The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
The last info is Russian sources denying that Russian troops are in the town, though they do seem to be engaged in the summer cottages on the south-east. A reminder, that's where the last Russian push into Ugledar stalled. Though of course this time around Russian forces are east and west, and north-east of the town. The last movements have turned the town into a salient. I'm a bit curious as to why they're pushing into the town at all. One would think taking the fields north of the town would be easier. There are also reports of Ukrainian forces counter-attacking in areas around the town, and reports of Ukrainian forces withdrawing from the north-western part of the No3 mine complex. Russia did seem to have grabbed a fresh batch of POWs in the Ugledar area. I'm attaching the Suriyakmaps screengrab, but they haven't updated since yesterday afternoon and the situation is fluid. Note details on the fighting are all unconfirmed statements from Russian sources so... grain of salt.


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It appears Ugledar is done. The problem is not so much the Russian assault on the south-east. The problem is the Russian push north-west of the town which is the hammer, against the anvil of Russian positions north-east of it in the mine complex. If Ukrainian command has no strength for a major counter-push, and this seems to be the case, then they need to withdraw in a hurry.

On a side-note, many have commented, and I concur, that this is a direct consequence of Ukraine wasting troops in Kursk region. That "success" will bear other similar fruit in other areas (consider how quickly Russia is plowing through the center of Toretsk). If I was Russia I would hope Ukraine tries another large cross-border push, maybe this time in Bryansk region. Ideally with thousands of troops committed to months of fighting, and pulled from both their strategic reserve and the front line in the Donbas.

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T.C.P

Well-Known Member
It appears Ugledar is done. The problem is not so much the Russian assault on the south-east. The problem is the Russian push north-west of the town which is the hammer, against the anvil of Russian positions north-east of it in the mine complex. If Ukrainian command has no strength for a major counter-push, and this seems to be the case, then they need to withdraw in a hurry.

On a side-note, many have commented, and I concur, that this is a direct consequence of Ukraine wasting troops in the Kursk region. That "success" will bear other similar fruit in other areas (consider how quickly Russia is flowing through the center of Toretsk). If I was Russia I would hope Ukraine tries another large cross-border push, maybe this time in Bryansk region. Ideally with thousands of troops committed to months of fighting, and pulled from both their strategic reserve and the front line in the Donbas.

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Ukraine really had no answer for the fall of Avdivka. You can blame lack of western supplies all you want, but to spend 2 years not building any proper defensive lines behind Avdivka, even when archmair twitter geenrals could see it coming is kind of inexcusable. Especially when they saw how effective the Russian defensive lines were in their own counteroffensive failure.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Ukraine really had no answer for the fall of Avdivka. You can blame lack of western supplies all you want, but to spend 2 years not building any proper defensive lines behind Avdivka, even when archmair twitter geenrals could see it coming is kind of inexcusable. Especially when they saw how effective the Russian defensive lines were in their own counteroffensive failure.
Unlike the situation in the Pokrovsk-Krasnogorovka-Kurakhovo triangle, this situation really has little to nothing to do with the fall of Avdeevka. Ugledar was defended well and skillfully, with appropriate defenses, when adequately manned. Russia spent months creeping towards the Konstantinovka-Ugledar road, and could have spent many months more to accomplish this encirclement. Instead this happened in a couple of weeks. A rapid race westward out of Pavlovka taking Prechistovka and pushing either half-way or into Zolotaya Niva, a series of attacks in and around Vodyanoe, and now a pounce on the town itself. The problem seems to be that Ukraine doesn't have adequate troops/resources to hold the areas around the town. There were multiple reports of units from that area being sent elsewhere prior to this happening.

Your main is correct however, Ukraine made a pretty fatal mistake in not layering defense lines around Avdeevka appropriately. I've mentioned this before, but everyone seems to ignore a basic reality. The corruption, bureaucratic obstacles, and casual incompetence one often encounters in the Russian military and state apparatus applies to Ukraine every bit as much, if not more. Russia botched the invasion and had to re-orient their entire approach to the war, and Ukraine was the beneficiary of some massive western aid, but really, what doubt can there be about a final outcome of a contest to the bitter end between Russia and Ukraine?
 

tonnyc

Well-Known Member
But it is not a contest to the bitter end for Russia. We have discussed this when the war started. While this may be an existential war for Ukraine, it is not for Russia. If Russia wins decisively, Ukraine would no longer be a sovereign state. Maybe it ends up like Belarus, and at worst case it may be forcibly annexed by Russia. Meanwhile the most Ukraine can get is the restoration of their 2014 border and some reparations. The state of Russia would remain sovereign and have their territory (2014 version) intact.

It may be a war to the bitter end of Vladimir Putin, who may very well end up dead if he loses this war, but while he is the leader of Russia, he is one man and is not the whole of Russia.

Ukraine's entire grand strategy is predicated on assuming that Russia won't fight to the bitter end. That this is just some side adventure that Russia will give up once the cost gets too high. Ukraine may very well fail to force the cost of this war up high enough for Russia that they no longer want to continue, but it was never 100% of Ukraine strength vs. 100% of Russia's but 100% of Ukraine's vs. some undeterminable but low percentage of Russia's strength.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Russians appear to be communicating that they will provide anti-ship missiles to the Houthis if strikes with the western long range assets are allowed within actual Russian borders.


Whatever the news reports suggest, I still personally do not believe this is going to happen. To be fair though, I believed the common sense would prevail and the invasion would not happen back in 2022 to begin with. My faith in human ability to think logically and avoid the great disasters at fairly low costs has, of course, been shattered (wasn’t the first time and surely won’t be the last) - this is sarcasm to some degree, fyi. There is plenty of discussion in the mass and social media in regard to the Ukrainian capabilities of launching such strikes (using Storm Shadows, for example) on their own. Regardless of people’s beliefs in the adaptability and learning and innovation and whatever else of Ukrainians, I am convinced that they do not posses the capabilities for such operations. This is not nearly the same as sending dozens/hundreds/whatever many drones at the sites that everything you need to know about has been available publicly for years now. It is way more than just “coordinates”, it is the flight plan, precise geographic data or high resolution imagery for that plan, etc. It is almost literally rocket science that Ukraine is simply not capable of at present time. All this will have to be provided by the US, as it has been providing such data for all Ukrainian strikes using such assets. I do not believe there can be any doubt about it, however little. This is precisely why Germans have refused to provide their Taurus missiles (or one of the reasons, likely the main one though). I am going to quote a part of my own post here. This post is from 2023 and is just as valid today. I am quoting the excerpts from a Washington Post article cited in the post:

Ukrainian officials said they require coordinates provided or confirmed by the United States and its allies for the vast majority of strikes using its advanced U.S.-provided rocket systems, a previously undisclosed practice that reveals a deeper and more operationally active role for the Pentagon in the war.[…]

One senior Ukrainian official said Ukrainian forces almost never launch the advanced weapons without specific coordinates provided by U.S. military personnel from a base elsewhere in Europe. Ukrainian officials say this process should give Washington confidence about providing Kyiv with longer-range weapons.

