The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Fredled

Active Member
While we are discussing drones: Zelensky advertises his new Palianytsia missile-drone or mini-cruise missile.
It's supposed to have been the culprit behind the recent attacks on oil depot. Thought there is no confirmation of this.

If they can produce them in large quantity, it could be a game changer.
Let's remember that Ukraine has developed small jet engines for the Bayraktar 2.

Curiously the Bayraktar has disappeared from the radars. Maybe because direct hit by a quadcopter is more effective than dropping a bomb from above. These small bombs often missed their targets. Their only advantage is a longer range. Bayraktars can also be shot down more easily than small drones.

So the Ukrainians have prefered to develop another type of weapon. If they call their Palianytsia a missile-drone and not a cruise missile, maybe it's because it's piloted like a drone, with First Person View technology, while the cruise missile is autonomous.

Feanor said:
The question is whether one should take Ukrainian data of this sort at face value. Your own statement strongly suggests that one should not.
Yes, I always said that their numbers are probably inflated.

KipPotapych said:
I came back to the mental exercise of intercepted UAV reports and looked at a couple more months. June and May were quite supreme for shooting down Shaheds.
The shahed is well known to be easy to shot down. It's noisy and slow. Maybe the easiest target in the sky.
I don;t think that it's useful to try to count each of them with precision. Russians launches 10 Shaded and if one hit the intended target, they are happy. For them it's 100% success ratio because the target was hit.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
While we are discussing drones: Zelensky advertises his new Palianytsia missile-drone or mini-cruise missile.
It's supposed to have been the culprit behind the recent attacks on oil depot. Thought there is no confirmation of this.

If they can produce them in large quantity, it could be a game changer.
Let's remember that Ukraine has developed small jet engines for the Bayraktar 2.

Curiously the Bayraktar has disappeared from the radars. Maybe because direct hit by a quadcopter is more effective than dropping a bomb from above. These small bombs often missed their targets. Their only advantage is a longer range. Bayraktars can also be shot down more easily than small drones.

So the Ukrainians have prefered to develop another type of weapon. If they call their Palianytsia a missile-drone and not a cruise missile, maybe it's because it's piloted like a drone, with First Person View technology, while the cruise missile is autonomous.


Yes, I always said that their numbers are probably inflated.


The shahed is well known to be easy to shot down. It's noisy and slow. Maybe the easiest target in the sky.
I don;t think that it's useful to try to count each of them with precision. Russians launches 10 Shaded and if one hit the intended target, they are happy. For them it's 100% success ratio because the target was hit.
They look cheap and easy to produce. It is likely Russia would need to expend a significant amount of munitions just to shoot them down. I suspect they will incorporate AI and that is going to give Putin quite a few headaches. I doubt any of Russia's aging Soviet era air defences were designed with defending against AI equipped drones in mind.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
A lot of these drones often have to manoeuvre around netting sometimes getting caught ,its easy to wonder if a higher speed jet drone can defeat netting such as around large fuel tanks
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
A lot of these drones often have to manoeuvre around netting sometimes getting caught ,its easy to wonder if a higher speed jet drone can defeat netting such as around large fuel tanks
I would say different drones for different jobs. Having said that you would have to wonder how effective netting would be fending off a plunging drone traveling at 500 knots.

The Palianytsia sounds more like a poor man's cruise missile. I have read estimates of it costing about $40,000 a drone with a range of perhaps 300 miles which could be a near nightmare scenario for the Russians. No longer can they strike targets inside Ukraine with impunity believing that they won't cop anything back in return. If that price is right it will quickly drain Russia's stock of very expensive air defence missiles. This is before we even get into the effect of responding to constant air raid warnings will have on the public opinion of your average Russian.

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
The shahed is well known to be easy to shot down. It's noisy and slow. Maybe the easiest target in the sky.
So is loaded Cessna or its equivalent. Though Cessna is probably an easier target, yet we get to see the results.

I don;t think that it's useful to try to count each of them with precision. Russians launches 10 Shaded and if one hit the intended target, they are happy. For them it's 100% success ratio because the target was hit.
I don’t agree. Also, the point of my excessive was to calculate the intercept rate as reported by the Ukrainian MoD after every raid and to show that it is quite different from Syrsky’s claims (which are likely more realistic, yet we still don’t know how much more). Perhaps, I should have done that with the missiles instead. On the other hand, the situation with missiles is pretty clear too. For example, Syrsky stated that about 25% of all Kizhals were intercepted (28 out of 111, or something like that) and I cited an example above where 10 out of 10 of those projectiles were intercepted in a single event (more than a third of all-time shoot downs). If I go back far enough, I am sure I can show that the daily reports indicate way more X-22/32 intercepted than the 2 out of 360 or whatever it was that Syrsky reported. We will get to see what is claimed tomorrow as it appears there is a very large missile attack happening as I am writing with explosions reported all over the country, including Dnepr, Odessa, Kiev, Lutsk, Lviv, Zaporozhie, Mirhorod, and many other places.

