There is debate of course on merits of the Kursk incursion ,but there was not the losses as per short lived summer offensive against heavy minefields ,what seems apparent is the political effect in Russia to such incursion and the morale boost to Ukrainian population certainly footage of Ukrainian troops providing assistance to the local civilians in Kursk captures the narrative who respond with the tales of looting by retreating Russian forces
I don’t think we know what losses they are sustaining in Kursk. We don’t know what losses the Russians are sustaining there either. Judging simply by the equipment that Ukraine had lost in Russia and the amount of bombs dropped and drone strikes, I would think they are significant. Moreover, these losses contribute to higher losses (including land) in Ukraine, where it matters most. Are these numbers comparable to the 2023 offensive? Probably not, but the magnitude and scope of the fighting isn’t the same either.
Here is one source that provides a glimpse of the losses among the Russians. Note that I cannot say anything in regard to the reliability of this source whatsoever. I can say that they post seldom (very - 12 posts since Aug 1, for example), but a lot of what they post that can be verified to some extent at the time of the posts or at some point later (not a lot) usually checks out. Posts like this one, however are not as simply verifiable, so a few pounds of salt. I would also argue that this is how a propaganda outlet would operate, but I have no evidence one way or the other. They basically post about Russian f-ups and losses, be it equipment, ammunition, or personnel.
❗️Потери ВС РФ в Курской области. Информация состоянием на 20.09.2024. «200» – 1031 военнослужащий; «300» - 8395 военнослужащих; Пропавших без вести – 302 военнослужащих (226 срочников, 52 контрактника, 24 ПУ ФСБ РФ); В плену – 289 военнослужащих (из которых 262 уже обменяны). @dosye_shpiona
t.me
So according to that post, as of Sept 20, the Russian forces “permanently” lost 1,031 troops in Kursk. The number of wounded stands at 8,395. Missing in action is another 302, of which 226 are conscripts, 52 are the contract troops, and 24 are FSB border guards. It also suggests that 289 were captured PoWs, of which 262 were already exchanged.
While unnecessary, I am going to state this again: I have no idea whether these numbers are reliable and I do not have any evidence to support or refute these numbers. Assuming these numbers are rubbish, there is nothing to discuss. Assuming we can somewhat trust the source (to be clear, I do not suggest doing so), there are some things these numbers can tell us. First, they can tell us the relative composition of the Russian forces in the region in the beginning stages of the offensive by looking at the MiA numbers: 75% conscripts, 17% volunteers that signed a contract, and 8% FSB border guards. I would assume some of the 17 and 8% were the commanding officers, but many of the 8% were likely conscripts as well. This composition I am sure has changed since then, but it still gives us hints about what’s what and it correlates quite well with the approximations we talked about earlier - I believe I said about 80% were conscripts and that is reasonably right when you add the conscripted FSB personnel.
Second thing these numbers tell us is that in poorly prepared defense positions - actually very well prepared but poorly defended positions, haha - Russians lost in all (killed, wounded, captured, mising) about 10K in personnel in about a month and a half of fighting. However, this number also includes quite a few conscripts killed snd wounded in those rather terrible HIMARS strikes that we talked about in the beginning of August. It also includes some number of lost personnel during the “chaos and organization” period, which lasted probably a couple of weeks, perhaps 3 weeks (?). In other words, likely the majority of these casualties would not necessarily happen in the “everyday events” type of thing in this conflict. I mean it would be fair to assume (or even state with a fair degree of confidence) that these troops were not trained, equipped, or otherwise prepared for the events that took place. We can try and talk about projections of these losses to the Ukrainian side and frontline elsewhere, but I do not want to want to start st this time.
As for the political effect of the offensive in Russia, I posted not long ago citing a very reliable source that talked about it. Basically the support for ending the war has since dropped, while the support for continuing the “special military operation” has increased by 7-10% (?). It is rather trivial (to me) and I am not sure why people find it hard to believe.
Ukrainian troops helping the local civilians in Kursk is not particularly an attractive point simply because there are too many contradicting statements, some of which include documented firing at the civilians, for example. I really cannot comment on the subject much more as I simply do not have any information that I can rely on at all. I can say that in many of the helping videos that I saw, the civilians speak with “Ukrainian accent”. Note that this is not to suggest about some fabrications or anything of the nature since it is very plausible and believable (or so I think).
Last thing in regard to Kursk, a rare statement by Dyumin was quoted today in the Russian press. Dyumin is currently a Putin’s aide and (very prematurely, imo) referred to by some as Putin’s potential successor. Today he said Kursk will be liberated very soon and his basis for that is the plan of the General Staff that he reviewed. Whether this actually means anything remains to be seen - such as intensified counteroffensive, etc. I think Russians have recaptured more land in Kursk in the past couple of days, but I haven’t been really following, so I can be corrected on this. Reference for Dyumin’s statement:
Помощник президента России Алексей Дюмин заявил, что в скором времени территория Курской области будет полностью освобождена, передает ТАСС. Он основывает свой прогноз на существующем плане Генштаба
lenta.ru
An absolutely fantastic photo that shows the precariousness of Ukrainian positions in Ugledar.
That’s funny, because I was going to post almost the exact same thing. This guy takes the credit for the creation of the “map” - my guess is he got the idea from what you posted - but he does add some more colours: green represents the two remaining dirt roads in and out of town, red is the territory under Russian control, and blue is the land controlled by Ukraine - anything in between blue and red is obviously the “grey zone”.
Post on X:
x.com
Why there are still Ukrainian troops in that town I have no idea, really. Is it because there are no prepared lines to fall to? Very likely as it appears to be the case everywhere else. Is it because Zelensky is currently in the US trying to show viability and his victory plan? Just as likely, in my opinion.
The Americans have announced another aid package to Ukraine worth $375M and includes HIMARS munitions, M1117s, artillery ammunition, boats, etc. Here are the contents:
The biggest news, however, is going to hit tomorrow, reportedly, when the US announces the largest package yet worth a whopping $8B.
$5.6 is coming from the drawdown from stocks and $2.4B from the USAI programme. None of this $8B is coming any time soon though since the stocks had been depleted beyond the comfortable level of the United States. It can be kind of seen from the contents of the $375M package announced today, in my opinion.
Can I use this opportunity and say
Because
There maybe a very significant military aid package announced by the US in the near future - perhaps, coinciding with Zelensky’s visit.
I will post more on the depleted stocks tomorrow (maybe), but here is the last thing for today: a look at the thermite drop from the ground, I believe that’s a first.
Видел отчет работы fpv «Дракарис» по позициям русни... публика довольна
t.me
The same video on X:
x.com
Not nearly as bad as it looks from the sky, no? There were a few videos of Russians doing the same thing recently.