The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Ukrainians claim to have destroyed an Utyos-Tm radar.
It seems to them that it's significant. (I can't verify myself)
It's this thing;


I'm not sure this is even a military installation, though I suppose it might be.

Talking about Ukrinform, my favorite website ==> LOL :D , I thought it was a website opened recently. In fact it's a 107 years old institution.
Complete BS. The current Ukrinform borrows the name of the old one but it's not the same institution. The government structure of the 1917 Ukraine was very fluid, not consistent, government shifted multiple times, and all of it disappeared after the Soviets won in the Civil War.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
Kalibrated insist with Piatijatki...
And someone else.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Kalibrated insist with Piatijatki...
And someone else.
Yes, over the past ~3 days a Russian push north-west of the former Rabotino salient has developed. The goal is unclear, but speculating based on the previous unsuccessful attempts to break through Kamenskoe, they intend to flank that village from the east and eventually north-east, to advance north-ward along a relatively wide front west of Orekhov.

EDIT: The other part that seems to be developing is that Russia has just crossed the Oskol in two more spots. If we include the currently unconfirmed crossing in Sen'kovo, we're up to 5 footholds across the river, with 4 of them all in a relatively small area. The two crossing between Topoli and Figolevka around Krasnoe Pervoe almost bridge the gap. It's pretty clear the intent is to form a single front line, uniting the crossings, and with a route back to Russia across the state border.
 
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PachkaSigaret

New Member
EDIT: The other part that seems to be developing is that Russia has just crossed the Oskol in two more spots. If we include the currently unconfirmed crossing in Sen'kovo, we're up to 5 footholds across the river, with 4 of them all in a relatively small area. The two crossing between Topoli and Figolevka around Krasnoe Pervoe almost bridge the gap. It's pretty clear the intent is to form a single front line, uniting the crossings, and with a route back to Russia across the state border.
It still puzzles me why Russia simply hasn't crossed from the border to link up with those footholds. Or even before the Oskol crossings... perhaps there is a good reason that eludes me.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
It still puzzles me why Russia simply hasn't crossed from the border to link up with those footholds. Or even before the Oskol crossings... perhaps there is a good reason that eludes me.
Ukraine has defenses on the border, presumably it's easier to attack across the river? Unclear. Technically Russia did attack into Topoli from both sides, across the border and across the river. But you're right, Russia has a preference for attacking across the river, instead of pushing in from the north.
 

crest

Member
It still puzzles me why Russia simply hasn't crossed from the border to link up with those footholds. Or even before the Oskol crossings... perhaps there is a good reason that eludes me.
As fennor said it's not heavily but well defended, far as I know there alot of forest cover and some high ground along the riverbank,makes sense if you don't have a large enough attacking force to try and take any beneficial terrain you can (odd as that sounds about a river crossing!)

I would also assume drones are a large factor here getting to the treeline may be worth the risk of crossing a relatively narrow river. Or at least preferable to attacking along a expected and defended axis

There is also then question of Ukrainian manpower well they have indeed brought up some reinforcements to the region they may not have the manpower to spare in physically holding the river line. This many foothold strategy could be in part (or by chance likely) a effort to force them to spread out, or commit even more forces to the area. One that has been quiet for quite some time and really not all that valuable, tho if Russia makes significant inroads that could change.
 
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Bob53

Well-Known Member
Pic of the day:

This pic was taken from a rare acknowledgement of withdrawal by the The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine .
The map they are showing looks like other maps shared by independent sources. It's also rare when they show a map.

Ukrainians claim to have destroyed an Utyos-Tm radar.
It seems to them that it's significant. (I can't verify myself)

@Feanor
In Kryvyi Rih, more than 150 families whose apartments were damaged by the attack have received building materials.
Of course, it's not the multi billion dollars reconstruction of Mariupol, but they give something... ;)

Talking about Ukrinform, my favorite website ==> LOL :D , I thought it was a website opened recently. In fact it's a 107 years old institution.
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For counter battery strike you need precise artillery. Not the speciality of soviet systems. And you need advanced radars, which Russians have. But are they as good as western ones? (doubt)

From what I have read, the quality is very disparate. From the shells freshly produced by Rhein Metal to old shells acquired by the Czech Initiative at debilitating price from unknown producers.