Anyway, my point being is that whatever the daily reports indicate is a load of manure. And it is almost certainly the case for Shaheds as well.

As for success ratio, if they send n number of UAVs or missiles to a specific target and it is hit and destroyed or sufficiently damaged, the success rate is 100%, regardless of how many times it is hit. However, if they send n number of the same projectiles to n number of targets, your success rate is clearly targets sufficiently damaged divided by n, which is according to the MoD’s daily reports is well below 0.15 more often than not. I wish had the same stars provided by the RU MoD that were easy to track for comparison (and maybe there is, but I don’t know about it).

Another thing to keep in mind is that more often than not (at least in the past few months that I looked at), Shaheds are either sent alone or with very few missiles. Then, there are days when they send dozens of missiles with no UAVs at all, like what is currently happening (or so it looks like in the reports at the moment, but things may change). What is the point of sending 89 or 54 or 36 Shaheds over and over when Ukraine reportedly intercepts them all and states that a grain bin was destroyed in the port of Odessa with debris of one of the UAVs that was shot down? They are obviously not using Patriots to shoot them down. Then Ukraine sends 3-4 of their unmanned small aircrafts loaded with explosives 100’s of kilometres away from the frontline and we see the explosions at some airfield. Which, in turn, suggests that Ukrainian very limited air defences are significantly better than the Russian equivalents.

Another tidbit. Apparently there is a guy/team on X who tracks Shahed launches and trajectories daily and reports the monthly totals as well. The account is called Shahed Tracker. My calculations above are equivalent to his reports, after rounding - except that the number of drones differs (he has a few more each month - I looked at July and June), but the rates are exactly the same. A few examples of the tracked trajectories below.

Here, 30 Shaheds were launched and all 30 were intercepted:

IMG_6721.jpeg

Notice that some were flying over 1,000 kilometres, circling around before being shot down.

Here 69 were launched, 50 were intercepted and 16 more were “disabled” by electronic warfare (so in reality the success rate is 96% here rather than the reported 72%):

IMG_6717.jpeg

Some were flying for hours (7+) and over 1,000 kilometres before being shot down or “EW-ed”

Here, 27 out of 27 were shot down:

IMG_6718.jpeg

Anyway, my last post on the subject.

I wonder what is going to be reported tomorrow as it looks like one of the largest air raids took place while I was writing this post. So far I see power outages reported all over (as if there weren’t enough as it is) as well as water, etc.

Edit: to add, here is what I meant by one or two helicopters per base in my post above, but represented by the Ukrainians here (sorry, but an X post):

 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
It's curious to watch what's happening in Kursk region. As the fronts solidify the expansive picture of Ukraine's advances shrinks fairly rapidly. It appears that much of the initial map drawing was done based on sightings of Ukrainian forces, which didn't necessarily reflect areas of control. The Ukrainian salient towards Gir'yi is now gone completely, and it becomes fairly clear that there was never a firm Ukrainian presence. Rather some mobile patrols headed out in that direction several times. Ditto for the Ukrainian "finger" that terminated in Kauchuk where a Ukrainian recon element got hit. I think we're getting pretty close to seeing the true front line in Kursk, with the heavy fighting around Martynovka and Russkaya Konopel'ka, Ol'govka and Korenevo. The situation around Glushkovo remains unclear with the bridges knocked out and the pontoon crossings under fire. Most maps show the area under Russian control mostly because Ukraine hasn't entered it, but I'm wondering how firm Russian control in the area actually is.
 

Fredled

Active Member
Ukrainian air defence in action during massive attack: By the Ukrainian Air Force (@KipPotapych).
They claim a rate of 80% for the long range missiles and of 90% for the Shaheds while at the same time reporting devastating destructions, casualities and black out in many parts of Ukrtaine including Kiev.
If the 20 missiles which passed through the air defence hit their targets acurately, they could make such effect. More probably, a few less missiles were destroyed than they said because Russian missiles are not accurate.

My guess is that they also count missiles which missed their targets and didn't make significant damage or casualities.
 
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Fredled

Active Member
Feanor said:
It's curious to watch what's happening in Kursk region.
I don't think we should expect more Ukrainian advance except in the cauldron south of the Seym river where another success is possible. We don;t know how much forces Ukrainian still have for this sector.

