Hoover
Active Member
Maybe you missed the irony.
The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread
Hoover
Active Member
Come on. Russia placed nukes in Kaliningrad after 2014, and in Belraus during the war. That is a provocation. Done by Russia. Okay, for you not, of course.
personaldesas
Active Member
Sorry, I meant to quote and ask @rsemmes, not you. Fixed that now.
rsemmes
Well-Known Member
First, nothing new: Greater reliance on nuclear weapons has become a staple feature of Russian defense strategy. This trend became particularly pronounced in 1999 when NATO bombing of Yugoslavia over Kosovo vividly demonstrated that Russia’s capability to resist a highly superior conventional force was limited. (Zapad-99)
The “Tactical Nuclear Weapons Scare” of 2001
Approaches and positions towards tactical nuclear weapons will need rethinking and reformulation.
nonproliferation.org
Second, has NATO called it a provocation? There were any negotiations to make Russia remove those weapons? They are there now, that is what is called status quo. There are no nuclear weapons in the Baltic states now. You heard about Cuba, right?
Sadly, I don't possess your clear cut, black & white vision of the world.
Then, it doesn't matter how much wishful thinking someone wants to exercise. Russia is paying cash for Chinese components, Ukraine is bankrupt; they don't depend on others, not just to keep fighting, but simply to keep the country running.
-Ukraine will postpone some spending commitments, including reconstruction work.
-The Ukrainian government said earlier this month it would seek an additional $53 billion in foreign aid next year.
"The situation regarding public finances remains challenging, some of the planned international funding has not yet arrived, partly because Ukraine has not managed to fulfil certain commitments made to international partners on time." Koretsky said.
Ukraine to postpone some spending amid delays in aid: PM
Ukraine will postpone some spending commitments, including reconstruction work, because of delays in receiving aid from its foreign backers, Ukraine's prime minister said Monday.
www.france24.com
Last, Ukraine has cleared all of the city of Liman...
Russo-Ukrainian War Map — Black Bird Group
A regularly updated front-line map of the war in Ukraine, maintained as a public product.
rsemmes
Well-Known Member
Rubio just said that the explosives that never existed transported by 5 British nationals from London in 3 vans was Iran.
Where is the irony?
western media have been reporting on killing the Russians for ages, they host officials that celebrate the death of Russians, they blow Russian casualties out of proportion, making it look like Ukraine is killing more Russians. EU and US officials talk openly about killing Russians, small Poland even thinks it can defeat Russia. remember when Biden said that if Russia invades, there will be no more Nord stream? i think Russian media should be more active in this type of publication, it might make the west rethink it's policy towards Russia
Last, Ukraine has cleared all of the city of Liman...
And Stepnogirsk is a huge grey area.Russo-Ukrainian War Map — Black Bird Group
A regularly updated front-line map of the war in Ukraine, maintained as a public product.blackbirdgroup.fi
Ukraines counter-offensive is developing around Krasniy Liman. They're trying to push Russia across the Zherebets river. They've also pushed Russia out of Nikolaevka and have re-entered Ray-Aleksandrovka, though Russian counter-attacks are developing. September may be the first month of Ukrainian net gains since 2023, outside of Kursk region. And this is, in my opinion, the biggest success for Ukraine since the fall of '22. They've effectively removed Russian pressure on the Slavyansk-Izyum road. It's also noteworthy that Russia's failure here is following a pattern. They didn't complete work on the flanks of their assault, and instead tried to push into Liman proper before fending off Ukraine's counter-offensive. They failed to take Krasniy Liman and Ukraine succeeded on the flanks, forcing a Russian withdrawal. Some sources have condemned Russia's West MD quite strongly, claiming this is the result of false reporting to Russian leadership. This is probably at least somewhat true, given Putin's claims about Svyatogorsk. On the other hand there is evidence of a robust pattern of airstrikes to cover the Russian withdrawal in this area. So the lies have to be happening at a fairly high level, well above the tactical. Note West MD has a pattern of poor performance and of trying for visible results over substance. We saw this in their assault on Kupyansk a year ago.
There's a big question about this year's pattern of fighting. Clearly net Russian gains are significantly lower this year than '25 or even '24. We have had now three areas of sustained Ukrainian gains on the ground, southern Dnepropetrovsk, the Velikaya Novoselka axis, and now east of Krasniy Liman. This is distinctly different from what we saw in previous Ukrainian actions. Some sources are reporting on Russia's recruiting efforts slowing down somewhat. Some sources are reporting on Ukraine stepping up mobilization efforts and getting more bodies to the front line. It's not clear if the current efforts by Ukraine are sustainable, meaning they're expending forces at roughly the same pace they recruit at, or if they've once again gathered up resources and are now burning through them in these actions. It's also not clear how significant Russian difficulties with recruitment are. There are reports for example of a new Russian force grouping being gathered north of Chernigov. So is Russia really short on men overall, or has Russia not provided sufficient replacements to other sectors, to husband a fresh grouping of forces in the Chernigov area? There are no obvious answers, only time will tell. And Russia does continue to make gains in many sectors, including their semi-encirclement of Ukrainian forces in the north-eastern corner of Khar'kov region, the continuing push on Druzhkovka, and the Russian offensive around Dobropol'ye.