A senior U.S. official — who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue — acknowledged the key American role in the campaign and said the targeting assistance served to ensure accuracy and conserve limited stores of ammunition for maximum effectiveness. The official said Ukraine does not seek approval from the United States on what to strike and routinely targets Russian forces on their own with other weapons. The United States provides coordinates and precise targeting information solely in an advisory role, the official said.[…]

The senior Ukrainian official described the targeting process, generally: Ukrainian military personnel identify targets they want to hit, and in which location, and that information is then sent up to senior commanders, who then relay the request to U.S. partners for more accurate coordinates. The Americans do not always provide the requested coordinates, the official said, in which case the Ukrainian troops do not fire.[…]

The senior Ukrainian official contended that the Ukrainian military would face the same limitations it does now with conventional HIMARS rounds if it received ATACMS, with Ukraine still dependent on U.S. targeting coordinates.[…]

“According to our maps and software, a point will have one set of coordinates,” Malinovsky said. “But when we give this target to partners for analysis, the coordinates are different. Why? Because the Americans and NATO countries have access to military satellites.

“We’re all basically always online,” he added. “They immediately get us the coordinates and we then fire the MLRS right away.”

A third Ukrainian official confirmed that targeting all goes through an American installation on NATO soil and described the process as “very fast.” The Post is withholding the name of the base at the request of U.S. officials who cited security concerns.
A few things to note here. The belief was that this process of coordinating HIMARS strikes would provide confidence to the US when supplying long range assets. The implication is pretty clear and not worth commenting on. Second, Ukrainians have not sought the approval of the targets from the USA, so the provision of the coordinates for precise targeting was justified (not really, imo) as simple advisory. As we are all aware, Zelensky is currently visiting the US with a list of targets to be reviewed and approved by the American administration if the permission for the long range strikes in Russia to be granted. Third, the Ukrainians have in no ambiguous terms had admitted that they do not have the technology even for simple precise coordinates for their targets. Fourth, they assure that the same limitations would persist if they are given ATACMS, which is now in the past. Fifth, all targeting goes through an “American installation on NATO soil”.

One could fairly say this is a dated article (half a war ago!) and they must have learned and developed the capabilities of their own and so on. Not the case, clearly. That is not something a country like Ukraine (or any country) develops or acquires on such a short notice, help notwithstanding. The fresh Washington Post article suggests the same:

But Kyiv has long been dependent on receiving target coordinates for strikes with its precision Western weaponry from U.S. military personnel on a base elsewhere in Europe. Without those, the missile is likely to miss its mark, the military official said, and the United States has sometimes declined to provide coordinates for some of Kyiv’s desired targets.


Again, to use Storm Shadows or SCALPs, it is more than just “coordinates”.

Furthermore, from the same article:

The Ukrainians also want more agency to pick their own targets, including energy infrastructure, such as oil depots, officials said. Those kinds of strikes can hurt Russia’s economy, limiting its ability to fund the war effort, explained a senior Ukrainian military official. It’s fair play, the official added, as Moscow has been pummeling Ukraine’s power grid for the past two years, causing rolling blackouts throughout the country.

Not only the US has publicly discouraged such strikes and stated that they are against these type of attacks since they pretty much began, the Ukrainians are now asking to do what some Russian top brass was charged with war crimes for. Of course, nothing is going to happen beyond the alleged charges, but the fact itself that Ukraine is asking Americans to do the same is ludicrous.

Anyway, this is on escalation. Well, I guess I didn’t say a word on actual escalation. Is it necessary though? I believe what I outlined above speaks for itself. We can, however, also talk about the potential benefits if these “deep in Russia” strikes, but what about the overall picture? Some believe that these will turn the tide and so on. I think at this point in time we should ask whether this decision would affect the final outcome of this conflict. Not whether it may but actually would. Would this allow, in combination with other capabilities already provided, Ukraine to defeat Russia? That is a serious question. The stakes are certainly high and escalation is not a linear function.

Interesting note from the same article:

But in an example of the widening disconnect between the two sides more than two years into Russia’s invasion, the Ukrainians had expected Biden to have already granted permission by now, according to two officials who, like others in this article, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss a sensitive matter.

And

“We think the permission should be granted yesterday, not today or tomorrow,” one Ukrainian official said. “Otherwise, the phrase ‘We want to see Ukraine as strong as possible for any scenario’ looks like total BS.”

I find it funny how the expectations work, as well as the concept of commitment, which I talked about numerous times starting a couple of years ago, and how that is being used almost as blackmail against the “rational players” who probably made some mistakes in previous decisions.

I will try to continue on the subject tomorrow.

Short notes:

As per ABC’s Pentagon reporter, the US is going to include cluster JSOWs to be launched from F-16s in the next assistance package.

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Vuhledar is about to be lost, probably a matter of few short days (likely sooner). The following map is interesting because the mapper portrayed their own interpretation of the events (more or less coincides with Deepstate) and added Suriyak’s data for comparison (hatched):

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I would think even Suriyak’s data is somewhat behind as well.

Russia has finally split the area in two at Nevske that was now anticipated for some time.

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In the same post, there is a map that indicates that the, what used to be, Nevelske pocket, is continuing to expand and close at the same time.

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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Didn’t fit into the previous post:

Some (very) Ukrainian outlets are suggesting that the Ukrainian public should prepare “morally and psychologically” that the Ukrainian forces will withdraw from Selidove, Toretsk, and Vuhledar in short order.


Ukrainians are asking why “Russian defeat” at Liptsi and Vovchansk aren’t reported in the Western media, likely referring to the takeover of the aggregate plant in Vovchansk.

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Interestingly, the prerogative is that Russians have achieved there nothing in 5 months.
 

Fredled

Active Member
Feanor said:
On a side-note, many have commented, and I concur, that this is a direct consequence of Ukraine wasting troops in Kursk region.
I strongly disagree. Ukrainian troops staying near the Russian border south of the Kursk Region, in the Sumy Region, for two year and half were under constant artillery attack. They forcibly had losses (Russian didn't target empty fields). That's what I would call a waste of resource, in the long term.
Instead of being passively eroded, these troops were finaly acvtivated, alongside other troops which stayed in the rear for some time. They were put into action with unexpected results (name one single person who expected it).
Very little troops from the Donbas, if any were involved.
Elsewhere in the front line, it was the same: Ukrainian troops are constantly bombarded while waiting for Russian assaults, which more often than not, are not coming.But they are taking losses nonetheless, as the time pass by and they stay idle.

