The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
A Norwegian defence analyst believes that if Europe and US keeps supporting Ukraine during 2025 Russia will lose. Russian Navy and Air Force largely neutralized (after long range strikes were allowed Russia had to allocate aicraft more than 300km from the front and the use of guided glide bombs have declined by up to 75% in some areas). 54% of Russian losses came during 2024, and the trend seems to continue in 2025. Ukraine is surging production of FPV drones and can now manufacture up to 4 million per year. In addition they aim to produce 30,000 long-range drones and 3,000 cruise missiles and missile drones in 2025.

However Russia may still win if it manages to convince Europe and the US to stop supporting Ukraine. That is the main threat of Ukraine right now.

I am confident Russia will lose this year. Here’s why - Euromaidan Press
 

rsemmes

Member
A Norwegian defence analyst believes that if Europe and US keeps supporting Ukraine during 2025 Russia will lose. Russian Navy and Air Force largely neutralized (after long range strikes were allowed Russia had to allocate aicraft more than 300km from the front and the use of guided glide bombs have declined by up to 75% in some areas). 54% of Russian losses came during 2024, and the trend seems to continue in 2025. Ukraine is surging production of FPV drones and can now manufacture up to 4 million per year. In addition they aim to produce 30,000 long-range drones and 3,000 cruise missiles and missile drones in 2025.
However Russia may still win if it manages to convince Europe and the US to stop supporting Ukraine. That is the main threat of Ukraine right now.
I am confident Russia will lose this year. Here’s why - Euromaidan Press
Every Russian aircraft is 300km away from the front line? They cannot refuel in air? If it has decline in some areas, has it augmented in some other areas? The only reason for that decline is that all Russian aircraft are farther away? From what distance can a Russian vessel launch a missile? What % of casualties suffered Ukraine in 2024? How many drones will make Russia in 2025? How many long-range drones and missiles?
A British general mentioned that Ukraine could lose the war in 2024, it hasn't. Looking at the same data, different analysts can predict different results.
Ukraine is not putting boots in the field, but it is asking for NATO boots; not a total war for Ukraine yet.


"Without more troops Ukraine has lost the war. Worthless tanks, F-16 or local damage by missiles without thousands of soldiers. The Ukrainian Army is only capable (by desertions and demoralization) of limited attacks that will be eliminated by the Russian response".

Sin más soldados, sin muchos más soldados, Ucrania tiene perdida la guerra. De nada sirven los misiles de largo alcance occidentales, que apenas causan daños localizados en Rusia, o los carros de combate o los aviones F-16. Sin el correspondiente despliegue terrestre de miles de soldados, es imposible consolidar ningún avance ni aún menos detener los continuos asaltos de las fuerzas rusas.
Mermado por las deserciones, el cansancio y la desmoralización creciente, el ejército ucraniano solo puede defenderse, bombardeos limitados o protagonizar ofensivas puntuales que son fagocitadas inmediatamente por las respuestas rusas. Acaba de suceder con la última incursión ucraniana en Kursk, la región rusa invadida por el sur en agosto por miles de soldados ucranianos, que intentaron consolidar una cabeza de puente hacia el corazón de Rusia.

It also mentions growing lack of support (from 90% to 52%) and distrust (from 7% to 39%) in Zelensky. I am sure you can find different figures in different newspapers.

I think that the main threat is lack of troops... and facing "des gros bataillons".
 

Fredled

Active Member
There has been less glide bomb attacks since the day Ukrainians were allowed to strike "deep inside" Russia with western missiles, al thought there could multiple factors. How much "less" is unknown but interviewed soldiers on the front line noticed a difference, It didn't stop the Russians from advancing, but Ukrainians certainly suffered much less losses.
 

rsemmes

Member
There has been less glide bomb attacks since the day Ukrainians were allowed to strike "deep inside" Russia with western missiles, al thought there could multiple factors. How much "less" is unknown but interviewed soldiers on the front line noticed a difference, It didn't stop the Russians from advancing, but Ukrainians certainly suffered much less losses.
Yes, and it has been discussed already. Maybe just a bit to quick the conclusion: ATCAM> 300km> less glide-bombs.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Kursk area.

Russian forces now contest Kositsa village, north of Sudzha. Russkoe Porechnoe is fully in Russian hands. From the west, Russian forces have taken Aleksandriya, Leonidovo, and approached Viktorovka. From the eastern side Russian forces have entered Mahnovka, but the village remains contested despite reports to the contrary.


Ukraine launched an attack towards the village of Berdino using what appear to be two mech companies, one riding Strykers, the other mainly armored cars. Reportedly there were actually two attempts, one on the first day and the other on the second. From the Russian side Akhmat fighters and the 30th Motor-Rifles Rgt Storm detachment were defending and doing drone strikes. After taking out most of the vehicles , and forces the rest back, Russian assault teams cleared the village, killing some Ukrainian forces and taking others prisoner. Strikes during the attack we can see include 2 Strykers, 1 mine clearing vehicle (IMR?), 1 MBT type unclear, 1 BTR-4, 1 unknown vehicle blown completely to pieces (allegedly an MBT), 1 T-64BV, 1 APC (Stryker?), 1 knockedout vehicle type unclear, 1 IFV (Bradley?). Russian sources claim 15 Ukrainian vehicles taken out.


Ka-52M missile strike on a Ukrainian vehicle, the vehicle explodes spectacularly, might be one getting blown apart in the video link above.


A Russian National Guard technical team with a machiengun and AGS-17 in a pickup truck, providing fire support. Note the AGS-17 is being used for indirect fire, and even has a table for fires taped to the receiver. The machiengun has an optic, and a suppressor on it.


The aftermath of Ukraine's failed attack towards Berdin. We have a destroyed T-72B3, a M577, at least a couple of Gyurza armored cars, and 3 Strykers.


A damaged Stryker returning after fighting at Berdin.


Ukrainian POWs taken allegedly near Berdin.


Russian soldiers walk past a burned out Ukrainian armored car. Based on the terrain it doesn't look like one of the ones above and it's clained a Titan-DS.


