The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Yes, that was happened. But you see, at the end of the day, they voted the package.
Sure, months late, with no predictability for Ukraine. No damage done obviously.

I know. But it's still nuch cheaper than ordering new material for Ukraine.
My point was that the US is able to send much more equipment and missiles that they have been doing without too much spending.
I guess "too much" depends on what you plan to do in the future. In principle the US might be trying to hang on to some of their stockpiles for the future. I agree that the US could supply much more than what they have been.

I don't agree. Western aid, current or past, was a game changer in the sens that it allowed Ukraine to resist against its complete disparition.
It's just that it wasn;t enough to repel the Russian back to the 1991 borders. Everybody says that it's not realistic. It becomes realistic when you get the numbers.
The 2023 counter offensive failed because of lack of air power. Now with the F16's, they will have something to work with. The US has just promised 50 F16's, ...finally. Some F16's are theoretically already in Ukraine. But it will take until 2025 for the full force to be operational. We won;t see a sudden change in the game. It will grow gradually in favour of the Ukrainians.
At first the main task will be to intercept incoming cruise missiles and prevent the Russian air force to come close. They will protect the bases, the front line and the infrastructures.
In a second stage, they will bomb Russian lines. Then it will start to be interesting.
Your scenario seems to assume that the F-16s will get Ukraine at least air superiority if not outright air dominance. This seems unlikely. Consider the effort the US had to put into rolling back Iraqi IADS during the two Gulf Wars. Russia's IADS is considerably more sophisticated, and Ukraine has far fewer resources, including certain categories of kit that are completely absent. So the chances that they can accomplish a similar effect are extremely low. At this point we don't even know what configuration they will come in.

The second part you're ignoring is... Ukraine is already bombing Russian lines with gliding bombs from their current inventory. I suspect that in addition to Russian combat jets and air defenses, availability of munitions is a major limiting factor for Ukraine's ability to drop ordinance on Russian forces. So the question becomes, do the F-16s come with a massive boost in overall aid levels to provide Ukraine with the munitions they need?

Lastly, consider Russia. Russia has more missiles and UAVs to throw at striking long range targets. Russia has also been dropping over 1000 gliding bombs per month for many months (the numbers now are closer to 3k per month). Yet the pace of Russian advance has been glacial. in the grand scheme of things. And this is despite now an advantage in manpower, artillery, and armor. Remember Ukraine's offensive in the summer 2023. It didn't fail due to lack of air power exclusively. It failed because the advances were extremely slow and extremely costly. It's possible a hefty portion of F-16s could have chased Russian Ka-52s back from the front lines, but even that's not obvious. The offensive failed because the nature of the fighting makes it very hard to gain ground and concentrate troops. Even if the arrival of F-16s shifts the fighting to a Ukrainian offensive (and I think it's likely they will at least attempt it) I don't believe we're going to see any rapid gains. Supporting a large F-16 fleet in Ukraine will be more and more expensive as they keep arriving. Dealing with Russian jets and IADS will be a substantial challenge, and Ukraine will lose jets in the sky, hiding from Russian strikes becomes harder the more jets you have, so Ukraine will lose jets on the ground. And the greatest fight jet in the world can't help you if your armored columns get stuck on a minefield, or disassembled by drones. The arrival of F-16s won't reverse the pattern of who can drop more ordinance on the other side. That will still be Russia. So why would it reverse the course of the war?

