The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Kursk area.


In the Glushkovo area Ukrainian forces broke into Veseloe and Obukhovka but were repulsed by a Russian counter attack. They're still present in the village which is now contested. In the north Russian forces retook the villages of Novoselovka and Khitrovka. On the eastern side Russian forces are pushing on Plekhovo.


Russian UCAVs continue their harvest. In general their effect should be pretty devastating however it's hard to tell what their role is in the Russian counter-offensive in Kursk region, and in repelling Ukrainian advances in Glushkovo area.


A Ukrainian Bradley with a drone cage and BRAT ERA burns in Kursk region. It's interesting because it's another indication that elements of Ukraine's 47th Mech have now been sent to Kursk region.


Two Ukrainian vehicles get hit near Veseloe, allegedly IFVs. I can't make out the vehicle type but both appear to be destroyed as a result.


Russian wire-guided drone strike on 2 Ukrainian Leo-2s, Glushkovo area.


Near Veseloe, Russia's 56th VDV hits a Ukrainian vehicle of some sort, while it's moving. It appears destroyed.


Glushkovo area a Ukrainian BMP-1 taken out by a drone strike, and the surviving dismounts getting finished off by drone-dropped munitions.


Russian forces shelling Ukrainian positions in the village of Plekhanovo, with North Korean shells.


Russian drone and loitering munition strikes also continue. We have one hitting an M88 ARV, and allegedly a Tunguska, though I can't tell what they hit there. Hitting vehicles engaged in recovery efforts is a pretty standard approach for Russia. We also have what looks like a Kozak armored car, already knocked out, getting finished off. Lastly we have two strikes, one hits something, unclear, but it explodes pretty spectacularly, the other hits what looks like a stationary Stryker with cage armor.


Another series of drone strikes on different vehicles and infantry.


Scarce Russian 2B9 automatic mortar fires, from Marines of battlegroup north in Kursk area.


A knocked out Kirpi and two destroyed cars, Ukrainian, Kursk region.


A flipped Stryker, Kursk region. It's not the first time we've seen this happen and it's unclear why.


A group of Ukrainian POWs alleged from the 47th Mech Bde captured near Glushkovo after a failed attack and another group taken under unknown circumstances.


Russian 56th VDV hauls away a captured Kirpi, possibly the same as above.


From a Ukrainian TV report, we can see the combat load of a Russian T-90M captured in Kursk region. The sabot rounds we see are the 2BM23 Zakolka, 3BM44 Mango, and 3BM27 Nadezha-R. Out of these the Mango is the most modern, being the last soviet APSFDS round from the '80s, the rest are all older. Note I don't think we have another captured T-90M, I suspect it's the same one from early in the push now filtering its way from social media reporting to TV channel coverage.


Russia hit a locomotive in Sumy region with a Lancet. This is possible the first time Russia has done this.


One Ukrainian drone apparently attempted to strike the Kursk NPP, another hit a residential building in Kursk.


Russia hit a saltpeter storage in Kursk region, Ukrainian held area, causing a large explosion.


Russian forces preparing a Vandal wire-guided drone for launch.


Ukrainian MR-2 Viktor, in Kursk area, note the triangle. Russia has done some damage to Ukrainian air defenses here, and presumably is scrambling resources, especially with the appearance of Russian MALE UCAVs.


Ukrainian Stryker with EW in Kursk area.


Kharkov area.

Russian combined strike with Tornado-S and Uragan rockets on alleged Ukrainian forces massed in the woods near the village of Slatino, Kharkov area.


Russian strike on allegedly a Ukrainian SP Howitzer near Bayrak village, Kharkov region. Note with the thermals there definitely does appear to be a vehicle hiding in the woods.


Russian strike on some garages in the Kharkov area, we have what appear to be secondaries, suggesting Russia hit something explosive.


Russian ODAB-1500 strike in Volchansk, and a FAB-3000 strike on the factory complex (3rd link).


Russia hits a Ukrainian infantry team in Volchansk with a Lancet.


5 Ukrainian POWs out of Volchansk.


Ukrainian strikes on Shebekino continue.


The ruins of Volchansk, the town is basically gone.


Kupyansk area.

Russian forces have expanded the salient around Peschanoe again. Russian forces are now inside Kolesnikovka, and have approached Kruglyakovka. The road there is certainly unusuable as a supply route.


