Middle East Defence & Security

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
More recent statistics shed light on several phenomenons. Previously I saw info indicating Hamas used child soldiers as young as 14, and I was unaware of elderly ones. It is possible the new reality demanded they expand their recruitment criteria.
The source is unnamed but it is said to be derived from a list provided by Hamas including names and ID. That is, unidentified are excluded.

As with any society, male-female split is very near 50-50. We get however an indication on who's uninvolved and who's uninvolved by seeing where the lines separate. Notice the graph of uninvolved is descending with age due to the high birth rate in Gaza.

  1. Cutoff is at 10 years, indicating child soldiers.
  2. Majority of KIA are 30 years old, showing Hamas was more of a career than a short military service (Not new to me but figured it might be to you).
  3. Bump among women around 30. That is a mystery to me.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Major movement of US strategic bombers to Diego Garcia the past few days.
It's precisely the lack of media coverage of it that raises the chances of it being a real preparation for a strike (on Iran). If it's for deterrence, as IMO it's unlikely a strike will happen, then deterrence works even better without the media.
Possibly the US flexing and keeping assets close by just in case diplomacy with Iran fails.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
I don't think it will have any real effect now or later, but it's still interesting so I'm sharing.
Anti-Hamas protests in Gaza are now a thing.
Perhaps protests 24-36 months earlier would have been more useful albeit many would have died it but likely way less (especially if Arab countries interceded) than than a massive IDF retaliatory invasion. As for the present, how many human shields does Hamas want to lose killing protesters?
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Perhaps protests 24-36 months earlier would have been more useful albeit many would have died it but likely way less (especially if Arab countries interceded) than than a massive IDF retaliatory invasion. As for the present, how many human shields does Hamas want to lose killing protesters?
With a birth rate so high, they really don't care. Fewer mouths to feed, if anything.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Ignore the AI photo. This guy makes good points.


I'll quote:

Israel’s modern mode of thinking is entirely different than psyche & mindset of its enemies, says psychologist & researcher Ofer Grosbard. Israel must develop a much deeper understanding of how its enemies see the world.
Israel’s flawed psychological perceptions led to severe strategic failures, Grosbard says; in an interview with Maariv Online, he argues that Israel must adopt new strategic approach based on 5 principles:
  1. Verbal threats against Israel must be taken seriously. Enemy leaders & their followers are fully committed to Israel's destruction. These are not empty words. Israel must proactively and consistently attack these enemies.

  2. Targeted eliminations of enemy leaders are vital. While not a magic solution, such actions are highly significant, delivering a severe blow to the self-confidence of Israel’s adversaries.

  3. Israeli policy of containing threats projects weakness & fuels hatred. Passive approach reinforces the notion in the eyes of the world & our enemies that attacks on Israel with no response are a normal state of affairs.

  4. Economic incentives offered by Israel have no impact on enemy leaders. They're wealthy, don’t need financial rewards & don't mind sacrificing their own people. They are likely to exploit economic aid to bolster their own leadership status & boost military capabilities.

  5. Israel must break its addiction to short-term calm, which carries high costs in the long run. The pursuit of illusory peace must end, as well as the reluctance to strike enemies before they attack us. Israel must favor ongoing preemptive action.
My 2 cents on this analysis, in the same order:
  1. When someone tells you who they are - believe them. I always believe in giving people/things a chance. If they extend an arm for peace, go all the way. If they start making threats, it's time to take military action and escalate until they agree that threats don't solve things.

  2. Aside from self confidence, persistent targeting of leadership, not just top leadership but across all echelons - political, military, from strategic to tactical level. This ensures that even if they persist in hostility, their leadership will be of lower quality, and members will be deterred from rising through the ranks and thus from being recruited in the first place.

  3. I agree. Every nation's security policy should be inherently proactive.

  4. This refers directly to the "conception" as it is widely called in Israel. The concept that economical prosperity and improved quality of life will incentivize calm and peace. It has been tried and failed numerous times, but October 7th finally put the final nail in the coffin.

  5. If in the early 2000's Israel had committed to a persistent strike campaign against Iranian MIC and nuclear facilities, an Iranian escalation vs Israel would not be made possible. Today Iran possesses thousands of ballistic missiles it can fire on Israel. Shooting them all down would be both costly and unrealistic.

Re: Strategic aviation buildup in Diego Garcia.
Although signs of increased readiness, these are also possibly negotiation tactics.
Multiple CSG should also arrive soon before the strike package could be described as completed, but signs of real strike intentions would probably consist of:
  • Evacuation of valuable assets from Al Udeid and other major US bases in the gulf.
  • Evacuation orders for civilians in the area.
  • NOTAMs across Iran and much of the gulf area.


