The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

seaspear

Well-Known Member
Update.

Kursk area.

Ukrainian attacks towards the Glushkovskoe area seem to have slowed down. Russian forces have also advanced far enough east that they're harder to cut off from Russian forces near Korenevo. Russia's own advance has reached Sverdlikovo and seems to be halted. Meanwhile from the eastern side Russian forces have gained some ground towards Plekhovo. The scheme of Russia's counter-offensive here seems clear. They're attacking along the border towards the base of the Ukrainian salient, likely hoping to force a withdrawal.


An interesting video of the 83rd VDV Bde operating in Kursk region. You can't really see the assault, only sort of guess the directionality based on the bursts of fire, but allegedly they're assaulting and clearing a Ukrainian strong point with an assault detachment on two BMD-2s.


VDV 56th Regiment carrying out drone strikes against Ukrainian vehicles. Warning footage of corpses.


Russian FPV drones double-tap a Ukrainian tank. Note the EW causing signal issues but not preventing the strikes.


Russian FAB strikes near Malaya Loktnya.


Russian Molniya drone strikes a Ukrainain Kozak armored car.


A series of Russian drone strikes on knocked out Ukrainian vehicles near Tetkino and a couple of strikes on on a BMP and a tank.


Russian loitering munition (looks like a Kub to me) strikes allegedly a Ukrainian M777. We can't make out what it hits, but ammo clearly cooks off.


A Ukrainian BTR-4, possibly abandoned, getting taken out.


Ukrainian Leo-2A5 getting hit in the Glushkovo area.


Another Leopard getting hit, allegedly a 2A6 but I can't tell, it might be another 2A5.


A strange incident took place near Veseloe. Allegedly this Ukrainian crew attempted to surrender with their CV90 to Russia, but were shot by a friendly ATGM to prevent this. Other sources claim it hit a land mine. Details are lacking but allegedly the white fabric was a surrender marker.


More footage of destroyed Ukrainian vehicles as part of the failed attacks in the Glushkovo area.


Russian drone strike takes out a Ukrainian pickup and BTR-60 in the Kursk area.


Russian UCAV strikes continue, this time against an alleged Ukrainian staging area. an IMR-2, and multiple other targets


Russian UAV-directed artillery fires at Ukrainian troops attacking towards Veseloe.


Russian strike on a Ukrainian crossing near Kursk region. It's unclear which crossing this is and which side of the border this is.


Russian Iskander strike in Khrapovschina, Sumy region, and a storage facility in Sumy itself. Allegedly the former is a Ukrainian staging area.


Russian strike on Shaposhnikovo, Sumy region, targetting allegedly a HIMARS. We do see a pair of Ukrainian vehicles and one looks like it might be a HIMARS.


Russia strikes a Ukrainian 2S1 in Sumy region.


Russian Marines from the 155th show off a destroyed Ukrainian mobile element with either 2 or 3 destroyed Humvees and a pickup. Maneuver elements like this were all over the area and created much panic and confusion, but usually carried very small sized elements, either squad or platoon sized typically, though there were a few entire companies.


A knocked out M113, Kursk area.


A new Ukrainian drone type downed in Kursk region, allegedly called Palyanitsa (bread).


Russian forces show off a captured M577 in Kursk region, captured near Veseloe or near Korenevo, sources disagree. They also have apparently captured an abandoned T-72AV with a KMT-6 mine trawl. The latter is something Russia can and will easily use.


A group of 4 Russian conscripts spent 39 days cut off in the woods near Dar'ino. They apparently maintained comms with the 155th MarBde passing on intelligence, and staying hidden. My suspicion is they used cell phones, possibly Telegram, or something similar to communicate. I doubt they had radio comms.


Russian Mi-28NM with Kh-39s taking off. I wonder if the regular Mi-28N can use Kh-39s or Vikhr-1s.


Russian Molniya drone being prepared for launch, Kursk region.


A scarce Ukrainian 2S7 in support of their Kursk forces.


Ukraine has begun using ground-based drones with machineguns in Kursk region. They're wheeled unlike their Russian counter-parts, the Kurier drone.


A Ukrainian M60 AVLB in Kursk region, presumably they inteded to force the Seym.


Kharkov area.

Russian forces have reportedly withdrawn from the factory complex in Volchansk. They then proceeded to strike the area with thermobarics.


Russian Molniya loitering munition strike on a Ukrainian staging area.