I don;t think we should talk about physical inability. It's rather the choice not to deplete too much one's own stocks for the sake of aiding Ukraine. If we consider the European countries bordering Russia, they are actually increasing their forces rather than depleting them. There is a double effort going on.
You pointed out that German stocks are running low and cited Slovakia as an example (I would also consider Poland who donated vast amounts of Soviet-era kit but are now running low in many categories). I agree that there is a double effort, but the double effort is being fed in large part by the same industrial base and from the same existing stockpiles. The only real example where that works in Ukraine's favor is where the Poles (and now Romanians) are purchasing RoK kit, which theoretically opens up their own old kit to donation.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
The glide bombs being released by Russian forces seem to be using up old Soviet era bombs with newly designed wing kits ,these though are not immune as this article shows and if Ukraine receives these aircraft it may assist against the glide bombs with its range of sixty to seventy kilometres certainly Russian aircraft carrying such heavy ordinance could in theory be targeted by air to air missiles from Ukrainian aircraft still inside their own front lines
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
The glide bombs being released by Russian forces seem to be using up old Soviet era bombs with newly designed wing kits ,these though are not immune as this article shows and if Ukraine receives these aircraft it may assist against the glide bombs with its range of sixty to seventy kilometres certainly Russian aircraft carrying such heavy ordinance could in theory be targeted by air to air missiles from Ukrainian aircraft still inside their own front lines
Absolutely and the EW part is already happening. We've had some recent strikes (will be in the next update) where likely due to Ukrainian EW, the glide bombs are missing their targets hard.
 

Larry_L

Active Member
Ukraine is striking long range every chance they get. They have attacked another roll on, roll off ferry, and several airbases. One of the bases was at a distance of over 1000 miles. Fighter bomber confirms 3 airbases attacked, also stating that air defense operated "normally"? . He also mentions a Su-34 technical crash and speaks cryptically about western surveillance aircraft, and efforts to keep them farther from key areas. Ukraine claims a bomber was damaged in their longest strike with no confirmation. I have not provided translation for these. Let me know if this is a problem for you. It is now built in to the firefox browser, and works most of the time for me.







An interesting view of a Russian UAV control center. These are prime targets for both sides, an illustrate the need for tight operational security.


Russia is talking about their Cobra system which allegedly can pinpoint UAV control centers, and target them.

 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
This article tries to provide a balanced approach to Ukrainian and Russian material losses with graphs over the war sing comparisons even to showing both sides over claim opponent losses and extent an interesting read for people here trying to make sense of the drip feed of singular claims often portrayed
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Kharkov front.


Some Ukrainian counter-attacks regained a few buildings inside Volchansk. Meanwhile in Glubokoe after many Ukrainian attacks that penetrated deep into the village, the entire village is now apparently under Russian control. Overall the situation remains murky.


Another Russian land mine toss, this one in Volchansk.


Russian forces engaged in Volchansk.


Russian battlegroup north using a UAV to target Ukrainian infantry. Note the Ukrainian forces are using thermal shrouds.


Russia airstrikes around Glubokoe and Volchansk.


Allegedly a PzH-2000 getting hit by a Russian strike. Note we can't make out what the vehicle is, but it explodes spectacularly and it looks like a howitzer.


A Ukrainian 2S22 Bogdana getting hit by an Iskander strike. Note the source claims there were multiple howitzers there, but we only see one.


Ukrainian T-64BV with mine trawl and Bergenpanzer ARV destroyed, Kharkov region.


Russia hit airspace control radars in the Kharkov airport. Note these are static systems that have been active during this entire war.


Russia hit the Kharkov Tank factory, and then double-tapped Ukrainian teams attempting to pull out a tank. Russia also hit an industrial building allegedly housing foreign fighter from Ukraine's 151st Mech Bde. Finally Russia hit a kindergarted near Dergachy, Kharkov outskirts, allegedly being used as a Ukrainian staging area. All are Iskander strikes.


Russia hit two Ukrainian military trains near Barvenkovo, Kharkov region. 3rd link has ground-level footage after the strike.


Aerial footage of the ruins of Volchansk.


A Russian M-46 from battle group north.


Ukraine shelled Shebekino, hitting a residential building, wounding 7 civilians.


Belgorod region, Ukraine allegedly killed a civilian driver in a lone vehicle with an FPV drone strike.


A city bus in Belgorod with anti-drone netting.


Oskol front.

Russian forces have taken Peschanoe and are expanding their area of control around it north and west. This salient is developing, and will likely cut Ukraine's lines on the left shore of the Oskol in half.