Yes, it was. It was the most advanced Russian position in the direction of Odessa. Their only area of control west of the Dniepr. A real threat to the Ukrainian state.

The Russian retreat from Kherson is similar to the Ukrainian retreat from Soudzha. In the sens that the Ukrainians didn't really fought the Russians away. But the Russians decided to leave the Right Bank because it was too difficult to stay there under a more and more assertive Ukrainian resistance.

The big difference is that no external power put Russia under pressure to force them to give up Kherson in a matter of days. Whereas Ukrainians were clearly under pressure after Trump cut military aid and intelligence. The timing is too exact to be a coincidence and it's also perfectly logical. Putin always said that there will be no ceasefire as long as Uke troops were in Russia. And Trump wanted this hurdle gone.

Every time they talked about this topic, Ukrainian officials repeated and insisted that they didn't intent to hold Russian territories in the long term.

Of course, he can win this war. He just need enough weapons, ammunitions and a decent air force.
It won't take that much to inflict one more big blow to the Russian occupation force and liberate another large area. They can't because the West has never given the tools to do it. If Trump wanted, he could give Ukraine what it needs to defeat the Russians, at least on a big portion of the front. Biden didn't want. Sholtz didn't want. If the new administrations want, there is potential.
Recently, I posted:
The U.S. will resume shipments to Ukraine of long-range bombs known as Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs (GLSDB), after they were upgraded to better counter Russian jamming. (Reuters)
If the US gives them in sufficient numbers (not just 40 pieces) and German finally give some Taurus, it opens more possibilities. At the same time, the Ukrainian air force is expanding. Slowly, but each new F16 or Mirage is an important input. Ukrainians are also proving that their announcements on domestic production of long range drone and mini cruise missiles were no BS. We never saw so many deep strikes on Russia as now.

Of course liberate all of Ukraine totally is not realistic, but this is not the definition of victory. A second large Russian withdrawal would. Even keeping the border along the current front line would be victory. A smaller one, but a victory nonetheless. Because Putin's hordes would have been stopped.

When the Austrians and the Poles stopped the Mongols, it was not a defeat because the Mongols managed to conquer up to the Gates of Vienna, but it was a victory because they were stopped. This is the same situation in Ukraine. That's why I often call the Russian army "Russo-Mongols". (Also because many of their soldiers are asiates.)
Hmmmm… didn’t the Mongols turn around because Great Khan … Ögedei Khan… died so they returned to the East As death of the Khan triggered a leadership council.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
...el presidente de Ucrania, Volodimir Zelenski, ha establecido este fin de semana sus particulares líneas rojas en esta negociación. El primero puede ser clave: no ceder territorio adicional a Moscú. Es decir, el presidente ucraniano sí admitiría en una negociación perder las zonas que ya ocupa Rusia de facto, aunque no los reconocería como rusos, sino que renunciaría por escrito a recuperarlos mediante la fuerza.
"..not to give additional territory"

This one seems to be from the horse's mouth:
Ukraine has four key terms that must be upheld in order for the full-scale war to end, sources said. These are:

It is over, Zelenski accepts (at last) that he has lost. I have to wonder what he thinks, now, about Turkey, he lost a lot less then. Boris can always say it was NATO's fault.
 

crest

Member

The last 3 min or so is relivent to mypost

Again a more Russian source but apparently Ukraine is is trying another push into belragod region. Doesn't appear to be that large just one mech bttln but it's also breaking news so could be more. Honestly I don't understand this move seems to me theyare in need of reinforcements in a few important fronts as it is. Why in the world would you want to start a new one. Especially one running into prepared defences for low value positions
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
...el presidente de Ucrania, Volodimir Zelenski, ha establecido este fin de semana sus particulares líneas rojas en esta negociación. El primero puede ser clave: no ceder territorio adicional a Moscú. Es decir, el presidente ucraniano sí admitiría en una negociación perder las zonas que ya ocupa Rusia de facto, aunque no los reconocería como rusos, sino que renunciaría por escrito a recuperarlos mediante la fuerza.
"..not to give additional territory"