Russian large bomb strikes with a FAB-3000 and 3 FAB-1500s in Volchansk.


Russian FPV drone hits a Ukrainian SUV near Liptsi.


Russian strike on a industrial building where allegedly a Ukrainian Vampir MLRS was hiding.


Ukrainian strikes on Belgorod continue. 4 civilians are reported wounded.


Ukrainian drone hit an apartment in Belgorod, unclear if intentionally.


Battle damage to a residential building in Kharkov after a Russian strike. Russian sources claims this was done by a Ukrainian SAM but the extent of the damage makes this unlikely.

 

Fredled

Active Member
Feanor said:
A strange incident took place near Veseloe. Allegedly this Ukrainian crew attempted to surrender with their CV90 to Russia, but were shot by a friendly ATGM to prevent this. Other sources claim it hit a land mine. Details are lacking but allegedly the white fabric was a surrender marker.
Yes it's strange. However it can be hit by Russian fire as well as Ukrainian fire.
Russians thinking it's a trap or just didn't see the white flag. If it's Ukrainian flag, it's probably turncoats moving to the Russian side. They could get a nice reward for delivering a CV90. It was not soldiers durrendering because they were surrounded or helpless. Their vehicle seemed fine and driving at high speed. When you really want to surrender, you drive slowly and usually you do it when your vehicle had been severly hit, preferably disabled.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Yes it's strange. However it can be hit by Russian fire as well as Ukrainian fire.
Russians thinking it's a trap or just didn't see the white flag. If it's Ukrainian flag, it's probably turncoats moving to the Russian side. They could get a nice reward for delivering a CV90. It was not soldiers durrendering because they were surrounded or helpless. Their vehicle seemed fine and driving at high speed. When you really want to surrender, you drive slowly and usually you do it when your vehicle had been severly hit, preferably disabled.
Yeah, I don't think anyone is claiming they were surrendering out of necessity. The claim is that the treeline they were shot at from was under Ukrainian control but unfortunately the current war is too messy and too little information is available. It's possible they had an agreement with Russia for a safe corridor to surrender to Russian forces, and they were gunning it to avoid other Ukrainian soldiers from doing something about it. I don't think they were turncoats in the sense that they wanted to fight for Russia, more likely they figured it was safer to surrender then to risk their lives fighting. And if so, they miscalculated pretty badly.

On a side note, we really don't know if this is true. It's possible the white sheet is something that got caught on the vehicle, and they were moving quickly to pass through a dangerous spot when they were hit by a Russian munition. I'll see if anything else shakes out about this.

I've seen many reports from Russian sources that claim Ukrainian forces will fire on other Ukrainian forces trying to surrender, but I consider the credibility of the reports low. It's not that it isn't happening, it might be (it also might not be). It's just that we need something more concrete then Russian reports. In principle it would make sense given the unwilling population, forcible draft methods, and massive AWOL problem, that there would be a pattern of some Ukrainian service members who would rather surrender than fight.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
A couple of excerpts from a recent Economist article:

IMG_7167.jpeg

IMG_7168.jpeg

The first one also shows the Ukrainian numbers “from earlier this year” cited in the WSJ article I mentioned in my previous recent post. What’s true and what’s not, we don’t know. Here, the departed in the field to wounded ratio for the Russians seems to be fairly reasonable. I talked about the losses a few times and believe discussed more or less extensively earlier this year why, in my opinion, they cannot be very different on both sides. What I find funny (word used within the limitations of the subject matter discussed) is that there are people discussing the above information and some say that the Ukrainian numbers are too low (citing Russian propaganda) and some say that the Russian numbers are too low (citing mostly Ukrainian propaganda).

The second shows the number of troops at the front, as well as the point brought up by Feanor in his recent update in regard to the “absent without leave”. I think this number sounds way more reasonable than the 100,000 cited in Feanor’s post. I have seen various numbers provided by various sources, but I cannot comprehend 100K or roughly 25%, personally. Some of the explanations I saw discussed by the Ukrainian outlets is that there is a good chunk written in that 100K that also represents those that are missing in action, killed but reported as such to reduce the casualties, killed but written as such to reduce the payments, etc. Take it all as hearsay (which it really is, even I find the articles), but I do not believe I would be able to find references for these claims even if I wanted to - so purely for discussion purposes, so to speak. I can also see those who surrendered to be written into the 100,000. Many more categories, really, that combined could produce such a high number. I can also easily see 10% to be on point, provided the current methods of mobilization and so on.