Russian forces have taken Andreevka completely, south of Myasozharovka and have gained ground towards Nevskoe.


Russian forces shoot up a Ukrainian trench line using a BTR-82A, with a UAV directing the fires. Russia then assaults the position.


Russia hits allegedly an AN/TPQ-50 counter-battery radar, Kupyansk area.


Seversk salient.

Russian forces have gained a trench line north of Razdolovka and have taken Ivano-Dar'yevka west of Spornoe.


Chasov Yar.

Russian forces have crossed the canal in a wide front, both north and south of the old bridge. The first row of houses has been taken by Russian forces. Note the neighborhoods immediately west of the canal are all private houses, 1-2 stories. They don't make for great strong points. It's likely Russia's next problem will be the refuse mounds and the factory at the center of town.


Russian forces also continue to push north of the Chasov Yar area, towards the canal. There are no immediately obvious targets for the pushes here, this is probably ground work for future advances towards the Kramatorsk area.


Russian drone munition drop near Grigorovka, north of the Chasov Yar area.


A Russian command post near Artemovsk/Bakhmut.


Gorlovka-Toretsk.

Russian advances in Zheleznoe lay the ground work for that town falling (suriyakmaps has it at 80% Russian). While a separate municipality, it's effectively all part of the same urban sprawl as Toretsk itself. There are a couple of large refuse mounds and a suburban area separating the two, but it's not a clear fat line. So far Russian successes here continue, though at a slower pace then the initial push. Ukraine partially stabilized the situation, compared to the first few days, but continues to lose ground steadily. In Novogorodskoe (New York) Russia holds about half of the village, and has expanded control of the fields east and especially west of it, and continues to bite off pieces in the center.


A Ukrainian T-72AV destroyed near Toretsk.


Ukrainian MANPADS downed a Russian Su-25 near Toretsk (other source claims Pokrovskoe axis), the pilot reportedly survived and was evacuated.


Russian drone drops munitions on Ukrainian infantry dismounting from a vehicle.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Pokrovskoe axis.

Russian forces continue to push westward along the rail line, capturing areas around it. Russian forces have taken Progress and Volchye, and entered Veseloe. Russian forces have also taken all of Novoselka Pervaya, and it looks like Ukrainian positions east of the Volchya river are done. Some still remain but they're going to fall sooner rather then later. Overall this area remains the most successful for Russia, and a push on Selidovo, and then Pokrovsk looks very realistic. It appears my predictions from before were wrong, there does not appear to be a specific effort to take the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka road. I'm not convinced this won't happen, but the immediate effort seems to be aimed at breaking past the Volchya.


Russia has gained another pair of tree-lines near Nevel'skoe and have gained some ground on both sides of the Karlovka reservoire.


There are unconfirmed reports of Ukrainian forces cut off near Progress, but this is not confirmed.


Russian forces raise the flag over Yasnobrodovka. Note in principle Russia had the village some time ago, but it appears this is the official "taking".


Russian forces clearing houses inside Novoselka Pervaya.


Russian soldiers riding on top of a vehicle attempt to shoot down an FPV drone with a shotgun but fail.


Russian VT-40 drone strike on a Ukrainian BMP, near the Karlovskiy reservoire.


Ukrainian MaxxPro somewhere near Avdeevka first flipped and then finished off with multiple drone strikes.


A Ukrainian M1 getting hit near Novoselka Pervaya and another near Progress. The second one looks like it got stuck.


Another M1 gets hit by an FPV drone but keeps moving. The description claims the tank was later abandoned by the crew, but this is not shown, making it questionable.


A Russian Buk-M3 with an anti-drone cage near Avdeevka. Note it has literally one missile on the rack. I suspect Russia is facing a shortage of these advanced SAMs.


Russian Msta-S, Strela-10, and TOS-1 operating near Avdeevka. Note the anti-drone teams.


Russian Tor-M2 covering the Pokrovskoe axis.


Russian soldier with a Vepr-12 automatic shotgun, from the 74th Motor-rifles.