There were videos of Russian convoys from the south moving to Kursk and it was big gears. According to analysts, troops withdrawn from Ukraine make less than 5% of the forces deployed at the front, maybe as low as 3%. While in Pokrovsk Russian troops have even been reinforced.
So it won't make much difference for the Ukrainians in the Donbas. At least for now.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Ukrainian air defence in action during massive attack: By the Ukrainian Air Force (@KipPotapych).
They claim a rate of 80% for the long range missiles and of 90% for the Shaheds while at the same time reporting devastating destructions, casualities and black out in many parts of Ukrtaine including Kiev.
If the 20 missiles which passed through the air defence hit their targets acurately, they could make such effect. More probably, a few less missiles were destroyed than they said because Russian missiles are not accurate.

My guess is that they also count missiles which missed their targets and didn't make significant damage or casualities.
The devil is in the details, of course. What was reportedly launched:
- 3 Kinzhal missiles
- 6 Iskander-M/KN-23
- 77 Kh-101 missiles
- 28 Kalibr missiles
- 3 Kh-22
- 10 Kh-59/69
- 109 Shahed UAVs

What was shot down:
- 1 Kinzhal missle
- 1 Iskader-M/KN-23
- 1 Kh-22
- 99 cruise missiles, including Kalibr, Kh-101, and Kh-59/69
- 99 Shahed UAVs

First thing is that this is third Kh-22/32 (1 out of 3, 33%) that was intercepted and the first since Syrsky’s statements. He reported intercept rate of these missiles to stand at 0.55% (2 out of 362). Is it possible they shot one down? It sure is. Is it plausible? Well, not very likely. I should note that we don’t even know if any were launched at all. But now the count stands at 3 out of 365 (0.82%) in accordance with these reports.

Second, 1 out 6 (17%) Iskander-M was claimed to have been downed. Syrsky’s intercept rate stood at 4.5% for these missiles (62 out of 1,388, including Tochka-U). So possible? Yes. Plausible? Well maybe, but highly unlikely likely. But we now have the count of 63 of 1,394, no change in rate.

Third, another Kinzhal was shot down (1 out of 3, or 33%). Syrsky’s rate stood at 25%, or 28 of 111 launched. Possible? Yes. Plausible? Perhaps. The count is now 29 of 114, no change in rate.

According to Syrsky, Kalibr and Kh-101 are intercepted on average at rate of 67%, while Kh-59 only at 22%. Here we have a mix of 115 in total, of those only 10 were Kh-59. They claimed to had shot down 99 of them, or 86%. Possible? Yes. Plausible? Well, not really, in my opinion.

Lastly, Shaheds. They reportedly shot down 99 of 109, or 91%. However, they also reported that “several units were also lost somewhere on the territory of Ukraine and 2 crossed the border with Belarus”. So out of 10 that were not shot down, 2 happened to fly to Belarus, and “several” of the remaining 8 crushed somewhere in Ukraine (by this they usually mean in the middle of nowhere and/or didn’t explode). What’s several? Well, at least 3. Thus, over 95% were disabled by some means or broke down on their own. Possible? Yes. Plausible? Well, not really, in my opinion.

To sum up, looking at all the numbers above and comparing them to the numbers Syrsky provided, is the current report by the Ukrainian Air Force true? If we were talking in person, you would probably see me laughing. I don’t believe it is true or even close to it.

The numbers and the extra Shahed comments are taken from the Ukrainian official report on their Telegram channel (I found out today they have one as well, which now makes things easier for me):

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I don't think we should expect more Ukrainian advance except in the cauldron south of the Seym river where another success is possible. We don;t know how much forces Ukrainian still have for this sector.

There were videos of Russian convoys from the south moving to Kursk and it was big gears. According to analysts, troops withdrawn from Ukraine make less than 5% of the forces deployed at the front, maybe as low as 3%. While in Pokrovsk Russian troops have even been reinforced.
So it won't make much difference for the Ukrainians in the Donbas. At least for now.
The situation on the Pokrovsk axis seems to be dire. Some indications suggest Russia has taken a large swathe of the E-50 highway in their southern push, and the refuse mounds, one north of Novogrodovka on the eastern side of the rail line, the other near Mikhailovka. It's starting to look like the Russian goal might be a simultaneous push on the right shore of the Volchya all the way down to Kurkhovo, and west on Pokrovsk. I was earlier speculating that this is the worst case scenario but it might be a reality with only the minor distinction that the southern push is the priority. This would require Ukraine to completely reorganize logistics on the southern Donbas and build a whole new defense line. Next year's campaigns might be the push on Slavyansk-Kramatorsk.

Suriyakmaps has been a bit delayed in his updates lately, though I think he's the gold standard for mapping this, meanwhile Kalibrated shows a grim picture. In the southern direction with the fall of Memrik Ukraine is threatened with encirclement in Karlovka. Galitsinovka and Karlovka are next in line to fall, and after that Russia may assault Ukrainsk or push into Zhelannoe Pervoe. Either move threatens the entire Ukrainian defense line from just south of Netaylovo to the northern parts of Maksimil'yanovka area with encirclement. Meanwhile on the western side Russian forces now appear to be a couple of tree lines from the first houses of Mirnograd. Note Mirnograd itself has a strange layout, it almost looks like two cities connected by a narrow spot, and it's the southern of the two "bulbs" that Russia has approached. Toretsk, Chasov Yar, Kupyansk axis, everything else is clearly secondary. This is Russia's main blow and it seems to be succeeding. Taking Pokrovsk by year's end is looking more and more realistic, though again still far from certain.