One more thing to note is that the number of those leaving the duties to maybe come back is not the only issue. Without any citations (ie, take as gossip, which, again, it is) Ukrainian outlets have previously discussed that those who leave and come back whenever they want aren’t really getting any real punishment either, especially if they are (to some degree) capable troops, because there is no one to replace them with.

Anyway, source for the tweet: x.com. And the paywalled Economist article: Ukraine is on the defensive, militarily, economically and diplomatically

Back to the Ukrainian fortifications that were discussed not long ago. Deepstate’s post from today shows more unfinished and quite subpar fortifications from Hirnyk.


Same post on X: x.com

They say that there are also positions that were better built (they call it “built with attention”) but there is simply no one to fill them with. They also say that the same picture can be seen throughout most of the Pokrovsk region and elsewhere. Their conclusion is that the entire fate of defending these positions will basically fall on drone operators, which is obviously not a prudent or sustainable strategy. I also saw rumours that they are pulling units out of Kherson to defend Pokrovsk (and some being sent to Kursk as well).

Mind-boggling stuff, really. Fortifications I mean. No positions to fall to unless some natural boundary prevents (or slows) further enemy advances seems to be normality here. Which is probably why they are still defending Vuhledar, losing some of the best troops. Again.

Speaking of Vuhledar. An excerpt from another recent article, this time in Financial Post. I want to note here that the situation described is not necessarily applicable to the entire front, but the Vuhledar only. I see many people discussing this issue being quite confused about this very point. The commanders and troops interviewed are from the 72nd brigade that has been responsible for Vuhledar for a very long time, so this cannot be simply projected elsewhere. These projections happen quite a bit, but it is not a reasonable way to process the information presented.

IMG_7169.jpeg

Post on X: x.com. The original article: Subscribe to read

It looks like that there will be no Ukrainian strikes with Western weapons “deep into Russia”. Shortly, the article suggests that the US intel sees that the benefits of such strikes are not worth the risks. An excerpt:

U.S. intelligence agencies believe that Russia is likely to retaliate with greater force against the United States and its coalition partners, possibly with lethal attacks, if they agree to give the Ukrainians permission to employ U.S., British and French-supplied long-range missiles for strikes deep inside Russia, U.S. officials said.

The intelligence assessment, which has not been previously reported, also plays down the effect that the long-range missiles will have on the course of the conflict because the Ukrainians currently have limited numbers of the weapons and it is unclear how many more, if any, the Western allies might provide.

The assessment highlights what intelligence analysts see as the potential risk and uncertain rewards of a high-stakes decision that now rests with President Biden, who met with President Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine at the White House on Thursday.



Not nearly everything I wanted to post, but it is Saturday (now Sunday) and I want to do something else (watch a short movie?) before heading to bed. With this post, I closed 7 (or 8?) tabs out of about 40 recent ones opened that I want to discuss out of 89 in total that are opened, haha. Maybe I should switch to some of my other hobbies for a while… If I suddenly stop posting, this is likely what happened, lol.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
An interesting article describing conditions for the Russians besieged in Vovchansk certainly grim not sure if anyone escaped though
I do not believe this is even a remotely credible source to rely on. Beyond the reliability of the source itself, the entire article relies on the statements of one individual that may (or may not?) have participated in the “storm” of Russian positions at the plant, a “storm” that may or may not have actually happened. All the evidence, some of which I posted recently, suggests that it is very likely made-up events to begin with - that is, the storm, the Russian positions, prisoners, etc.

unfortunately the current war is too messy and too little information is available
Imagine following something like this a few relatively short years ago and having to rely on the official statements and the “intel” of agencies from various countries with various interests in the conflict.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
Ordinarily you may dismiss such a claim of excesses by officers against their own but Russia has in many articles been described as having Chechens and others in the rear positions cited shoot Russian front line soldiers to prevent from retreating
https://www.forbes.com/sites/davida...wn-in-russias-kursk-oblast-and-take-a-record- number-of-russian-prisoners/
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
It appears that the Russians have attempted to spoil the Ukrainian triumph over the Vovchansk plant and “show them”. As a result, they reportedly lost about 125 (100 permanent and 25 wounded), as well as 16 or 17 MT-LBs, and a couple of tanks. To warn, there are dead bodies in the screenshot and video.