Allegedly a CR-2 hit in Kursk region, some sources tie this to the Berdin fighting.


Russian double-tap of a CV90 by wire-guided drones, Kursk area.


Russian strike on a Ukrainian infantry team, in Kursk region.


A Russian drone attempts to get a Bradley with a drone-dropped munition near Pogrebki. It's interesting that heavy fighting continues in that area despite the clear threat of encirclement by Russian forces pushing on Malaya Loknya.


Russian Lancet strike on a Humvee, Kursk area. The outcome is unclear due to poor video quality.


Two Ukrainian tanks getting hit, Kursk region.


Allegedly Ukraine hit one of their own tanks in Kursk region, an M1 Abrams. It's unclear if this is in error or if they were taking out a disabled vehicle to prevent capture.


Russian drone strike hits a T-64 near Mahnovka, a crew member bails, on fire.


Two Ukrainian T-64BVs and one Leo-2A6 getting hit by wire-guided drones, Kursk region.


A knocked out Ukrainian M113 getting finished off, Kursk region.


Russian wire-guided drone strikes on a Bradley, T-64BV mod '17, and a truck-mounted howitzer, type unknown.


Russian drone strikes on a Ukrainian Bogdana howitzer. Reportedly this was done by Russia's 177th Marines, the Caspian unit.


A strike on a Ukrainian 2S1 using what appears to be a DPRK missile system, near Malaya Loknya.


A series of Russian strikes on Ukrainian infantry near Pogrebki. We have a rare BTR-3 sighting, getting hit.


Russian FPV drone strike on a mystery vehicle. Russian sources claim it's a western radar provided to Ukraine and hit in the Sumy region area. Other Russian sources claim it's a DPRK SAM being seen by a Russian drone. Ukrainian sources claim it's a DPRK Tor clone on a truck chassis hit in Kursk region, as friendly fire. Of course there are two other possibilities. One is that no strike ever happened. The video that shows the strike is so grainy you can't really tell what they hit. And the one where you can clearly see the vehicle is a still. The other possibility is that it's actually a Ukrainian drone doing the strike and the internet has misinterpreted. It would in principle make sense for DPRK forces to bring their own SHORAD.


Russian CASEVAC using a Desertcross buggy, Kursk region.


A knocked out Ukrainian T-64BV near Russkoe Porechnoe getting finished off.


Knocked out and abandoned VAB in Kursk region, context unclear.


Russian airstrikes hitting Sudzha.


Russian strike on Linovo, Sumy region.


Russian Iskander strike near Yunakovka.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Ukraine has taken two allegedly DPRK POWs.


Russian soldiers with another captured M113 and hauling away an M577, Kursk region.


A captured M577 with US Army markings still on it from the 2nd btln 69th Rgt.


Russian soldier poses with allegedly a captured Ukrainian T-72AV.


Ukrainian Bergenpanzer 2 in Kursk region.


Russian 2S43 Mal'va in Kursk region. This one is using what looks like a Msta howitzer, so it's the original Mal'va, not the new Giatsint variant we saw and whose official index we still don't know.


Kupyansk.

Russia is expanding their area of control on the right side of the Oskol. All efforts to advance on the left shore towards Kupyansk have stopped for some time now. Inside Dvurechnoe, Russia now controls additional area, including across the smaller Nizhnee Dvurechnoe river which flows into the Oskol through this village. There are also reports of Russia troops taking Kalinovo south of there. Russian forces have taken another forest area south of the landing, and entered the water treatment plant south of it, north-west of Kalinovo. Note Suriyakmaps hasn't updated in over 24 hours so we don't have his confirmation on the Kalinovo area. Note Kalinovo used to be a village, but it's not clear there's anything left there.


Russian drones clearing Ukrainian mines in Petropavlovka, east of Kupyansk.


Russian strike on the crossing near Kupyansk-Uzlovoy.


Russian artillery ops in the Kupyansk area. We have a Grad, a TOS-1 (A?), and howitzers.


Oskol front.

Near the Peschanoe salient Ukrainian forces have recaptured a tree line on the northern side of it. Meanwhie Russian forces are advancing westward towards the river, south of the salient. South-east of the salient Russian forces have entered Nadiya.


Russian forces have hopped across the Zherebets and captured the village of Ivanovka. They've also expanded westward and all around the village from the foothold approaching Kolodezi. They've also expanded the area of control west of Makeevka, across the Zherebets. Inside Terny Russian forces continue to advance southward.


Russian strike on a Ukrainian T-72 in Terny. Note this is a wire-guided drone.


Russian UAV ops on the southern side of the Oskol front.


Russian assault elements doing training in the near rear of the Oskol front, Liman axis.


Seversk salient.

Russian forces have inched forward in the hills south of Verkhnekamenskoe. Russian forces also took the hills around Vyemka and Ivano-Darievka, but withdrew from the village of Vyemka itself.


Russian Grad on an MT-LBu chassis being targeted by a Ukrainian drone, Seversk salient area.


Chasov Yar.

Russian forces have entered Orekhovo-Vasilevka north-east of Chasov Yar. South of Chasov Yar a counter-attack pushed Russian forces back, but then they recaptured a refuse mound of the mining complex there. Inside Chasov Yar Russian forces are attempting to envelop the factory complex from two sides.


Russian Molniya drone carrying a TM-62 mine as a payload hits a building in Chasov Yar.


Russian artillery disables an M113 and a drone finished it off, near Chasov Yar.


Ukrainian Su-25 throws a Hammer bomb at Russian forces. This is over Konstantinovka so presumably the strikes are towards Russian forces in or around Chasov Yar.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Toretsk.

Russian forces have taken the refuse mound in the north, next to the school. There is one more refuse mound directly north of this, but it's the end of the town in this direction. West of Toretsk Russian forces have expanded the area of control and entered Novospasskoe. They've also taken some fields west of Leonidovka. I don't know where exactly the municipal boundries of Toretsk lie, but there are still a few clusters of buildings on the north and western side that don't appear to have been taken.