This one seems to be from the horse's mouth:
Ukraine has four key terms that must be upheld in order for the full-scale war to end, sources said. These are:

It is over, Zelenski accepts (at last) that he has lost. I have to wonder what he thinks, now, about Turkey, he lost a lot less then. Boris can always say it was NATO's fault.
I don't think this is going to work though. Note that Zelensky recently said that recognizing any territories as Russian is a red line. In other words, he's talking about freezing the conflict, not a lasting peace. I don't see Russia accepting a deal under the full list of terms mentioned in this article. Now the four that you outline, I think could be the basis for a compromise peace, one that neither side will be particularly happy about (so a true compromise) but I think Russia will demand recognition of a new state border along some sort of line, rather than a cessation of hostilities with a ceasefire or armistice in place along a line of contact. Given the recent discussions in the west, it seems very likely that as soon as the fighting stops, even for a little bit, there will be a foreign military presence inserted into Ukraine by a number of European countries. If there is no lasting peace in place, it becomes tempting for Ukraine to restart hostilities at a convenient time to recapture lost territory, with the cover of a foreign military presence as a guarantee against any catastrophic defeat. It would be rather unwise for Russia to ignore this possibility, and all of their statements suggest that they aren't ignoring it.
 

Fredled

Active Member
Trump - Putin Phone Call Sky News video
Putin agreed that Ukraine stops striking Russian energy infrastructures. He also agreed not to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure, but that's less relevant because Ukraine doesn't depend on oil&gas exports to finance their war.

It also implies that Russia will still target non-energy related targets all over Ukraine with all types of long range missiles. Whereas it will prohibit Ukraine to strike deep inside Russia because apart from the oil industry and oil depots, there isn't much to strike in Russia. Ukrainians can still try to strike air bases, but that's not very effective.

There is also the problem of the definition of an energy infrastructure.

IMO, this type of arrangement is not realistic. You say that you won't strike some types of target while striking others. You can strike a military hospital and it's ok because it's not "energy infrastructure". Or you strike a military fuel truck, and it's not ok because it's energy related. It doesn't make sens.

At the same time Putin demanded that weapon deliveries to Ukraine stopped. It seems that he talked about US weapons. It's not clear if it should apply to all weapons and that Putin forgot that Europe provide 45% of all western military aid...

It's a proposal which can be agreed upon... if it's reciprocal: Russia won't sent any weapon or ammunition to their troops in Ukraine neither. I think it's fair.
Of course, as Putin thinks only about weapons for the defence of the Ukrainian territory against him, this is not a peace proposal.

Putin's offer for Energy Sector truce is too fragmented to be serious. It only shows that deep strikes on Russian oil facilities started to bite.

If Ukrainians agree to play ball, they were right to throw all the could to strike Russian oil facilities in the last days until whatever truce emerges in any shape or form. It's possible that they agree because they don't have many long range drone left. They could also divert their missile and drone ressources to bomb Russian military logistic or to something closer to the front.
_____________________

crest said:
Again a more Russian source but apparently Ukraine is is trying another push into belragod region. Doesn't appear to be that large just one mech bttln but it's also breaking news so could be more. Honestly I don't understand this move seems to me they are in need of reinforcements in a few important fronts as it is. Why in the world would you want to start a new one. Especially one running into prepared defences for low value positions
It seems to me to be a small scale diversion attempt.
A larger incursion is making sens if Ukrainians can afford to do it depending of the forces that they still have in reserve in the region and how many they need to keep up north to prevent a Russian advance in the Sumy Region. With the rapid withdrawal of their army from the Kursk Oblast, one can imagine that they are able to redeploy their forces in another configuration.

Politically, however, it wouldn't make sens since the withdrawal from Kursk was helping restore US military aid. re-invading somewhere else may not please Donald Trump. That's why I think it will be very limited.

rsemmes said:
You forgot to mention "troops". He needs, so he doesn't have, so he, cannot win the war.
The number of troops is important but not the most important.
With enough long range and mid range missiles and gliding bombs they can demolish Russian defence lines. Then making a counter offensive without losing too many men. If Putin doesn't agree to a ceasefire now, that could happen.