Crazy stuff. Dumb and dumber doesn’t have anything on these people.

Edit: to be clear, by “these people” I mean those making the decisions, such as to attack in this case.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
In the month of September, Russia has gained about 400 sq km. The biggest and majority of the gains were made at Pokrovsk direction and Kurakhove, about 160 sq km each. Oskol advances were about 60 sq km, while Kharkiv and Kramatorsk saw some minor advances.

In the Kursk region, Ukraine lost control of about 120 sq km.

Note that these numbers are as per Deepstate, which is usually or more often than not can be quite behind on updating these numbers.

IMG_7200.jpeg

Post on X: x.com

Interesting timing, but the commander of the 72nd brigade that defended Vuhledar for 2.5 years now, was first reported to had been dismissed and then reported as transferred for the purpose of promotion. The article cited below still says “dismissed” if you look at the url address. Both, the initial report and correction, were reported by the 72nd brigade itself.

IMG_7201.jpeg

Post on X: x.com

A Kyiv Independent article that talks about it:


This transfer has literally happened two days after the publication of the article I cited 4 or so posts above, discussing Vuhledar, interviews with troops and commanders, etc. Could very well be coincidental, especially as Vuhledar is falling, but could be not.

An excellent short thread on X amplifying the strategic significance of Pokrovsk for Ukraine: x.com

For those without an X account (I tried the unroll thing, but it only provides chunks of the posts, so not very useful), here are the briefs:

- Pokrovsk produces most of the coking coal in Ukraine crucial in steel production (separate note, completely unrelated but interesting - the UK shut down one of the big boys today that used coking coal, by the way - a historic event, really);
- currently, the main issue is a severe shortage of electricity expected in the winter and the rates are expected to rise by 20% for the metallurgy sector;
- the metallurgical plants are now operating at 65-75% capacity (the figure remains unchanged from 2023 to 2024);
- when Pokrovsk falls, the plan is to purchase coke from Poland and the US (West Virginia, Virginia, and Kentucky - huge and much needed boost to the economy in those states);
- clear consequences are reduced production of steel and increase in manufacturing costs, which is a blow to the Ukrainian economy overall, but their MIC in particular.

Perhaps, this explains the reports of mines still operating in Pokrovsk and kind of late evacuation of the personnel and supporting staff, which is thousand of people?

Not sure if many followed, but there was (is) “a bit” of a panic about a ship (called Ruby) loaded with 20K tonnes of ammonium nitrate that departed from Russia and headed for Malta (if I recall correctly) and had some mechanical issues on the way. Norway acted reasonably and let it park for a few days in its port and basically no one else in Europe is willing to accept it in their ports or even enter their territorial waters. First google search result for reference, but those interested in the story should google it:


Why is this relevant to this thread? Well, it seems like the “Russian sabotage” theory is really taking ahold of the, at least, most of the European authorities. This is surely not the first cargo carrying Russian fertilizer in such quantities. As one of the commentators described it, a storm in a cup, and I completely agree.

The UK MoD recently reported that the Ukrainians are not sending the agreed quota of personnel to be trained. They also said that their stockpiles are so low that they have ”slashed” the aid to Ukraine in the middle of last year.

IMG_7202.jpeg

Post on X: x.com. The original Times article: UK weapon stockpiles ‘threadbare’ after arming Ukraine

UK is not only country hat had raised these concerns recently. Germany did a while ago. So did Poland, I believe a long while ago. Among others. The last aid package from the US and the extension of the drawdown of $5.8B (?) from the existing resources in the US suggest a similar problem. As for the UK, this likely also implies the constraints on the availability of the Storm Shadow missiles for the proposed “deep into Russia” strikes.

Edit: this is a graph I wanted to attach as well:

IMG_7204.jpeg

Post on x: x.com

Just to note, these numbers are as reported by the Ukrainian General Staff.

Last edit: it certainly appears that long-range strikes into Russia are not going to be allowed for the time being.

[…]And don’t you think that Ukraine actually could be able to prevent those weekend attacks if it had permission to strike back?

MR MILLER: So I don’t have anything to expand on the statement that we put out. But of course, Ukraine – first of all, Ukraine does not need our permission to strike back against Russian targets. They are a sovereign country and can use the weapons that they build on their own, of which are many, if you look at the programs that they have put in place over the last year. And then when you look at the weapons that we have provided to them, we’ve made clear that they can use them to strike back against Russian targets across the border that are launching attacks.

