The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[Feanor]

The last info is Russian sources denying that Russian troops are in the town, though they do seem to be engaged in the summer cottages on the south-east. A reminder, that's where the last Russian push into Ugledar stalled. Though of course this time around Russian forces are east and west, and north-east of the town. The last movements have turned the town into a salient. I'm a bit curious as to why they're pushing into the town at all. One would think taking the fields north of the town would be easier. There are also reports of Ukrainian forces counter-attacking in areas around the town, and reports of Ukrainian forces withdrawing from the north-western part of the No3 mine complex. Russia did seem to have grabbed a fresh batch of POWs in the Ugledar area. I'm attaching the Suriyakmaps screengrab, but they haven't updated since yesterday afternoon and the situation is fluid. Note details on the fighting are all unconfirmed statements from Russian sources so... grain of salt.

Colonelcassad

ОБСТАНОВКА НА УГЛЕДАРСКОМ НАПРАВЛЕНИИ Итак, как Вы уже знаете, за прошедшие сутки подразделения группировки войск "Восток" заметно продвинулись на Угледарском направлении. Как мы уже говорили ранее, бой за Угледарские дачи начался 4 суток назад, еще с утра сохранялась очаговая оборона...

t.me

Воин DV

❗️ОБСТАНОВКА НА "ЮЖНОДОНБАССКОЙ №3"❗️ Похоже, противник устал убиваться о западную часть шахты и лесополосу, прилегающую к юго-западному углу её территории, и в ночь попытался бежать в сторону вентствола. С мест сообщают, что вдогонку насыпали хлопчикам полную охапку гостинцев. Есть пленные...

t.me

Воин DV

Богатый улов бойцов 29 Армии в ходе боёв на Угледарском направлении. Ты офигеешь, но именно так выглядят пресловутые "Волки Да Винчи". @voin_dv

t.me

Z комитет + карта СВО

t.me

View attachment 51781

It appears Ugledar is done. The problem is not so much the Russian assault on the south-east. The problem is the Russian push north-west of the town which is the hammer, against the anvil of Russian positions north-east of it in the mine complex. If Ukrainian command has no strength for a major counter-push, and this seems to be the case, then they need to withdraw in a hurry.

On a side-note, many have commented, and I concur, that this is a direct consequence of Ukraine wasting troops in Kursk region. That "success" will bear other similar fruit in other areas (consider how quickly Russia is plowing through the center of Toretsk). If I was Russia I would hope Ukraine tries another large cross-border push, maybe this time in Bryansk region. Ideally with thousands of troops committed to months of fighting, and pulled from both their strategic reserve and the front line in the Donbas.

 

[T.C.P]

It appears Ugledar is done. The problem is not so much the Russian assault on the south-east. The problem is the Russian push north-west of the town which is the hammer, against the anvil of Russian positions north-east of it in the mine complex. If Ukrainian command has no strength for a major counter-push, and this seems to be the case, then they need to withdraw in a hurry.

On a side-note, many have commented, and I concur, that this is a direct consequence of Ukraine wasting troops in the Kursk region. That "success" will bear other similar fruit in other areas (consider how quickly Russia is flowing through the center of Toretsk). If I was Russia I would hope Ukraine tries another large cross-border push, maybe this time in Bryansk region. Ideally with thousands of troops committed to months of fighting, and pulled from both their strategic reserve and the front line in the Donbas.

View attachment 51784

Ukraine really had no answer for the fall of Avdivka. You can blame lack of western supplies all you want, but to spend 2 years not building any proper defensive lines behind Avdivka, even when archmair twitter geenrals could see it coming is kind of inexcusable. Especially when they saw how effective the Russian defensive lines were in their own counteroffensive failure.

 

[Feanor]

Ukraine really had no answer for the fall of Avdivka. You can blame lack of western supplies all you want, but to spend 2 years not building any proper defensive lines behind Avdivka, even when archmair twitter geenrals could see it coming is kind of inexcusable. Especially when they saw how effective the Russian defensive lines were in their own counteroffensive failure.

Unlike the situation in the Pokrovsk-Krasnogorovka-Kurakhovo triangle, this situation really has little to nothing to do with the fall of Avdeevka. Ugledar was defended well and skillfully, with appropriate defenses, when adequately manned. Russia spent months creeping towards the Konstantinovka-Ugledar road, and could have spent many months more to accomplish this encirclement. Instead this happened in a couple of weeks. A rapid race westward out of Pavlovka taking Prechistovka and pushing either half-way or into Zolotaya Niva, a series of attacks in and around Vodyanoe, and now a pounce on the town itself. The problem seems to be that Ukraine doesn't have adequate troops/resources to hold the areas around the town. There were multiple reports of units from that area being sent elsewhere prior to this happening.

Your main is correct however, Ukraine made a pretty fatal mistake in not layering defense lines around Avdeevka appropriately. I've mentioned this before, but everyone seems to ignore a basic reality. The corruption, bureaucratic obstacles, and casual incompetence one often encounters in the Russian military and state apparatus applies to Ukraine every bit as much, if not more. Russia botched the invasion and had to re-orient their entire approach to the war, and Ukraine was the beneficiary of some massive western aid, but really, what doubt can there be about a final outcome of a contest to the bitter end between Russia and Ukraine?