Russian infantry assaulting a Ukrainian positions near Petropavlovka. Warning footage of corpses.


Oskol front.

Russia has continue attacking along multiple areas. West of Makeevka Russian forces have taken the hills on the western side of Zherebets, securing the Russian hold on that bank. West of Andreevka Russian forces have also taken the hills on the right shore of the Zherebets approaching the village of Vishnevo. South of Andreevka Russian forces have taken the rest of the left bank. Russian forces have gained some ground in the fields east of Novosadovoe, south-east of Nevskoe, which is now under Russian control. Lastly Russia now has all of Makeevka.


Fragments of a Switchblade loitering munition in Makeevka.


Seversk salient.


Russian advances have resumed here. Russian sources claim the capture of Verkhnekamenskoe, but this isn't clear. Suriyakmaps confirms the capture of the major trench system east of it, and Russian forces present in the eastern side of the village.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Gorlovka-Toretsk.

Russian forces are continuing to expand their area of control in the center of Toretsk, and have taken all of Nelepovka. Russian forces have also taken many of the fields between the southern part of Toretsk and Nelepovka, likely due to Ukrainian forces pulling back.


A panorama and a car-filme video of the ruins of Toretsk. Unlike Novogrodovka and Ukrainsk, this town will be in ruins by the time it falls, much of it already is.


Pokrovsk axis.

Here Russia is continuing to push westward north of Selidovo and south of Selidovo. That town is now slowly being enveloped. Meanwhile Russian forces have taken the rest of Nikolaevka and now firmly hold Krasniy Yar and Krutoy Yar, south of Mirnograd. I don't think Russia will push on Pokrovsk until they take Mirnograd, and I don't think they will push on Mirnograd until they take Selidovo.


Footage of Russian forces inside Nikolaevka. We do have a Bradley present in the area as well.


North of Selidovo Russian drones double-tap a Ukrainian MaxxPro. The vehicle is definitely damaged, and veers off the road stopping behind a structure. We don't know the ultimate fate, as the video cuts off, but if it's immobilized it's probably finished off later.


Russia struck the Udachnoe train station, west of Pokrovsk. Apparently they hit a fuel train.


Ukrainian RM-70 Vampir on the Pokrovsk axis. This is essentially a longer ranged Grad variant.


Russian Nona-SVK on the Pokrovsk axis. Despite being an old system lacking in modern features, Russia would be lucky to be able to produce these in bulk. As is there's no evidence of new deliveries of the type since the war started.


Russian Buk-M3 and Tor-M1 on the Pokrovsk axis. We still see the Buk-M3 with minimal missiles on the rack indicating continuing shortages of these advanced SAMs. The Tor has interesting armor panels on the sides, it's definitely up-armored, but it's not the neat kit we sat on Tor-M2s and M1s in other footage, yet it also looks factory made.


A Russian T-80BVM in action on the Pokrovsk axis. We have double-layer ERA side-skirts and a robust roof cage.


Kurakhovo area.

Russian forces have widened their salient west of Krasnogorovka, north of Maksimil'yanovka and have pushed it out further entering the eastern part of Ostrovskoe. This cuts the last road south out of Gornyak east of Kurkhovo. Moreover the road into Kurakhovo is across a bridge. West of Gornyak Russia is pushing southward, having taking the mine complex south of Ukrainsk, and into Tsukurino, where Russia now holds half of the village. Russian forces have also pushed out towards Novoselidovka, west of Gornyak.


There are reports of Russian strikes on Kurakhovo intensifying. Given it's central location, there are likely Ukrainian supplies and reserves there being targeted as part of Russia's push in the area. I think an assault on Kurakhovo itself is still a ways off.


Russia struck the village of Yasenovoe, north-east of Kurakhovo. Target unclear.


Ugledar area.

Ugledar itself appears fully under Russian control and there doesn't seem to be any prospect of a Ukrainian counter-attack. Russian advances north of Ugledar push towards the ventilation complex for the No3 mine, and towards the village of Katerinovka, west of Konstantinovka. I think we're going to see continued Russian pushes here, aiming to push towards Kurakhovo area from the south. They probably won't reach Kurakhovo from this axis for some time, but the pressure will complicate logistics as Russian troops approach the reservoir from the north.

There is one thing we can say, no mass surrender of Ukrainian forces took place, meaning the 72nd Mech was probably able to break out of the town before it was fully cut off. It's unclear what losses they took exiting.