There are also several technological pieces that may be part of the puzzle here. Ukraine has access to Starlink and until earlier this year so did Russia. Russia no longer does and a Russian Starlink alternative is being deployed with shocking speed, though not without the usual problems. This is likely not something Russia will be able to resolve in the next few months, but may be at least partially resolved in the second half of next year. This often has been talked about in terms of the ability to use drones guided by Starlink, but this likely has a substantial effect on frontline communications. There's also Russia's attempts to reintroduce mechanized warfare. We saw the debut of Arena-M in what was mislabeled by some observers as an attack but most certainly wasn't that, it was a movement of troops towards the Dobropol'ye area. The takeaway is that Arena-M works against drones to some degree, though to what is unclear. It's also clear that even with it's 12 counter-munitions, this is likely inadequate. Other anti-UAS solutions are being explored, including vague reports of a BMP-3 with a RCWS for anti-drone work, possibly similar to one of the systems we saw tested recently. In the meantime Russia has reduced use of armored vehicles dramatically on the front lines, husbanding them for a future fight when they can once again be effective. There are even reports of some Russian MRBdes having their tank btlns reduced to tank companies. There have also been some reports of older tanks being send back to storage bases. Meanwhile production of T-90Ms continues and we even have an upgrade for the T-80U fleet being tested. It's possible that this careful preservation of mechanized and armored assets could be contributing to Russia's worse performance on the front lines, though personally I'm skeptical. I will also reserve judgement about the question of whether it will at any point be possible to reintroduce Russia's large AFV fleet to the fight in a useful manner. It simply isn't clear right now.
Lastly many commentators conclude that this year has been much better for Russia's attrition rations. Ukraine is definitely losing many more vehicles than Russia, and with the expanding use of glide bombs as well as mediazona clearly documenting a decrease in Russian casualty rates, there's good reason to think that from a purely attrition standpoint Russia is in better shape this year than last. Is it possible this is what Russia's command is banking on? Have they given up on a territorial gain sufficiently large to force a political concession, and are they now fighting to a military conclusion, intended to force a full collapse of the Ukrainian armed forces through attrition? There's no obvious answer at this time, but this could be a factor.
personaldesas
Active Member
No irony, just a genuine question. How would you react if the BBC ran a column saying "if Russia does X, we'll just nuke them"? Just to understand your position better.
personaldesas
Active Member
Not sure that follows. The airstrikes show that higher command knew about the withdrawal when it happened, not that they knew the real situation before. You can have optimistic reporting going up the chain for weeks, and then at the point where the position is collapsing the truth becomes undeniable and air assets get released to cover the pullback.
personaldesas
Active Member
Related question: is Russia's limit on men economic rather than demographic?
Unemployment is at record lows. The defence industry itself reports labour shortages. So every recruit is a worker taken from somewhere.
Or is there still a large pool of men with low economic output, in poor rural regions or low-productivity jobs, where, sending them to the front is still a clear net gain for the war effort?
personaldesas
Active Member
It would be interesting to know how badly the units in the Ukrainian counter-offensive are attrited.
rsemmes
Well-Known Member
The same reaction as to Rubio's or to Trump's being upset because those Britishers are not in Guantanamo: None. It is just another (wild in this case) statement by a politician or an influencer. I was reading something "interesting" in the editorial of lemonde, just another one...
When we send troops to a combat zone or we start bombing the area, that's another matter, but there is plenty of time for escalation and negotiation. Do we have any date for the deployment of those missiles in the Baltic states?
BTW, the threat would not be credible coming only from the UK, even when "a country does have the right to react to a direct threat to their security". Hopefully, you noticed that my reaction was to the post (I would call it "high horse", I think Swerve use the word "childish"), not to the RIA Novosti comment.
Well, it could have played out that way. But Russian command is still insisting they control the area, and old videos are being posted on related social media channels to try and "prove" this. The strikes also seem to have come well before the pullback. In other words it seems Russia was aware of the Ukrainian counter-offensive. Overall it's fuzzy. Putin claiming Russia has Svyatogorsk is interesting too because at one point Russian infiltrators had reached Svyatogorsk, though no Russian consolidation took place. But Putin announced it well after Russia has been pushed back from there.
Of course the real limit is currently economic (and financial) since Russia has to pay them and pull them from the work force.