Feanor said:
I don't think this is going to work though. Note that Zelensky recently said that recognizing any territories as Russian is a red line. In other words, he's talking about freezing the conflict, not a lasting peace. I don't see Russia accepting a deal under the full list of terms mentioned in this article. Now the four that you outline, I think could be the basis for a compromise peace, one that neither side will be particularly happy about (so a true compromise) but I think Russia will demand recognition of a new state border along some sort of line
The big problem with recognition of Russian territories is that it makes the use of force a valid way to acquire land. That would be a very dangerous precedent for world stability. Even in Syria and Iraq, they didn't dare to do that.
That's why I think that this Zelensky's red line will get the support of many western countries. And maybe from China too.

IMO, Trump should say that if parts of Ukraine is recognised as Russian land, then Taiwan will be recognised as a fully independent country. Then Xi will ask Putin to drop this demand.

More realistically, I think that Putin doesn't care much about international recognition as the change in the Russian Constitution to include the 4 Ukrainian Oblasts is enough to make it legitimate.

I think he can agree to drop the demand for territories not yet under his control. But the peace talk expectation is that he would leave some territories that he already controls, instead.

Putin will never accept any security guarantees. He made it abundantly clear already.
So there is no peace deal possible anyway, in my view.

The idea of a ceasefire is only a tool for Donald Trump to judge who is honest about peace and who is not. The one who keeps on firing is not the serious one.

Feanor said:
Given the recent discussions in the west, it seems very likely that as soon as the fighting stops, even for a little bit, there will be a foreign military presence inserted into Ukraine by a number of European countries. If there is no lasting peace in place, it becomes tempting for Ukraine to restart hostilities at a convenient time to recapture lost territory, with the cover of a foreign military presence as a guarantee against any catastrophic defeat. It would be rather unwise for Russia to ignore this possibility, and all of their statements suggest that they aren't ignoring it.
Problem is that Russian Official's statements remain statements, not fact.
So far Putin hasn't agree to a ceasefire except the ridiculous proposal mentioned above.
I don't think that they realise what they are risking by continuing the war. They are not considering European forces as a valid threat. They think that all European soldiers are degenerate transgenders or something.
 

rsemmes

Active Member
I don't think this is going to work though. @Feanor

In Spanish...
"...el presidente ucraniano sí admitiría en una negociación perder las zonas que ya ocupa Rusia de facto, aunque no los reconocería como rusos, sino que renunciaría por escrito a recuperarlos mediante la fuerza."
Zelenski would negotiate accepting the loss of territory and offering, in writing, not to retake it by force; but not as "Russia".

First, kievindependent is not saying that, but it is a position to start negotiating. Then, does Putin trust that guarantee in writing from Zelenski? Will (if) "those troops" intervene to stop Ukraine doing that?
kievindependent is using the word 'peace', "a long-lasting peace, not a short ceasefire." 'Short' could be tricky, to say the least; those 30 days or one year to rearm and train 20 brigades more?

They are fighting with words now, I see all that just as the possibility of starting peace negotiations. The details, what is going to happen with those 30 days and what will happen during those 30 days...
Well, it still has to be... negotiated.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Trump - Putin Phone Call Sky News video
Putin agreed that Ukraine stops striking Russian energy infrastructures. He also agreed not to strike Ukrainian energy infrastructure, but that's less relevant because Ukraine doesn't depend on oil&gas exports to finance their war.

It also implies that Russia will still target non-energy related targets all over Ukraine with all types of long range missiles. Whereas it will prohibit Ukraine to strike deep inside Russia because apart from the oil industry and oil depots, there isn't much to strike in Russia. Ukrainians can still try to strike air bases, but that's not very effective.

There is also the problem of the definition of an energy infrastructure.