Russian BMP-2 delivering an assault team under fire. We appear to have multiple ATGM misses. The ultimate fate of the vehicle is unclear, the last bit seems to imply it survived, but the video is spliced, so it may have been destroyed when it came under fire after the infantry dismounted.


Russian drone strike on Ukrainian infantry near Ugledar and on buildings in Ugledar.


Ukrainian BMP-2 inside Ugledar knocked out by an FPV drone and finished off with drone-dropped munitions.


Russian infantry from the 5th Tanks inside Ugledar. They appear pretty comfortable posing for a group shot from the UAV. Meanwhile the panorama shot is a great illustration of why Ugledar is a town and not a village.


Russia striking the complex around the air ventilation shaft for the No 3 mine. It's south-west of the main complex, north of Ugledar.


Russian FAB-3000 strike on allegedly Ukrainian military storage in the village of Razliv, west of Kurakhovo, north-west of Ugledar.


Russian LMUR strike on a building in Zolotaya Niva, confirming the village is still in Ukrainian hands. Note series of LMUR stikes preceeded Russian attack in Prechistovka.


We have footage of Russian forces coming out of Ugledar. Apparently there were still civilians left in the city, either 107 or 116, sources disagree. Warning footage of corpses.


Russian soldiers in the No 3 mine complex, Ugledar.


Zaporozhye.


Russian forces continue to advance in the Orekhov area.


Russian Lancet strike on a Ukrainian Tunguska in Zaporozhye. It's interesting, this is the third Ukrainian Tunguska sighted recent, two were in Kursk area. Previously these scarce vehicles were almost invisible. Outside of Russia only a few countries have them, one of them being Morocco. I'm wondering if that's where Ukraine got their recent boon of 2S6s.


Russian gliding bomb strikes on Zaporozhye continue hitting energy infrastructure and the Motor-Sich factory.


Russian forces training with new BMP-3Ms. It's a fully loaded variant, with the extra armor, roof cage, EW kit, and camo netting.


Dnepr front.


Reports continue to come in that Ukraine has lost most of the islands in the Dnepr delta.


Russia hit a community hall in Kherson, footage of burned out camo netting suggests it was being used for a military purpose. Note the city of Kherson is almost completely empty.


Russia hit Velikaya Aleksandrovka, specifically the school house, on the right shore of the Dnepr with an Iskander. Allegedly this was a Ukrainian staging area. Russia claims 60 Ukrainian officers were in the building for a gathering of some sort.


Russia has taken a gaggle of POWs on the Dnepr islands. I count 8. While a cross-Dnepr assault seems very unlikely under current circumstances, Ukraine seems to have lost the river. Depending on how things continue, I suspect we will see Russian raids on the right shore.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Strikes.

Russia hit a train in Kazanka, Nikolaev region, allegedly carrying munitions.


Russia hit the Novokramatorsk machinebuilding plant in Kramatorsk causing a major fire. Presumably, like many industrial complexes, it was being used as a staging or storage area.


Russian strike on Belgorod-Dnestrovskiy allegedly hit a staging area for foreign fighters in Ukraine.


Ukrainian air defenses firing in Kiev. I can't be sure but it looks like some Russian impacts right before the camera shifts at the start. It's also unclear if those flashes are intercepts, they might be.


Battle damage from the Russian strike on the Odessa port.


Russian sources claim the recent strike on Starokonstantinov killed 9 NATO officers, 6 Americans and 3 French, and wounded a number of others. Confirmation is obviously not forthcoming.


A Ukrainian drone struck a fuel storage facility in Voronezh region causing a fire. It's unclear if this was the intended target, as the Russian source claims it went down due to EW. If true, it's a very bad place to bring it down.


Another Ukrainian drone struck a residential building in Voronezh.


Interesting bits.

Russian ZFB-05s continue to show up in recent footage. It's likely the same small batch.


A good photo of one of Russia's depth-charge launcher vehicles, on an MBT chassis.


Ukraine has demonstrated a towed Bogdana variant using a Giatsint-B carriage, and a new small guided bomb, possible for UCAV use. I suspect Ukraine's Bogdana howitzers are being manufactured outside Ukraine but it's still telling that Ukraine is getting towed guns made and Russia isn't.