Everybody rembember how many defenders were lost during the defence of Sivierodoneskt, Bahkmut and Avdiivka. It was time not to repeat the same mistake. The best strategy now is to defend the DonBas with as little troops as possible, preferably with end-of-life, disposable equipment, just to stop Storm-Z meat assault, yet supported by strong drone regiments. Anything more would be wasted under FAB and artillery. Even better yet: dispatching new recruits who won't take any risk and will retreat on time to save their lives. The goal being to preserve Ukrainian forces as much as possible. Trading some territories and small towns (Vuhledar is nothing but a big village) for the preservation of troops is the best decision.

Yes, without irony, a push into the Bryansk Region would be another interesting development as it's possibly even less defended than Kursk. Ukrainians could move much deeper into Russia. Then bring HIMARS into Russian logistic range (some ammpo depot ot something). The problem is that Lukashenko could then intervene.
Of course the best would take Belgorod or its vincinity. But Russians are massively regrouped there.

The lack of effect on the front line is theoretical. You don't have a crystal ball telling you what would be had the Kursk intrusion not happened. One thing is that if Russians didn't remove significant troops, they couldn't send additional ones as much as they wanted.
More concretely the effect was felt in the Karkiv/Volkshansk axis.

It doesn't mean it was useless. Thousands of Russians who were not supposed to be involved in war were dragged into it. Ukrainians secured a large prisoner exchange in a promptly manner.
Yet, the most important is perhaps the information we got about the state of readiness of the Russian Army: Disastrous.
This operation told us whether Russians had a reaction force in case of emergency. The answer is not. The Russian territorial defence is inoperant. Add to this the failed Sarmat test and you get the cherry on the cake.
(I just see that they was another big explosion in Moscow, but didn't watch it yet...)
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I strongly disagree. Ukrainian troops staying near the Russian border south of the Kursk Region, in the Sumy Region, for two year and half were under constant artillery attack. They forcibly had losses (Russian didn't target empty fields). That's what I would call a waste of resource, in the long term.
Instead of being passively eroded, these troops were finaly acvtivated, alongside other troops which stayed in the rear for some time. They were put into action with unexpected results (name one single person who expected it).
Very little troops from the Donbas, if any were involved.
Elsewhere in the front line, it was the same: Ukrainian troops are constantly bombarded while waiting for Russian assaults, which more often than not, are not coming.But they are taking losses nonetheless, as the time pass by and they stay idle.
They could have been activated elsewhere with more relevant results. And the losses they took as a result of this type activation are substantially higher then they would have been had they sat in the rear, hiding. Ukrainian troops lose way more attacking then they do defending. If the goal is to bleed Russia, given the nature of this war and Russian air superiority, it should be done defensively, they way it has been done defensively before.

Everybody rembember how many defenders were lost during the defence of Sivierodoneskt, Bahkmut and Avdiivka. It was time not to repeat the same mistake. The best strategy now is to defend the DonBas with as little troops as possible, preferably with end-of-life, disposable equipment, just to stop Storm-Z meat assault, yet supported by strong drone regiments. Anything more would be wasted under FAB and artillery. Even better yet: dispatching new recruits who won't take any risk and will retreat on time to save their lives. The goal being to preserve Ukrainian forces as much as possible. Trading some territories and small towns (Vuhledar is nothing but a big village) for the preservation of troops is the best decision.
You assume that this would make for a successful defense, but I suspect it wouldn't. Drones aren't a panacea. Russian leadership had the same kind of mindset, except for them it was UAV-directed artillery filling that role. We can see how well it went in Kharkov region, in '22. Ugledar is definitely a town and not a big village, but that's not the point. The point is that Russia was "enjoying" very minor successes at a considerable cost when Ukraine had sufficient forces in the area. Russia is enjoying much greater successes at a much lower cost now that Ukraine doesn't have the troops there.

Ukraine can defend successfully from prepared, adequately manned, positions for a long time. Ukraine tends to fail when they don't have those prepared positions, or when they don't have enough troops. I'm not even sold that the smaller presence at Ugledar necessarily means less casualties. Picking well entrenched infantry out of positions is hard, but hitting troops retreating because there are too few of them to hold can be easy (look at the retreat from Avdeevka). If Russia ties the noose around Ugledar, Ukraine could take larger one-time losses then months of sitting in the defense would have meant.

Yes, without irony, a push into the Bryansk Region would be another interesting development as it's possibly even less defended than Kursk. Ukrainians could move much deeper into Russia. Then bring HIMARS into Russian logistic range (some ammpo depot ot something). The problem is that Lukashenko could then intervene.
Of course the best would take Belgorod or its vincinity. But Russians are massively regrouped there.
It would require troops to be deployed there. Troops Ukraine likely can't spare. A Kursk incursion while losing a series of towns in the Donbas isn't worth it. A Bryansk incursion, while stretching forces in the Donbas even thinner and losing even more ground is even less worth it. Remember these incursions are ultimately unsustainable, and that was a common theme in commentary on the incursion practically from the beginning.

The lack of effect on the front line is theoretical. You don't have a crystal ball telling you what would be had the Kursk intrusion not happened. One thing is that if Russians didn't remove significant troops, they couldn't send additional ones as much as they wanted.
More concretely the effect was felt in the Karkiv/Volkshansk axis.
Russia's distraction that was clearly meant to draw Ukrainian forces to it, is the thing that stopped once Ukraine drew it's own forces voluntarily to Kursk. Well that certainly makes sense, but you don't seriously suggest that it was worth it?

It doesn't mean it was useless. Thousands of Russians who were not supposed to be involved in war were dragged into it. Ukrainians secured a large prisoner exchange in a promptly manner.
Yet, the most important is perhaps the information we got about the state of readiness of the Russian Army: Disastrous.
This operation told us whether Russians had a reaction force in case of emergency. The answer is not. The Russian territorial defence is inoperant. Add to this the failed Sarmat test and you get the cherry on the cake.
(I just see that they was another big explosion in Moscow, but didn't watch it yet...)
It was a waste of resources. It wasn't entirely useless but the resource expenditure was out of all proportion to any useful results. Consequently Ukraine is now feeling the absence of those troops at the front.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Ukrainians are asking why “Russian defeat” at Liptsi and Vovchansk aren’t reported in the Western media, likely referring to the takeover of the aggregate plant in Vovchansk.

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Interestingly, the prerogative is that Russians have achieved there nothing in 5 months.
The recapture of the plant was boasted as some carefully planned and executed complex operation by the HUR. According to HUR’s statement,

The Russians turned the aggregate plant into their propaganda "fortress", using in its defense the most motivated and professional units, among which there were even fighters of the 45th brigade of SpP airborne troops (Kubinka, Moscow).