IMO, this type of arrangement is not realistic. You say that you won't strike some types of target while striking others. You can strike a military hospital and it's ok because it's not "energy infrastructure". Or you strike a military fuel truck, and it's not ok because it's energy related. It doesn't make sens.
It makes complete sense. Russia will stop it's systematic campaign against Ukrainian power plants, powergrid substations, gas facilities, and fuel storage facilities. But a military fuel truck, especially one operating near the front line, is completely fair game. It's not energy related in the sense of what's being discussed here. You're splitting hairs in a counter-intuitive manner. Otherwise following your logic Ukraine would banned from firing at Russian vehicles' fuel tanks, since those are energy related. It's a fairly straightforward discussion, though I also have doubts it will be implemented because just as you say, it would also help Russia. And Russia is in this for the long haul.

At the same time Putin demanded that weapon deliveries to Ukraine stopped. It seems that he talked about US weapons. It's not clear if it should apply to all weapons and that Putin forgot that Europe provide 45% of all western military aid...

It's a proposal which can be agreed upon... if it's reciprocal: Russia won't sent any weapon or ammunition to their troops in Ukraine neither. I think it's fair.
Of course, as Putin thinks only about weapons for the defence of the Ukrainian territory against him, this is not a peace proposal.
It's not a peace proposal at all. He's talking about the 30 day ceasefire. I.e. he is pointing out that Ukraine is on the defensive in general, and is slowly losing ground, and it's forces are not in great shape. A 30 day ceasefire if followed by a resumption of hostilities with no agreements reached would help Ukraine far more than Russia. So he wants guarantees that Ukraine will not only not get more weapons during the ceasefire (weapons that could be delivered openly since no Russian strikes to hit warehouses) and Ukraine will halt their mobilization efforts during the ceasefire period. That's a very tall order, and I suspect that if Ukraine agrees it will be in bad faith. Most likely they simply won't agree.

The big problem with recognition of Russian territories is that it makes the use of force a valid way to acquire land. That would be a very dangerous precedent for world stability. Even in Syria and Iraq, they didn't dare to do that.
That's why I think that this Zelensky's red line will get the support of many western countries. And maybe from China too.
Completely true but also likely a sine qua non for Russia at this point. Ukraine recognizes the lost territories as Russia or the war goes on. I think this is one of the major stumbling blocks currently, possibly the single biggest one.

IMO, Trump should say that if parts of Ukraine is recognised as Russian land, then Taiwan will be recognised as a fully independent country. Then Xi will ask Putin to drop this demand.
No. The way that would play out is that Russia would simply respond by stating that America's recognition of Taiwan has no bearing on this negotiation, and if America is ready to recognize Russian land, great. America can then do whatever it chooses to vis-a-vis Taiwan and China. You could theoretically try to cinch it by requiring Russia to recognize the independence of Taiwan in exchange. But that would likely be rejected, without any need for calls from Xi.

More realistically, I think that Putin doesn't care much about international recognition as the change in the Russian Constitution to include the 4 Ukrainian Oblasts is enough to make it legitimate.
He needs to de-legitimize future Ukrainian efforts to retake the regions. That's why he needs the recognition. It doesn't matter how duplicitous it looks in the short term, given time and official Ukrainian recognition, a future resumption of hostilities by Ukraine to reclaim the territory would start to look like a fresh act of aggression. And the more time goes by, the more it will appear that way. Hence the need for the official recognition of loss of territory. If the territory remains politically disputed, then the question remains open indefinitely. Frozen conflicts can become unfrozen. Hence the focus on a lasting peace from Russia's side.

And I think they really do want a lasting peace, to digest the annexed territory. A python takes one hell of a nap after feeding.

I think he can agree to drop the demand for territories not yet under his control. But the peace talk expectation is that he would leave some territories that he already controls, instead.
I think one scenario could be that Russia wants to drop the demand for additional territories in exchange for recognition of currently taken territories as Russian, with some possible land swaps.

Putin will never accept any security guarantees. He made it abundantly clear already.
So there is no peace deal possible anyway, in my view.
That's not true. He doesn't want NATO guarantees. Nothing stops multi-lateral or EU guarantees.

The idea of a ceasefire is only a tool for Donald Trump to judge who is honest about peace and who is not. The one who keeps on firing is not the serious one.
No. The one who keeps firing is the one who is winning, who needs the ceasefire less. Again given the recent signals from Europe it's very likely that even a 30 day ceasefire could see European "peacekeepers" (in reality an allied military force) inserted into Ukraine.

