prepared against Russian artillery. So why worry about something they can’t do? Dynamic targeting of moving targets is orders of magnitude more difficult to do than bombing static targets.

3. Russian UAVs are there to support their artillery and from my perspective, they are doing a piss-poor job in the recon, counter-recon battle. Their BTGs have outdated maps, they have poor field discipline (poor concealment), and their piss poor tactics ensures that they keep fighting blind. I have a quote in paragraph 4(a), in bold, to illustrate my point.

4. In the Battle for Donbas, the Russian ‘plan’ was grind the Ukraine forces there down with artillery and then later, with follow up waves of infantry — that style of warfare needs a certain number of troops, numbers that the Russians don’t have. In over simplistic terms:

(a) the Russians can temporarily "gain" ground with artillery. But to "hold" ground gained, they need infantry, and tanks. Western officials have said that Russia is using "far greater concentration of fires...more artillery pieces over a narrower front on a more restricted set of targets [with] devastating effect... what they're not doing as well as one might expect, is integrate surveillance & recon capability";​

(b) in war, the Ukrainian brigades in defence are not allowed to do were they were designed to do. More often than not — these brigades are forced to do what they must do — the Ukrainians dug-in, had disciplined sleep cycles by rotation — ensuring that the Russian artillery rounds affected them less. Where the attack is too heavy, Ukrainian troops are withdrawing as a delay battle; and​

(c) the Ukrainians are trading space for enemy troops. They have inflicted the maximum damage to the Russians. That takes discipline, when men are dying in a delay battle.​
 
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Larso66

Member
Thanks for that lengthy explanation. I just thought providing anti-air weapons that could operate with convoys would be difficult for starters. And I'm not falling for propaganda. Again, I thought the ability to find (using satellites) targets on a limited number of transport routes and at some stage thereafter direct air assets to attack them was a basic skill of a top-end power? Frankly it is inexplicable that the Russians are struggling with this. It's fortunate for Ukraine and the West that they are.

Reports here on the ABC have the Ukrainians claiming to have inflicted heavy losses on the Russians, while also admitting significant casualties of their own.
"Ukraine has acknowledged losing control of some towns and villages there since the assault began last week, but says Moscow's gains have come at a massive cost to a Russian force already worn down from its earlier defeat near the capital."

There is no way to know the exact truth of things but it had seemed that many of the reports provided by Feanor feature more Ukrainian casualties and destroyed vehicles than Russian. I imagine this is due to the ebb and flow of the battlefield, with Ukrainians being forced back and unable to record successes?
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Thanks for that lengthy explanation. I just thought providing anti-air weapons that could operate with convoys would be difficult for starters. And I'm not falling for propaganda. Again, I thought the ability to find (using satellites) targets on a limited number of transport routes and at some stage thereafter direct air assets to attack them was a basic skill of a top-end power? Frankly it is inexplicable that the Russians are struggling with this. It's fortunate for Ukraine and the West that they are.

Reports here on the ABC have the Ukrainians claiming to have inflicted heavy losses on the Russians, while also admitting significant casualties of their own.
"Ukraine has acknowledged losing control of some towns and villages there since the assault began last week, but says Moscow's gains have come at a massive cost to a Russian force already worn down from its earlier defeat near the capital."

There is no way to know the exact truth of things but it had seemed that many of the reports provided by Feanor feature more Ukrainian casualties and destroyed vehicles than Russian. I imagine this is due to the ebb and flow of the battlefield, with Ukrainians being forced back and unable to record successes?
Just remember @Feanor is using mostly Russian sources and whilst they are official Russian sources they are still Russian sources. So like Ukrainian sources they still have to be taken with serious caution. He does a really good job but he also has an inherent bias as well, like we all do.
 

OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 2 of 3: Understanding dynamic targeting and delay battles

I imagine this is due to the ebb and flow of the battlefield, with Ukrainians being forced back and unable to record successes?
5. Delay battles are the hardest to fight and the goal is an orderly leap frogging retreat with losses. To delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy formations larger than the defender always carries risk. This includes operations that employ obstacles, and other plans. When talking about obstacles, I mean a counter mobility plan through the use of engineering and other means to increase the friction in war (like destroying bridges).
FEBE50C2-E0E8-4E60-9ED0-DE0642632C11.png
(a) The fact that the main retreating force is not destroyed (despite Russian fires superiority in offensive action), is often seen by a professional, as a partial mission success — we have not seen evidence of whole scale destruction or entrapment of a brigade, except in one city. This was a deliberate decision — as the battle of Kyiv could not have been won, if not for this commander’s choice.​
(b) The large scale American shipment of 155mm rounds to support the newly delivered howitzers will enable the more effective conduct of an artillery screen to facilitate any Ukrainian counter-offensive or delay battle — in about 2 weeks or less. In war, nothing is instant but I believe that by week 3 of this delivery, Russian superiority in fires can no longer be assured.​
(c) Poland operates 4 battalions of T-72M1s, each with 58 tanks (~230 total). These were to be phased out by 2026 by Abrams MBTs to be acquired. It is unclear if Poland took 200 tanks out of storage, or have they unloaded most of their T-72As and T-72M1s to Ukraine. There are unconfirmed reports that Poland replenished Ukraine with air-to-air missiles for their Mig-29s and confirmed that Polish-made loitering munitions Warmate has been sent to Ukraine.​
(d) Britain pledged to donate 120 armored vehicles to Ukraine during a visit by the prime minister to Kyiv earlier this April. A small number of Ukrainian troops are reportedly involved in training at an unnamed military base in England. Britain is also training Ukrainian troops in Poland. “We are moving, in conjunction with our allies, to [provide] new types of equipment that perhaps the Ukrainians wouldn’t have had previous experience of, so it’s only sensible that they get the requisite training to make the best use of it,” the prime minister’s spokesperson told reporters.​
(e) Russia is caught between needing a lightning offensive, and not being capable enough to risk its remaining force in such a move. It has neither the mass nor the skill. IMO, Ukraine’s military leadership must decide:​