 

[tonnyc]

But it is not a contest to the bitter end for Russia. We have discussed this when the war started. While this may be an existential war for Ukraine, it is not for Russia. If Russia wins decisively, Ukraine would no longer be a sovereign state. Maybe it ends up like Belarus, and at worst case it may be forcibly annexed by Russia. Meanwhile the most Ukraine can get is the restoration of their 2014 border and some reparations. The state of Russia would remain sovereign and have their territory (2014 version) intact.

It may be a war to the bitter end of Vladimir Putin, who may very well end up dead if he loses this war, but while he is the leader of Russia, he is one man and is not the whole of Russia.

Ukraine's entire grand strategy is predicated on assuming that Russia won't fight to the bitter end. That this is just some side adventure that Russia will give up once the cost gets too high. Ukraine may very well fail to force the cost of this war up high enough for Russia that they no longer want to continue, but it was never 100% of Ukraine strength vs. 100% of Russia's but 100% of Ukraine's vs. some undeterminable but low percentage of Russia's strength.

 

[KipPotapych]

Russians appear to be communicating that they will provide anti-ship missiles to the Houthis if strikes with the western long range assets are allowed within actual Russian borders.

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-brokering-talks-send-advanced-russian-missiles-yemens-houthis-sources-say-2024-09-24/

Whatever the news reports suggest, I still personally do not believe this is going to happen. To be fair though, I believed the common sense would prevail and the invasion would not happen back in 2022 to begin with. My faith in human ability to think logically and avoid the great disasters at fairly low costs has, of course, been shattered (wasn’t the first time and surely won’t be the last) - this is sarcasm to some degree, fyi. There is plenty of discussion in the mass and social media in regard to the Ukrainian capabilities of launching such strikes (using Storm Shadows, for example) on their own. Regardless of people’s beliefs in the adaptability and learning and innovation and whatever else of Ukrainians, I am convinced that they do not posses the capabilities for such operations. This is not nearly the same as sending dozens/hundreds/whatever many drones at the sites that everything you need to know about has been available publicly for years now. It is way more than just “coordinates”, it is the flight plan, precise geographic data or high resolution imagery for that plan, etc. It is almost literally rocket science that Ukraine is simply not capable of at present time. All this will have to be provided by the US, as it has been providing such data for all Ukrainian strikes using such assets. I do not believe there can be any doubt about it, however little. This is precisely why Germans have refused to provide their Taurus missiles (or one of the reasons, likely the main one though). I am going to quote a part of my own post here. This post is from 2023 and is just as valid today. I am quoting the excerpts from a Washington Post article cited in the post:

Ukrainian officials said they require coordinates provided or confirmed by the United States and its allies for the vast majority of strikes using its advanced U.S.-provided rocket systems, a previously undisclosed practice that reveals a deeper and more operationally active role for the Pentagon in the war.[…]

One senior Ukrainian official said Ukrainian forces almost never launch the advanced weapons without specific coordinates provided by U.S. military personnel from a base elsewhere in Europe. Ukrainian officials say this process should give Washington confidence about providing Kyiv with longer-range weapons.

A senior U.S. official — who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue — acknowledged the key American role in the campaign and said the targeting assistance served to ensure accuracy and conserve limited stores of ammunition for maximum effectiveness. The official said Ukraine does not seek approval from the United States on what to strike and routinely targets Russian forces on their own with other weapons. The United States provides coordinates and precise targeting information solely in an advisory role, the official said.[…]

The senior Ukrainian official described the targeting process, generally: Ukrainian military personnel identify targets they want to hit, and in which location, and that information is then sent up to senior commanders, who then relay the request to U.S. partners for more accurate coordinates. The Americans do not always provide the requested coordinates, the official said, in which case the Ukrainian troops do not fire.[…]

The senior Ukrainian official contended that the Ukrainian military would face the same limitations it does now with conventional HIMARS rounds if it received ATACMS, with Ukraine still dependent on U.S. targeting coordinates.[…]

“According to our maps and software, a point will have one set of coordinates,” Malinovsky said. “But when we give this target to partners for analysis, the coordinates are different. Why? Because the Americans and NATO countries have access to military satellites.

“We’re all basically always online,” he added. “They immediately get us the coordinates and we then fire the MLRS right away.”

A third Ukrainian official confirmed that targeting all goes through an American installation on NATO soil and described the process as “very fast.” The Post is withholding the name of the base at the request of U.S. officials who cited security concerns.

A few things to note here. The belief was that this process of coordinating HIMARS strikes would provide confidence to the US when supplying long range assets. The implication is pretty clear and not worth commenting on. Second, Ukrainians have not sought the approval of the targets from the USA, so the provision of the coordinates for precise targeting was justified (not really, imo) as simple advisory. As we are all aware, Zelensky is currently visiting the US with a list of targets to be reviewed and approved by the American administration if the permission for the long range strikes in Russia to be granted. Third, the Ukrainians have in no ambiguous terms had admitted that they do not have the technology even for simple precise coordinates for their targets. Fourth, they assure that the same limitations would persist if they are given ATACMS, which is now in the past. Fifth, all targeting goes through an “American installation on NATO soil”.

One could fairly say this is a dated article (half a war ago!) and they must have learned and developed the capabilities of their own and so on. Not the case, clearly. That is not something a country like Ukraine (or any country) develops or acquires on such a short notice, help notwithstanding. The fresh Washington Post article suggests the same:

But Kyiv has long been dependent on receiving target coordinates for strikes with its precision Western weaponry from U.S. military personnel on a base elsewhere in Europe. Without those, the missile is likely to miss its mark, the military official said, and the United States has sometimes declined to provide coordinates for some of Kyiv’s desired targets.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/09/24/ukraine-weapons-limits-biden-permission-atacms/

Again, to use Storm Shadows or SCALPs, it is more than just “coordinates”.