While I haven’t been following Russian sources on Telegram and the like, or not nearly close enough, in the past couple of months, I have been following the Russian news media as close as I usually do and can say that I haven’t seen too many mentions (if any at all) of the aggregate plant there. Definitely no mentions of “fortresses” and the like. That seems to be the Ukrainian thing. Granted, I do not read RIA and the like, for my own sanity. Let’s see how propaganda is actually created though…

Several dozen Russians are blocked at the aggregate plant in Vovchansk, Kharkiv region. They are trying to break through but are constantly suffering losses, said Oleh Syniehubov, Kharkiv Oblast Governor.

From June 26 report by the Ukrainian outlet: Governor: Several dozens Russian troops blocked at aggregate plant in Vovchansk, Kharkiv region

Russian troops may have seized the entire aggregate plant in Vovchansk, reported the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), citing geolocation footage on July 28.[…]

“It is unclear when Russian forces seized the plant, however. Fighting also continued near Hlyboke and elsewhere within Vovchansk,” ISW reported.


Same outlet report from July 31: ISW: Russians may have seized aggregate plant in Vovchansk, Kharkiv region. Of note here, the Ukrainian officials have denied it and said that the plant was seized from the very beginning of the Russian offensive (suggesting end of May-ish to mid-June?).

“The number of Russian troops still blocked at the aggregate plant constantly decreases. Currently, about 40 of them are there. They have food and ammunition delivered by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and they cannot leave,” Sarantsev said.

Same outlet reported on August 6: Military: Russians have occupied Vovchansk aggregate plant since the beginning of new offensive in Kharkiv region, not seized it recently

"They (the Russians – ed.) use drones to carry out logistics tasks. They use them to deliver water, ammunition and medicines. In particular, this is what is happening in the blocked area near Vovchansk, i.e. at the aggregate plant...

At the very beginning, there were about 40 soldiers there. They are suffering losses there. They have killed and wounded alike. There are wounded who can't walk, there are wounded who still can fight. A certain number of them remain there, I cannot say the exact number for certain reasons."


Reported by Ukrainska Pravda on Aug 25: Russian troops remain trapped at aggregate plant in Vovchansk for several months

In the meantime, Russians (as well as Ukrainians) have been shelling the plant ever since their Kharkiv offensive began and there was a recent, I want to say about 3 weeks ago, fairly massive bombardment of this plant by Russia. Unfortunately, I am was not able to locate the video - saw it posted at several outlets and described as Russians shelling their own at the plant. Here is some reference though:

He specifically commented on reports that the occupation forces recently struck their own forces at the Aggregate Plant using a heavy flamethrower system, Solntsepyok.

"Perhaps they decided to ease the suffering of the trapped Russians at the plant. I don't know the answer; I can't get into their heads. But indeed, this is not the first time that strikes on the Aggregate Plant and the surrounding areas by the Russians have been recorded, as we haven't been responsible for these attacks," Cherniak noted.


Posted by RBC-Ukriane a couple of days ago: Aggregate plant in Vovchansk becomes problem for Russia: Potential good news for Ukraine

Note from the same article:

There are currently a few of them left there, many of whom are incapacitated.

Then HUR report yesterday:

As a result of an extremely complex and successful operation, the GUR units completely liberated the territory of the Vovchan aggregate plant and destroyed the occupiers in all the buildings of the enterprise.[…]

The fighters of the GUR MOU carried out a systematic sweep of the plant's buildings, constantly engaging in contact battles with the enemy in densely built-up conditions. In some cases, Ukrainian special forces engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the enemy.[…]

Despite the fierce resistance of the enemy, the fighters of the GUR MOU managed to destroy the enemy, take prisoners and replenish the exchange fund.


I am assuming the “hand-combat” part comes from the same universe as the “hiked on foot 800 km” or whatever it was.


There is a video of the “storm” and everything, as well as a photo op, including the planning with Budanov, in the next few posts:


Finally, an article in the western media, as the poster I mentioned in my previous post demanded: Fighting Hand To Hand, Ukrainian Commandos Just Cleared The Last Starving Russians From A Concrete Fortress In Vovchansk. “Concrete fortress” is how they refer to the plant.

So out of the 40 that were stuck at the plant from the beginning and that kept taking heavy causalities over the past three months, and “several dozens”, ie 40, that remained a month ago, 20 of the most motivated and capable fierce VDV, though starving, incapacitated, wounded and can’t walk, but some still able to fight, were captured by HUR forces after engaging in hand-to-hand combat, killing “several dozens”, of course. Yes, that sentence is hard to follow and somewhat confusing, just like the entire story and the official statements that they couldn’t follow themselves. Source for the numbers of captured and killed:


In the meantime, Russians reportedly dropped a few more thermobaric bombs on the plant overnight:


The post also says:

It is interesting that the day before, the GUR of Ukraine reported the liberation of the aggregate plant, which was located in the gray zone, and published a rather pompous video showing the storming of empty workshops.

I’d say it is hard to decide who to believe in this case. Epic Russian defeat in Kharkiv or another staged Ukrainian propaganda video and photo op? Hmm…

More evidence that further suggests towards the latter, from just over a week ago:

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This could probably be continued into a couple more posts, but this is probably sufficient. "Fool me once, shame on, shame on you. Fool me ... you can't get fooled again!" (C) Bush Jr.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Didn’t fit into the previous post:

Some (very) Ukrainian outlets are suggesting that the Ukrainian public should prepare “morally and psychologically” that the Ukrainian forces will withdraw from Selidove, Toretsk, and Vuhledar in short order.


Ukrainians are asking why “Russian defeat” at Liptsi and Vovchansk aren’t reported in the Western media, likely referring to the takeover of the aggregate plant in Vovchansk.

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Interestingly, the prerogative is that Russians have achieved there nothing in 5 months.
Yeah that's almost comical. Lose several towns and expect to lose several more. Recapture a half-demolished factory in another town where the town is still contested. Why, oh why, isn't the media singing our praises? :rolleyes:
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
There is debate of course on merits of the Kursk incursion ,but there was not the losses as per short lived summer offensive against heavy minefields ,what seems apparent is the political effect in Russia to such incursion and the morale boost to Ukrainian population certainly footage of Ukrainian troops providing assistance to the local civilians in Kursk captures the narrative who respond with the tales of looting by retreating Russian forces
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
It appears Ugledar is done. The problem is not so much the Russian assault on the south-east. The problem is the Russian push north-west of the town which is the hammer, against the anvil of Russian positions north-east of it in the mine complex. If Ukrainian command has no strength for a major counter-push, and this seems to be the case, then they need to withdraw in a hurry.