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Pokrovsk direction looks pretty bad. Post on X showing a short video by Deepstate of the Russian movement on the map over the past 2 weeks:


Tatarigami talks a bit about the Significance of Pokrovsk:


According to Syrsky’s statement, Ukraine controls 1,294 sq km in Kursk region. He also provided the most reasonable assessment of the captured Russian soldiers, which he said stands at 594. This is most reasonable because the 2,000+ “estimates” floating around are unrealistic. 594 could be high too.

He also said that one of the main objectives of the operation was to divert significant forces from Pokrovsk and Kurakhove fronts, but that didn’t happen. Instead Russians are increasing their efforts there. Estimated 30,000 troops were brought in from elsewhere (most other reports indicate from the reserves and “the rear”, ie internal forces, as well some capable troops South and North directions).

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Pokrovsk direction looks pretty bad. Post on X showing a short video by Deepstate of the Russian movement on the map over the past 2 weeks:


Tatarigami talks a bit about the Significance of Pokrovsk:

His comment about there being uncertainty as to why Pokrovsk is important made me smile. Not sure who is uncertain, it's been Ukraine's main logistical hub for everything from Velikaya Novoselka (through Bogatyr) all the way to the Artemovsk/Bakhmut area (through Konstantinovka). Kramatorsk can take over as a very viable alternate supply hub for the latter, it already serves as that for forces on the Liman axis, and the Seversk salient, and it's a quick shot through Druzhkovka down to Konstantinovka. But for the entire Donetsk area there is no easy alternative. It's actually questionable whether Pokrovsk is still serving as a supply hub of whether as part of their ongoing evacuation efforts Ukraine is already shifting their logistics. On the one hand this would be wise in preparation for it's fall. On the other hand it would accomplish one of Russia's goals without them even entering the city. There's also the question of the practicality of running supply trains with artillery range.

Also it appears Selidovo is next. Russian forces are apparently assaulting the city from the east, which makes sense. The biggest question is that of the large refuse mound inside the town (north-eastern side). If they take it, the rest of the town is going to be much easier to clear. If they don't, they will have problems.

According to Syrsky’s statement, Ukraine controls 1,294 sq km in Kursk region. He also provided the most reasonable assessment of the captured Russian soldiers, which he said stands at 594. This is most reasonable because the 2,000+ “estimates” floating around are unrealistic. 594 could be high too.
594 is at least theoretically possible. My best guess on POWs would be low triple digits, somewhere between 100-300. Note this is just a guess. For territory controlled, you can look at the maps, they speak for themselves.

He also said that one of the main objectives of the operation was to divert significant forces from Pokrovsk and Kurakhove fronts, but that didn’t happen. Instead Russians are increasing their efforts there. Estimated 30,000 troops were brought in from elsewhere (most other reports indicate from the reserves and “the rear”, ie internal forces, as well some capable troops South and North directions).

Sounds very plausible, possibly just true, and if so, it failed completely.
 

Fredled

Active Member
There isn't much happening in the last few days, except in Pokrovsk and of course the missile attack on Ukraine and drone attacks on Russian oil depots. If I were the Ukrainians, I would wait a few weeks or a few months and when enough new forces are ready make a counter attack in the DonBas to wipe out all recent Russian gains. Or re-attacking in the south, with more consistent means while keeping the pressure on Kursk.
Most of Russian forces defending Kursk are from inside Russia, there will be a time when these forces won't be enough unless you unreasonably deplete the minimal internal and border defence elsewhere in the country. I wonder what Russia would oppose again a surprise invasion by Mongolia right now....
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
His comment about there being uncertainty as to why Pokrovsk is important made me smile. Not sure who is uncertain, it's been Ukraine's main logistical hub for everything from Velikaya Novoselka (through Bogatyr) all the way to the Artemovsk/Bakhmut area (through Konstantinovka). Kramatorsk can take over as a very viable alternate supply hub for the latter, it already serves as that for forces on the Liman axis, and the Seversk salient, and it's a quick shot through Druzhkovka down to Konstantinovka. But for the entire Donetsk area there is no easy alternative. It's actually questionable whether Pokrovsk is still serving as a supply hub of whether as part of their ongoing evacuation efforts Ukraine is already shifting their logistics. On the one hand this would be wise in preparation for it's fall. On the other hand it would accomplish one of Russia's goals without them even entering the city. There's also the question of the practicality of running supply trains with artillery range.