Krasnogorovka-Mar'inka area.

Russia has taken almost all of Krasnogorovka. The northern outskirts, effectivel subrubs, are under Ukrainian control, and a small Ukrainian counter-attack has re-entered the town from the south-west (for the second time) briefly but were pushed back out. It will be interesting to see if Russia tries to take the ground between Pervomayskoe and Krasnogorovka. There are large open fields there, all the way up to the village of Nevel'skoe, all under Ukrainian control.


Russian forces have also gained ground in Maksimil'yanovka and a tree-line south of Mar'inka. Advances in this area are exposed from the flanks, and it's likely the massive slow-down here is related to the slow going in Krasnogorovka, and south of Pobeda.


Russian mechanized element hits landmines near Krasnogorovka, possibly planted there remotely as the area is fairly deep behind Russian lines.


Russian artillery fires on Krasnogorovka.


Russia hit a Ukrainian position, allegedly an FH-70 howitzer. However we don't see the artillery piece, we do see camo-netting and at least two people entering the area. Russia hits with a drone and we see no secondary detonations.


Konstantinovka-Ugledar.

Russian forces have entered Konstantinovka, and are pushing towards the road still along a wide front, with multiple pathways.


Russian artillery hitting Konstantinovka.


Ukrainian MBT (T-72) destroyed near Konstantinovka.


Ukrainian infantry falling back, somewhere in the fields east of Ugledar, getting hit by Russia.


Zaporozhye front.

Russia has taken some fields east of Urozhaynoe. Overall this remains a tertiary area of slow Russian advances. It's still along way from just reversing Ukraine's gains from last year, and is clearly not a priority.


Russia is bombing Velikaya Novoselka. Presumably these are interdiction strikes in support of Russian pushes in the area.


A look at the Russian T-80BVM turtle-tank that was involved in fighting around Urozhaynoe.


Russian continues to bite off pieces of the Rabotino salient.


Russia is striking forces trying to enter the Rabotino salient. The description says a column but the video quality is bad.


Russia hit Gulyaypole, allegedly hitting a Ukrainian staging area belonging to the 102nd TerDef Bde.


Russian drone strikes on allegedly Ukrainian positions in the village of Kamenskoe. The front line here has been static and there has been almost no heavy fighting.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Dnepr front.

There are indications that Russia is making an effort to capture the Dnepr islands, as Ukraine is short of troops here.


Russia allegedly hit an M270 MLRS. It's hard to be sure, but it looks like the case.


Russia hits an alleged Ukrainian staging area with a Kh-38 in the Burgunka village, Kherson region. Notable is that 3 Russian UAVs were watching the strike from different angles.


Allegedly Russia has taken 17 Ukrainian POWs in the islands in the Dnepr, who claim to have been abandoned there without water or supplies.


Russia hits a Ukrainian boat on the Dnepr.


Crimea and Black Sea.

Russian boats and helos destroying Ukrainian sea drones.


Russia is doing some sort construction using a floating crane near the Crimean bridge.


A Russian ferry operating from Crimea to Port Caucus was hit by a Ukrainian drone strike.


Strikes.

A near Russian strike on Belopol'ye, Sumy region, two bombs, each hitting one industrial shed. Accuracy with the munitions themselves seems to have been resolved, but we've see lately a few cases of them missing due to Ukrainian EW.


Russia hit the Ukrainian port at Izmail. Reportedly one Shahed entered Romania and exploded there.


In Nikolaev region Russia hit the Voznesenskaya airfield, fuel storage there burns.


Russia hits a P-18 radar in Dnepropetrovskaya region.


Russian bomb strike on Krasniy Liman. This area has generally been an unsuccessful one for Russia. Despite many attempts, Russia has not managed to gain Terny or Torskoe.


Russian Iskander strike on alleged Ukrainian equipment storage in Kramatorsk. Russia claims many destroyed vehicles and kit, but there is no evidence.


Another Kh-38ML bridge strike, location unknown.