Furthermore, from the same article:

The Ukrainians also want more agency to pick their own targets, including energy infrastructure, such as oil depots, officials said. Those kinds of strikes can hurt Russia’s economy, limiting its ability to fund the war effort, explained a senior Ukrainian military official. It’s fair play, the official added, as Moscow has been pummeling Ukraine’s power grid for the past two years, causing rolling blackouts throughout the country.

Not only the US has publicly discouraged such strikes and stated that they are against these type of attacks since they pretty much began, the Ukrainians are now asking to do what some Russian top brass was charged with war crimes for. Of course, nothing is going to happen beyond the alleged charges, but the fact itself that Ukraine is asking Americans to do the same is ludicrous.

Anyway, this is on escalation. Well, I guess I didn’t say a word on actual escalation. Is it necessary though? I believe what I outlined above speaks for itself. We can, however, also talk about the potential benefits if these “deep in Russia” strikes, but what about the overall picture? Some believe that these will turn the tide and so on. I think at this point in time we should ask whether this decision would affect the final outcome of this conflict. Not whether it may but actually would. Would this allow, in combination with other capabilities already provided, Ukraine to defeat Russia? That is a serious question. The stakes are certainly high and escalation is not a linear function.

Interesting note from the same article:

But in an example of the widening disconnect between the two sides more than two years into Russia’s invasion, the Ukrainians had expected Biden to have already granted permission by now, according to two officials who, like others in this article, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter.

And

“We think the permission should be granted yesterday, not today or tomorrow,” one Ukrainian official said. “Otherwise, the phrase ‘We want to see Ukraine as strong as possible for any scenario’ looks like total BS.”

I find it funny how the expectations work, as well as the concept of commitment, which I talked about numerous times starting a couple of years ago, and how that is being used almost as blackmail against the “rational players” who probably made some mistakes in previous decisions.

I will try to continue on the subject tomorrow.

Short notes:

As per ABC’s Pentagon reporter, the US is going to include cluster JSOWs to be launched from F-16s in the next assistance package.



Post on X: x.com

Vuhledar is about to be lost, probably a matter of few short days (likely sooner). The following map is interesting because the mapper portrayed their own interpretation of the events (more or less coincides with Deepstate) and added Suriyak’s data for comparison (hatched):



I would think even Suriyak’s data is somewhat behind as well.

Russia has finally split the area in two at Nevske that was now anticipated for some time.



Post on X: x.com

In the same post, there is a map that indicates that the, what used to be, Nevelske pocket, is continuing to expand and close at the same time.

 

[KipPotapych]

Didn’t fit into the previous post:

Some (very) Ukrainian outlets are suggesting that the Ukrainian public should prepare “morally and psychologically” that the Ukrainian forces will withdraw from Selidove, Toretsk, and Vuhledar in short order.

Zvиздец Мангусту

Я бы порекомендовал нашему гражданскому обществу быть морально и психологически готовым к тому, что ВСУ отойдут из Селидово, Торецка и Угледара Это совсем необязательно должно случиться. И я очень хотел бы ошибаться. Но из той информации, которая есть у меня, это очень вероятный сценарий...

t.me

Ukrainians are asking why “Russian defeat” at Liptsi and Vovchansk aren’t reported in the Western media, likely referring to the takeover of the aggregate plant in Vovchansk.



Post on X: x.com

Interestingly, the prerogative is that Russians have achieved there nothing in 5 months.

 

[Fredled]

On a side-note, many have commented, and I concur, that this is a direct consequence of Ukraine wasting troops in Kursk region.

I strongly disagree. Ukrainian troops staying near the Russian border south of the Kursk Region, in the Sumy Region, for two year and half were under constant artillery attack. They forcibly had losses (Russian didn't target empty fields). That's what I would call a waste of resource, in the long term.
Instead of being passively eroded, these troops were finaly acvtivated, alongside other troops which stayed in the rear for some time. They were put into action with unexpected results (name one single person who expected it).
Very little troops from the Donbas, if any were involved.
Elsewhere in the front line, it was the same: Ukrainian troops are constantly bombarded while waiting for Russian assaults, which more often than not, are not coming.But they are taking losses nonetheless, as the time pass by and they stay idle.

Everybody rembember how many defenders were lost during the defence of Sivierodoneskt, Bahkmut and Avdiivka. It was time not to repeat the same mistake. The best strategy now is to defend the DonBas with as little troops as possible, preferably with end-of-life, disposable equipment, just to stop Storm-Z meat assault, yet supported by strong drone regiments. Anything more would be wasted under FAB and artillery. Even better yet: dispatching new recruits who won't take any risk and will retreat on time to save their lives. The goal being to preserve Ukrainian forces as much as possible. Trading some territories and small towns (Vuhledar is nothing but a big village) for the preservation of troops is the best decision.

Yes, without irony, a push into the Bryansk Region would be another interesting development as it's possibly even less defended than Kursk. Ukrainians could move much deeper into Russia. Then bring HIMARS into Russian logistic range (some ammpo depot ot something). The problem is that Lukashenko could then intervene.
Of course the best would take Belgorod or its vincinity. But Russians are massively regrouped there.

The lack of effect on the front line is theoretical. You don't have a crystal ball telling you what would be had the Kursk intrusion not happened. One thing is that if Russians didn't remove significant troops, they couldn't send additional ones as much as they wanted.
More concretely the effect was felt in the Karkiv/Volkshansk axis.