Also it appears Selidovo is next. Russian forces are apparently assaulting the city from the east, which makes sense. The biggest question is that of the large refuse mound inside the town (north-eastern side). If they take it, the rest of the town is going to be much easier to clear. If they don't, they will have problems.
I think there is a great amount of people who simply watch/read reports in their echo chamber without really considering the reality of the situation (goes for all sides involved). This includes the statements of many officials, Ukrainian and Western, that indicate whatever Russia captures is not to be of significance: loss of Bakhmut had no meaning, Chasov Yar if lost is not going to have any strategic effect, and so on. Now, according to the Deputy Director of the CIA, loss of Pokrovsk is not a “game changer in the strategic sense”.


At the same time, from what I see, while many are posting about the dire situation in Donbas, even more are now posting about the Kursk offensive, including numerous various posts about the first days, how the Ukrainian Forces rolled through in the first day, then the second, etc. Including the article above. In this sense, it was a great success. Twitter is full of Kursk success as well (example). So maybe that was the point if his post. He wrote a bit more extensive article on the subject as well:


On the subject of the above Reuters article. The deputy chief is of the opinion that Russians will mount a counteroffensive in Kursk, but will face a “difficult fight”. I am not convinced there will be some great counteroffensive there for a while though. I really do not see the relevance as long as the situation is contained and the Ukrainian advances stop. It would make a lot more sense to me is to let Ukraine dig in and then slowly pound them with artillery and bombs, small counterattacks, until they are stretched so thing that they either withdraw on their own, or you counterattack and face a significantly less “difficult battle”, see current East situation. In the meantime, they will have to keep sending additional troops, ammunition, and equipment, further reducing their ability to hold the east, south, and elsewhere. Also reducing the potential for any significant counteroffensive on the Ukrainian land in the foreseeable future. Something like that. I really do not see the significance of the Kursk as described by many individuals. Everybody (or most, I guess) understand that this is in no way sustainable by Ukraine in the long (or even medium) term and doing a considerable amount of damage to all other existing fronts immediately and later on. Like the deputy chief said “significance of the Ukrainian incursion remains to be seen”. Soon the leaves will fall and other natural cover will be gone as the autumn comes in, any week now, and things will become even more complex.

Sure, there is a lot of talk of “invasion of Russian land” and “embarrassment for Putin”, etc. I really doubt this is as big as some would like to believe. Wishful thinking. Again, everyone understands this is not sustainable from any perspective, be it manpower, equipment, logistics, and so on. But we shall see - not like there is any other choice anyway.

This journalist who visited Kursk recently indicates the following observation in his post on X:

The other thing that strikes you is how huge the area is even on the Ukrainian side. Vast sweeping fields. Even the 10-15,000 Ukrainian troops estimated to be in Kursk would quickly stretch thin. No wonder it was reported big areas were empty of both Russian and Ukrainian troops.

In the meantime, DefMon reported the following earlier today:

IMG_6764.jpeg

This was kind of really expected. In the meantime, DefMon, again, provided a couple of interesting charts yesterday:

IMG_6765.jpeg

IMG_6766.jpeg

594 is at least theoretically possible. My best guess on POWs would be low triple digits, somewhere between 100-300. Note this is just a guess. For territory controlled, you can look at the maps, they speak for themselves.
I think 300 is a good number to throw; perhaps, between 300 and 400 is better, but who knows.

As for the area, I don’t believe there is a clear line formed yet. There is fighting in certain same areas reported daily, but other that, I don't think there is much clarity at this time. Yet. The deputy chief of CIA in the article above suggests that the area captured by Ukraine is 777 sq km, or about a 40% reduction of Syrsky’s claims.

Sounds very plausible, possibly just true, and if so, it failed completely.
I think it was part of the intent. The only success so far that I can see is that this put Ukraine back in the news big time. And, as Zelensky said, it put on the back-burner the talk of Ukraine being unable to capture land and fight back, people don’t talk about it now. Though the latter, I believe is not as truthful as he desires.

Another thing that they have publicly state to achieve is to show that there are no “red lines” that cannot be crossed. In this, they so far have failed as no permission has been granted to use the western long-range missiles on the Russian territory. This is actually one thing I really doubt will be permitted. I really feel like this the line they do not want to cross and won’t. But, again, we shall see.

On the subject of red lines, btw. Here is a solid read and a perspective:

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
To follow up on what I meant above about the Twitter and echo chambers and people lacking understanding of the severity of the situation.

So I looked at this thread:


Then I decided to look over the comments and here are a few examples:











These are just from one thread (from a guy followed by many - 138.5K - and normally “everything is fine” type of attitude and a bit of its own echo chamber at times) with a dozen or two comments at the moment.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Apologies for multiple posts, but I wanted to follow up on the subject of drones and confusing statements from Syrsky in the article.