Problem is that Russian Official's statements remain statements, not fact.
So far Putin hasn't agree to a ceasefire except the ridiculous proposal mentioned above.
I don't think that they realise what they are risking by continuing the war. They are not considering European forces as a valid threat. They think that all European soldiers are degenerate transgenders or something.
Maybe. Or maybe to Russian leadership the question of Ukraine appears as an existential one. Meaning they will go to the brink over this question.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
1 of 2 (been a while since I needed two…)

Found this neat graph. Primary source is said to be a leak from an unnamed medical service in Russia.


Top graph: Recorded Russian suicides.

Bottom graph: Admitted casualties by severity. Green is light injuries. Yellow is moderate. Red is critical.

We can see that critical injuries are only a tiny fraction of admitted casualties throughout the entire war. This means they're just not admitted to medical care. So either they're abandoned, or they don't make it in time until they're stabilized.
We can also see an increasing number of suicides occurring, probably as they realize none will come rescue them.

A recently increasing share of moderate injuries and reduction of light injuries means there are probably more injuries overall and that soldiers with light injuries are turned down more often. Which isn't a good thing because light injuries can sometimes quickly develop to life threatening ones.
Thanks for the link, Big Z.

To note right away, I may have worded the question improperly, but I was asking about the abandonment in the sense of most casualties from “meat wave and wounded being abandoned” or whatever was claimed. Sorry for the confusion.

Here is the original article the graphs in the tweet you cited are pulled from, in Russian:


The source for the data is claimed to be the Ministry of Defense database that was obtained from the field medic and a commander of an evacuation team who defected to France. It is an interesting read, but there are a few things to note.

It is if the article was not edited, as there are grammatical mistakes, many charts appear twice or more in random places, etc (at least on my phone). This is not a reflection on the dataset, by the way, just some poor writing/editing by Radio Liberty.

Some claims are straight up weird and kind of stick out at you. For example (via Google translate):

According to the GVMU database, alcohol and drug use remains a serious problem at the front. Hundreds of people from 2022 to mid-2024 were admitted to hospitals with diagnoses of "acute oral poisoning with an unknown substance", "poisoning with unknown narcotic substances", "acute poisoning with alcohol-containing liquid".

So the conclusion that the alcohol and drug use is a serious problem is derived from “hundreds” of people being admitted to the hospital with alcohol, drug, and unknown substance poisoning. That would be in 2.5 years. And out of the sample of 166,000 people. And considering that the article mentions in the same and next paragraph that the locals may be providing poisoned supplies, be it alcohol, food, etc. to the Russian troops. One example provided by the source (the defector) is a lightly wounded lieutenant being brought in, who drank 4 shots of cognac (noted that it was of an unknown origin), with severe diarrhea, later swelling lungs, etc. Hardly survived. A case of acute poisoning, clearly. No consideration is given to the fact that tens of thousands were recruited from prisons, for example. It is safe to assume that many were convicted on drug related charges and many of those who weren’t probably have drug or alcohol… if not dependencies, but certainly issues. So considering only the latter, if there were hundreds of such cases just among the convicts, I wouldn’t be surprised in the slightest.

This is not saying that there are no issues because there have to be. Any war as horrible as this one had these exact effects on the personnel. Look at the American vets of the recent wars and the severity of engagement is not even comparable, however horrific. Vietnam anyone?

According to a 1971 report by the Department of Defense, 51 percent of the armed forces had smoked marijuana, 31 percent had used psychedelics, such as LSD, mescaline and psilocybin mushrooms, and an additional 28 percent had taken hard drugs, such as cocaine and heroin.


So there are problems, no doubt. It would be weird if there weren’t. But the premise for the author’s conclusion is extremely weak in this case. Which again, is not reflective of the dataset, but the authors’ interpretation.

I am not going going to go into other things that I do not see as kosher that, in my opinion, greatly reflect the authors’ intent, but yeah, they could do better.