It doesn't mean it was useless. Thousands of Russians who were not supposed to be involved in war were dragged into it. Ukrainians secured a large prisoner exchange in a promptly manner.
Yet, the most important is perhaps the information we got about the state of readiness of the Russian Army: Disastrous.
This operation told us whether Russians had a reaction force in case of emergency. The answer is not. The Russian territorial defence is inoperant. Add to this the failed Sarmat test and you get the cherry on the cake.
(I just see that they was another big explosion in Moscow, but didn't watch it yet...)

 

[Feanor]

I strongly disagree. Ukrainian troops staying near the Russian border south of the Kursk Region, in the Sumy Region, for two year and half were under constant artillery attack. They forcibly had losses (Russian didn't target empty fields). That's what I would call a waste of resource, in the long term.
Instead of being passively eroded, these troops were finaly acvtivated, alongside other troops which stayed in the rear for some time. They were put into action with unexpected results (name one single person who expected it).
Very little troops from the Donbas, if any were involved.
Elsewhere in the front line, it was the same: Ukrainian troops are constantly bombarded while waiting for Russian assaults, which more often than not, are not coming.But they are taking losses nonetheless, as the time pass by and they stay idle.

They could have been activated elsewhere with more relevant results. And the losses they took as a result of this type activation are substantially higher then they would have been had they sat in the rear, hiding. Ukrainian troops lose way more attacking then they do defending. If the goal is to bleed Russia, given the nature of this war and Russian air superiority, it should be done defensively, they way it has been done defensively before.

Everybody rembember how many defenders were lost during the defence of Sivierodoneskt, Bahkmut and Avdiivka. It was time not to repeat the same mistake. The best strategy now is to defend the DonBas with as little troops as possible, preferably with end-of-life, disposable equipment, just to stop Storm-Z meat assault, yet supported by strong drone regiments. Anything more would be wasted under FAB and artillery. Even better yet: dispatching new recruits who won't take any risk and will retreat on time to save their lives. The goal being to preserve Ukrainian forces as much as possible. Trading some territories and small towns (Vuhledar is nothing but a big village) for the preservation of troops is the best decision.

You assume that this would make for a successful defense, but I suspect it wouldn't. Drones aren't a panacea. Russian leadership had the same kind of mindset, except for them it was UAV-directed artillery filling that role. We can see how well it went in Kharkov region, in '22. Ugledar is definitely a town and not a big village, but that's not the point. The point is that Russia was "enjoying" very minor successes at a considerable cost when Ukraine had sufficient forces in the area. Russia is enjoying much greater successes at a much lower cost now that Ukraine doesn't have the troops there.

Ukraine can defend successfully from prepared, adequately manned, positions for a long time. Ukraine tends to fail when they don't have those prepared positions, or when they don't have enough troops. I'm not even sold that the smaller presence at Ugledar necessarily means less casualties. Picking well entrenched infantry out of positions is hard, but hitting troops retreating because there are too few of them to hold can be easy (look at the retreat from Avdeevka). If Russia ties the noose around Ugledar, Ukraine could take larger one-time losses then months of sitting in the defense would have meant.

Yes, without irony, a push into the Bryansk Region would be another interesting development as it's possibly even less defended than Kursk. Ukrainians could move much deeper into Russia. Then bring HIMARS into Russian logistic range (some ammpo depot ot something). The problem is that Lukashenko could then intervene.
Of course the best would take Belgorod or its vincinity. But Russians are massively regrouped there.

It would require troops to be deployed there. Troops Ukraine likely can't spare. A Kursk incursion while losing a series of towns in the Donbas isn't worth it. A Bryansk incursion, while stretching forces in the Donbas even thinner and losing even more ground is even less worth it. Remember these incursions are ultimately unsustainable, and that was a common theme in commentary on the incursion practically from the beginning.

The lack of effect on the front line is theoretical. You don't have a crystal ball telling you what would be had the Kursk intrusion not happened. One thing is that if Russians didn't remove significant troops, they couldn't send additional ones as much as they wanted.
More concretely the effect was felt in the Karkiv/Volkshansk axis.

Russia's distraction that was clearly meant to draw Ukrainian forces to it, is the thing that stopped once Ukraine drew it's own forces voluntarily to Kursk. Well that certainly makes sense, but you don't seriously suggest that it was worth it?

It doesn't mean it was useless. Thousands of Russians who were not supposed to be involved in war were dragged into it. Ukrainians secured a large prisoner exchange in a promptly manner.
Yet, the most important is perhaps the information we got about the state of readiness of the Russian Army: Disastrous.
This operation told us whether Russians had a reaction force in case of emergency. The answer is not. The Russian territorial defence is inoperant. Add to this the failed Sarmat test and you get the cherry on the cake.
(I just see that they was another big explosion in Moscow, but didn't watch it yet...)

It was a waste of resources. It wasn't entirely useless but the resource expenditure was out of all proportion to any useful results. Consequently Ukraine is now feeling the absence of those troops at the front.

 

[KipPotapych]

Ukrainians are asking why “Russian defeat” at Liptsi and Vovchansk aren’t reported in the Western media, likely referring to the takeover of the aggregate plant in Vovchansk.

Post on X: x.com

Interestingly, the prerogative is that Russians have achieved there nothing in 5 months.