So Ukraine does have an enormous amount of material to defend itself. We always look at whether there are additional tools that we can provide them. If you notice the announcement that the President made on Thursday, we are providing them with an additional $8 billion in security assistance, and we will continue to support them.

QUESTION: If you are okay with Ukraine’s striking back, then why not letting them strike back with your weapons?

MR MILLER: So Alex, first of all, I’m just going to say again that you and I have had this conversation before about other weapon systems that – or tactics that you presented to me as the one magic capability that would change the face of the conflict. And I think I have always made clear that that is not how we see it, that we look at all of the capabilities and all the tactics and all the support that we provide Ukraine in totality, and look at how – when we approve any new weapon system or any new tactic, we look at how it’s going to affect the entire battlefield and Ukraine’s entire strategy. And that’s what we’ll continue to do.[…]


Source: https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefing-september-30-2024/
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Ugledar has fallen, continuing the pattern of Russia taking out small towns around Donetsk, and it's the 4th since the Russian offensive on the Pokrovsk axis started advancing past Ukrainian defense lines. Krasnogorovka in July, Novogrodovka in August, Ukrainsk in September, and now Ugledar on effectively Oct 1st. Next in line are Selidovo and Gornyak. I'm not sure which one will be the focus, currently Russia is making flanking motions around both towns, extending lines to encircle them. I'm intentionally leaving Toretsk outside of this conversation because I don't think the actions there are directly tied to the bigger Donetsk area effort.
 

T.C.P

Well-Known Member
Ugledar has fallen, continuing the pattern of Russia taking out small towns around Donetsk, and it's the 4th since the Russian offensive on the Pokrovsk axis started advancing past Ukrainian defense lines. Krasnogorovka in July, Novogrodovka in August, Ukrainsk in September, and now Ugledar on effectively Oct 1st. Next in line are Selidovo and Gornyak. I'm not sure which one will be the focus, currently Russia is making flanking motions around both towns, extending lines to encircle them. I'm intentionally leaving Toretsk outside of this conversation because I don't think the actions there are directly tied to the bigger Donetsk area effort.
Considering the number of armoured assaults Vuldehar has survived in the last 2 years, has there been any other town/settlement that cost this much armour casualties from an attacking side to take in this war so far?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Considering the number of armoured assaults Vuldehar has survived in the last 2 years, has there been any other town/settlement that cost this much armour casualties from an attacking side to take in this war so far?
I think this is two separate things. One is a number of costly failed assaults that did not accomplish much of anything. The other is the fall of Ugledar that happened once Ukraine pulled some forces out and Russia managed to take over the flanks along a very wide front. I think it's important to understand that the second in no way depended on the first happening. In other words it was both possible for Ukraine to have continued to defend Ugledar for quite some time with relatively low casualties, and it was possible for Russia not to have taken those losses in botched attacks.

So two answer you, no definitely not worth it. But that can be said of this war in it entirety. Nothing Russia can possibly gain from this war justifies the inherent costs to invading Ukraine. I think I said this at the start, but I'll say it again. Even if the Ukrainian military had toppled like a house of cards, the locals welcomed Russian troops with open arms, and Zelensky committed suicide in a bunker, Russia would still have been worse off as a result of invading.

The significance here is that Ukraine is suddenly losing ground that it had previously defended successfully for a long time.The fight for Avdeevka was ~3 months. The fight for Krasnogorovka ~4 months (it started in iirc April). The fight for Novogrodovka lasted 3 days, and Ukrainsk was less then a week also. Ugledar itself was taken in also under a week. This is the problem Ukraine now faces. It's absolutely not worth it for Russia to expend resources the way they did in previous assaults. But it is worth it if they can do it the way they currently are.

EDIT: For general illustration purposes, not directly connected to this reply, here's a good map from z-archiv showing the situation west and south-west of Donetsk. Note they don't show Ugledar fallen, the change in area here is Sep 1st to Sep 30th. It illustrates the intent of Russian command quite well, they're conducting a major operation to collapse the entire south-Donetsk area. I don't even know that the actual fall of Kurakhovo is as significant as the broader picture, though I suspect that's part of the plan.