After several days of Hezbollah firing rockets at Israel, Israel is now responding with an evacuation warning for an area in the Shi'te part of Beirut.

EDIT: 2 roof knocks were reported so far. The Lebanese government is gathering to discuss these developments.
IMO: The Lebanese government must decide whether it takes military action to drive out Hezbollah and prevent rocket fire into Israel, or stay on course and risk resumed fighting.
It's not a clear decision. Strategically, Lebanon benefits from potential resumed Israeli strikes on Hezbollah. Less things to worry about. On the other hand, it'll only further cement the idea that Lebanon is incapable of maintaining order within its borders, which will have an effect on normalization talks.
Lebanon demands territorial exchange. Weak and inactive central government would not persuade Israel and the US.
 
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Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
I struggle to understand how an Israeli-Syrian normalization would look like.
It's not peace, but so far normalization as part of the Abraham Accords has pretty much been peace-like.
I'm assuming much like in the past, the main obstacle would be the definition of Syria.
Is it an independent state? Or is it a proxy to a hostile power? Is it the full Syria? Or will millions of Syrians remain outside of Jolani's control?
I'm open to surprises, but I don't expect anything to come out of it in the next couple years.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I struggle to understand how an Israeli-Syrian normalization would look like.
It's not peace, but so far normalization as part of the Abraham Accords has pretty much been peace-like.
I'm assuming much like in the past, the main obstacle would be the definition of Syria.
Is it an independent state? Or is it a proxy to a hostile power? Is it the full Syria? Or will millions of Syrians remain outside of Jolani's control?
I'm open to surprises, but I don't expect anything to come out of it in the next couple years.
Presumably this just means "please stop bombing us so we can go pummel our ethnic and religious minorities into submission without worrying about external factors".
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Presumably this just means "please stop bombing us so we can go pummel our ethnic and religious minorities into submission without worrying about external factors".
They'll struggle to do that unless they have some big sponsor that Israel would probably rule out in any normalization effort so...
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Developed nations' markets are crashing, at 5% - 10% drops and some even exceeding that.

Meanwhile, Israel's TA-35 and TA-125 indexes have dropped "only" 2.4%.

Specifically on the trade war:
Israel announced a few days ago it'll remove all tariffs from the US. However Israel did not even have meaningful tariffs on the US to begin with. An empty statement.
The US imposed a 17% tariff on Israel, estimated to cost Israel some $2.3 billion.
Trump and Netanyahu will meet today, and it's assumed tariffs will be on the agenda.

It's possible Israel will ask to reduce tariffs to the baseline 10% if not further reduce them.

The economical "fear factor" in Israel is much lower than the general west. It's barely in the news, and this could also somewhat explain the more graceful drop in Israel. This is likely also partially because Israelis believe it'll be resolved.

This unique Trump-Netanyahu dialogue is also an indicator that Israel's more closed doors and practical approach to geopolitics and general relations with the US are more effective than European strategies.
I'm not sure the muscle flexing in Europe is contributing to lowering the fear factor and to resolving the situation.


Regarding CENTCOM vs Houthis:
I thought Trump would change policy on usage of strategic weapons e.g. Harpoons, JASSM, LRASM etc that are crucial to INDOPACOM.
While JDAMs and SDBs were indeed more frequently used, so has the use of strategic munitions as the intensity grew.
I was dead wrong in that assessment. I hope they'll stop wasting precious munitions.

The silver lining is it could finally push decision makers to start mass producing these weapons. But I'm pessimistic on that.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Been a while since any major development has occurred regarding the regional war, but some interesting processes are occurring.

1. Hezbollah's disarmament is going better than expected. Lebanon's government is clearing some areas faster than expected, and there were even instances of Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups surrendering arms and being arrested.

2. Israeli airstrikes continue in Lebanon (as per ceasefire agreement) with 0 response from Hezbollah so far, indicating Hezbollah is thoroughly deterred, demoralized, and broken.

3. In Gaza, the IDF seems (according to satellite footage) to prepare the ground in several ways.
A. Rafah buffer zone is being expanded massively.
B. Rafah is being flattened and rubble is cleared. Ground is paved in a way that indicates a future tent city.
C. Netzarim and Morag corridors are being expanded.
D. Buffer zone into Gaza is being expanded.

4. It's indicated that the plan is to evacuate the entire population of Gaza to Rafah into the large camp being prepared. Aid will be distributed from just 1 location in Gaza, directly from IDF-controlled territory, in order to reduce thefts that allow Hamas to stay politically relevant.

5. New poll reveals 47% of Gazans are willing to leave Gaza if given the option. Small numbers of Gazans with foreign citizenship have already left via Israel.

6. The US initiated a massive strike campaign on the Houthis and recently stopped following a ceasefire announcement.

7. Israel and Houthis engaged more directly recently after a Houthi missile landed very close to Israel's Ben Gurion international airport, and Israel retaliated by destroying the Houthis' only international airport in Sanaa, and their sea port in Hodeidah.