Russian drone take out knocked out a Bradley and an M113 near Toretsk.


Ukraine hit Gorlovka with cluster munitions and hit a car with a drone. Note given the frequent use of civilian cars for military purposes, this doesn't tell us much. But pushing the front back from Gorlovka is definitely a major goal.


Pokrovsk area.

Russian forces are now one tree-line from the western road out of Pokrovsk, and have taken the refuse mound south of Kotlin. It's fall is probably necessary to push across the road and into Kotlin and eventually Udachnoe. Solenoe and Novovasilievka are fully under Russian control, Peschanoe is mostly so. Peschanoe is a de-facto suburb of Pokrovsk, it turns into Zverovoe, Leontovichi, and then into Pokrovsk proper. Russian forces are contesting Zelenoe, and Yasenovoe. Russian forces also continue to advance in the fields and villages north-west of Kurakhovo, south of Pokrovsk. Petropavlovka, Slavyanka have falle, Yasenovoe is probably next. East of Pokrovsk Russian forces have taken a number of fields north-west and north-east of Vozdvizhenka, and have tried to take but failed to secure the highway intersection north of there. Note whether Russia has secured the cross-roads or not (and right now it seems not), that road isn't really viable as a supply route with Russian forces so close.


Russian flag raising in Shevchenko, the one near Pokrovsk. The village has been in Russian hands for some days, this is more an indication that Russian forces have repelled counterattacks and have pushed a little ways beyond it.


There are reports of an unsuccessful Ukrainian counter-attack towards Vozdvizhenka, with 4 tanks and 4 pickups.


A series of Russian drone strikes near Pokrovsk on disabled Ukrainian troop transports, a moving Kozak armored car, and an MBT.


Russian wire-guided drones wander the streets of Pokrovsk taking out Ukrainian pickup trucks, their EW notwithstanding.


Leo-2A4 covered in K1 tiles got stuck near Pokrovsk and was taken out by Russian drones.


Allegedly a Russian strike on a Ukrainian MT-LB near Pokrovsk.


Russian Msta-B and Grad-1 operations on the Pokrovsk axis. Note the shiny new Krasnopol'-M shells in their plastic boxes. The Grad has drone cages over the missile racks, and armored panels over the cabin.


Russian T-80BVM with a robust drone cage near Pokrovsk.


More Ukrainian dragon's teeth arrive in Mirnograd.


Kurakhovo area.

Kurakhovo has definitively falln. Russian forces took Yantarnoe and have approached Andreevka. North-west of Kurakhovo Russian forces have taken Shevchenko and are approaching Andreevka. There's a large Ukrainian strong-point just east of Andreevka, whose current fate is unclear. Russia will have to take it to advance. South-west of Kurakhovo Russian forces have taken another tree line approaching Razliv and south of Kurakhovo Russian forces continue to gain ground in the fields.


An interesting video of a Russian assault on a Ukrainian strong point. They're riding I think either a BMP-3 or BMD-4 (forward turret with an automatic weapon). They use a UGV with what looks like a mine to blow up a dugout, and are operating with UAVs coordinating their movements.


Russian strike on allegedly a Ukrainian 105mm howitzer near Ulakli. I can't really make out what they hit, but it looks like something.


Ukrainian T-72 getting hit near Sukhie Yaly, note the village is now fully in Russian hands.


Ukrainian tank getting hit near Kurakhovo.


Russia strikes Ukrainian bridges near Konstantinopol'. The two-pronged offensive here continues. Russian forces advance on the flanks north and south, creating a Ukrainian salient and then hammer the salient.


3 knocked out Kirpis and a burned out VAB at the entrance to Kurakhovo. It's likely there was a similar "road of death" to Kurakhovo as there was to other locations where Russia pressurred the flanks.


Ukrainian POWs captured in Kurakhovo. Note given how difficult getting in and out of the town was towards the end, this is actually a fairly small number.


Some footage of Ukrainian trenches near Kurakhovo taken by Russian forces. Note how thoroughly constructed they were.


Civilians inside Kurakhovo happy to see Russian forces.


Some aerial footage of Kurakhovo. While we have battle damage, the town isn't destroyed.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Velikaya Novoselka.

The main village still holds but Russian forces have a tight grip on the main roads in and out, and have taken Neskuchnoe. West of the village Russian forces have one hold on the road but have approached it on a fairly wide front. A counter-attack to clear that road would require pushing Russian forces back along a fairly wide area.


Allegedly Ukrainian infantry moving around in the Velikaya Novoselka area on foot getting hit. We saw attempts to exit similar positions on foot in other situations.


Zaporozhye.

Russian forces inched forward in the village of Belogor'ye, north of the former Rabotino salient.


Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian BMP-1 near Novoandreevka. The vehicle isn't moving, and burns afterwards.


A Ukrainina Baba Yaga drone attempts to hit a Russian Tor-M2, but the vehicle quickly maneuvers away. Note it doesn't shoot it down, raising some questions.


Ukraine's 3rd National Guard bde with a DITA howitzer in the Zaporozhye area.


Dnepr front.

Russian LMUR strike on the Antonov bridge. It's unclear what this is intended to achieve as the missile is too light to damage the bridge.


Ukraine fired on the clinic in Aleshki, in Russian-occupied Kherson region. Note prior to this the doctor there had been the target of assassination attempts.


Russian Buk-M2 on the Dnepr front.


Strikes.

Russian strikes landing in Kramatorsk. Targets allegedly include a furniture store.


Russian strikes in Kiev hit the National Bank and a tram depo. The latter may be converted to do military work, but the former seems like a symbolic strike. It does appear that some of the damage to the city was caused by SAMs falling.


We have a Russian strike in Chernigov allegedly using hypersonic missiles. Targets are unclear.


And we have reports from Russian sources that they tested a Kinzhal missile from an Su-34 carrier, unclear if related to the incident above.


Russian allegedly Kh-35 strike hit a Ukrainian P-18ML radar, Kharkov region.


Russian strike on either a Ukrainian S-300 position or decoy, near Pavlograd.