Russia has started using a new domestic drone called a Gerber, which is apparently a Shahed alternative.


There are unconfirmed reports of Russia rebasing aircraft away from the Ukrainian border in anticipation of Ukrainian strikes on airfields.


Ukrainian Vampire SAM destroying a Shahed drone.


Ukraine hit a fuel storage facility near Kursk.


Ukraine hit an oil refinery in Tuapse.


Ukraine apparently converted a light plane into a UAV and loaded it with C-4. It crashed inside Russia.


Russia apparently downed 3 ATACMS missiles aimed at Lugansk.


Footage of Olenya airbase shows no sign of a damaged Tu-22, despite earlier claims.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Interesting bits.

Ukrainian FPV drone first hits a van of some sort on a Russian road. A second drone then double-taps, hitting the fire truck that shows up to put it out. Intentionally targeting civilian firefighters is definitely a war crime.


A Russian BMP-3 burns. What makes this interesting is that this is the second time we see a BMP-3 with ERA destroyed. While it's clearly not a common loadout, some quantity seems to be making it to the front. Personally I'm curious if the ERA replaces the up-armor kits used on the BMP-3M, or are mounted over it.


Another destroyed 2S22 Bogdana, this one also hiding in trees, but clearly a different area from above. Note after it hides, someone comes out and tries to hide the tire tracks, which of course doesn't help when someone was watching from the start.


8 UMPK gliding bombs target a single tree line, and all miss, allegedly due to Ukrainian EW.


A downed Ukrainian SB-600 somewhere in the war. These munitions resurfacing now suggest a new batch.


A destroyed APR-40, a Romanian Grad clone, no doubt Ukrainian.


A destroyed Ukrainian Rosomak APC. These remain relatively rare, and are fairly new vehicles.


A rare Rak 120mm SP Mortar gets hit by a Lancet strike. This is likely Ukraine's 44th Mech.


Another rarity, a Dingo armored car destroyed, Ukrainian.


A Russian fire truck damaged allegedly by a Ukrainian double-tap, near Yasinovataya.


A Russian BM-21 Grad pretending to be a normal army truck. Note it's mislabeled as a Tornado-G, but this is clearly not true. It's a 2B26 Grad on a Kamaz chassis.


Another T-72A getting the ERA treatment. Despite rumors about ERA shortages it appears quite a bit of the boxes are being produced. Perhaps the shortage is in the filling. Though this one isn't carrying any K-5 tiles.


Russian Pantsyr-1 in desert camo, that matches the pattern used in Iraqi export SAMs.


Russian forces using a balloon, possibly as a comms retranslator.


A Russian D-30 howitzer covered in K-1 tiles. The value of this is questionable at best.


A highquality Russian decoy for once, of a D-30 howitzer.


Russian forces spotted with first-generation D-30 howitzers again. While outdated by modern standards, it's a marvel of technology compared to a D-1, D-44, or M101, all of which have been spotted in this war.


Russia's 30th Motor-Rifles operating a captured Humvee as a gun truck.


DPRK M-46 130mm shells in Russian service. Reactivating these howitzers was slow until very recently. Now they're steadily becoming more common.


Russian soldiers testing a 2A73 Grom cannon on a towed chassis. This gun is normally used in a BMP-1 and is essentially an infantry field gun. Their value in this form is questionable.


A Ukrainian MiG-29 carrying a small bundle of SDBs.


Ukraine's 111th TerDef Bde using a MAN KAT 8X8 carrying a KS-19 AAA, it's likely meant as artillery in place of howitzers.


A rare Ukrainian Ataman armored car, using a GAZ-66 chassis and a Ukrainian armor package.


Apparently Ukraine's 57th Mech Bde now has Bradleys too, likely reflecting new US deliveries.


Ukraine's Leo-1s get the K-1 treatment. So far these vehicles have only been spotted on the front lines once.


Indian 125mm shells in Ukraine's 36th MarBde.


Several more photos of Ukrainian Hawk SAMs.