8. Various mysterious explosions are occurring in Iran including in its largest sea port, during talks with the US regarding its nuclear program.


Large strike wave against rocket launchers and infrastructure in Lebanon.


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Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
On May 16th, the IDF announced commencement of Operation Gideon's Chariots - OGC.
OGC stands apart from SOI (Swords of Iron) in several key principles:
Operation Gideon's ChariotsOperation Swords of Iron
Maneuver across entire Gaza​
Partial maneuver in select areas of Gaza​
Permanent occupation​
Temporary occupations​
Gaza split in 3​
Gaza split in 2​
Sweeping North to south maneuver​
Shifting, disconnected main maneuver areas​
Shifting humanitarian zone​
Single designated humanitarian zone​
Private aid distributors​
UN-distributed aid​

Additionally, in a televised address to the public, PM Netanyahu laid out the objectives for OGC and terms for ending the war.

You can read the full statement in this thread:

Abbreviated version:

UN-instigated media hysteria and subsequent western nations' (e.g. UK, France, Canada, Spain) statements regarding measures against Israel, stem from official UNOCHA claim that 14,000 Palestinian babies will die within 48 hours, a claim made well over 48 hours ago which means UNOCHA claims they have already died.
There is however no indication that anti-Israel statements by said heads of states are pointed toward Israel or intended to affect Israel's prosecution of the war in any way. Basically media noise. If anything, there is an argument to be made that these statements are meant to indirectly encourage Israel to initiate OGC, by pressuring Hamas out of negotiating a surrender and release of hostages.

Hamas certainly appreciated those statements

We can already see first signs of the north-to-south maneuver to come:

It is worth stating that as of right now, May 22nd, the ground element of OGC has yet to commence. 5 divisions were already called up for this task, but for now there are medium intensity airstrikes in Gaza in preparation.
OGC had an additional intended effect of pressuring Hamas into a deal that would see all hostages released: A condition for the ending of the war in Gaza. But talks collapsed yet again.



As we're headed into a new round of war, said to be more intense than SOI, the matter of humanitarian aid is generating a lot of media noise. But this only clouds the perhaps centrality of said humanitarian aid in determining the effectiveness of war efforts.
As an interim measure, the IDF is sending in aid in the previous model, where the UN distributes the aid to Hamas.
COGAT report: 100 trucks enter Gaza.

In the longer term and per OGC parameters, the aid will be distributed by private contractors, from 4 pre-set locations in southern Gaza (Rafah area). The main goals are to drive the population to the south, and to ensure Hamas doesn't get their hands on the aid, but I seriously doubt the latter is feasible in the explained future model.
The humanitarian aid is Hamas's lifeline. Through it, it manages to pay salaries, recruit, and sustain combat operations.
But perhaps a greater war goal of Israel's is permanent occupation of Gaza, preferably with annexation of 2/3rds of it for strategic depth from major cities like Ashkelon and Ashdod.
And as we know, humanitarian affairs must be coordinated by an occupying power. So humanitarian aid must come in in one way or another. But it must also not reach Hamas, otherwise they cannot be eradicated in their current form.
Sri Lanka defeated the Tamil Tigers by completely choking them out. Along the way however they also killed a lot of their own civilians and there was the unique circumstance that the Tamil Tigers were hated by the local population. Almost none of that is applicable to Hamas, and obviously to choke out Hamas there's a need to address its external operations.


Unable to affect other nations policies, what Israel can do in Gaza to maximize pressure on Hamas:
  1. Food aid quickly perishable - not something you can store to sustain combat operations, but fully relevant to a civilian population.

  2. Maximum supervision on aid distribution including personal allocations and screening, preferably with food aid consumed in designated guarded dining areas and not to be taken home.

  3. No entry of war materiel such as:
    • fuel, generators, metals, plastics, vehicles, cement, and work tools.
    • all of which are needed for the sustainment of combat operations and production of weaponry.
    • Power generation can be provided on a by case basis for specific needs such as local medicine, if it were under proper supervision.

  4. Annex large parts of Gaza and flatten them.
    1. The purpose is dual:
      1. Exact a permanent price for the war thus increasing pressure.
      2. Create defensible strategic depth.

  5. Replace the aid model with a standard economical model:
    1. Industry is set up in Rafah. Standard salaries.
    2. Food is purchasable.
    3. Mutual benefit of increased Palestinian purchasing power, and boost to Israeli economy.
      1. Basically a return to the pre-October 7th work model, except Palestinians won't cross into Israeli territory again.
 