Russia hit the Motor Sich plant in Zaporozhye. Sources seem to disagree about whether they hit the office building or production area, possibly both. These appear to be UMPK gliding bomb strikes, not missiles or UAVs.


Ukrainian air defenses firing over Zaporozhye.


Russian strike against Chernomorsk, Odessa region. Target unclear.


Russian Molniya drone, 35kms behind the lines, over Kharkov.


A Ukrainian drone intercepts a Russian Gerber decoy drone. This is much cheaper then using an actual SAM.


Ukraine hit a school and a cultural institution in Bryansk region allegedly with HIMARS. This is in the village of Novie Yurkovichi.


Ukraine hit a shopping center in Donetsk with HIMARS missiles. Note with the movement of the front striking Donetsk with regular artillery isn't really possible anymore. It can be done with longer range MLRS, and rocket-assisted artillery projectiles.


A Ukrainian UAV hit a residential building in Tamvo region, town of Kotovsk. 11 wounded civilians are reported.


A Ukrainian UAV hit a residential building in Voronezh. 5 UAVs are claimed shot down.


Ukraine hit the Engel's fuel storage facility in Saratov region. Note unlike many of the previous fuel bases, this one is specifically related to the local airbase. The fire burned for over a day.


Russian air defenses firing over Taganrog.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Other interesting bits.

A rare case of a Ukrainian Bradley firing a TOW missile into a building, unclear if that was the intended target. Often Bradleys don't carry their TOWs because they can be detonated by a drone strike.


A look at a Russian biker platoon that does front line logistics and CASEVAC using buggies and motor-bikes. This is the 5th Guards Motor-Rifles.


M1989 Koksan howitzers appear to have reached the front line. Unclear if operated by Russian or DPRK forces.


A Russian drone with a drone cage. The spiral continues to unwind.


A look at Russia's Molniya-2 loitering munition. Overshadowed by the Lancet family, the Molniya is a war-time design. It's first version was made out of scraps and junk, but on a consistent design plan and worked fairly well. This version is cleaner looking. Note the Molniya 2 can carry an entire TM-62 anti-tank mine as a payload. Yes the video from the strike is the same strike in Chasov Yar as above, but I wanted to include it here for illustration.


Russia started equipping Vandal drones with thermals.


A Russian BTR-80 turned into an assault-shed, with smoke launchers added to the exterior of the new shell.


Interesting Russian analysis of the use of anti-drone cages. Apparently they don't really help on unarmored vehicles, and instead can even contribute to the shrapnel. As a result Russian forces are switching to stripping down jeeps and trucks for front line use for ease of disembarkation in case of UAV threat.


An example of Russian forces stripping down and converting vehicles for front line use. I think they're also armoring the engine compartments.


Sometimes footage only emerges long after fighting ended. Here we have a knocked and abandoned H-APC converted from a T-62, Russian, near Mar'inka.


An interesting Russian BTR-80 with a 32G01 RCWS in place of the normal turret.


Russian Northern Fleet Marines training with boats. Presumably for operations on the Dnepr. If nothing has changed, this is the 61st Rgt/Bde (not sure what their current status is).


Ukraine's 54th Mech Bde shows off a captured T-90S.


Ukrainian forces with an improvised MLRS using Grad tubes on a GAZ-66 chassis. I think this was earlier misidentified as the Grad-V.


Ukrainian forces with a Linza MRAP. Originalle a MEDEVAC, Ukrainian forces have converted it into a command post vehicle. Reportedly this is Ukraine's 117th Bde.


Ukraine's 4th National guard Bde 2S1 with Pakistani shells in the combat load.


Reportedly Ukranie's 150th Mech Bde has been converted into the 40th Coastal Defense Bde and is now part of the Ukrainian Marine Corps. It got YPR-765s with new RCWS on them though no word on quantity.


A Ukrainian "Loaf" van with a drone cage.


A look at new Ukrainian wire-guided drones.


Ukrainian forces from the 16th Arty Bde with a Zuzana-2 howitzer.


Ukrainian MIM-23 Hawk SAM decoys.


Ukrainian forces with a Riverine Assault Boat.


Ex-Macedonian Mi-24 and ex-Croatian Mi-8 in Ukrainian hands.


Ukrainian forces with a Scorpion light tank re-armed with a KPVT machinegun. It also has what look like EW antennas on it.


Reportedly Ukraine will get their first RCH-155 next week but likely only formal transfer of ownership to train on, not actually sent to Ukraine. Ukraine is also supposed to receive (or just has received?) their first Lynx IFV likely under similar circumstances.


Ukrainian soldiers training on Leo-1s in Germany.


Ukrainian sources suggest that the F-16s they received can't compete with Russian combat jets due to their older radar, and are wishing they had gotten a more modern F-16 variant. This I think answers the question, the F-16s Ukraine so far got haven't been upgraded with new radars.


Ukrainian forces posing with a V-BAT UAV.


Ukraine has reportedly arrested a company commander from the infamous 155th Bde for encouraging his soldiers to desert. It's unclear if there's any truth here or just scapegoating, as the entire situation has become scandalous.


Russia is cancelling enlistment bonuses for prisoners who choose enlistment in the war to get their sentence commuted.


An interesting look at the range of various systems and what this means for striking Donetsk area. Donetsk is the largest city Russia has taken in Ukraine and it is mostly intact. Pushing the front line away from it is key to making the city economically viable.


According to Fighterbomber there has been a recent reduction in strikes and it's due to weather. He actualls calls out that the decrease isn't that significant but also that some Russian commanders use weather windows to drop buckets of extra bombs to make up for the gaps, with poor effectiveness. This might be why Ukrainian soldiers see less effect from them. This also allows those commanders to report upward about munition expenditure and targets hit.