 
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Fredled

Active Member
Feanor said:
The significance here is that Ukraine is suddenly losing ground that it had previously defended successfully for a long time.The fight for Avdeevka was ~3 months. The fight for Krasnogorovka ~4 months (it started in iirc April). The fight for Novogrodovka lasted 3 days, and Ukrainsk was less then a week also. Ugledar itself was taken in also under a week.
If you look when Russian started their attempts to take Ugledar, it took them two years. Not one week.
The sudden accelerated pace of Russian advance is only the result of continual agression on Ukrainian facilities, logistics and forces on the front line. And this was made possible by increasing means of attack, like massive increase in flying bombs, shaheds, drones and virtually anything they can throw at it, pulling armours from soviet era storage and mass recruiting to maintain numerical superiority.
The intensity of attacks has increased year over year. The graph shown above speaks for itself.
It was a long term work. Not a sudden development caused by a recent event like the Kursk Incrusion or some failure to dig trenches.

The cause os much more deep rooted. Basicaly, it's Putin not taking care how much it costs and how long it takes as long as he sees some small progresses which give him motivation to continue this madness.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
A question might be is how sustainable in material terms are these advances with heavy losses of such ? Russia can bring in fresh troops at a price ,but the overwhelming material advantage is no longer ,certainly not to N.A.T.O in a conventional confrontation ,the economic strains to its economy in the funding of its war can be speculated on ,there is some sober reading in these articles even suggesting that Putin is unable to stop the war even if he wanted to
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
A question might be is how sustainable in material terms are these advances with heavy losses of such ? Russia can bring in fresh troops at a price ,but the overwhelming material advantage is no longer ,certainly not to N.A.T.O in a conventional confrontation ,the economic strains to its economy in the funding of its war can be speculated on ,there is some sober reading in these articles even suggesting that Putin is unable to stop the war even if he wanted to
Russia never really had an overwhelming material advantage on NATO. And it would be strange to think it had. Russia is one country, NATO is a gigantic military alliance boasting some of the world's leading economies. Without even mobilizing their economies, NATO provided thousands, possibly tens of thousands at this point, of armored vehicles to Ukraine.

As for sustainability, Russia can certainly not keep going like this forever. Ukrainian resistance isn't getting stronger, rather the opposite, it's getting weaker. So the question is whether Russia can keep going long enough to either force Ukraine to negotiate, or long enough to cause Ukraine to collapse under the strain of the war.

If you look when Russian started their attempts to take Ugledar, it took them two years. Not one week.
The sudden accelerated pace of Russian advance is only the result of continual agression on Ukrainian facilities, logistics and forces on the front line. And this was made possible by increasing means of attack, like massive increase in flying bombs, shaheds, drones and virtually anything they can throw at it, pulling armours from soviet era storage and mass recruiting to maintain numerical superiority.
The intensity of attacks has increased year over year. The graph shown above speaks for itself.
It was a long term work. Not a sudden development caused by a recent event like the Kursk Incrusion or some failure to dig trenches.

The cause os much more deep rooted. Basicaly, it's Putin not taking care how much it costs and how long it takes as long as he sees some small progresses which give him motivation to continue this madness.
We will have to agree to disagree. The pace of Russian advances increased drastically after Ukraine shifted their priorities.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group

economic strains to its economy in the funding of its war can be speculated on ,there is some sober reading in these articles even suggesting that Putin is unable to stop the war even if he wanted to

Western think tank already keep repeating the same problem in Russian economy throughout the years, and basically keep repeating their tone annually. Not saying they don't have base, but somehow also keep underestimating Russian resilience.

It won't change the fact that Russian economy basically and always been for decades corrupt oligarchs system but base on oil and gas and other commodities resources. Resources that can't be avoided by Global market.

This war already costing Russia, but also costing Euro zone. Both of them already make adjustments but both of them still need each other. For that continuous trade between them will continue trickling out sanctions barriers. They will try their best to get rid each other dependency as much as they can. However it will continue getting on, as both have some need from each other market.

Before the war, Western think tanks also already predict Russian continue collapsing as the oligarchs corruption will make it inevitable. Current global trend shown not always the control corruption environment bring down economy, and not always open rule compliance environment shield economy from deep recession.


for sustainability, Russia can certainly not keep going like this forever. Ukrainian resistance isn't getting stronger, rather the opposite, it's getting weaker. So the question is whether Russia can keep going long enough to either force Ukraine to negotiate, or long enough to cause Ukraine to collapse under the strain of the war.
That sum up the problem. Russia need to control their resources expense on this war. Personally I believe that's what make Russia not committing full resources on this war. Keep continue policy to treat the war as limited military campaign. Simply they have to limit the resources they can committing toward this war.