On a side-note, many have commented, and I concur, that this is a direct consequence of Ukraine wasting troops in Kursk region. That "success" will bear other similar fruit in other areas (consider how quickly Russia is plowing through the center of Toretsk). If I was Russia I would hope Ukraine tries another large cross-border push, maybe this time in Bryansk region. Ideally with thousands of troops committed to months of fighting, and pulled from both their strategic reserve and the front line in the Donbas.

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An absolutely fantastic photo that shows the precariousness of Ukrainian positions in Ugledar. The red lines show what's currently confirmed under Russian control. Exiting through the neck of this cauldron will be difficult and bloody. Meanwhile Russia has full control over the eastern side of the town. Meanwhile Russian troops continue to also advance north of the Ugledar area. I suspect Russia's offensive won't stop here but will aim to push towards Kurakhovo from the south.

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
There is debate of course on merits of the Kursk incursion ,but there was not the losses as per short lived summer offensive against heavy minefields ,what seems apparent is the political effect in Russia to such incursion and the morale boost to Ukrainian population certainly footage of Ukrainian troops providing assistance to the local civilians in Kursk captures the narrative who respond with the tales of looting by retreating Russian forces
I don’t think we know what losses they are sustaining in Kursk. We don’t know what losses the Russians are sustaining there either. Judging simply by the equipment that Ukraine had lost in Russia and the amount of bombs dropped and drone strikes, I would think they are significant. Moreover, these losses contribute to higher losses (including land) in Ukraine, where it matters most. Are these numbers comparable to the 2023 offensive? Probably not, but the magnitude and scope of the fighting isn’t the same either.

Here is one source that provides a glimpse of the losses among the Russians. Note that I cannot say anything in regard to the reliability of this source whatsoever. I can say that they post seldom (very - 12 posts since Aug 1, for example), but a lot of what they post that can be verified to some extent at the time of the posts or at some point later (not a lot) usually checks out. Posts like this one, however are not as simply verifiable, so a few pounds of salt. I would also argue that this is how a propaganda outlet would operate, but I have no evidence one way or the other. They basically post about Russian f-ups and losses, be it equipment, ammunition, or personnel.


So according to that post, as of Sept 20, the Russian forces “permanently” lost 1,031 troops in Kursk. The number of wounded stands at 8,395. Missing in action is another 302, of which 226 are conscripts, 52 are the contract troops, and 24 are FSB border guards. It also suggests that 289 were captured PoWs, of which 262 were already exchanged.

While unnecessary, I am going to state this again: I have no idea whether these numbers are reliable and I do not have any evidence to support or refute these numbers. Assuming these numbers are rubbish, there is nothing to discuss. Assuming we can somewhat trust the source (to be clear, I do not suggest doing so), there are some things these numbers can tell us. First, they can tell us the relative composition of the Russian forces in the region in the beginning stages of the offensive by looking at the MiA numbers: 75% conscripts, 17% volunteers that signed a contract, and 8% FSB border guards. I would assume some of the 17 and 8% were the commanding officers, but many of the 8% were likely conscripts as well. This composition I am sure has changed since then, but it still gives us hints about what’s what and it correlates quite well with the approximations we talked about earlier - I believe I said about 80% were conscripts and that is reasonably right when you add the conscripted FSB personnel.

Second thing these numbers tell us is that in poorly prepared defense positions - actually very well prepared but poorly defended positions, haha - Russians lost in all (killed, wounded, captured, mising) about 10K in personnel in about a month and a half of fighting. However, this number also includes quite a few conscripts killed snd wounded in those rather terrible HIMARS strikes that we talked about in the beginning of August. It also includes some number of lost personnel during the “chaos and organization” period, which lasted probably a couple of weeks, perhaps 3 weeks (?). In other words, likely the majority of these casualties would not necessarily happen in the “everyday events” type of thing in this conflict. I mean it would be fair to assume (or even state with a fair degree of confidence) that these troops were not trained, equipped, or otherwise prepared for the events that took place. We can try and talk about projections of these losses to the Ukrainian side and frontline elsewhere, but I do not want to want to start st this time.

As for the political effect of the offensive in Russia, I posted not long ago citing a very reliable source that talked about it. Basically the support for ending the war has since dropped, while the support for continuing the “special military operation” has increased by 7-10% (?). It is rather trivial (to me) and I am not sure why people find it hard to believe.

Ukrainian troops helping the local civilians in Kursk is not particularly an attractive point simply because there are too many contradicting statements, some of which include documented firing at the civilians, for example. I really cannot comment on the subject much more as I simply do not have any information that I can rely on at all. I can say that in many of the helping videos that I saw, the civilians speak with “Ukrainian accent”. Note that this is not to suggest about some fabrications or anything of the nature since it is very plausible and believable (or so I think).

Last thing in regard to Kursk, a rare statement by Dyumin was quoted today in the Russian press. Dyumin is currently a Putin’s aide and (very prematurely, imo) referred to by some as Putin’s potential successor. Today he said Kursk will be liberated very soon and his basis for that is the plan of the General Staff that he reviewed. Whether this actually means anything remains to be seen - such as intensified counteroffensive, etc. I think Russians have recaptured more land in Kursk in the past couple of days, but I haven’t been really following, so I can be corrected on this. Reference for Dyumin’s statement:


An absolutely fantastic photo that shows the precariousness of Ukrainian positions in Ugledar.
That’s funny, because I was going to post almost the exact same thing. This guy takes the credit for the creation of the “map” - my guess is he got the idea from what you posted - but he does add some more colours: green represents the two remaining dirt roads in and out of town, red is the territory under Russian control, and blue is the land controlled by Ukraine - anything in between blue and red is obviously the “grey zone”.

IMG_7096.jpeg

Post on X: x.com

Why there are still Ukrainian troops in that town I have no idea, really. Is it because there are no prepared lines to fall to? Very likely as it appears to be the case everywhere else. Is it because Zelensky is currently in the US trying to show viability and his victory plan? Just as likely, in my opinion.

The Americans have announced another aid package to Ukraine worth $375M and includes HIMARS munitions, M1117s, artillery ammunition, boats, etc. Here are the contents:

IMG_7099.jpeg

The biggest news, however, is going to hit tomorrow, reportedly, when the US announces the largest package yet worth a whopping $8B.


$5.6 is coming from the drawdown from stocks and $2.4B from the USAI programme. None of this $8B is coming any time soon though since the stocks had been depleted beyond the comfortable level of the United States. It can be kind of seen from the contents of the $375M package announced today, in my opinion.