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
This is one possibility but I'm not so sure. NATO's defense spending has increased, but without the US they will have problems. Many NATO armies readiness rates remain poor, and there has been a substantial depletion of arsenals to give to Ukraine in many areas.
I am fairly certain I mentioned here before, and this is the reason Zelensky is asking either for NATO membership or guarantees from the United States, but NATO without the United States is not nearly as serious of an Alliance. The same reason the Balts want presence of the American troops on their soil (just like anyone else paranoid/serious about their security) and not just the membership. And the higher the tensions, the more troops they want present (in spite of the fact that a couple of thousand additional personnel doesn’t change the board in any meaningful way). Like Kofman said in the podcast I cited a couple of/few days ago, European forces are more of a sidekick to the United States’ and are built to operate along side the American forces, not independently. Especially against something like Russia. There is no guarantee like US troops on the ground. Everybody knows it and why this is the case.

At the same time, everyone also knows that this point is probably moot because nuclear weapons will be used right after making sure that everyone understands the nuclear weapons will be used if the shit hits the fan (there is also a good chance that the latter will not happen before the former and everyone understands that too). My bigger concern is that this scenario of a much more capable Russia is going to be exactly the case after this conflict is “over”. They will rearm (and they will, without a doubt), it will probably take long years, but they will rearm with the lessons learned, and so on. Which is why this whole thing was completely contradictory to the idea of contributing “to security in the Euro-Atlantic area” in the first place; and the “security in the Euro -Atlantic area” has been deteriorating since 2008 (before that, really). We all here lived to winess it and are observing it today. But this has been discussed more than once previously.

Russia doesn’t take Europe seriously (relatively speaking); their main concern is the USA and Europe is seen as more of a pawn that is “tradable”. If anyone read what I posted in the other thread about the Russian nuclear doctrine, even the nuttiest of the Russian hawks don’t talk about the nuclear exchange with the United States or striking the American soil: they all start with Europe, then, maybe, moving on to the American assets elsewhere in the world, but not the North America itself. This is revealing. In fact, they think that they can work with most European nations, with few exceptions, if the “American influence” is removed (in real terms reduced) from the equation. The most notable exception is, of course, the UK, the “Anglo-Saxons”. And they are not wrong in their calculations either, in my opinion, as they have enough leverage over Europe, starting with cheap energy; not only cheap, but also reliable, which it has been for decades until it is no more, at least for now.

Anyway, this is beyond the scope of this thread, but in short, Russia doesn’t see Europe as an actual threat that they cannot deal with, but the United States they surely do, and there is no other in the vicinity of the magnitude.

I think those numbers are pure fantasy. Ukrainian Mediazona provides a very different set of numbers. Ukraine's MoD are liars, like their Russian counter-parts, and I don't know of anyone else significant making claims this extreme.
Reportedly, this is how the Ukrainian General Staff counts the losses:
- first, everyone counts, regardless of the extent of the wound or even perceived wound (touched an arm or hit the helmet, for instance);
- all units report this way and all units report regardless of the other units in the area - that is, if several different units fight in the same area and observe the same thing, they file individual reports that are counted as such, the fact that they all observed the same thing and the same people notwithstanding;
- this is, allegedly, true for personnel and equipment;
- for equipment, as an example, if two drone operators hit the same tank, it is counted as two separate events; if the tank rides away, quickly repaired (or not) and comes back to the battlefield hours or days later and is hit again, it is counted as another piece of equipment and if hit by two or more drone operators again…;
- as a result, we have over 800,000 killed and wounded Russian troops and over 50,000 destroyed Russian tanks, AVFs, and artillery units, among other things that make no sense.

I would have to dig out that report, but if they are actually keeping any count at all instead of simply making up numbers as they see fit, that is likely an accurate enough description of the procedure.

I would say Ukraine has been fighting with an extra hand. Ukraine can use Ukrainian weapons in whatever way Ukraine sees fit.

Edit.
Has Russia been hitting (Ukrainian?) satellites providing Ukraine with information? Or any other Ukrainian resource providing intelligence?
I believe we’ve gone a full circle one more time on this subject, haha.


Archival footage of the Russian fortifications in the Kursk Region. Quite a striking difference to what we are used to seeing from Ukrainian efforts in this department. I think I posted something similar a few months ago. Note that they have a command post, sleeping quarters, “washroom”, gym, etc. Filmed by the Ukrainians after capturing the “trench”, which is also an indicator of the importance of quantity and quality of troops who take a temporary house underground.


Incidentally, today, Janovsky posted their methodology for counting the losses in Oryx:


Story of the day time. A Ukrainian soldier who has been fighting in this war from the very beginning, and I mean that literally (referring to the 2022 as the beginning), talks about what he sees with his own eyes in North Korean troops, their discipline, tactics, etc. He also expressed his opinion, saying that the West should be cautious, etc. He is then being laughed (a lot) at by the couch warriors and “pro-Ukrainian” cheerleaders, some actually saying that his post is complete rubbish because they have never observed that on the videos they saw posted online, others saying he is just a “vatnik” posting Russian propaganda, a few citations of Ukrainian propaganda outlets with the same video that doesn’t mean anything, etc. Whether his opinion is valid or not is another question, but what he is witnessing is probably something that people should pay attention to, I would think. His post:


Another post by the guy a couple of hours later:

IMG_8421.jpeg
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
A still cropped up on several Russian channels that showed a UAZ light truck being used in the front line. Many comments suggest it's being used as an improvised assault vehicle with poor results but nobody links to the source. Does anyone know where this still might be from?

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
There has been less glide bomb attacks since the day Ukrainians were allowed to strike "deep inside" Russia with western missiles
This is not true. I would have to look back to cite the sources, but the Russians started moving and did move their aviation beyond the reach of ATACMS either in the summer or early fall. I have a feeling I posted it here previously though. I am also fairly certain I posted the stats indicating their use of glide bombs had increased since and set record use until the significant slowdown a month or so ago. The slowdown somewhat coincided with the turn of the weather and Ukrainians hitting an ammo depot they previously hit a couple of weeks prior. I am fairly certain I talked about it here because I feel like I am repeating myself.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
A Norwegian defence analyst believes that if Europe and US keeps supporting Ukraine during 2025 Russia will lose. Russian Navy and Air Force largely neutralized (after long range strikes were allowed Russia had to allocate aicraft more than 300km from the front and the use of guided glide bombs have declined by up to 75% in some areas). 54% of Russian losses came during 2024, and the trend seems to continue in 2025. Ukraine is surging production of FPV drones and can now manufacture up to 4 million per year. In addition they aim to produce 30,000 long-range drones and 3,000 cruise missiles and missile drones in 2025.