Western think tanks and media call Russia now on War Economy. I tend to see other way as similar with some of my colleagues in commodities desks see. Russia is on western substitution economies. Russia on that situation will depend much on non Western market and systems, thus means China and Global South like India and some others in Asia. All that to increase their own domestic industrial output in replacing their dependency toward Western products. That's actually the big game in town for Russia.

That's something that should be see whether Russia will be able to do that, instead the continues talk of collapse due to corruption. Russia is a corrupt system and so far shown it is always be. Still it is also manage to steer from collapsing for decades now due their control on big portions of commodities that world needs.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I think this is two separate things. One is a number of costly failed assaults that did not accomplish much of anything. The other is the fall of Ugledar that happened once Ukraine pulled some forces out and Russia managed to take over the flanks along a very wide front. I think it's important to understand that the second in no way depended on the first happening. In other words it was both possible for Ukraine to have continued to defend Ugledar for quite some time with relatively low casualties, and it was possible for Russia not to have taken those losses in botched attacks.

So two answer you, no definitely not worth it. But that can be said of this war in it entirety. Nothing Russia can possibly gain from this war justifies the inherent costs to invading Ukraine. I think I said this at the start, but I'll say it again. Even if the Ukrainian military had toppled like a house of cards, the locals welcomed Russian troops with open arms, and Zelensky committed suicide in a bunker, Russia would still have been worse off as a result of invading.

The significance here is that Ukraine is suddenly losing ground that it had previously defended successfully for a long time.The fight for Avdeevka was ~3 months. The fight for Krasnogorovka ~4 months (it started in iirc April). The fight for Novogrodovka lasted 3 days, and Ukrainsk was less then a week also. Ugledar itself was taken in also under a week. This is the problem Ukraine now faces. It's absolutely not worth it for Russia to expend resources the way they did in previous assaults. But it is worth it if they can do it the way they currently are.
I think this sums it up rather well. I will add, however, while I do believe that the Kursk incursion had significantly accelerated the Russian advances, I think the overall developments over the past… several months, call it this year for the most part, dictated the direction of the trajectory. Many blame the delayed approval of the aid bill in the US for what took place in Avdiivka and beyond, for example. While it is hard to disagree that it had an effect, I believe it was just another accelerant rather than the cause.

I believe what we have been witnessing over the past few months is the actual result of attrition of the Ukrainian forces, mixed in with questionable decisions by the Ukrainian command (as well some factors outside of their control - external aid). The latter goes way beyond just the few months in question though. There are many poor decisions that have been made, but probably the main one, in my opinion, is what seems like a complete disregard for the fortifications and lines to fall to. Past Avdiivka, Russia has now crossed the third and last line of defense going west. There are fortifications around Pokrovsk, which one may call the fourth line, but there is nothing south of it and that may cause the collapse of the entire south-eastern front, maybe more. Russia will be coming in from the flank and behind, as well as from the south, the former greatly degrading the ability of the Ukrainian forces to defend their positions, likely taking much more significant losses while doing so. I will attach a map below where you will see two or three defense lines, all facing south, that basically lose their purpose if things keep developing the way they do, which is most likely the case. Pokrovsk won’t matter at all then and it will be assaulted from at least two, maybe three, directions and it will fall. This isn’t a forecast, to be noted, and surely isn’t a week- or two-long venture. But this is now the most likely outcome it seems. I have talked about this a few times over the past month or two.

Mobilization was another blunder, of course, and one of the bigger ones. It is about to be a year (Or has it been already? Sorry, I am not firm on this timeline) since Zaluzhny first said that he needs another half a million men to hold positions and, maybe, counterattack. The mobilization law was finally passed in… May? 3-4 months ago? That’s obviously absolutely crazy stuff if Zelensky is serious about his “goals” - either he isn’t or he is delusional and I am fairly certain it is the latter. An acute lack of troops is evident and has been talked about by many, including the Ukrainians of various ranks on the frontline. Here comes Kursk, again, stretching those limited resources even further. And it looks like they keep pumping more and more resources there, while losing the territory they control. It is pretty clear it was a bad decision. Shortage of men has its implications for the construction of fortifications as well, of course: first, outfitting the construction to private enterprises that have no clue about what they are doing (but allowing for corruption to bloom) and, second, one doesn’t need fortifications if there are no trained troops to man them with (see my post above citing Deepstate addressing these very issues, as well as the Russian fortifications in Kursk and trained men).