A rare Ukrainian T-62MV, no doubt captured from Russia, on a training ground. It's unclear if Ukraine intends to field it in combat.

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
In the month of September, Russia has gained about 400 sq km. The biggest and majority of the gains were made at Pokrovsk direction and Kurakhove, about 160 sq km each. Oskol advances were about 60 sq km, while Kharkiv and Kramatorsk saw some minor advances.

In the Kursk region, Ukraine lost control of about 120 sq km.
Quoting myself here for continuity. I mentioned in the quoted post that Deepstate’s numbers are usually lagging behind and the area captured is likely larger than their claims. Today, another mapper posted their update on the September totals. While the number for Kursk in nearly identical (120 vs 126 sq km), the area in Ukraine that exchanged hands is quite larger (397 vs 468 sq km).

IMG_7242.jpeg

Source: x.com

This puts it into another consecutive monthly record (3 or 4th now?) of the territory captured by Russia. Note that the mapper I cited in my previous post #10,699 (the last image there and description (in French) on the left of it) claims this number to stand at 428 sq km.

For those using X, this is a really cool thread on the Ukrainian units involved and their movement in Kursk offensive, accompanied by neat visualizations and some commentary. I recommend it for viewing just for the coolness of it even. If anyone wants to do a proper unroll and post a link, I am sure others would appreciate it.


Some details of the Vuhledar withdrawal are coming to light. Very unsurprisingly, the pattern followed all other major (and minor?) withdrawals to a tee. It was somewhat obvious though, as I posted a few days ago asking why the Ukrainian troops were still in Vuhledar. The BBC reported a couple of days ago:

Over the past few days Ukrainian soldiers had to find their own way out of Vuhledar by foot as it was impossible to evacuate them otherwise, a machine-gunner who wished to remain anonymous said.

Many were wounded and killed by Russian drones and artillery as they tried to leave, another soldier, Roman, says. Many more are still missing.


According to the article, the order to retreat came on Wednesday (nuts, right?). I actually read conflicting accounts in regard to the order - some claim it never came, others say it came earlier. I didn’t post about it the other day because… Well, because it was suggested here that now there are proper withdrawals and whatever. Today, however, there was more supporting evidence of the above account. For example:

The 72nd Brigade left Vuhledar battered, with heavy losses. Before that, the Russians had already reached the areas through which the brigade would retreat and set up firing positions in garages behind the cemetery. The 72nd’s withdrawal was brutal. Vehicles, armored carriers were hit and burned. After days of agony in the besieged city before that, the soldiers were drained. By the dawn of retreat, not all had the strength to move to try break through. Some stayed behind, committing themselves to death to cover the retreat. […] Now, the 72nd, driven from its den, risks annihilation in the open fields under artillery and FPV drones. The Russians’ control from Vuhledar’s heights stretches 15 kilometers, nearly to Kurakhove.

Post on X: x.com. Or one readable to anyone: Thread by @Mylovanov on Thread Reader App.

Another kind of disturbing tidbit from that post:

By a cruel twist, while my brigade was clawing its way out of Vuhledar, people across the country were sipping coffee, going to cinemas, and strolling to street music. Well-wishes, both genuine and routine, were offered to the soldiers – even as they were dying, abandoned to their fate. I have no way to bridge these two worlds - the peaceful Ukraine and the military, each marching relentlessly on its path.

Hard to truly imagine what these guys really feel. Especially when their fellow men, likely the closets people they have, are being obliterated. Crazy stuff.

In another article, that I lost track of now, they interviewed an officer from the 72nd brigade and asked if Vuhledar could be defended, to which he replied that it could if the 72nd was replaced at least 2-3 months ago and whoever rotated into its place was properly trained and willing (basically had balls) to hold the line.

Other news… A few months ago, there was an idea to form a Ukrainian Legion in Poland, as an example for other countries having a great number of Ukrainian refugees, in order to enrol those Ukrainian men who left the country, properly train and equip them, and send them to the front. It was kind of a big deal with high hopes (or statements, rather). As it turned out and, frankly, was expected, no one came to sign up.


This, of course, is understandable because otherwise it would contradict the very basic logic behind leaving the country to begin with and seeing what is happening now. Imagine if many would want to though! People remaining inside Ukraine aren’t willing to join the fight, why would anyone who left, living a normal life do? The Times article described the situation yesterday:

In Odesa, a city of almost one million, one local conscription officer detailed how his department was falling well short of its targets. “We’re not mobilising even 20 per cent of what is required,” he said, adding that on some days more than 100 call-up papers were handed out, yet only a handful of men would respond. “Odesa region is one of the worst on the list.”