However Russia may still win if it manages to convince Europe and the US to stop supporting Ukraine. That is the main threat of Ukraine right now.

I am confident Russia will lose this year. Here’s why - Euromaidan Press
This isn't a credible assessment. Mediazona, again a Ukrainian source, but that works with real data, not the imaginary reports of Ukraine's MoD, reported a substantial decrease in Russian casualties in the second half of 2024. They tried to explain it away, but the data itself shows a significant decline. And this makes sense with the other observations we have. Russia's pace of advance increased in the same time their casualties decreased. Both of these likely have a common root cause, a decrease in the intensity of Ukrainian resistance. In 2024 it's been admitted that Ukraine isn't recruiting fast enough to replace losses, and at the same time it's pretty clear that Russia is not only recruiting fast enough to replace losses, they've actually increased their forces in Ukraine, again. We have one country whose recruiting efforts involve press gangs roaming the streets and grabbing people, who are frequently beaten, to get them into uniforms, and they still can't get enough manpower to replace losses. We have another country who continues an all-volunteer recruitment effort and has simply had to increase enlistment bonuses. It's very strange to think it's the second country that's going to run out of manpower first.

There has been less glide bomb attacks since the day Ukrainians were allowed to strike "deep inside" Russia with western missiles, al thought there could multiple factors. How much "less" is unknown but interviewed soldiers on the front line noticed a difference, It didn't stop the Russians from advancing, but Ukrainians certainly suffered much less losses.
Do you have anything that links the data to the dates? I'm curious because the explanations I've encountered from an otherwise trustworthy source indicate something else is going on.

Story of the day time. A Ukrainian soldier who has been fighting in this war from the very beginning, and I mean that literally (referring to the 2022 as the beginning), talks about what he sees with his own eyes in North Korean troops, their discipline, tactics, etc. He also expressed his opinion, saying that the West should be cautious, etc. He is then being laughed (a lot) at by the couch warriors and “pro-Ukrainian” cheerleaders, some actually saying that his post is complete rubbish because they have never observed that on the videos they saw posted online, others saying he is just a “vatnik” posting Russian propaganda, a few citations of Ukrainian propaganda outlets with the same video that doesn’t mean anything, etc. Whether his opinion is valid or not is another question, but what he is witnessing is probably something that people should pay attention to, I would think. His post:


Another post by the guy a couple of hours later:

View attachment 52201
In general I wouldn't advise arrogance against any adversary lest you end up looking like the Saudis in Yemen (or Russia during the initial invasion of Ukraine). However I suspect DPRK forces sent to Kursk region aren't representative. They probably sent elite forces, highly trained and motivated. I doubt the entire DPRK military is like this.
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
Other interesting bits.

A rare case of a Ukrainian Bradley firing a TOW missile into a building, unclear if that was the intended target. Often Bradleys don't carry their TOWs because they can be detonated by a drone strike.


A look at a Russian biker platoon that does front line logistics and CASEVAC using buggies and motor-bikes. This is the 5th Guards Motor-Rifles.


M1989 Koksan howitzers appear to have reached the front line. Unclear if operated by Russian or DPRK forces.


A Russian drone with a drone cage. The spiral continues to unwind.


A look at Russia's Molniya-2 loitering munition. Overshadowed by the Lancet family, the Molniya is a war-time design. It's first version was made out of scraps and junk, but on a consistent design plan and worked fairly well. This version is cleaner looking. Note the Molniya 2 can carry an entire TM-62 anti-tank mine as a payload. Yes the video from the strike is the same strike in Chasov Yar as above, but I wanted to include it here for illustration.


Russia started equipping Vandal drones with thermals.


A Russian BTR-80 turned into an assault-shed, with smoke launchers added to the exterior of the new shell.


Interesting Russian analysis of the use of anti-drone cages. Apparently they don't really help on unarmored vehicles, and instead can even contribute to the shrapnel. As a result Russian forces are switching to stripping down jeeps and trucks for front line use for ease of disembarkation in case of UAV threat.


An example of Russian forces stripping down and converting vehicles for front line use. I think they're also armoring the engine compartments.


Sometimes footage only emerges long after fighting ended. Here we have a knocked and abandoned H-APC converted from a T-62, Russian, near Mar'inka.


An interesting Russian BTR-80 with a 32G01 RCWS in place of the normal turret.


Russian Northern Fleet Marines training with boats. Presumably for operations on the Dnepr. If nothing has changed, this is the 61st Rgt/Bde (not sure what their current status is).


Ukraine's 54th Mech Bde shows off a captured T-90S.


Ukrainian forces with an improvised MLRS using Grad tubes on a GAZ-66 chassis. I think this was earlier misidentified as the Grad-V.


Ukrainian forces with a Linza MRAP. Originalle a MEDEVAC, Ukrainian forces have converted it into a command post vehicle. Reportedly this is Ukraine's 117th Bde.


Ukraine's 4th National guard Bde 2S1 with Pakistani shells in the combat load.


Reportedly Ukranie's 150th Mech Bde has been converted into the 40th Coastal Defense Bde and is now part of the Ukrainian Marine Corps. It got YPR-765s with new RCWS on them though no word on quantity.


A Ukrainian "Loaf" van with a drone cage.


A look at new Ukrainian wire-guided drones.


Ukrainian forces from the 16th Arty Bde with a Zuzana-2 howitzer.


Ukrainian MIM-23 Hawk SAM decoys.


Ukrainian forces with a Riverine Assault Boat.


Ex-Macedonian Mi-24 and ex-Croatian Mi-8 in Ukrainian hands.


Ukrainian forces with a Scorpion light tank re-armed with a KPVT machinegun. It also has what look like EW antennas on it.