The recapture of the plant was boasted as some carefully planned and executed complex operation by the HUR. According to HUR’s statement,

The Russians turned the aggregate plant into their propaganda "fortress", using in its defense the most motivated and professional units, among which there were even fighters of the 45th brigade of SpP airborne troops (Kubinka, Moscow).

While I haven’t been following Russian sources on Telegram and the like, or not nearly close enough, in the past couple of months, I have been following the Russian news media as close as I usually do and can say that I haven’t seen too many mentions (if any at all) of the aggregate plant there. Definitely no mentions of “fortresses” and the like. That seems to be the Ukrainian thing. Granted, I do not read RIA and the like, for my own sanity. Let’s see how propaganda is actually created though…

Several dozen Russians are blocked at the aggregate plant in Vovchansk, Kharkiv region. They are trying to break through but are constantly suffering losses, said Oleh Syniehubov, Kharkiv Oblast Governor.

From June 26 report by the Ukrainian outlet: Governor: Several dozens Russian troops blocked at aggregate plant in Vovchansk, Kharkiv region

Russian troops may have seized the entire aggregate plant in Vovchansk, reported the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), citing geolocation footage on July 28.[…]

“It is unclear when Russian forces seized the plant, however. Fighting also continued near Hlyboke and elsewhere within Vovchansk,” ISW reported.

Same outlet report from July 31: ISW: Russians may have seized aggregate plant in Vovchansk, Kharkiv region. Of note here, the Ukrainian officials have denied it and said that the plant was seized from the very beginning of the Russian offensive (suggesting end of May-ish to mid-June?).

“The number of Russian troops still blocked at the aggregate plant constantly decreases. Currently, about 40 of them are there. They have food and ammunition delivered by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and they cannot leave,” Sarantsev said.

Same outlet reported on August 6: Military: Russians have occupied Vovchansk aggregate plant since the beginning of new offensive in Kharkiv region, not seized it recently

"They (the Russians – ed.) use drones to carry out logistics tasks. They use them to deliver water, ammunition and medicines. In particular, this is what is happening in the blocked area near Vovchansk, i.e. at the aggregate plant...

At the very beginning, there were about 40 soldiers there. They are suffering losses there. They have killed and wounded alike. There are wounded who can't walk, there are wounded who still can fight. A certain number of them remain there, I cannot say the exact number for certain reasons."

Reported by Ukrainska Pravda on Aug 25: Russian troops remain trapped at aggregate plant in Vovchansk for several months

In the meantime, Russians (as well as Ukrainians) have been shelling the plant ever since their Kharkiv offensive began and there was a recent, I want to say about 3 weeks ago, fairly massive bombardment of this plant by Russia. Unfortunately, I am was not able to locate the video - saw it posted at several outlets and described as Russians shelling their own at the plant. Here is some reference though:

He specifically commented on reports that the occupation forces recently struck their own forces at the Aggregate Plant using a heavy flamethrower system, Solntsepyok.

"Perhaps they decided to ease the suffering of the trapped Russians at the plant. I don't know the answer; I can't get into their heads. But indeed, this is not the first time that strikes on the Aggregate Plant and the surrounding areas by the Russians have been recorded, as we haven't been responsible for these attacks," Cherniak noted.

Posted by RBC-Ukriane a couple of days ago: Aggregate plant in Vovchansk becomes problem for Russia: Potential good news for Ukraine

Note from the same article:

There are currently a few of them left there, many of whom are incapacitated.

Then HUR report yesterday:

As a result of an extremely complex and successful operation, the GUR units completely liberated the territory of the Vovchan aggregate plant and destroyed the occupiers in all the buildings of the enterprise.[…]

The fighters of the GUR MOU carried out a systematic sweep of the plant's buildings, constantly engaging in contact battles with the enemy in densely built-up conditions. In some cases, Ukrainian special forces engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy.[…]

Despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, the fighters of the GUR MOU managed to destroy the enemy, take prisoners and replenish the exchange fund.

I am assuming the “hand-combat” part comes from the same universe as the “hiked on foot 800 km” or whatever it was.

Головне управління розвідки МО України

Підрозділи ГУР звільнили від окупантів Вовчанський агрегатний завод ✔️ В результаті надзвичайно складної та успішної операції підрозділи ГУР повністю звільнили територію Вовчанського агрегатного заводу та знищили окупантів в усіх будівлях підприємства. У вівторок, 24 вересня, о 14:40...

t.me

There is a video of the “storm” and everything, as well as a photo op, including the planning with Budanov, in the next few posts:

Головне управління розвідки МО України

‼️ Вовчанський агрегатний завод — під контролем України! Це була важка битва, але воїни ГУР МО України здолали російських загарбників і здобули важливу перемогу — силою зброї і духу, майстерністю думки та небувалою сміливістю. Честь хоробрим! ⚔️ Продовжуємо боротьбу за вільну Україну...

t.me

Головне управління розвідки МО України

ГУР в інших соціальних мережах: Facebook YouTube Viber Instagram Twitter Threads WhatsApp Telegram Bot TikTok

t.me

Головне управління розвідки МО України

Люди памʼятатимуть воїнів, які не відвернули погляду перед загрозою, а зробили сміливий крок у горнило битви! ✨ Крізь пекельний пил від вибуху авіабомб пробивається впевнено вранішній промінь сонця, рухається посіченою уламками стіною і проникає далі у простір — освітлює шлях бійцю ГУР...

t.me

Finally, an article in the western media, as the poster I mentioned in my previous post demanded: Fighting Hand To Hand, Ukrainian Commandos Just Cleared The Last Starving Russians From A Concrete Fortress In Vovchansk. “Concrete fortress” is how they refer to the plant.