He painted a picture of corruption, mismanagement and disillusionment within his department, which made it “impossible to complete our goals”.

He said colleagues were accepting bribes worth thousands of pounds to forge exemptions, staff shortages meant employees had to take on several responsibilities at once — from processing papers to street patrols — and senior bosses threatened to send employees to the front line if they underperformed.

Some days, more than half the men who do come forward for mobilisation have health conditions that make them ineligible, such as tuberculosis, hepatitis or HIV, the officer added.[…]

A Telegram group shares updates on the location of Odesa’s roaming “conscription squads” and their checkpoints. Almost 150,000 men belong to the group, said to be run from Russia.

It is a marked shift from the beginning of the war when hundreds of thousands came forward to sign up, including Gennadiy, 47.

“I tried to volunteer but was told I wasn’t needed,” he said.“Now I don’t want to fight. Our government doesn’t support soldiers. They don’t have proper equipment and are forgotten about if they get injured.”



The article also describes how men are grabbed off the streets, often illegally, etc. Not really new stuff.

It’s really a crazy situations though, no? Polls indicate that people don’t want to cede any territory (though quite decreasingly so), yet they don’t want to actually do the fighting. It just doesn’t register, especially with the periodic reports suggesting that Russia wants to get rid of Ukraine and everything Ukrainian and so on. Then there is this guy in Vuhledar that cannot reconcile that and where he is and what he is doing. Like I said, it is hard to imagine what he feels if I cannot really fully process it sitting on the couch thousands of miles away. Anyway… Perhaps stranger things have happened.

On that ^ note, while the situation is already catastrophic, I would suggest that once the Ukrainian borders open again, it will quickly become much worse than most imagine. In other words, a huge country full of mostly old people who simply won’t move because this is where they live.

Other news… Support likely goes as far the finances do, among other things. France is planning to cut their budget by some €40B and raise taxes in order to collect another €20B next year. While far from the major contributors, this is somewhat an indication where the wind blows. Others have similar issues.


I would guess that I am close to running out of space in this post, so I will cut it here for today.
 
On that ^ note, while the situation is already catastrophic, I would suggest that once the Ukrainian borders open again, it will quickly become much worse than most imagine. In other words, a huge country full of mostly old people who simply won’t move because this is where they live.
For this among other reasons, I think people are underestimating the possibility that post-war Ukraine will eventually align once again with Russia. Russia's MO is to invest heavily in the areas they once fought over (Chechnya). And you can already see the seeds of antipathy toward the West in Ukraine for not providing enough support. Couple that with the fact that much of Ukraine's war debt is held by Western private equity; with the likelihood that the ending of the war will cause a political crisis in Ukraine (no way Zelensky escapes major blame for how the war went, and also no way he will go quietly), with the demographic decay and overall impoverishment of the country, and with the fact that Western attention is fleeting and is already fixed on China and the Middle East, and you have the recipe for major social unrest that the West largely ignores, and that provokes large scale anger towards the West.

If Ukraine is essentially a rump state, will Western interests really want to invest? Because Putin certainly will and he knows how to navigate the kind of corruption endemic in the post-Soviet world to suit his ends better than perhaps anyone. What happens if he throws his support behind the hard right nationalists after the war? They would seem to have more in common with him (a la Kadyrov) than they do with the peacetime Western political elite.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
For this among other reasons, I think people are underestimating the possibility that post-war Ukraine will eventually align once again with Russia. Russia's MO is to invest heavily in the areas they once fought over (Chechnya). And you can already see the seeds of antipathy toward the West in Ukraine for not providing enough support. Couple that with the fact that much of Ukraine's war debt is held by Western private equity; with the likelihood that the ending of the war will cause a political crisis in Ukraine (no way Zelensky escapes major blame for how the war went, and also no way he will go quietly), with the demographic decay and overall impoverishment of the country, and with the fact that Western attention is fleeting and is already fixed on China and the Middle East, and you have the recipe for major social unrest that the West largely ignores, and that provokes large scale anger towards the West.