Reportedly Ukraine will get their first RCH-155 next week but likely only formal transfer of ownership to train on, not actually sent to Ukraine. Ukraine is also supposed to receive (or just has received?) their first Lynx IFV likely under similar circumstances.


Ukrainian soldiers training on Leo-1s in Germany.


Ukrainian sources suggest that the F-16s they received can't compete with Russian combat jets due to their older radar, and are wishing they had gotten a more modern F-16 variant. This I think answers the question, the F-16s Ukraine so far got haven't been upgraded with new radars.


Ukrainian forces posing with a V-BAT UAV.


Ukraine has reportedly arrested a company commander from the infamous 155th Bde for encouraging his soldiers to desert. It's unclear if there's any truth here or just scapegoating, as the entire situation has become scandalous.


Russia is cancelling enlistment bonuses for prisoners who choose enlistment in the war to get their sentence commuted.


An interesting look at the range of various systems and what this means for striking Donetsk area. Donetsk is the largest city Russia has taken in Ukraine and it is mostly intact. Pushing the front line away from it is key to making the city economically viable.


According to Fighterbomber there has been a recent reduction in strikes and it's due to weather. He actualls calls out that the decrease isn't that significant but also that some Russian commanders use weather windows to drop buckets of extra bombs to make up for the gaps, with poor effectiveness. This might be why Ukrainian soldiers see less effect from them. This also allows those commanders to report upward about munition expenditure and targets hit.

Do you ever question why Russian forces have resorted to using golf carts and motorcycles for assaults and logistics? And has the weather been so bad that SU27/34/35s are unable to fly? And F16s can’t compete? Has there been any air to air duels? Surely The Russian Airforce with all their advanced radars and satellite tracking knows where the F16s are. Why don’t they just blow them up?
 

Bob53

Well-Known Member
I am fairly certain I mentioned here before, and this is the reason Zelensky is asking either for NATO membership or guarantees from the United States, but NATO without the United States is not nearly as serious of an Alliance. The same reason the Balts want presence of the American troops on their soil (just like anyone else paranoid/serious about their security) and not just the membership. And the higher the tensions, the more troops they want present (in spite of the fact that a couple of thousand additional personnel doesn’t change the board in any meaningful way). Like Kofman said in the podcast I cited a couple of/few days ago, European forces are more of a sidekick to the United States’ and are built to operate along side the American forces, not independently. Especially against something like Russia. There is no guarantee like US troops on the ground. Everybody knows it and why this is the case.

At the same time, everyone also knows that this point is probably moot because nuclear weapons will be used right after making sure that everyone understands the nuclear weapons will be used if the shit hits the fan (there is also a good chance that the latter will not happen before the former and everyone understands that too). My bigger concern is that this scenario of a much more capable Russia is going to be exactly the case after this conflict is “over”. They will rearm (and they will, without a doubt), it will probably take long years, but they will rearm with the lessons learned, and so on. Which is why this whole thing was completely contradictory to the idea of contributing “to security in the Euro-Atlantic area” in the first place; and the “security in the Euro -Atlantic area” has been deteriorating since 2008 (before that, really). We all here lived to winess it and are observing it today. But this has been discussed more than once previously.

Russia doesn’t take Europe seriously (relatively speaking); their main concern is the USA and Europe is seen as more of a pawn that is “tradable”. If anyone read what I posted in the other thread about the Russian nuclear doctrine, even the nuttiest of the Russian hawks don’t talk about the nuclear exchange with the United States or striking the American soil: they all start with Europe, then, maybe, moving on to the American assets elsewhere in the world, but not the North America itself. This is revealing. In fact, they think that they can work with most European nations, with few exceptions, if the “American influence” is removed (in real terms reduced) from the equation. The most notable exception is, of course, the UK, the “Anglo-Saxons”. And they are not wrong in their calculations either, in my opinion, as they have enough leverage over Europe, starting with cheap energy; not only cheap, but also reliable, which it has been for decades until it is no more, at least for now.

Anyway, this is beyond the scope of this thread, but in short, Russia doesn’t see Europe as an actual threat that they cannot deal with, but the United States they surely do, and there is no other in the vicinity of the magnitude.


Reportedly, this is how the Ukrainian General Staff counts the losses:
- first, everyone counts, regardless of the extent of the wound or even perceived wound (touched an arm or hit the helmet, for instance);
- all units report this way and all units report regardless of the other units in the area - that is, if several different units fight in the same area and observe the same thing, they file individual reports that are counted as such, the fact that they all observed the same thing and the same people notwithstanding;
- this is, allegedly, true for personnel and equipment;
- for equipment, as an example, if two drone operators hit the same tank, it is counted as two separate events; if the tank rides away, quickly repaired (or not) and comes back to the battlefield hours or days later and is hit again, it is counted as another piece of equipment and if hit by two or more drone operators again…;
- as a result, we have over 800,000 killed and wounded Russian troops and over 50,000 destroyed Russian tanks, AVFs, and artillery units, among other things that make no sense.

I would have to dig out that report, but if they are actually keeping any count at all instead of simply making up numbers as they see fit, that is likely an accurate enough description of the procedure.


I believe we’ve gone a full circle one more time on this subject, haha.


Archival footage of the Russian fortifications in the Kursk Region. Quite a striking difference to what we are used to seeing from Ukrainian efforts in this department. I think I posted something similar a few months ago. Note that they have a command post, sleeping quarters, “washroom”, gym, etc. Filmed by the Ukrainians after capturing the “trench”, which is also an indicator of the importance of quantity and quality of troops who take a temporary house underground.