So out of the 40 that were stuck at the plant from the beginning and that kept taking heavy causalities over the past three months, and “several dozens”, ie 40, that remained a month ago, 20 of the most motivated and capable fierce VDV, though starving, incapacitated, wounded and can’t walk, but some still able to fight, were captured by HUR forces after engaging in hand-to-hand combat, killing “several dozens”, of course. Yes, that sentence is hard to follow and somewhat confusing, just like the entire story and the official statements that they couldn’t follow themselves. Source for the numbers of captured and killed:

Intelligence units capture 20 Russian soldiers, kill dozens in Vovchansk Aggregate Plant liberation

Ukrainian forces from the Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) have liberated the Vovchansk Aggregate Plant in Kharkiv Oblast, capturing nearly 20 Russian soldiers and killing several dozen more, according to a HUR officer with the call sign Viking.

english.nv.ua

In the meantime, Russians reportedly dropped a few more thermobaric bombs on the plant overnight:

Военный Осведомитель

Ночью наши войска нанесли удар термобарическими боеприпасами по развалинам цехов агрегатного завода в Волчанске, которые контролировались противником. Интересно, что накануне ГУР Украины сообщило об освобождении агрегатного завода, находившегося в серой зоне, и опубликовало довольно пафосный...

t.me

The post also says:

It is interesting that the day before, the GUR of Ukraine reported the liberation of the aggregate plant, which was located in the gray zone, and published a rather pompous video showing the storming of empty workshops.

I’d say it is hard to decide who to believe in this case. Epic Russian defeat in Kharkiv or another staged Ukrainian propaganda video and photo op? Hmm…

More evidence that further suggests towards the latter, from just over a week ago:



Thread on X: x.com





This could probably be continued into a couple more posts, but this is probably sufficient. "Fool me once, shame on, shame on you. Fool me ... you can't get fooled again!" (C) Bush Jr.

 

[Feanor]

Didn’t fit into the previous post:

Some (very) Ukrainian outlets are suggesting that the Ukrainian public should prepare “morally and psychologically” that the Ukrainian forces will withdraw from Selidove, Toretsk, and Vuhledar in short order.

Zvиздец Мангусту

Я бы порекомендовал нашему гражданскому обществу быть морально и психологически готовым к тому, что ВСУ отойдут из Селидово, Торецка и Угледара Это совсем необязательно должно случиться. И я очень хотел бы ошибаться. Но из той информации, которая есть у меня, это очень вероятный сценарий...

t.me

Ukrainians are asking why “Russian defeat” at Liptsi and Vovchansk aren’t reported in the Western media, likely referring to the takeover of the aggregate plant in Vovchansk.

View attachment 51791

Post on X: x.com

Interestingly, the prerogative is that Russians have achieved there nothing in 5 months.

Yeah that's almost comical. Lose several towns and expect to lose several more. Recapture a half-demolished factory in another town where the town is still contested. Why, oh why, isn't the media singing our praises?

 

[seaspear]

There is debate of course on merits of the Kursk incursion ,but there was not the losses as per short lived summer offensive against heavy minefields ,what seems apparent is the political effect in Russia to such incursion and the morale boost to Ukrainian population certainly footage of Ukrainian troops providing assistance to the local civilians in Kursk captures the narrative who respond with the tales of looting by retreating Russian forces

 

[Feanor]

It appears Ugledar is done. The problem is not so much the Russian assault on the south-east. The problem is the Russian push north-west of the town which is the hammer, against the anvil of Russian positions north-east of it in the mine complex. If Ukrainian command has no strength for a major counter-push, and this seems to be the case, then they need to withdraw in a hurry.

On a side-note, many have commented, and I concur, that this is a direct consequence of Ukraine wasting troops in Kursk region. That "success" will bear other similar fruit in other areas (consider how quickly Russia is plowing through the center of Toretsk). If I was Russia I would hope Ukraine tries another large cross-border push, maybe this time in Bryansk region. Ideally with thousands of troops committed to months of fighting, and pulled from both their strategic reserve and the front line in the Donbas.

View attachment 51784

An absolutely fantastic photo that shows the precariousness of Ukrainian positions in Ugledar. The red lines show what's currently confirmed under Russian control. Exiting through the neck of this cauldron will be difficult and bloody. Meanwhile Russia has full control over the eastern side of the town. Meanwhile Russian troops continue to also advance north of the Ugledar area. I suspect Russia's offensive won't stop here but will aim to push towards Kurakhovo from the south.

Colonelcassad

Обстановка в Угледаре. Горловина для выхода пока сохраняется, но сопряжена с серьезным риском для жизни. Схема https://t.me/zovpobedy/13224

t.me

Suriyakmaps

Ukrainian-Russian war. Day 944: Situation southwest of Donetsk: During the last 48 hours Russian Army captured the last section of T-05-24 road south of Kostyantynivka & continued the advance towards Katerynivka. Meanwhile, during the last hours Russian Army secured the western dachas of...

t.me

 

[KipPotapych]

There is debate of course on merits of the Kursk incursion ,but there was not the losses as per short lived summer offensive against heavy minefields ,what seems apparent is the political effect in Russia to such incursion and the morale boost to Ukrainian population certainly footage of Ukrainian troops providing assistance to the local civilians in Kursk captures the narrative who respond with the tales of looting by retreating Russian forces

I don’t think we know what losses they are sustaining in Kursk. We don’t know what losses the Russians are sustaining there either. Judging simply by the equipment that Ukraine had lost in Russia and the amount of bombs dropped and drone strikes, I would think they are significant. Moreover, these losses contribute to higher losses (including land) in Ukraine, where it matters most. Are these numbers comparable to the 2023 offensive? Probably not, but the magnitude and scope of the fighting isn’t the same either.