I would suspect losses are substantial. They always have been in this kind of fighting previously. The real question I think is whether the losses are sustainable or unsustainable.
vikingatespam
Well-Known Member
Most western estimates use places like Mediazona:
Russian losses in the war with Ukraine. Mediazona count, updated
283,000 deaths confirmed by October 23
en.zona.media
These are based on actual Russian records. Do you object to some of the methodologies here ?
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
To come back to this, just to reply, as I was not able to do so earlier. No confusion on my part about their electoral process, but I surely botched my post up. I was actually going to go back and edit it, edited the one I made after (re question marks) and, apparently, moved on. So…
A few things to consider in the polls you provided. The most obvious one is Tiahnybok. There is no universe in the world we know where he would defeat Yanukovych (or most of anyone else in the UA political space) in the presidential election in Ukraine. The idea is beyond preposterous. If the two somehow (it would never ever, and I mean ever - I cannot stress this enough - happen in real life) got to the second round, Yanukovych would clear the house (probably better than Churchill did in 2019), regardless of what any poll says. I mean, while I don’t like hyperbole… in this case, there are no words one can use to describe these results as unreasonable that can be treated as such.
Second, Klitchko as the front-runner is not necessarily a serious proposition. The actual election was not due for another year (and a quarter if we take Dec 17, 2013 as the starting point). Have you ever listened to the guy talk? He has hard time putting words together. It would be like electing Mike Tyson to the presidency in the US or Valuev in Russia. Granted, they elected Klitchko to be the mayor of Kyiv (and a clown as a president in Ukraine and Valuev to Duma in Russia, so everything is possible). Would he survive a political campaign in a normal world and sustain his polling numbers? Probably (or most certainly) not, in my opinion. But your point stands as opposed to the one I ended up making.
Furthermore, Poroshenko would likely not be a thing if not for the events that took place. Timoshenko was jailed since… 2011 (?) to February (?) 2014 and would not be able to run. Yatseniuk? He ranked significantly below Timoshenko in the opinion polls consistently (and always), which should translate to the polls you cited accordingly, but it does not. I do not see him as a strong contender at all at the time (see where he is today). They would need another face. Also note, Klitchko allegedly agreed to withdraw his candidacy for a united front candidate type of thing. He was the front runner though, according to most polls. He settled for the guaranteed post of mayor of the capital vs the presidency of the country. Unreasonable, right? Well, I would refer back to the point I made just above. I am talking about a democratic process, of course, which events that took place had nothing in common with, in spite of being advertised as such.
What your cited poll numbers show is that it is anyone but and the opposition would back any candidate but. Again, Tiahnybok is a huge red flag. Regardless, your post is a fare counterpoint to the one I ended up making. Nothing is as clearcut though. A lot has been going on and things were not static. What is notable, however, is that every single poll I saw gave a noticeable boost to Yanukovych’s ratings immediately after Dec 17. Furthermore, no president in the Ukrainian history had such high approval ratings when he was removed from office (and by democratic means, which is kind of important or should be). Kravchuk (the first president) was the absolute record holder (I’d bet he still might be if…) being defeated by Kuchma while still enjoying ~20% or something like that in approval ratings. Kuchma ran in single digits at the end of his second term (opted not to run for reelection although was permitted by the court and endorsed Yanukovych instead). Yushchenko is the record holder on the other end, running something like 2% or slightly higher in the approval ratings at the end of his first and only term (but Maidan and all, only electing Yanukovych again). Poroshenko was in single digits or just above when he was defeated by Zelensky. Yanukovych had well above 36% in approval from decided voters (likely higher across the entire population) after signing the debt agreement on Dec 17, 2013. The opposition then decided to “reject Russia’s preferred president” and shit hit the fan. Why none of the other leaders of the country were “rejected” by the opposition of the day, but served their term(s) since they all had substantially lower approvals (Yushchenko was basically a reject of society, for instance)?
In 2014, shit really started hitting the fan. I would recommend listening to this conversation of Michael Kimmage (of Kennan Institute) with Yaroslav Hrytsak, start at 26:19 (if not interested in the whole thing). I don't think anyone can question Hrytsak’s bias (laughing), so there is no Russian (or anti-Ukrainian?) propaganda here anyone can, as usually, accuse me of (laughing harder).
The guy clearly tells us the major protests began after Yunokovych announced that he was not going to sign the EU agreement. To note, he also says that it was Yanukovych himself who changed course and said that he would previously. This is the money fishing expedition I talked about long time ago that has nothing to do with Russia or the EU, but the funds the country desperately needed. But anyway, he said he would not sign the agreement (after negotiations with the EU), protest began, but died down a week later because there was no wide support, Hrytsak tells us. For whatever reason, protesters were beaten up (allegedly by Yanukovych’s people), so there was another wave of protests as a result. Hrytsak says that it is very clear that there was a third party that tried to destabilize the situation as much as possible every time things seemed to settle and some consensus was agreed to. Of course, his conclusion here is that it was Putin trying to set a precedent where he comes in and sets order (or whatever the idea is). So, we basically have, an allegedly Russian-puppet president, who signed a financing agreement with Russia and not the EU, the protests died down, but Putin, being as unreasonable as he is, decided to wreck havoc because… whatever the thought process is here.