Ukrainian forces show of their Yugoslav RPG-6 hand anti-tank grenades from 1943. While very much antiques, they can be used as drone munitions.


Reportedly Ukraine is forming female anti-drone teams for service in the rear. It's unclear if the intent is to free up the males for front line service or if this is an attempt to beef up anti-drone efforts.


The Netherlands have reportedly funded the repair and delivery of 14 Leo-2A4 tanks for Ukraine. I'm not sure where they're being sourced from. Germany and Denmark jointly handed over 8 more Leo-1s. Spain is preparing another Hawk SAM.


An ugly pattern has developed inside Ukraine. I haven't really mentioned it so far because I wasn't sure if this was a major trend or isolated incidents but at this point it's undeniable. There are widespread burnings of military cars and buses belong to the military commissariat. This is no doubt a reflection of the behavior of these organizations. I'm posting just a few, but there are very many videos.

Операция Z: Военкоры Русской Весны

There are reports of another wave of military medical center being built in Russia.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
A lot of people have talked about Russia running out of armored vehicles, and this has been an ongoing pattern of people counting "boxes" left at storage bases, and trying to project trajectories of losses. I've always found this a bit questionable. I recall the first few months of the war when "Russia will run out of missiles" was the catch phrase, and yet here we are in 2024... the pattern repeated itself with discussions of artillery shells. And there we see increases of domestic output, importation of shells from partners like North Korea and Iran, and lastly of course the importation of entire artillery shell production lines from, likely, China. For armored vehicles I believe we're watching a similar pattern play itself out. Russia started by pulling as much Soviet kit as they could. They also boosted domestic production. The next stage will be imported vehicles from the DPRK, and possibly other sources. Lastly we will probably see importation of entire production lines (China produces BMP-1s domestically for a long time, and I don't believe they still are, does that production line still exist?). For now here's apparently a DPRK SP ATGM carrier, on a modified BTR-80 chassis spotted in Kharkov region. I suspect we will see some imported DPRK and Iranian vehicles in Russian use as this continue, as well as local production of something based on imported production lines.

 

Larry_L

Active Member
For some time Ukraine has been chipping away at Russian logistics. With it's drones it is trying to reach closer to the source of material, and energy. There also has been a focus on isolating Crimea. Recently they have targeted ferries of the roll on roll off variety, which carry rail traffic. As a backup Russia has been building a new rail line from Rostov-on Don to Mariupol. This line appears to have been completed, and in testing. If complete this line will take some of the traffic that would normally have to go through Crimea. At the same time the last of the Ro-Ro ferries has allegedly been taken out of service. There have been reports that Russia has stopped using the Kerch bridge for military traffic. A video came out on the 23rd of a train, on June 9th carrying tank cars crossing the bridge.

The completion of the new rail line.


Freight train on the Kerch bridge.


A report on the May 30 strike on 2 ferries.


An excerpt from Donald Hills 29 July report on the war covering much of the Kerch area logistics strikes. the link follows the Quote.

Quote:_ Crimea

In 2018, Russia had four ferries in the Black Sea that could transport trains and rail cars by moving directly from the tracks to the ferry by a method called Roll On, Roll Off (RORO). In May of that year, one of those ferries, Annenkov, collided with a pier at Port Kavkaz but was found to be unharmed. Less than two months later, cargo from a rail car fell onto the deck, creasing the hull and tearing ten holes that caused the engine room to flood. After repairs, it continued in service but in 2020, leaks forced it to be beached at Aliaga on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast.

On October 8, 2022, a truck that was carrying explosives planted by Ukraine blew up while on the bridge. On the adjacent railway bridge, a train carrying fuel just happened to be traveling by and the fuel cars burned for hours after the blast. The heat from those fires permanently weakened the rail bridge even after it was repaired. In its weakened state, the bridge regularly supported passenger train traffic but the heavy loads of fuel cars rarely crossed the bridge anymore. Instead, the Russians would move the fuel cars to Port Kavkaz, load them on to the three remaining RORO train ferries and offload them at another port located 4.5 km across the Kerch Strait.