Here is one source that provides a glimpse of the losses among the Russians. Note that I cannot say anything in regard to the reliability of this source whatsoever. I can say that they post seldom (very - 12 posts since Aug 1, for example), but a lot of what they post that can be verified to some extent at the time of the posts or at some point later (not a lot) usually checks out. Posts like this one, however are not as simply verifiable, so a few pounds of salt. I would also argue that this is how a propaganda outlet would operate, but I have no evidence one way or the other. They basically post about Russian f-ups and losses, be it equipment, ammunition, or personnel.

Досье Шпиона

❗️Потери ВС РФ в Курской области. Информация состоянием на 20.09.2024. «200» – 1031 военнослужащий; «300» - 8395 военнослужащих; Пропавших без вести – 302 военнослужащих (226 срочников, 52 контрактника, 24 ПУ ФСБ РФ); В плену – 289 военнослужащих (из которых 262 уже обменяны). @dosye_shpiona

t.me

So according to that post, as of Sept 20, the Russian forces “permanently” lost 1,031 troops in Kursk. The number of wounded stands at 8,395. Missing in action is another 302, of which 226 are conscripts, 52 are the contract troops, and 24 are FSB border guards. It also suggests that 289 were captured PoWs, of which 262 were already exchanged.

While unnecessary, I am going to state this again: I have no idea whether these numbers are reliable and I do not have any evidence to support or refute these numbers. Assuming these numbers are rubbish, there is nothing to discuss. Assuming we can somewhat trust the source (to be clear, I do not suggest doing so), there are some things these numbers can tell us. First, they can tell us the relative composition of the Russian forces in the region in the beginning stages of the offensive by looking at the MiA numbers: 75% conscripts, 17% volunteers that signed a contract, and 8% FSB border guards. I would assume some of the 17 and 8% were the commanding officers, but many of the 8% were likely conscripts as well. This composition I am sure has changed since then, but it still gives us hints about what’s what and it correlates quite well with the approximations we talked about earlier - I believe I said about 80% were conscripts and that is reasonably right when you add the conscripted FSB personnel.

Second thing these numbers tell us is that in poorly prepared defense positions - actually very well prepared but poorly defended positions, haha - Russians lost in all (killed, wounded, captured, mising) about 10K in personnel in about a month and a half of fighting. However, this number also includes quite a few conscripts killed snd wounded in those rather terrible HIMARS strikes that we talked about in the beginning of August. It also includes some number of lost personnel during the “chaos and organization” period, which lasted probably a couple of weeks, perhaps 3 weeks (?). In other words, likely the majority of these casualties would not necessarily happen in the “everyday events” type of thing in this conflict. I mean it would be fair to assume (or even state with a fair degree of confidence) that these troops were not trained, equipped, or otherwise prepared for the events that took place. We can try and talk about projections of these losses to the Ukrainian side and frontline elsewhere, but I do not want to want to start st this time.

As for the political effect of the offensive in Russia, I posted not long ago citing a very reliable source that talked about it. Basically the support for ending the war has since dropped, while the support for continuing the “special military operation” has increased by 7-10% (?). It is rather trivial (to me) and I am not sure why people find it hard to believe.

Ukrainian troops helping the local civilians in Kursk is not particularly an attractive point simply because there are too many contradicting statements, some of which include documented firing at the civilians, for example. I really cannot comment on the subject much more as I simply do not have any information that I can rely on at all. I can say that in many of the helping videos that I saw, the civilians speak with “Ukrainian accent”. Note that this is not to suggest about some fabrications or anything of the nature since it is very plausible and believable (or so I think).

Last thing in regard to Kursk, a rare statement by Dyumin was quoted today in the Russian press. Dyumin is currently a Putin’s aide and (very prematurely, imo) referred to by some as Putin’s potential successor. Today he said Kursk will be liberated very soon and his basis for that is the plan of the General Staff that he reviewed. Whether this actually means anything remains to be seen - such as intensified counteroffensive, etc. I think Russians have recaptured more land in Kursk in the past couple of days, but I haven’t been really following, so I can be corrected on this. Reference for Dyumin’s statement:

Помощник Путина спрогнозировал скорое освобождение Курской области

Помощник президента России Алексей Дюмин заявил, что в скором времени территория Курской области будет полностью освобождена, передает ТАСС. Он основывает свой прогноз на существующем плане Генштаба

lenta.ru

An absolutely fantastic photo that shows the precariousness of Ukrainian positions in Ugledar.

That’s funny, because I was going to post almost the exact same thing. This guy takes the credit for the creation of the “map” - my guess is he got the idea from what you posted - but he does add some more colours: green represents the two remaining dirt roads in and out of town, red is the territory under Russian control, and blue is the land controlled by Ukraine - anything in between blue and red is obviously the “grey zone”.



Post on X: x.com

Why there are still Ukrainian troops in that town I have no idea, really. Is it because there are no prepared lines to fall to? Very likely as it appears to be the case everywhere else. Is it because Zelensky is currently in the US trying to show viability and his victory plan? Just as likely, in my opinion.