Sure, there is also an issue of the bombs that Russian air forces drop more and more of and there isn’t much Ukraine can do about it. Among other things.

To sum up, I believe it is a combination of factors that led to where we are today and not the Kursk incursion alone. While it was a bad decision, it was not the only contributor. Maybe it was a deciding factor and nail in the coffin, but not the only one. Vuhledar also wouldn’t fall now, for instance, if the Russians didn’t grind their way through for months capturing Novomihaylivka (spelling?), for example, then Konstantynivka, Vodyane, and so on. Of course, it is not a coincidence that Konstantynivka fell at the end of August and Vodyane first week of September, while the Kursk operation began three weeks prior.

It sure looks more and more like Kursk was a desperation move that didn’t pan out and instead increased the severity of the situation.

EDIT: For general illustration purposes, not directly connected to this reply, here's a good map from z-archiv showing the situation west and south-west of Donetsk. Note they don't show Ugledar fallen, the change in area here is Sep 1st to Sep 30th. It illustrates the intent of Russian command quite well, they're conducting a major operation to collapse the entire south-Donetsk area. I don't even know that the actual fall of Kurakhovo is as significant as the broader picture, though I suspect that's part of the plan.

I’ll do one better, haha. This map is facing west - that is, you are looking west instead of north and I think one should really appreciate this rotation as it provides a better view and perspective; added fortifications Russia is going to face in the near future portray the severity of the situation and some hard decision Ukraine will have to make as the situation unfolds.

IMG_7217.jpeg

Note that the map is a little dated, a couple of weeks old. This is the X thread it came from: x.com. This one should be readable to everyone: Thread by @clement_molin on Thread Reader App. It’s a good thread with great illustrations and I would suggest anyone interested in the subject to give it a read.

Since I have space for a 3 more images to attach, I am going to use the opportunity and do so since I think these are interesting and informative

This one showS the Russian gains for the month of September (only south of Bakhmut to Velika Novosilka (spelling again?)):

IMG_7206.jpeg

This one shows the lines of Russian control by year (2022, 2023, 2024) of the same area, more or less:

IMG_7229.jpeg

This one shows the total Ukrainian territory (by region) that is controlled by Russia as of end of September:

IMG_7205.jpeg

Note that Donetsk they controlled the least of (well, Kharkiv and Mykolaiv aside) and that is for, I believe, obvious reasons - this is where formidable fortifications existed before the invasion.

I hope this is sufficient, this is the X account the maps came from: x.com. If this is not kosher enough, I can cite individual posts for each of the images.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
The intensity of attacks has increased year over year. The graph shown above speaks for itself.
While I partially agree that it wasn’t “sudden” (see above), in regard to the graph, however, here is another one from the same source (if not the same thread):

IMG_7216.jpeg

While the number of attacks has increased, so did the territory Russia seized control of. Is it a coincidence that the upward trend for the captured territory began just before the Kursk invasion happened? This is quite literally if you examine the graph above. Is it a coincidence the number of attacks has increased shortly after? While it is still a grind, less so now, there are decisions that result in “make it or break it” and Kursk incursion, in my opinion, was clearly the latter.

A few other things:

IMG_7234.jpeg

IMG_7235.jpeg

While Russia has been counterattacking in Kursk, Ukraine keeps losing more equipment there. Personnel losses I am assuming follow the same trend, probably more so with bomb drops.

Furthermore, the number of artillery (including MLRS) and gliding bombs strikes has increased significantly. The 600 number of bombs dropped in Kursk is additional to the 10% increase elsewhere.

Source for the first post: x.com
Source for the second: x.com

there is some sober reading in these articles even suggesting that Putin is unable to stop the war even if he wanted to
Does he have to though? The thing is that there can be a smoother than implied transition. The priority in Russia will be to rearm, which the industry is currently set for. With lack of labour they are facing, I am sure they will find a way to wiggle gradually. All depends, of course, on what happens when this madhouse is over. Their budget is set as such for a reson:

IMG_7236.jpeg

Source: x.com

I have a lot more to say on the subject, but am out of time. I may come to this later though.
 
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