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Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
Update on developments so far:

Briefly first:
  1. GHF (Gaza Humanitarian Foundation) is a resounding success, arguably more effective than kinetic operation.
  2. Israel on the brink of elections (ahead of time).
  3. Lebanon showing increasing signs of stabilization.
  4. Iran-US struggling to reach agreement.
  5. Recognized Yemeni gov't ramping up talk about operation against Houthis.
  6. Laser was deployed in combat for first time in 2024.

#1
In Gaza, the GHF has so far:
  1. Received massive public support.
  2. Resulted in Hamas lowering demands.
  3. Led to looting of Hamas's aid warehouses.
  4. And led to armed uprising against Hamas.
  5. Some desertions from Hamas also recorded as their stolen aid rapidly devalued.

#2
In Israel, a political crisis re-emerges around the issue of Haredi conscription. As Netanyahu failed to provide them exemptions from service and the court mandates the government to implement sanctions and issue draft orders, the Haredi senior religious leadership ordered Haredi party leaders to resign from the coalition, potentially leaving Netanyahu in a lame duck state or even forcing elections.
Netanyahu has reportedly one week to resolve the crisis.
One major mitigating factor is that forcing elections is the MAD policy of the Haredim. They are only set to lose from it if it happens. But it could still happen and it's the closest we've been to re-elections so I'm posting this.


#3
Quietly, IDF demobilized municipal reservist-based QRFs in towns bordering Lebanon, which signals a lower threat perception, in turn indicating Hezbollah's disarmament by the LAF is more or less a success.
But Hezbollah could simply be trading its presence in southern Lebanon in exchange for reinforced presence in other Hezbollah strongholds like Baalbek (north) or Beirut (center).


#4
I will not address specifics. Trump's negotiations tactics intentionally involve significant media noise.
But it seems quite clear that negotiations are going longer than desired and early indications of military preparation are observed.
Some include Israel's reshuffling of air defense assets and callup of their relevant reserve formations, and today the shift of C-UAS assets from Ukraine to CENTCOM.


#5
Nothing to add here. Just an increasing tempo of announcements.


#6
Israel revealed that Rafael's Lite Beam was deployed in combat in late 2024.
In multiple statements throughout the year, Rafael said it is on track to deliver an Iron Beam 450 (450mm mirror, 100kW) to the IDF by the end of 2025. The system used in 2024 is heavily implied to be the Lite Beam (10kW) tactical C-UAS laser.
The Iron Beam family also includes the Iron Beam 250 (250mm mirror, 50kW) with higher mobility.
Together they will drastically alter the economical balance of missile defense, giving Israel an upper hand on asymmetrical threats.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
It's been publicly disclosed today that the armed uprisings against Hamas are done with Israeli approval, and supply of firearms.

I understand why some Israelis might oppose this. It's arming people who are just as hateful to us as Hamas, and putting more weapons in Gaza.
But considering the robust C2 capability Hamas set up over decades of existence and through advice from state sponsors, it's arguable that 1 Hamassy is more of a problem than 1 other terrorist.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
It's been publicly disclosed today that the armed uprisings against Hamas are done with Israeli approval, and supply of firearms.

I understand why some Israelis might oppose this. It's arming people who are just as hateful to us as Hamas, and putting more weapons in Gaza.
But considering the robust C2 capability Hamas set up over decades of existence and through advice from state sponsors, it's arguable that 1 Hamassy is more of a problem than 1 other terrorist.
I get that argument, but how confident are you that this will be the outcome? What if the outcome is 10 Hamas become 7 Hamas and 10 others?
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
I get that argument, but how confident are you that this will be the outcome? What if the outcome is 10 Hamas become 7 Hamas and 10 others?
That's still preferable as younger organizations are expotentially easier to defeat.
I remember the announcement of the "Lion's Den" group in J&S a couple years ago. They only popped up when they had hundreds of operatives. Took maybe a couple weeks to entirely dismantle that one.
But also, and perhaps primarily, the key enabler of any armed expansion in Gaza and anywhere is a concentration of resources to secure basics like salaries and then infrastructure, equipment, elevated social status and so on.
Under the former aid plan, Hamas managed to consolidate much of the resources in Gaza by stealing aid and selling it at massively inflated prices.
Under the new plan, civilians individually receive food packs, which pretty much dismantled Hamas's resource dominance and also prevents future monopolies.
Therefore it would be really difficult for new players to consolidate resources and recruit.

Plus even with resources, Hamas failed to recruit properly. In every Hamas PR photo recently it's just 10-14 year old kids. They can't even handle a rifle properly.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Plus even with resources, Hamas failed to recruit properly. In every Hamas PR photo recently it's just 10-14 year old kids. They can't even handle a rifle properly.
A pathetic situation for sure, I guess the one positive aspect for Israel is these recruits will not live long enough to develop realistic combat/terrorist skills.
 
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