With Russian military vehicle traffic mostly using roads through Zaporizhzhia, and Russian rail traffic mostly using the rail ferries, the military importance of the Kerch bridge was reduced.
On 30 May 2024, the rail ferries Avangard and Conro Trader were both hit by ATACMS and damaged. The oil tanks at Port Kavkaz were also attacked and four tanks burned. Since its ability to transport oil across the Kerch strait was reduced by 66%, the Russians sent a train with oil cars over the Kerch bridge on June 9th. It was the first time they did that since February. The Kerch bridge became a little more important.

This left the Slavyanin as the only rail ferry left in the Black Sea. It was carrying cargo from Bulgaria to Turkey on November 8, 2023, when it collided with another ship, damaging its railing and its ballast tanks, which took on water. On July 23rd, it was hit by a aerial drone and damaged.

There are not published estimates of how long it will take to repair the ferries, but until they are repaired, Russia lost one of its routes to deliver oil to Turkey, and it must deliver oil through Zaporizhzhia, within range of HIMARS/MLRS, or use the Kerch bridge."

The link for the above with illustrative images.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
For some time Ukraine has been chipping away at Russian logistics. With it's drones it is trying to reach closer to the source of material, and energy. There also has been a focus on isolating Crimea. Recently they have targeted ferries of the roll on roll off variety, which carry rail traffic. As a backup Russia has been building a new rail line from Rostov-on Don to Mariupol. This line appears to have been completed, and in testing. If complete this line will take some of the traffic that would normally have to go through Crimea. At the same time the last of the Ro-Ro ferries has allegedly been taken out of service. There have been reports that Russia has stopped using the Kerch bridge for military traffic. A video came out on the 23rd of a train, on June 9th carrying tank cars crossing the bridge.

The completion of the new rail line.


Freight train on the Kerch bridge.


A report on the May 30 strike on 2 ferries.


An excerpt from Donald Hills 29 July report on the war covering much of the Kerch area logistics strikes. the link follows the Quote.

Quote:_ Crimea

In 2018, Russia had four ferries in the Black Sea that could transport trains and rail cars by moving directly from the tracks to the ferry by a method called Roll On, Roll Off (RORO). In May of that year, one of those ferries, Annenkov, collided with a pier at Port Kavkaz but was found to be unharmed. Less than two months later, cargo from a rail car fell onto the deck, creasing the hull and tearing ten holes that caused the engine room to flood. After repairs, it continued in service but in 2020, leaks forced it to be beached at Aliaga on Turkey’s Mediterranean coast.

On October 8, 2022, a truck that was carrying explosives planted by Ukraine blew up while on the bridge. On the adjacent railway bridge, a train carrying fuel just happened to be traveling by and the fuel cars burned for hours after the blast. The heat from those fires permanently weakened the rail bridge even after it was repaired. In its weakened state, the bridge regularly supported passenger train traffic but the heavy loads of fuel cars rarely crossed the bridge anymore. Instead, the Russians would move the fuel cars to Port Kavkaz, load them on to the three remaining RORO train ferries and offload them at another port located 4.5 km across the Kerch Strait.

With Russian military vehicle traffic mostly using roads through Zaporizhzhia, and Russian rail traffic mostly using the rail ferries, the military importance of the Kerch bridge was reduced.
On 30 May 2024, the rail ferries Avangardand Conro Trader were both hit by ATACMS and damaged. The oil tanks at Port Kavkaz were also attacked and four tanks burned. Since its ability to transport oil across the Kerch strait was reduced by 66%, the Russians sent a train with oil cars over the Kerch bridge on June 9th. It was the first time they did that since February. The Kerch bridge became a little more important.

This left the Slavyanin as the only rail ferry left in the Black Sea. It was carrying cargo from Bulgaria to Turkey on November 8, 2023, when it collided with another ship, damaging its railing and its ballast tanks, which took on water. On July 23rd, it was hit by a aerial drone and damaged.