Q: How much ground it is willing to trade in the next two weeks?​

In three weeks, it can seek to wear down Russian forces in Donbas through attrition, only when the American, British and Polish trained troops from Ukraine are deployed to the front. Some assess Ukraine will soon have more tanks. But it needs more long-range artillery, and a CONOPs for going on the offensive, at a later stage.​
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Post 3 of 3: Understanding dynamic targeting and delay battles

6. In contrast to the battle of Kyiv and Donbass, we should refer to the failed delay battles during the Korean War. On 25 Nov 1950, the full-scale intervention of the Chinese PLA changed the entire complexity of the war and forced Eighth Army and X Corps (which were operating independently of each other at that time) to transition to the defence.
(a) With the advantage of surprise and numerical superiority, the PLA launched multiple synchronized attacks that ultimately expelled friendly forces from North Korea and on 4 Jan 1951, Seoul would change hands for the third time within a six-month period.​
(b) The US Eighth Army withdrawal in the retreat from North Korea was an example of a disorderly retreat — sudden collapses of ROK forces twice before had placed the US Eighth Army in jeopardy. The withdrawal of UN forces from North Korea that took place from 2–25 December 1950, was the start of the longest retreat in US Army history, where numerous delay plans on lines A, B and C, did not go to plan.​
(c) If you compare the the Battle for Donbas to the failed delay battles during the Korean War, the Ukrainians are pretty credible.​

7. Everybody on social media likes to talk about CAS but none of these ‘instant online experts’ understand the role of indirect fires and battlefield air interdiction (BAI) in Oct 1973 — go look it up, if you are interested. In Exercise Forging Sabre, Singapore’s indirect fires and BAI concepts are similar in doctrine (aka the conduct of deep fires often beyond the FSCL by the division strike centre).

8. BAI involves air attacks that tend to affect ground combat for days. In the prior post, I explained indirect fires but I am not going to further explain BAI here, as most with a civilian background, just won’t understand it — it’s a choice, to do A but not B — it will in the longer run, ensure the survival of collapsing defensive sectors, in any near peer war.

(a) This brings to mind the desperate delay battles fought from 6 to 7 Oct 1973 and Operation Nickel Grass was a strategic airlift operation conducted by the US to deliver weapons and supplies to Israel during the 1973. If you are privileged to hear the recordings of the Golan Heights sit-reps over that 36 hour period, you would cry along with the IDF officers sending the reports, as their units are being destroyed. And yet, the decision to sacrifice them was correct (as history records) but it haunts the commanders for the rest of their lives.​
(b) In many ways, the Battle for Donbas carries echos of this level of desperation, at this present time. The last 10 days have seen a major increase of fighting with much heavier losses being suffered in the Donbas (presumably by both sides). And what have the Russians gained in 10 days? Incrementally a few kilometres here and a few kilometres there.​
(c) The Battle for Donbas is underway and even though Russia has somewhat improved its tactics there and has shorter logistics routes, Ukraine has a chance to thwart major Russian territory gains; but the massive heavy weapons aid arriving now from the West will only take effect from the 3rd week onwards, as Ukrainians need time to be trained on these new platforms and systems.​

9. As Albert Einstein said, "Make everything as simple as possible, but not simpler." For too long, the mainstream media in has been [complicit] in making discussion simpler.

10. The level of discussions on war remain incoherent in the media or mainstream press. This is especially for BBC, CNN and MSNBC presenters, who have not bothered to understand the key doctrinal differences in certain terms.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
The UN brokered a deal to evacuate a small number of civilians from the Azovstal area, but hundreds more remain under siege. The commanders of the Azov Regiment & 36th Marine Brigade continue to appeal for a larger evacuation of civilians & wounded.
There's info that they're passing through Russia or rebel managed filtration procedures prior to release. Presumably if any are found to have been combatants they will become POWs.

 
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