If Ukraine is essentially a rump state, will Western interests really want to invest? Because Putin certainly will and he knows how to navigate the kind of corruption endemic in the post-Soviet world to suit his ends better than perhaps anyone. What happens if he throws his support behind the hard right nationalists after the war? They would seem to have more in common with him (a la Kadyrov) than they do with the peacetime Western political elite.
What you suggest is a possibility but Putin isn’t exactly awash with spare cash. Post war Ukrainian discontent with the West might see Ukraine approaching China rather than Russia. Gives China a footprint in Eastern Europe and Russia is hardly in a position to object.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
For this among other reasons, I think people are underestimating the possibility that post-war Ukraine will eventually align once again with Russia. Russia's MO is to invest heavily in the areas they once fought over (Chechnya). And you can already see the seeds of antipathy toward the West in Ukraine for not providing enough support. Couple that with the fact that much of Ukraine's war debt is held by Western private equity; with the likelihood that the ending of the war will cause a political crisis in Ukraine (no way Zelensky escapes major blame for how the war went, and also no way he will go quietly), with the demographic decay and overall impoverishment of the country, and with the fact that Western attention is fleeting and is already fixed on China and the Middle East, and you have the recipe for major social unrest that the West largely ignores, and that provokes large scale anger towards the West.

If Ukraine is essentially a rump state, will Western interests really want to invest? Because Putin certainly will and he knows how to navigate the kind of corruption endemic in the post-Soviet world to suit his ends better than perhaps anyone. What happens if he throws his support behind the hard right nationalists after the war? They would seem to have more in common with him (a la Kadyrov) than they do with the peacetime Western political elite.
What you suggest is a possibility but Putin isn’t exactly awash with spare cash. Post war Ukrainian discontent with the West might see Ukraine approaching China rather than Russia. Gives China a footprint in Eastern Europe and Russia is hardly in a position to object.
I think there is near 0 chance Putin can get in bed with Ukrainian nationalists. Despite Putin being in bed with right-wingers elsewhere, in Ukraine the ultra-nationalist crowd has based a large part of their identity on being anti-Russian in principle.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
This channel offers a balanced approach for both sides material losses,I find more credible than just citing Russian propagandists

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I think there is near 0 chance Putin can get in bed with Ukrainian nationalists. Despite Putin being in bed with right-wingers elsewhere, in Ukraine the ultra-nationalist crowd has based a large part of their identity on being anti-Russian in principle.
While this is probably (disclaimer is below) true, there is an issue of these guys remaining relevant in Ukraine. They never were. At times great influence, but never relevance beyond some short period of time. It can be argued that association of any politician with their values to some extent beyond very little was like a poison and basically a cross on their career (in the big-boy circle). Yushchenko is probably the best example of that. Note that he is the only (ex) Ukrainian politician who we never heard from during this war (beyond some “russian fascist and junta” or whatever it was he said back in the very beginning); and this is considering we have heard from Kuchma and plenty from Kravchuk! At the end of the day, money talks. And by that I do not mean some Russian involvement in some backdoor influence and the like, but economy.

Here is the thing that many may not realize or believe (not directed at you, Feanor, just a general assessment): there is no future for Ukraine without dealing with Russia and likely dealing a lot and on, at the very least, “neutral” terms. This is just a fact of life as long as the two countries exist. Here is Ukraine on the map (centred, more or less):

IMG_7256.jpeg

Starting with Russia and going counterclockwise, it borders with Russia, Belarus, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova (and Romania again). The (internationally recognized) land border with Russia is 1,944 km long. The remaining land border has a length of 3,637 km. Of the 3,637 km, 1,111 km is with Belarus and 1,202 km is with Moldova, probably 2/3 of which (don’t quote me on that, but it has to be fairly close) is actually with Transnistria. Times change and so do the governments, as well as the borders in the longer term, but currently Ukraine’s border with Russia and Russia’s “friendlies” is about 3,855 km out of 5,581 km in total, or about 70%. Source for the numbers:


To note, Moldova is likely more “flippable” towards Russia than Belarus otherwise, for example. Hungary has some issues of its own with Ukraine in Zakarpattia and would likely straight up take that chunk as its own if the situation permits. Slovakia is mostly irrelevant with its less than 100 km border with Ukraine, but is also in favour of dealing with Russia (this is a question mark, btw). What we have left is Poland and Romania (about 1,100 km border with Ukraine, or 20%). Poland doesn’t really like Ukraine that much at all and is simply using it for its own interests. When it comes to trade, however, it sees Ukraine as a threat and made it quite obvious over the duration of this war. It also sees it as a threat in terms of influence within the EU, but also in NATO and, namely, with the US - Ukraine is probably Poland’s would be biggest competitor if “stars were to line up”. And so on.