The Americans have announced another aid package to Ukraine worth $375M and includes HIMARS munitions, M1117s, artillery ammunition, boats, etc. Here are the contents:



The biggest news, however, is going to hit tomorrow, reportedly, when the US announces the largest package yet worth a whopping $8B.

https://www.reuters.com/world/us-prepares-8-billion-arms-aid-packages-zelenskiy-visit-sources-say-2024-09-25/

$5.6 is coming from the drawdown from stocks and $2.4B from the USAI programme. None of this $8B is coming any time soon though since the stocks had been depleted beyond the comfortable level of the United States. It can be kind of seen from the contents of the $375M package announced today, in my opinion.

Can I use this opportunity and say

Because

There maybe a very significant military aid package announced by the US in the near future - perhaps, coinciding with Zelensky’s visit.

I will post more on the depleted stocks tomorrow (maybe), but here is the last thing for today: a look at the thermite drop from the ground, I believe that’s a first.

Exilenova+

Видел отчет работы fpv «Дракарис» по позициям русни... публика довольна

t.me

The same video on X:

x.com

x.com

Not nearly as bad as it looks from the sky, no? There were a few videos of Russians doing the same thing recently.

 

[Capt. Ironpants]

Why are there still Ukrainian troops in that town I have no idea, really. Is it because there are no prepared lines to fall to? Very likely as it appears to be the case everywhere else. Is it because Zelensky is currently in the US trying to show viability and his victory plan? Just as likely, in my opinion.

Just a quick peek in here, but according to this channel (UKR 46th BDE) your guess re Zelensky in US is correct:

https://t.me/oaembr46

Those poor guys, reportedly some of Ukraine's finest.

EDITED to add: Well, this is embarrassing. I thought I saw that on this channel (staying put in Ugledar) but now I can't find the post. I used to be able to "get" about 70% of Ukrainian because it's close enough to Russian, but these days it's down to about 50% unless it's pretty simple. My sincere apologies! Maybe someone with better language skills can spot it. Or maybe I misremembered where I saw that.

Ref the aggregate plant in Vovchansk, the latest videos I have seen show it reduced to rubble, with pretty much everything around flattened. I can't understand how or why the Russians would try to hold it as there is no cover whatsoever. And maybe I am missing something, but won't the Ukrainians be just as exposed once they occupy that ground?

 

[Fredled]

They could have been activated elsewhere with more relevant results. And the losses they took as a result of this type activation are substantially higher then they would have been had they sat in the rear, hiding. Ukrainian troops lose way more attacking then they do defending. If the goal is to bleed Russia, given the nature of this war and Russian air superiority, it should be done defensively, they way it has been done defensively before.

Ukrainians troops have had more losses in one month during their Special Military Operation in Kursk than they would have by staying behind the border. But they didn't have more losses in this month of operation than they had during one year of no operation.
That the Ukrainian losses in Kursk was disproportionate and/or that Russian losses were smaller or not higher remains to be verified with tangible evidence.

About the defence in the Donbas: You overestimate the effect of the "line of defence". They help, but they don't resist intensive aerial bombing. The other thing is that it's materialy impossible for Ukraine to build solid lines of defence everywhere and one several layer. If you build one line, you need two or three behind it in case the first and the second falls. This would be disproportionate spending, and probably there isn't enough excavators and material to do the job. Disproportionate in the sens that it would barely stop the Russian for an extra two or three weeks, the time they carpet bomb the area.

The same with the precious Leopards and Abrams and the best trained troops: It's only a matter of time for the Russians to destroy them with MLRS, artillery and drones. Just for the sake of keeping the Russian advance slower, while it's already slow enough, it's not worth their sacrifice. So, yes, Russians are advancing faster than they would with the modern Ukrainian reserves on the front line, but at least Ukrainians keep these reserves safe or use them in Kursk.

Basically the support for ending the war has since dropped, while the support for continuing the “special military operation” has increased by 7-10% (?). It is rather trivial (to me) and I am not sure why people find it hard to believe.

It was not the goal of this special operation. Ukrainians don't pay much attention to this because the Russian population have no way to express their opposition and enough men are attracted by the high pay to replace the dead ones and continue the war.

An absolutely fantastic photo that shows the precariousness of Ukrainian positions in Ugledar. About Vuhledar or Vugledar, the picture

It also shows how small this "town" is. It was typical of Soviet Union to build high rise outside urban areas, in the middle of empty fields.

 

[Feanor]

It also shows how small this "town" is. It was typical of Soviet Union to build high rise outside urban areas, in the middle of empty fields.

It's comparable to most of the Donbas towns. They're mostly what are called mono-cities. A single city-forming enterprise, in the Donbas usually a mining complex or a factory, and the town is built around it. Avdeevka, Krasnogorovka, Ukrainsk, Novogrodovka, Selidovo, Gornyak, they're all of this variety. Kurakhovo and Mirnograd also fall neatly into this pattern. I'm not sure about Pokrovsk, but all the things we would talk about in this area as towns look similar to this. Some have larger or smaller "private sector" neighborhoods with houses vs apartments.

Ref the aggregate plant in Vovchansk, the latest videos I have seen show it reduced to rubble, with pretty much everything around flattened. I can't understand how or why the Russians would try to hold it as there is no cover whatsoever. And maybe I am missing something, but won't the Ukrainians be just as exposed once they occupy that ground?

It seems Russia captured it at some point likely as part of an effort to continue offensive actions, and then stopped once priorities shifted. And to your point, after Russia lost the plant, they proceeded to pummel it with bombs and thermobaric rockets.