Can I use this opportunity and say



Because

There maybe a very significant military aid package announced by the US in the near future - perhaps, coinciding with Zelensky’s visit.
I will post more on the depleted stocks tomorrow (maybe), but here is the last thing for today: a look at the thermite drop from the ground, I believe that’s a first.


The same video on X:


Not nearly as bad as it looks from the sky, no? There were a few videos of Russians doing the same thing recently.
 

Capt. Ironpants

Active Member
Why are there still Ukrainian troops in that town I have no idea, really. Is it because there are no prepared lines to fall to? Very likely as it appears to be the case everywhere else. Is it because Zelensky is currently in the US trying to show viability and his victory plan? Just as likely, in my opinion.
Just a quick peek in here, but according to this channel (UKR 46th BDE) your guess re Zelensky in US is correct:


Those poor guys, reportedly some of Ukraine's finest.

EDITED to add: Well, this is embarrassing. I thought I saw that on this channel (staying put in Ugledar) but now I can't find the post. I used to be able to "get" about 70% of Ukrainian because it's close enough to Russian, but these days it's down to about 50% unless it's pretty simple. My sincere apologies! Maybe someone with better language skills can spot it. Or maybe I misremembered where I saw that.

Ref the aggregate plant in Vovchansk, the latest videos I have seen show it reduced to rubble, with pretty much everything around flattened. I can't understand how or why the Russians would try to hold it as there is no cover whatsoever. And maybe I am missing something, but won't the Ukrainians be just as exposed once they occupy that ground?
 
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Fredled

Active Member
Feanor said:
They could have been activated elsewhere with more relevant results. And the losses they took as a result of this type activation are substantially higher then they would have been had they sat in the rear, hiding. Ukrainian troops lose way more attacking then they do defending. If the goal is to bleed Russia, given the nature of this war and Russian air superiority, it should be done defensively, they way it has been done defensively before.
Ukrainians troops have had more losses in one month during their Special Military Operation in Kursk than they would have by staying behind the border. But they didn't have more losses in this month of operation than they had during one year of no operation.
That the Ukrainian losses in Kursk was disproportionate and/or that Russian losses were smaller or not higher remains to be verified with tangible evidence.

About the defence in the Donbas: You overestimate the effect of the "line of defence". They help, but they don't resist intensive aerial bombing. The other thing is that it's materialy impossible for Ukraine to build solid lines of defence everywhere and one several layer. If you build one line, you need two or three behind it in case the first and the second falls. This would be disproportionate spending, and probably there isn't enough excavators and material to do the job. Disproportionate in the sens that it would barely stop the Russian for an extra two or three weeks, the time they carpet bomb the area.

The same with the precious Leopards and Abrams and the best trained troops: It's only a matter of time for the Russians to destroy them with MLRS, artillery and drones. Just for the sake of keeping the Russian advance slower, while it's already slow enough, it's not worth their sacrifice. So, yes, Russians are advancing faster than they would with the modern Ukrainian reserves on the front line, but at least Ukrainians keep these reserves safe or use them in Kursk.

KipPotapych said:
Basically the support for ending the war has since dropped, while the support for continuing the “special military operation” has increased by 7-10% (?). It is rather trivial (to me) and I am not sure why people find it hard to believe.
It was not the goal of this special operation. Ukrainians don't pay much attention to this because the Russian population have no way to express their opposition and enough men are attracted by the high pay to replace the dead ones and continue the war.

Feanor said:
An absolutely fantastic photo that shows the precariousness of Ukrainian positions in Ugledar. About Vuhledar or Vugledar, the picture
It also shows how small this "town" is. ;) It was typical of Soviet Union to build high rise outside urban areas, in the middle of empty fields.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
It also shows how small this "town" is. ;) It was typical of Soviet Union to build high rise outside urban areas, in the middle of empty fields.
It's comparable to most of the Donbas towns. They're mostly what are called mono-cities. A single city-forming enterprise, in the Donbas usually a mining complex or a factory, and the town is built around it. Avdeevka, Krasnogorovka, Ukrainsk, Novogrodovka, Selidovo, Gornyak, they're all of this variety. Kurakhovo and Mirnograd also fall neatly into this pattern. I'm not sure about Pokrovsk, but all the things we would talk about in this area as towns look similar to this. Some have larger or smaller "private sector" neighborhoods with houses vs apartments.

Ref the aggregate plant in Vovchansk, the latest videos I have seen show it reduced to rubble, with pretty much everything around flattened. I can't understand how or why the Russians would try to hold it as there is no cover whatsoever. And maybe I am missing something, but won't the Ukrainians be just as exposed once they occupy that ground?
It seems Russia captured it at some point likely as part of an effort to continue offensive actions, and then stopped once priorities shifted. And to your point, after Russia lost the plant, they proceeded to pummel it with bombs and thermobaric rockets.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Kursk area.

Ukrainian attacks towards the Glushkovskoe area seem to have slowed down. Russian forces have also advanced far enough east that they're harder to cut off from Russian forces near Korenevo. Russia's own advance has reached Sverdlikovo and seems to be halted. Meanwhile from the eastern side Russian forces have gained some ground towards Plekhovo. The scheme of Russia's counter-offensive here seems clear. They're attacking along the border towards the base of the Ukrainian salient, likely hoping to force a withdrawal.


An interesting video of the 83rd VDV Bde operating in Kursk region. You can't really see the assault, only sort of guess the directionality based on the bursts of fire, but allegedly they're assaulting and clearing a Ukrainian strong point with an assault detachment on two BMD-2s.


VDV 56th Regiment carrying out drone strikes against Ukrainian vehicles. Warning footage of corpses.


Russian FPV drones double-tap a Ukrainian tank. Note the EW causing signal issues but not preventing the strikes.


Russian FAB strikes near Malaya Loktnya.


Russian Molniya drone strikes a Ukrainain Kozak armored car.


A series of Russian drone strikes on knocked out Ukrainian vehicles near Tetkino and a couple of strikes on on a BMP and a tank.


Russian loitering munition (looks like a Kub to me) strikes allegedly a Ukrainian M777. We can't make out what it hits, but ammo clearly cooks off.


A Ukrainian BTR-4, possibly abandoned, getting taken out.


Ukrainian Leo-2A5 getting hit in the Glushkovo area.


Another Leopard getting hit, allegedly a 2A6 but I can't tell, it might be another 2A5.


A strange incident took place near Veseloe. Allegedly this Ukrainian crew attempted to surrender with their CV90 to Russia, but were shot by a friendly ATGM to prevent this. Other sources claim it hit a land mine. Details are lacking but allegedly the white fabric was a surrender marker.


More footage of destroyed Ukrainian vehicles as part of the failed attacks in the Glushkovo area.