So when someone says that the “opposition rejected” or “democratic forces” and the like, it is not an honest discussion. At the time, Yanukovych had more support than the actively opposing forces, I believe this is fairly clear. The portrayal of the events that took place and every escalation that followed is the key difference in the eventual outcome. We will never know what could have been, unfortunately.
Another thing to note here about Hrytsak’s statements. At one point he says “I was younger, but I remember” because he was also at Maidan. This is rubbish, of course. No respected or self-aware historian would speak this way about any extraordinary social events that they themselves were a part of. This is psychology 101, basic stuff. Here Prof Paul Bloom of Yale (now of University of Toronto too) explains this phenomenon in one of his lectures on Introductory Psychology (at 49:21 exactly, and less than two minutes on):
I would actually suggest going a little further back, to 37:22 mark and go from there because it directly relates to our discussion overall. It is critical, in my opinion, to understand or, at least, be aware of these things happening “behind the scenes”, naturally, because we are humans.
If anyone is interested in Introductory Psychology course, by the way, Bloom’s entire course from Yale is on Yale’s Youtube (link to the first lecture, then go from there):
Code:
https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=P3FKHH2RzjI&pp=0gcJCYsCo7VqN5tD&ra=mThat is just an aside for those interested (because why not?) and I don’t think many can beat Paul’s classes (my PSYCH 101 course was quite a bit more lame, when I took it, lol). Note, this stuff is somewhat dated (I don’t recall the exact year it was posted, surely over a decade ago) and new research has taken place, but all these fundamentals are true today as they were back then.
Lastly, The Origins of War series ran by the Kennan Institute, as mentioned above, are quite great and I highly recommend it. Many interesting people talking about Ukraine, Russia (mostly), etc. I haven’t listened to all the episodes yet (and the project is still ongoing), but most of the ones I did listen to so far were good stuff. The depth of the project and the number of people (historians, analysts, politicians, etc) interviewed deserves some attention in itself. Search for it and give it a try. I think Kennan Institute has a chronological order somewhere, though it is not as relevant (it began last winter, I feel like, maybe spring).
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
Is this also an obligatory reminder as mine was? Haha.
Politics are the choice of any particular country, I agree. But politics of another is also a choice, which is theirs. One guy said something about wars and politics by other means. Whether we agree with it or not, the world had been spinning before we were around and will keep doing so after we no longer are.
Has Russia invaded because Ukraine was in the position to threaten Russia?
I did not say they should have elections. Frankly, none of my (or anyone else’s) business (and I truly don’t care if they do or not, as in I could not care less). My point is that if running elections to your advantage because someone cannot participate, do not use the same argument for not running elections in the future.
Also, the country in question does not rate very high on the democratic scale. In fact, see attachments in the quoted post:
For the “Ukraine is a democracy” crew, the latest v-dem report published recently:
View attachment 54588
View attachment 54589
The full report for those interested:
personaldesas
Active Member
Thanks for coming back to this, I've read your answer in full, but I won't reopen it, since I've already pulled too often the thread away from the war hehe.
One closing note though: I'm not going to vouch for the polls either, which is why I said "if you believe the polls." My point was only that they don't support him winning a second round. Whether they're reliable is a fair separate question.
The first direct Russian missile strike on a moving civilian grain ship at sea occurred on 12 September 2024
rsemmes
Well-Known Member
"We have developed an estimate based on excess male mortality". It sounds perfectly reasonable. Just how biased is that estimate?Most western estimates use places like Mediazona:
Russian losses in the war with Ukraine. Mediazona count, updated
283,000 deaths confirmed by October 23
These are based on actual Russian records. Do you object to some of the methodologies here ?
All right, Russia has suffered more than 1m casualties (4 WIA for each KIA) or around that number and Ukraine has suffered more than 1m casualties. Russia can take more casualties than Ukraine, the prognosis for Ukraine is still bleaker than that for Russia and that is what we don't want to report.
Maybe Deyhere got a bit carried away.
Readers of Ukraine’s leading English news site “really want Russia to suffer” but that should not lead the title to downplay the military and political problems facing Kyiv.
Kyiv Independent editor: ‘Our readers want Russia to suffer but we can’t be propagandists’
Olga Rudenko says news site has duty to report on Russian military gains and Ukrainian corruption even if subjects are not so well read
www.theguardian.com