For the dataset itself though. First thing to note is that it includes 166,000 injured that went through the system at various hospitals in Russia, occupied territories, and some in Belarus (at the very beginning of the war, injured around the Kiev area). Where are another couple hundred thousands? Is that data different from this set? Why are some of the wounded included in this set and others are not? And so on. The article only says the following about the set:

It is sent to military units so that the wounded who are sent away for treatment do not "get lost". The document was shared with Radio Liberty by military medic Alexei Zhilyaev, who deserted to France.

They say they verified it, by basically drawing random names and verifying the service and, if possible, injuries via social media and official reports. I have no reason to suspect otherwise or doubt the validity of the database. Its completeness and quality is highly debatable though.

On the quality, the authors themselves reflect:
- often columns are left blank;
- wrong information written into various columns;
- includes military personnel not directly participating in the war - that is, personnel hospitalized due to influenza, chronic ailments of the older personnel (read higher rank, they note generals in particular), etc;
- it straight up says that the severity of the injuries often was made up or intentionally reduced;
- it is stated that the light injuries are not accounted for in the database, while talking about the light injuries in the database;
- duration of hospitalization calculated by the authors is somewhat suspicious provided the three groups of severity of the injuries;
- etc.

I will only comment on a few things here. One is the inclusion of “normal” hospitalizations. The authors make a reasonable assumption that these would normally not fluctuate year to year, so they can be ignored. Normally, this would be a reasonable assumption. Here, however, no consideration is given to the fact that the beginning of the war directly corresponds to the last wave of the covid pandemic and hospitalizations of the senior rank in particular would differ greatly compared to normal seasonal fluctuations. I do not disagree with their general observations in this section though.

Next is how is the severity of the injuries defined? Is there a scale used to define the severity of the injuries? Firstly, the article indicates that lightly injured personnel is not included in the database at all. Most of the lightly wounded are possibly treated in the field hospitals and these people are not counted as hospitalized, which is what this dataset is about. However, the lightly wounded category represents nearly 50% of the entries in the database.

Then, the article also states that the severity of the injuries is not only often made up on the fly, but is also “encouraged” (or forced?) to be downplayed, possibly due to the monetary compensations paid to the wounded personnel based on the sustained injuries or, rather, severity of those injuries (360K vs 80K, severely vs lightly). At the same time, the authors say that amputations are one of the indicators of the severity of an injury and those who sustained such injuries do not get sent back to the front. Yet, they talk about how sometimes amputations are regarded to as light injuries and sometimes as moderate. To note, of the 166,000 entries in the database, only 3,200 involved amputations (including toes and fingers), which causes a bit of further confusion as to the validity of the dataset. Validity does not necessarily argue against authenticity in this case, by the way.

The next thing to note is how long the wounded personnel stayed in the hospitals.

Radio Liberty calculated the average length of stay in hospital for these three categories of wounded. For the seriously wounded, it is almost 60 days, for patients with moderate injuries – over 37 days, for the slightly wounded – 18.5 days. These figures do not include the time that the wounded spend in field hospitals and other places of initial evacuation, as well as the time spent on further rehabilitation, for example, in sanatoriums of the Russian military department.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
2 of 2:

These average durations of hospitalization cast further doubt on the assignment of the severity of the injuries. Quick search on the net provided me with the following:

IMG_8965.jpeg

In very simple and rough terms, category A is minor and moderate injuries; B and C are severe, non- and life-threatening with survival probable; D and E are critical, survival uncertain (E); F is more than 1 severe injury (combinations of multiple injuries with severities from E, D, and C). The only survivor in the last category, G, was transferred to another hospital after the 3-day stay, so the fate unknown: these are not expected to survive (visually upon recovery), as clearly visible. Classified otherwise, in more common terms:

IMG_8966.jpeg

To me it seems clear that this dataset does not contain any light injuries and represents mostly, what one would call, moderately and severely wounded personnel. They also probably calculated the means and not the medians, which likely to be lower for the durations of stay. It is hard to tell anything, really, without seeing the data itself. But overall, I believe what I said above is likely true, which may explain the fact that some amputations (like a finger, for instance) would be classified as light and others (like a leg, perhaps) would be moderate, while both being severe injuries. Those “seasonal” non-war related hospitalizations likely do not have any designation as far as severity is concerned, and which is why it may have been left blank in some cases. Here is what the article states about it:

The database allows one to estimate the approximate ratio of injuries of varying severity, although not every wounded person has a mark about it (and in many cases, other data, such as the number of the military unit or the type of disease, was mistakenly entered into this column in hospitals or in the Main Military Medical Directorate).