Russian drone strike takes out a Ukrainian pickup and BTR-60 in the Kursk area.


Russian UCAV strikes continue, this time against an alleged Ukrainian staging area. an IMR-2, and multiple other targets


Russian UAV-directed artillery fires at Ukrainian troops attacking towards Veseloe.


Russian strike on a Ukrainian crossing near Kursk region. It's unclear which crossing this is and which side of the border this is.


Russian Iskander strike in Khrapovschina, Sumy region, and a storage facility in Sumy itself. Allegedly the former is a Ukrainian staging area.


Russian strike on Shaposhnikovo, Sumy region, targetting allegedly a HIMARS. We do see a pair of Ukrainian vehicles and one looks like it might be a HIMARS.


Russia strikes a Ukrainian 2S1 in Sumy region.


Russian Marines from the 155th show off a destroyed Ukrainian mobile element with either 2 or 3 destroyed Humvees and a pickup. Maneuver elements like this were all over the area and created much panic and confusion, but usually carried very small sized elements, either squad or platoon sized typically, though there were a few entire companies.


A knocked out M113, Kursk area.


A new Ukrainian drone type downed in Kursk region, allegedly called Palyanitsa (bread).


Russian forces show off a captured M577 in Kursk region, captured near Veseloe or near Korenevo, sources disagree. They also have apparently captured an abandoned T-72AV with a KMT-6 mine trawl. The latter is something Russia can and will easily use.


A group of 4 Russian conscripts spent 39 days cut off in the woods near Dar'ino. They apparently maintained comms with the 155th MarBde passing on intelligence, and staying hidden. My suspicion is they used cell phones, possibly Telegram, or something similar to communicate. I doubt they had radio comms.


Russian Mi-28NM with Kh-39s taking off. I wonder if the regular Mi-28N can use Kh-39s or Vikhr-1s.


Russian Molniya drone being prepared for launch, Kursk region.


A scarce Ukrainian 2S7 in support of their Kursk forces.


Ukraine has begun using ground-based drones with machineguns in Kursk region. They're wheeled unlike their Russian counter-parts, the Kurier drone.


A Ukrainian M60 AVLB in Kursk region, presumably they inteded to force the Seym.


Kharkov area.


Russian forces have reportedly withdrawn from the factory complex in Volchansk. They then proceeded to strike the area with thermobarics.


Russian Molniya loitering munition strike on a Ukrainian staging area.


Russian large bomb strikes with a FAB-3000 and 3 FAB-1500s in Volchansk.


Russian FPV drone hits a Ukrainian SUV near Liptsi.


Russian strike on a industrial building where allegedly a Ukrainian Vampir MLRS was hiding.


Ukrainian strikes on Belgorod continue. 4 civilians are reported wounded.


Ukrainian drone hit an apartment in Belgorod, unclear if intentionally.


Battle damage to a residential building in Kharkov after a Russian strike. Russian sources claims this was done by a Ukrainian SAM but the extent of the damage makes this unlikely.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Kupyansk area.

Russia continues to gain ground south of Sin'kovka. Note, while in theory this threatens Kupyansk, Russia is still a ways away from realistically assaulting the town. Near Peschanoe Russia continues to wide the salient, threatening multiple villages along the Oskol coast. In general the road becomes unsafe as a supply route once a solid chunk of it is within easy UAV use.


Russian strikes inside Kupyansk which itself is getting closer to the front line.


Russian strike on a Ukrainian crossing near Kupyansk-Uzlovoy.


In Kupyansk a Russian ODAB-1500 hit an alleged Ukrainian staging area in a residential neighborhood.


Oskol front.

Russian forces continue to gain ground inside Makeevka and now control ~80% of the village. Russian forces here are across the Zherebets. They have also taken Nevskoe and are advancing towards Torskoe. With the fall of Nevskoe, most of Ukraine's positions east of the Zherebets are gone. Only the stretch by Teryn and Torskoe is left. Of course the river loops west from there, making them substantially less vulnerable.


Russia striking Ukrainian tanks in the Nevskoe area.


A destroyed 2S22, Ukrainian, allegedly near Krasniy Liman.


Chasov Yar.

Russian forces have advanced inside Kalinovka, and have taken most of Grigorievka. In general Russian offensive action in this area has come practically to a halt. Russian forces seem to be mainly be focused on reaching the canal in many areas. It's likely they will try again after the fall of Toretsk.


Ukrainian forces have on the other hand recaptured Russian positions near Zheleznyanskoe.


Gorlovka-Toretsk.

Russian forces continue to advance inside Toretsk, taking over half of downtown, and are now expanding their area of control. On the eastern side they've taken the refuse mound next to the prison. Out of Nelepovka Russian forces have pushed northwards and entered Leonidovka.


5 destoyed MaxxPro Internationals along a road in Nelepovka. They were likely being used for logistics or troop rotations.


Ukrainian MaxxPro taken out near Toretsk.


Russian bomb strikes in Toretsk.


Ukrainian Uragan strike hit the bus station in the center of Gorlovka.


Pokrovsk axis.

Russian forces have taken most of Nikolaevka, Krutoy Yar, and most of Krasniy Yar. They are now a couple of kms away from Mirnograd. Russian forces also continue to push west of the rail line. I don't think we will see an attack on Mirnograd until they take Selidovo.


Russia taking out an M109 and a MaxxPro near Pokrovsk.


A destroyed Marder near Novogrodovka.


Destroyed vehicles and battle damage inside Novogrodovka. At least one of the tanks, the one with the distinctive zig-zagging roof cage, appears to be Russian. Another one is clearly Ukrainian with the foldable cage.


Russian video from inside Novogrodovka. You can see the town, while damaged, is generally still there. There are even some civilians still in it. Warning footage of corpses at the end.


A rare Ukrainian BMP-1TS has been spotted in the Pokrovsk area.


Russian 2S7 operating near Pokrovsk. This one has no drone cage.


Russian forces have captured a knocked out Marder near Pokrovsk.


Russian soldiers show off a knocked out and captured M113 near Novogrodovka, allegedly the result of a failed counter-attack.


Russian forces show off a Zemledelie remote minelayer. It's one of the most relevant and capable systems in the Russian artillery park. I'm still waiting for them to unveil normal HE-FRAG for it.


Krasnogorovka-Kurakhovo area.

Russian forces have taken the school complex in the outskirts of Gornyak. Note it appears Russian forces aren't pushing into Gornyak at all but instead are wrapping around westwards and eastward of it. West of Ukrainsk Russian forces appear to be pushing on Tsukurino, and have cut the rail and road out of Tsukurino towards Selidovo. North of Ukrainsk, south of Selidovo, Russian forces continue to advance in the fields, building towards an envelopment of Selidovo. The salient north of Krasnogorovka is almost gone and Russian forces have taken Zhelannoe Drugoe.