In the article, Syrsky clearly refers to Shaheds and Lancets, as mentioned. Why two different numbers and statistics are provided is unknown to me. To include all drones, including the “ali-baba quadcopters”, this number probably looks closer to a daily use, lol, not from Feb 22, 2024. Even with the 13 whatever thousand, it doesn’t necessarily look plausible if you include Lancets even. But I cannot speak with certainty. Feanor used to post some sort of count of Lancet launches or something of the sort. I wonder what that count looks like now.
So as my quote above indicates, Syrsky said he was talking about Shaheds and Lancet, or so it was interpreted in the article. I do not believe this is the case. Since I found out about the existence of the Telegram channel of the UA Air Force, I looked at some things from the very beginning of the war and their posts. I am fairly positive that what syrsky is referring to in the UAV numbers he provided is not the Lancets and Shaheds. Most is certainly Shaheds, without a doubt. The rest is a mix, however the absolute majority of the rest is what they called “operational tactical level” UAVs in their posts, the same drones that they are also referring to as Orlan-10. These were the absolute majority of the drones that were (claimed to be) intercepted. Until middle of October 2022 (so a month after the first use of Shahed), there were only several other UAVs reported to have been shot down and everything else were these “operational tactical level” UAVs, often specified to be Orlan-10s in the comments to the image or separate posts. For example:



That one says UAV of “operational tactical level”.



That one says Orlan-10 UAVs.

So far, I saw Lancet mentioned once and I am not even sure it was the loitering munition kind they were referring to because they were talking about a surveillance drone or something of that nature. Only other drone that I can recall seeing of the top of my head were 2 or 3 Iranian Mohajers. So I very much doubt the provided stats include anything but surveillance and Shahed UAVs, with maybe very few of anything else. I will report on this later again (unless I lose interest).

I should also note that it is quite a mess to follow. They report one thing in their comments, then add a completely different number to their daily totals. Then their starting daily totals can be different from the ending daily totals from the previous day. I had to make adjustments to my counters several times (yes, I made a bit of a project there for myself), always adding at least ten to the “new” opening total. Missiles are the same, but so far only between 1 and 3 were the adjustments that had to be made. There are many indications of the numbers being “fixed” in the early day, that’s for sure. Sometimes something as simple as this:



They show and state 6 Shaheds on the image, say 4 in the text below and another place (not pictured), then add 8 to the count (8 is arbitrary).

Then, on October 19, 22 they posted that since the first interception of Shahed on September 13, 223 in total were shot down. The first day they mentioned Shahed was different in my notes (based on their daily briefings) - something like 19 or 21st, I don’t recall - but it could be my miss. The number on my counter was also different (194 or something like that), which isn’t likely to be a simple inconsistency and me not seeing the reports.



However, it should be noted that it is rather hard to follow when and how they reported the intercepts and add the totals on the daily basis.

They didn’t report the number of launches except on a few occasions back in the day. When they did, the intercept rate of UAVs (Shaheds) was reported usually at well above 80%. Same for Kalibr missiles - they had a couple of 100% intercepts (like 5 out of 5, for example) within days after reporting the first one, lol. This is funny too:



The point of the post (which is longer and I should have saved the reference to) is that they are laughing and celebrating that they intercepted missiles and Russians wasted money, but include the missile that hit the target into their calculations. Also, of course, avoiding the cost of the assets they used to (presumably) shoot down these and other missiles (I guess it could be argued it is not their money that paid for them?). This is also one of not many examples of interception rates from the old days, in this case about 85% for KH-101 cruise missiles.

I will come back to this subject some time later.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Kursk front.


Ukrainian forces have apparently taken Russkaya Konopel'ka. This is where we saw the Marders shooting up some buildings. Reportedly the 1009th Rgt from Russia (the 4 digits suggest a mobilized regiment) was engaged there, and practically encircled. It was recently broken out of encirclement, and it's possible Russia pulled back from this area. Ukrainian forces on the western side of this salient have taken Krasnooktyabrskoe. Note this is significant because it cuts off Russian access to the Glushkovo area. Now Russia's only ways in across the Seym river. On the other hand, north of Korenevo Russia has recaptured Zhelobovka, Borki, and Durovka, and now contests Ol'govka.


An interesting video from Cherasskoe Porechnoe, Kursk region, filmed from inside a Ukrainian vehicle. We have a Ukrainian T-64BV get hit by a Lancet. The tank loses a track, hides near some trees. Meanwhile a Ukrainian MRAP overtakes it with an open rear door, and picks up an infantry team, that's firing but also mounting up, suggesting that this is a fighting retreat. The third link is the same spot but filmed by the Russian UAV. We can see the tank eventually burns up, with the ammo cooking off.


Russian drone strike on a Ukrainian vehicle. Outcome unclear, the video cuts out.