So the “mistakenly entered” could very be well be intentional and systematic. This is all just a mental exercise and pure guessing, of course. But things clearly do not make much sense as they are presented in the article. So in a way, from what is presented, it can actually be argued that quite a bit of evacuation is taking place?

According to the article, there are 2,250 severely wounded soldiers in the database, 58,632 with moderate wounds, and 80,269 with light injuries. Out of the total of 166,000 entries. That adds up to just over 141,000. Is it reasonable to conclude that the remaining 25,000 did not have an assignment the severity of wounds/condition? Why? It is about 15% of the total number of entries in the database. Only just over 200 not surviving, as per the srticle, adds to the confusion. This is nonsense, of course.

Anyway, I would not put much weight to the analysis presented in the article and even less to the Tweeter post cited by Big Z. For example, from the post:

1.62% seriously injured 42.29% moderately injured 56.09% slightly injured or ill The main conclusion? The Russian army does not bother to evacuate the seriously wounded, letting them die in the field without significant treatment. In any case, seriously wounded people are not expected to return to combat, so it is not worth evacuating them. For comparison, the IDF's wounded in the maneuver in the Gaza Strip, 50.41% of those injured were lightly injured, 30.34% were moderately injured, and 19.36% were seriously injured.

Is it the main conclusion though? Certainly not. I mean it could be if one simply looked at the numbers, disregarding other facts, both presented in the article and basic critical thinking, for that matter. Then compare the numbers to the Israeli “maneuver in the Gaza Strip” and viola - as they type nowadays - RusSiA dOeS nOt EvacUaTe tHe WounDeD. I will add some actual numbers as of March 17 to the authors post, as he only mentioned percentages:

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So in the 14-15 months of “maneuver”, Israel sustained some days/weeks (pick your poison, it is irrelevant in this discussion) worth of casualties in Ukraine. He, of course also completely disregarded the environment and the nature of the warfare, the fact that Israel uses helicopters to evacuate the wounded when deemed necessary, etc. Comparing apples to pineapples on the basis that there is “apples” in both.

Anyway… to end this post, is there an issue of evacuation? Effing right there is! Is it a Russian problem? Most certainly not, it is this war’s issue. Moving wounded bodies, and severely wounded in particular, is not the same as throwing bags filled with dirt from one place to another. It requires time, effort, and expertise. Otherwise there is no point as they will all die anyway, be it during the recovery, transfer, in the field hospital, etc. In the environment where the enemy waits for the evacuation team to arrive and then strikes them too, double and triple taps, in order to inflict as much damage as possible, including killing the qualified/trained medical personnel, or just fellow soldiers coming for help (the article actually talks about it: Ukrainians hunting the evacuation teams; surely Russians do the same). An example from today:

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There are plenty of videos (and, ironically, I hardly watch any) that show evacuation attempts, where vehicles drives over the wounded while trying to flee from an incoming drone, troops simply dropping the body (live body) and continuing walking for no apparent reason other than they have had enough (?), Russians (maybe Ukrainians too?) driving in on a quad with a trailer, performing basic stabilization and evacuating the severely wounded, all under artillery and drone fire. And so on. Comparing this to what Israel is doing in Gaza is idiotic, to say the least.

The most interesting things I found for myself in the article is a) the age distribution over time chart:



And b) the average age of the wounded Russians being 35 in January 2024, while the average age of the Ukrainian troops was 43 at the time. Would be interesting to see a similar chart for the Ukrainian forces.

P. S. Part 2 of 2 got messed up in the process and wasn’t saved, apparently, so this is a quick “rewrite” of what was meant to be (which was quite a bit more and was trimmed to fit the character limit). Oh well…
 
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