West of Krasnogorovka Russian forces have taken over the entire prison colony there, and the village of Ostroe as Ukrainian forces pull back.


Russian artillery strikes on Ostroe, west of Krasnogorovka. The village is currently in Russian hands.


Russian FAB strikes on Gornyak.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Ugledar area.

Russian forces have taken the smaller refuse mound north of the No1 Mine Complex and are closing on Ugledar from different sides.


Reportedly this is Russia's area of control inside Ugledar, but of course the information is both delayed and might not be accurate. I suspect in many areas Russian and Ukrainian infantry are inside the same buildings. In other words this map might show Russia's maximum advance rather then area of control.


First shots of Russian infantry inside Ugledar. Video was posted on Sep 24th, and is on the eastern outskirts.


Russian forces operating north of Prechistovka. I wouldn't be surprised if we see this area develop into a push northward towards Kurakhovo.


Ukrainian BMP-1 getting gets destroyed by a drone-dropped munition near Ugledar.


Ukrainian T-64BV getting taken out north-west of Ugledar and another one somewhere in the Ugledar area (it's the Russian 40th MarBde).


Russian drone-dropped munitions on allegedly Ukrainian positions inside Ugledar.


Russian incendiaries falling on Ugledar. While this is very pretty I question the effectiveness of this strike against dug in infantry in an urban area.


Russian incendiary drones operating north of Ugledar, near Katerinovka.


Russian artillery fires on Ugledar.


Russian forces inside I believe the No 3 mine complex, Ugledar.


A group of 4 Ukrainian POWs near Ugledar.


Zaporozhye front.

Russian forces have taken a patch in the former Vremyevskiy bulge and have reached the outskirts of Makarovka out of Staromayorskoe.


Russia also continues to grab pieces in the former Rabotino salient.


Russia struck the Motor Sich factory in Zaporozhye with UPMK-500 munitions which appears to be the designation for the new longer-range gliding bomb kits. Russia followed up with an Iskander strike. Allegedly Ukraine was using the factory for UAV assembly. Pre-war it was an engine factory for aircraft.

.https://t.me/boris_rozhin/138398

An unexploded FAB-500T near Zaporozhye, this is the new longer range variant.


Dnepr front.

Ukrainian boat attempting to cross the Dnepr gets hit.


Russian strike on Ukrainian infantry in the runis of the Antonov bridge.


A destroyed M548 transporter, Kherson region. Ukraine got ~50 of these from Norway.


The head doctor of the Aleshki hospital, in Russian-held Kherson region, was hit by a Ukrainian FPV drone. While Russian sources seem to suggest this is an assasination attempt by Ukrainian forces, it's just as likely it was a random attack. In the same breath the post mentions that this doctor is known for making house calls to patients near the front lines, and it's common for Ukraine to simply target all vehicles moving in such areas.


Strikes.

Russia hit a police building in Krivoy Rog with Iskanders.


Russia struck an unknown target in Dnepropetrovsk. Details are lacking. In a separate incident Russia hit the MVD institute in Dnepropetrovsk.


Russia hit the Starokonstantinov airfield. Results are unclear.


Russian Lancet strikes takes out a Ukrainian project 736 boat, in Ochakov, Nikolaev region.


Russia strikes a P-19 radar and an ST-68 somewhere on Donetsk region. The radar burns and the operator escape on foot.


Russia strikes allegedly a HIMARS in Donestk region. We can't see what the vehicle is, but something is clearly there and Russia must thing it's important because we appear to get an Iskander and a Tornado-S strike.


Reportedly Russia hit the port of Odessa again, damage unclear.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Other interesting bits.

A Russian Molniya loitering munition strike on a Ukrainian tank, note the automated target tracking.


A rare BMP-1TS, Ukrainian, destroyed, possibly near Pokrovsk.


A destroyed T-90M, as notated, an interesting variant it has old tracks, the kind Russia doesn't use today. I think it's a baseline T-90, pulled from storage and remanufactured into a T-90M.


Russian 2S4 with a drone cage, operating in Ukraine. These super-heavy artillery pieces have gotten a new lease on life with the current war.


Ukraine has managed to a captured a mostly intact Russian drone called Vandal, that uses the cable-guided system to avoid EW. Russian sources report a range of 17 kms for this drone though I have my doubts.


Russian forces show off another captured FV103 Spartan.


It appears Russia has borrowed Ukraine's tactic of using drones with incendiary capabilities.


An uparmored Russian Strela-10M4. The M4 is characterized by improvsed sensors and fire control and were quite rare pre-war.


A Russian BMR-3M operating in the rear areas, Donetsk region. It's unclear how many of these Russia has, but the numbers could easily be single digits.


Chinese ZBF-05 Xinxing armored cars have shown up in Russian service. It appears some quantity were purchased by Chechen security forces pre-war, and have now been handed over to the troops on the front line.


A series of improvised anti-UAS rigs for small arms, Russian. While both sides use such arrangements, their effectiveness is questionable.


A Russian Pantsyr up-armored with rubber sheeting.


An interesting video of a Russian repair btln doing repairs on damaged T-90Ms. They readily cannibalize turrets from damaged chassis and vice versa top get working vehicles, while the damaged ones will go back to the factory.


A Russian BMP-1 and MT-LB both with drone cages. Note the extra armor kit on the BMP-1. I still don't know why they don't have one for the MT-LB.


Ukrainian soldiers training with Skynex AAA. Note at least one truck-mounted system was destroyed already.


Ukraine's 58th Mech operating a captured Russian T-80U.


Ukrainian soldiers with longer ranged Swedish-made 155mm shells.


Finnish 120 KRH 92 mortar in Ukrainian service.


We have footage of Ukraine firing an ASRAAM from a Supacat truck.


A rare Ukrainian S-300V radar.


An interesting look at an underground shelter for an AS-90. It also has a drone cage.


Reportedly Ukraine will receive another batch of AS-90s from the UK, 16 this time. Allegedly 10 are already in Ukraine from this batch.


Ukrainian sources report over there have been over 100 000 AWOL personnel listed.


Jordanian Gepards have arrived in Ukraine..


An interesting Russian recruitment poster. Apparently the sign-up bonus is now 2.5 mln roubles, and the monthly payments are 260k roubles. Note this is for a 1 year contract, and under current conditions likely means getting stop-lossed to the end of the war. They're willing to take people with no prior service experience, and some criminal records depending on what it is. Out of all the recruitment offerrings I've seen this is by far the most generous one Russia has done.


Russian soldier in South MD training with MR-155 pump action shotguns against drone targets. I wonder why they're not using the Vepr' instead.

 
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