A series of videos of FPV drones striking Ukrainian vehicles. We don't see the outcomes. The second link is interesting because it's the same kind of footage but using wire-guided drones, so we don't have any EW obscuring the last few seconds.


Russian strike on allegedly parked Ukrainian vehicles by a skating rink in Zaoleshenka, Kursk region.


Ukrainian BMP gets hit, Kursk region.


A Ukrainian T-72M1 ripped apart by a drone strike. The anti-drone cage doesn't seem to help any.


Ukrainian BMP-2 taken out, Kursk region. Warning footage of corpses.


Russia strikes a Stryker and a BREM-1 trying to evacuated the knocked out Stryker.


Russian drone with wire-guidance hits a Bushmaster. There's a knocked out Stryker in the same area. This might be the same Bushmaster we saw destroyed in the last update.


A Ukrainian Stryker ESV with mine trawl destroyed near Ol'govka.


A smashed Ukrainian column with an M577 M113 variant, a Kozak armored car, and what appears to be a pair of civilian cars. This is reportedly near Korenevo.


Three wrecked Ukrainian vehicles, a Strkyer, a Kozak, and another flipped 4X4 vehicle, maybe another Kozak.


A destroyed Kozak armored car with Ukrainian KIA being examined by Russian marines from the 810th MarBde. Warning footage of corpses.


Russia hits an unknown Ukrainian armored vehicle after it hides in a building, a BTR-60 after it hides in a treeline, and an ST-68 radar in Sumy region. The ST-68 may have been a decoy.


Russia strikes an allegedly Ukrainian military pickup truck near Odnobrovka, on the Ukrainian side of the border in the general vicinity of Grayvoron.


Russia delivers 2 strikes, one a storage building in Sumy region, allegedly hitting a HIMARS TEL. There's quite the explosion but it's hard to make anything out for sure. The other against allegedly a HIMARS on the move. We see a plausible truck in the video hide a tree line and then get hit, but again we can't really confirm.


Russian strike hits a Ukrainian Buk-M1 near Gritsenkovo, Sumy region.


Russia struck a Ukrainian bridge in Sumy region near Akhtyrka.


Russia hits a P-18 radar with a Lancet near Boromlya, also in the area of Akhtyrka, Sumy region.


GMLRS missiles allegedly shot down in Kursk region, relatively intact.


A VAB knocked out and captured by Wagner mercenaries, Kursk region.


Ukrainian POWs.


Russian up-armored Tor-M2 has shown up in Kursk region. It might be the exact same vehicle we saw north of Kharkov. We also have a Pantsyr-S1.


A Russian M-46 operating in Kursk region, battlegroup North.


Ukrainian Strykers, in Kursk region.


Kharkov front.

Ukraine hit Shebekino again, residential buildings appear to have been targeted.


Oskol front.

Russia takes out a T-64BV mod'17, somewhere in the Kupyansk area. Reportedly it was immobilized by artillery and abandoned. We see it get finished off by a quadcopter munition drop.


A destroyed Ukrainian Rosomak APC near Liman.


Reportedly Russia struck the military commissariat in Kupyansk, causing casualties. No confirming footage so far.


Chasov Yar.


Russian forces have expanded their area of control on the other side of the canal, recapturing much of what they had lost in the last counter-attack, and making some new inroads.


Russian forces have captured and hauled away another CV90 in this area. It was apparently taken out with a penetration through the rear of the turret.


Gorlovka-Toretsk.


Russia has taken the houses in between their two salients pushing into Toretsk. Russia has also, for some reason, attacked and captured some trenches west of the canal, north of Druzhba. Maybe the intent is to start wrapping around from the north, but I would have thought it would be easier to advance northward out of Druzhba.


A Ukrainian T-64BV burns, Toretsk.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Pokrovsk axis.

Russia has taken most of Grodovka, up to the Zhuravka river, and crossed the Kazeniy Torets near Novotoretskoe, setting up to assault Mirolyubovka, possibly to envelop Ukrainian defenses along the river in Grodovka. Russia has begun the assault on Selidovo. The fog of war is still dense, but Russia is clearly inside the town either in or approaching the center, and controls both refuse mounds. Russia has taken Kamyshevka, Ptichye, Kalinovo and has also taken Memrik, crossing the E-50. Note Novogordovka is now fully under Russian control, making it the third town Russia has captured this year (after Avdeevka and Krasnogorovka). The towns of Selidovo and Ukrainsk are probably next, with Mirnograd and Pokrovsk also threatened. On the nothern side Russia is creeping up to the outskirts of Mirnograd.


Two Bradleys getting hit, Pokrovsk axis.


A smashed Abrams near Novozhelannoe.


Another knocked out Abrams captured by Russian forces near Vol'chye.


A completely destroyed Bradley, in Zhelannoe. It stopped inches away from a land mine, and may have hit other mines.