The point of the story: dealing with Russia is inevitable for Ukraine. Eventually, they will buy the Russian gas, their goods, send their goods to Russia, etc. This is regardless of what some nationalists and extremists want. This is pure economics and business. We can also talk about the political structure, overall mindset of the society, etc in Ukraine, but this is too controversial at the moment. In short, it is much closer to Russia than elsewhere. While quite different, but, for the lack of a better example, look at Georgia. They have even recently officially blamed Saakashvili, who has also been imprisoned for the past 3 or 4 years, for the very short war with Russia in 2008 (which isn’t far from the truth either).

So yes, there is very little that can be predicted at the moment. We don’t even know when and how this conflict will end. After all, Zelensky may very well need that ride he supposedly refused two and a half years ago; but it won’t be the ride to save himself from the Russians. We will see what happens.

Furthermore, as far as ultranationalists and the like go, provided the demographic problems that Ukraine faces, they simply cannot avoid filling the void via immigration. These immigrants would mostly come from the central Asia, of course, namely post-Soviet and other -stans. Well, these ultranationalist fellas have certain negative feelings towards those people; arguably (or evidently), these feelings are even stronger than their feelings towards the Russians (this is the disclaimer mentioned in the beginning). I think we already talked about it though.

Then there is India and China that cannot be discounted either. But we are getting too far down the rabbit hole at this point.

To conclude this post, Russia will have plenty of leverage over Ukraine in the foreseeable future, regardless of what some may think or hope for. Sooner or later (and in the circumstances rather sooner) basic economics will come into play. Ironically, if the most ridiculous predictions come true, such as Putin is entirely removed from the equation, for example, that leverage may only increase and speed up the process.

Now add the above to the negotiations and the upper hand. Some believe that Kursk is some great leverage though.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Something very interesting took place. It appears Russia's LO UCAV the S-70 Okhotnik showed up in the war zone and was downed. Russian sources speculate it was downed by friendly fire because it malfunctioned and flew into Ukraine-controlled airspace. This follows the pattern where new Russian kit used in the war is not revealed until they turn up in Ukrainian sources. This happened with the Mal'va for example. It may be the case that Russia has been using the S-70 for quite some time until this happened. It may also be the case that this is an accidental malfunction and the S-70 is not being used in the conflict at all.


EDIT: I spoke too soon. The aircraft is carrying an AL-41 engine with a circular rear, meaning it's an early prototype. This is almost certainly a malfunction on a test flight, rather then actual combat use.

 
When I see the closeups of the open rivets and a total lack of radar absorbent coating on this LO UCAV, we aren't talking about a very stealthy UCAV. The shape might result in some LO features, but this looks like "stealth" on a very tight budget..
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
When I see the closeups of the open rivets and a total lack of radar absorbent coating on this LO UCAV, we aren't talking about a very stealthy UCAV. The shape might result in some LO features, but this looks like "stealth" on a very tight budget..
It's an early prototype. You saw the same difference on early Su-57 prototypes and serial run ones.
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
Something very interesting took place. It appears Russia's LO UCAV the S-70 Okhotnik showed up in the war zone and was downed. Russian sources speculate it was downed by friendly fire because it malfunctioned and flew into Ukraine-controlled airspace. This follows the pattern where new Russian kit used in the war is not revealed until they turn up in Ukrainian sources. This happened with the Mal'va for example. It may be the case that Russia has been using the S-70 for quite some time until this happened. It may also be the case that this is an accidental malfunction and the S-70 is not being used in the conflict at all.


EDIT: I spoke too soon. The aircraft is carrying an AL-41 engine with a circular rear, meaning it's an early prototype. This is almost certainly a malfunction on a test flight, rather then actual combat use.

So is this early-model S-70 Okhotnik crashed on Ukrainian controlled land, or on Russian controlled land?
It is quite inconvenient if highly advanced weapon systems/prototypes from secret defence programs fall into the hands of the enemy.