Incidentally, today, Janovsky posted their methodology for counting the losses in Oryx:


Story of the day time. A Ukrainian soldier who has been fighting in this war from the very beginning, and I mean that literally (referring to the 2022 as the beginning), talks about what he sees with his own eyes in North Korean troops, their discipline, tactics, etc. He also expressed his opinion, saying that the West should be cautious, etc. He is then being laughed (a lot) at by the couch warriors and “pro-Ukrainian” cheerleaders, some actually saying that his post is complete rubbish because they have never observed that on the videos they saw posted online, others saying he is just a “vatnik” posting Russian propaganda, a few citations of Ukrainian propaganda outlets with the same video that doesn’t mean anything, etc. Whether his opinion is valid or not is another question, but what he is witnessing is probably something that people should pay attention to, I would think. His post:


Another post by the guy a couple of hours later:

View attachment 52201
Not so sure about your thesis here. A 3 day special operation is coming up for its 3rd year Against cobbled together Ukraine army with a lot of antiquated equipment. It’s doesn’t matter if it’s 800k killed and wounded. Whatever the number is it’s a lot. Enough to affect the Russian economy for many years. Otherwise Russia would not need to get help for North Korean troops and have to do drafts for the military as they have done. The Navy anywhere near Ukraine has been sunk. Russia has all these TU22, 160, 95 and SU34 … three thousand tanks at the start of the war but still unable to roll over tiny Ukraine. still unable to stop Ukraine hitting fuel and air bases hundreds of Kms from the front lines.

I think Russia Is lucky it never entered a war with the USA because Nuclear would be the only option for them.

A still cropped up on several Russian channels that showed a UAZ light truck being used in the front line. Many comments suggest it's being used as an improvised assault vehicle with poor results but nobody links to the source. Does anyone know where this still might be from?

Does anyone wonder why they are using truck as an assault vehicle?

This isn't a credible assessment. Mediazona, again a Ukrainian source, but that works with real data, not the imaginary reports of Ukraine's MoD, reported a substantial decrease in Russian casualties in the second half of 2024. They tried to explain it away, but the data itself shows a significant decline. And this makes sense with the other observations we have. Russia's pace of advance increased in the same time their casualties decreased. Both of these likely have a common root cause, a decrease in the intensity of Ukrainian resistance. In 2024 it's been admitted that Ukraine isn't recruiting fast enough to replace losses, and at the same time it's pretty clear that Russia is not only recruiting fast enough to replace losses, they've actually increased their forces in Ukraine, again. We have one country whose recruiting efforts involve press gangs roaming the streets and grabbing people, who are frequently beaten, to get them into uniforms, and they still can't get enough manpower to replace losses. We have another country who continues an all-volunteer recruitment effort and has simply had to increase enlistment bonuses. It's very strange to think it's the second country that's going to run out of manpower first.



Do you have anything that links the data to the dates? I'm curious because the explanations I've encountered from an otherwise trustworthy source indicate something else is going on.



In general I wouldn't advise arrogance against any adversary lest you end up looking like the Saudis in Yemen (or Russia during the initial invasion of Ukraine). However I suspect DPRK forces sent to Kursk region aren't representative. They probably sent elite forces, highly trained and motivated. I doubt the entire DPRK military is like this.
It’s quite clear that Russian with a Population 4 x of Ukraine has a manpower advantage. with a NKs in Kursk it does appear they have sent special forces and some of their better units but at this stage they are restricted top operating on Russian soil. If they operate on Ukrainian soil it would open the door to other countries assisting Ukraine with troops On the ground.
 
Last edited by a moderator:

Bob53

Well-Known Member
An article on some of the North Korean equipment and units in Kursk region. Discuss the loss of a NK SAM ( states it was friendly fire but what are sources) and some of the artillery they are using.

 

Aerojoe

Member
Question, a few months back there was mention that Australia would provide its old M1 Abrams to Ukraine. Is there any indication of a timeline for this to occur?
 

rsemmes

Member
It’s quite clear that Russian with a Population 4 x of Ukraine has a manpower advantage. with a NKs in Kursk it does appear they have sent special forces and some of their better units but at this stage they are restricted top operating on Russian soil. If they operate on Ukrainian soil it would open the door to other countries assisting Ukraine with troops On the ground.
Do you know of any country eager to put boots on the ground? Who is stopping that country?

The "using a truck as an assault vehicle" (if), do you mean front line improvisations? Like coop cages?
I wouldn't call Ukraine "tiny". Would you call Afghanistan "tiny"? I think to recall US having a tiny row with China; I think we are all lucky. Yes, in a couple of weeks Abrams would be in Moscow, that easy (it happened before).
Just out of curiosity, how long do you think US needs to get all the logistics to advance with one division from Warsaw to Moscow?

Imagination is rowing away from the actual war in Ukraine, and the lack of Ukrainian troops.
 

T.C.P

Well-Known Member
Do you ever question why Russian forces have resorted to using golf carts and motorcycles for assaults and logistics? And has the weather been so bad that SU27/34/35s are unable to fly? And F16s can’t compete? Has there been any air to air duels? Surely The Russian Airforce with all their advanced radars and satellite tracking knows where the F16s are. Why don’t they just blow them up?
The F-16s not being able to compete was not a Russian declaration. It was from an excerpt from an official of the Ukranian airforce. Regarding weather conditions, I think its more of the fact, that it causes poorer ISR from drones than the jets being able to fly. The Ukr front is huge, no point blindly tossing bombs.

As for golf carts and motorcycles and even more hilarious electric sccoties, its more an indication of the current level of small drone war fare and mining. Russian assaults with motorcycles and electric scooties are harder to hit with drones and when hit, cause less causalties.if I have to choose between cramping 20 men into a MTLB thats going to get obliterated from one FPV or 20 men on 20 electric scooties, I will go with the scooties.
 

Ben Dhyani

New Member
Question, a few months back there was mention that Australia would provide its old M1 Abrams to Ukraine. Is there any indication of a timeline for this to occur?
According to this, they have already been delivered.
Ukraine requests additional military aid from Australia
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sibiha has formally requested additional military aid from Australia. Sibiha expressed gratitude to the Australian Foreign Minister for her "courageous and supportive" visit, marking the first bilateral visit by an Australian foreign minister to Ukraine in a decade.
“We deeply appreciate the defense assistance, including the recent delivery of 49 Abrams tanks and 14 patrol boats. Australia's total support has exceeded USD 1 billion, with USD 880 million dedicated to military aid.
 
Top