A thoroughly up-armored M1, Ukrainian, Pokrovsk axis.


Krasnogorovka-Mar'inka area.

This entire section of front might be rendered irrelevant if Russian advances southward out of the Pokrovsk area continue. This front is currently on the other side of the reservoir in Karlovka, but it's not the primary direction of assault. Instead they are the supporting side, while the forces out of the rail berm push southward. I suspect we're about to see a large scale Ukrainian withdrawal from the entire area between the Pervomayskoe-Netaylovo area, the Krasnogorovka area, and the old front line.

A destroyed Marder near Netaylovo.


Konstantinovka-Ugledar.

Russian forces have taken Konstantinovka, and have advanced to the road along a broad section south of there. At this point the road has lost significance so it's likely Ukraine wasn't holding it very hard at this point. Note this isn't visible on the update posts (presumably suriyakmaps is behind) but on his main map and on Kalibrated's map we see that Russian forces have advanced north of Shevchenko, west of Pavlovka, taking a section of the road there. It's possibly Russia is making another play for Ugledar, this one with a wider encirclement.


Dnepr front.

Russian strikes landing in Sadovoe village, Kherson region. Allegedly they're striking Ukrainian staging areas.


A Ukrainian barge destroyed on the Dnepr.


Black Sea/Crimea.


Russia hit the Tavrida and Crimea-1 platforms in the Black Sea. Since the Russian Navy pulled back, Ukraine has been using these platforms as observation posts. It's interesting since they also recently hit Zmeiniy, suggesting they're intentionally targetting Ukrainian forces in the Black Sea area, possibly as a preventitive measure in anticipation of more Ukrainian attacks on the peninsulas that Ukraine recently tried to land on.


A rare Russian Pantsyr-1SM guarding the Crimean bridge. Not sure why it's not parked inside the hesco barriers.


Strikes.


Russia hit the Kiev hydro-electic plant, allegedly striking the machine hall.


Russia hit the Aurora hotel in Krivoy Rog. Among those killed we have a Ukrainian SBU officer and the former governor of Cheraksy region (an ex-SBU man himself). The explosion was so large it threw nearby cars into buildings.


Russia also struck a hotel in Kramatorsk where repotedly foreign journalists were staying. At least one person that was killed was a security specialist of some sort.


Russia hit Odessa again, targets unclear.


Russia hit Dnepropetrovsk, targets unclear.


A Russian air defense tower firing, Moscow region.


Ukrainian Mi-24 and Mi-8 trying to intercept Russian drones. Note they're firing from the passenger compartment. The Mi-24 has always fascinated me, being a combination of a troop carrier and a gunship, a sort of flying IFV.


We have reports of Ukrainian AirForce Lt. Col. Aleksey Mes' killed, possibly in a recent Russian strike on the Ukrainian airbase in Ivano-Frankovks region. Note this is where we recently saw the F-16s in released footage. Some Russian sources have speculated that this indicates a downed or destroyed F-16, but this is not in any way clear.


Ukraine hit another Russian fuel storage facility (Atlas) in Rostov region, igniting two tanks, and one in Kirov region.


Interesting bits.

We have reports and footage that Belarus is massing troops on the Ukrainian border and the troops are marked with the letter B.


A Russian Tunguska in action. Despite being relatively common, we're seeing very few of these being used. It's unclear why. Their confirmed losses are low.


Recent footage of an F-16 in Ukraine reveals it's located at an airfield in Ivano-Frankovsk region, western Ukraine.


A rare Ukrainian T-84 (not BM, regular) with the 3rd Tanks. Last time we've seen these tanks in one place, Ukraine had 5 in working condition. Only 10 were ever built with two sold to the US, one converted into the Oplot-M prototype, and one converted into the Yatagan prototype.


Ukraine's 19th Missile Bde shows off a rare Tochka TEL. Russia hasn't really done much to destroyed these, but the munitions aren't particularly easy to source.


A ex-Finnish 2S1 in Ukrainian service. This is confirmation of something I've long since suspected, Finland is transferring their Soviet/Russian kit to Ukraine quietly.


Iranian 125mm tank shells have shown up in Ukrainian service. Maybe they were seized during an attempt to deliver them to the Houthis. Maybe they were purchased through intermediaries.


Ukrainian soldiers training in the UK. Reportedly it's a 5 day course.

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Russians were talking about an obituary for an F-16 pilot yesterday, citing Ukrainian outlets that posted it. I didn’t look into it more than that. The Russian sources were proposing that he was likely at the air base that was hit during the last air raid. Today the Wall Street Journal reported that the pilot was in fact killed and it happened when an F-16 crashed while repelling the aerial attack. A few other outlets posted the story since.


That is quite a loss for Ukraine. The reason of the crash is not reported, but it appears Ukrainians are hinting at technical reasons.
 
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