The US normally destroys/drops some bombs on their stuff if this happen
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
While there may be some app for towed artillery, in the Ukraine, perhaps not so much. Why not integrate a cannon with whatever feasible vehicle that is available for quick integration that provides a reasonable escape time from counter battery return fire?

 

T.C.P

Well-Known Member
While there may be some app for towed artillery, in the Ukraine, perhaps not so much. Why not integrate a cannon with whatever feasible vehicle that is available for quick integration that provides a reasonable escape time from counter battery return fire?

A lot of the Pro Ukr people like Andrew Perpetua and many front line Ukr artillery guys says they prefer towed arty to SPGs. I am no expert, so I am just mentioning things they said. Per the Ukr fighters, on a static or slowly moving front line, its easier to disguise and protect towed arty over SPGs and they can fire more rounds from them . According to them its easier to protect the dug in towed arty from Lancets and FPVs .

I have heard the opposite as well. I remember 2 ukrainian sources come out one month of each other, where one was complaining about the Ceaser and Krab and saying how they prefer towed Arty, and another one was saying the Caesar is the best artillery he ever used.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
A lot of the Pro Ukr people like Andrew Perpetua and many front line Ukr artillery guys says they prefer towed arty to SPGs. I am no expert, so I am just mentioning things they said. Per the Ukr fighters, on a static or slowly moving front line, its easier to disguise and protect towed arty over SPGs and they can fire more rounds from them . According to them its easier to protect the dug in towed arty from Lancets and FPVs .

I have heard the opposite as well. I remember 2 ukrainian sources come out one month of each other, where one was complaining about the Ceaser and Krab and saying how they prefer towed Arty, and another one was saying the Caesar is the best artillery he ever used.
Interesting opposing views from the Ukrainian perspective. Not sure what to make of these differing viewpoints but I am sure Western militaries are evaluating this.
 

Fredled

Active Member
It's an early prototype. You saw the same difference on early Su-57 prototypes and serial run ones.
Why would Russian fly a top secret prototype close to or above Ukraine? If it was for a test, they would do it very far from Ukraine.
I think it's one more sign that they throw everything they have into the battle, including prototypes, hoping that it will make suddenly a difference.
I agree with @wild_Willie2 that it was made with primitive technology. Corruption is so high that they could have made a mock stealth UAV, which was not stealth at all, but looked convincingly like one to show Putin how good they are at beating the West with new technology. And justify funding,
 

Fredled

Active Member
Feanor said:
We will have to agree to disagree. The pace of Russian advances increased drastically after Ukraine shifted their priorities.
Yes, but did it because Ukraine shifted their priorities (thought I think defending Ukrainian territory is still their priority IMHO) or because Russia drastically increased the number of troops and air and missile forces involved?
 

swerve

Super Moderator
For this among other reasons, I think people are underestimating the possibility that post-war Ukraine will eventually align once again with Russia. Russia's MO is to invest heavily in the areas they once fought over (Chechnya). e in common with him (a la Kadyrov) than they do with the peacetime Western political elite.
Russia invests heavily in territories it's reconquered, & which have pro-Russian leaders, or Russian puppets in power, & where it sees benefit to Russia from doing so. Elsewhere? Look at Abkhazia. Half of it's still in ruins, after 30 years. South Ossetia? Not quite as bad, but still partly depopulated. Even the Ossetian population has shrunk, with people leaving to find work. And so on . . .
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Russia invests heavily in territories it's reconquered, & which have pro-Russian leaders, or Russian puppets in power, & where it sees benefit to Russia from doing so. Elsewhere? Look at Abkhazia. Half of it's still in ruins, after 30 years. South Ossetia? Not quite as bad, but still partly depopulated. Even the Ossetian population has shrunk, with people leaving to find work. And so on . . .
And I think the two examples are a good distinction. Abkhazia has no real desire to be part of Russia. They're friendly with Russia because their existential enemy is Georgia. This is quite different from South Ossetia which really just wants to be part of Russia together with North Ossetia. And they're treated differently as a result. On the flip side this example doesn't necessarily apply to areas Russia annexes directly. Consider Mariupol' and the reconstruction efforts there. I think in this case if Russia gets to keep these territories Russia will invest heavily into them similar to what they did in Crimea post '14. They will make sure that anyone comparing honestly the socio-economic conditions in Ukraine and the annexed territories will have to admit that life is better in the latter.
 
Top