There are not published estimates of how long it will take to repair the ferries, but until they are repaired, Russia lost one of its routes to deliver oil to Turkey, and it must deliver oil through Zaporizhzhia, within range of HIMARS/MLRS, or use the Kerch bridge."

The link for the above with illustrative images.

The rail line to Mariupol' is stage one of a longer rail line all the way to Crimea, already under construction. They also rebuilt the Mariupol' civilian rail station, and expanded it in anticipation of greater passenger traffic then pre-war, though I suspect this is a tad optimistic. While in principle it's in HIMARS range (and other nasty things) rail lines are very repairable, and striking a moving train requires some really good recon. There have been a few such strikes by Ukraine against Russia, but I don't think we've seen one for a while now. If anything Russia has stepped up strikes on Ukrainian troop trains, although those also remain relatively rare. I think the key here will be redundancy. If Russia can repair the ferries, and use the Crimean bridge, and have an alternate rail line, it will be hard to shut down everything. Add to that the use of trucks for logistics, along that new highway they built along the coast, and the logistics there become relatively safe.


EDIT: When I say "moving" I really should say just "train". I don't think Russia or Ukraine hit trains in motion, rather they hit them when they reached a station. Even so these are uncommon events suggesting that targeting trains is more difficult that it might appear.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
More and more Ukrainian troops of different ranks, as well as Ukrainian “connected bloggers” are speaking out about Syrsky having to be replaced. Most are basically saying what was said in this thread upon his promotion. Here is one example, the guy probably familiar to most who follow the (pro-)Ukrainian twitter and whatnot.

IMG_6409.jpeg

He is talking about Syrsky’s post on Telegram where the latter claimed that “the enemy, in spite of heavy losses, had little success” and “… during the hostilities tactical positions may change several times during the day… there were no significant changes as of now”.


It has been widely reported that Ukrainians are taking some heavy losses in the Kharkiv direction (without actually much progress), but it seems to be politically important to push the Russians out. This is also confirmed by the same individual in the discussion that followed his post cited above:

IMG_6408.jpeg

In the meantime, there are for now unconfirmed reports, call it rumours, in the Ukrainian segment, that Russians are slowly grinding forward in Vovchansk and are getting closer to taking the high-rise block called Citadel (I have no idea what that neighbourhood is, but my understanding is that it would have a significant negative impact on the Ukrainian positions on the left bank of the river).

Down at Ocheretine direction at the same time, the Russians appear to be moving with about the same steam. I didn’t really understand the significance of the loss of Progres village (town?), but, apparently until recently, this is where the last Ukrainian defense lines were:

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Here is the updated map:

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The source for both maps is here (Twitter). To add, 3 days ago, the same individual talked about the necessity and inability of containing the (call it) Progres direction, as well as the problems the Ukrainian forces are facing within:


According to Deepstate’s map, the Russians have now broke through what used to be that last line of defense, as well as some of the newer trenches



(Didn’t realize only 4 images can be attached to a single post; I think I will maybe stick to the external image hosting sites altogether from now on)

Deepstate reported the situation in that direction to be critical and deteriorating:


There are clearly issues in other directions as well. Saw some, I’ll call it, unconfirmed rumours in the Ukrainian segment that Russians are also accumulating troops and equipment in various areas of the front, Toretsk and Sinkivka in particular.

Overall, I personally do not see how Ukraine can recover from these recent (and not so recent) developments. Counteroffensive definitely seems to be out of question at the moment. Basically, it looks like everything they have is currently on the frontline (and still losing ground). Even the newly formed reserves, namely the 150 series brigades (one of the links I cited above mentions it as well; there is another source I posted many days ago talks about it as well). Surely, there are the mobilization efforts and some troops still in training, but…

Russia had recently set a new record of 151 gliding bombs dropped per day (as of July 26):



Source is here (Twitter). The same source indicates that shelling has also increased by about 22% from the month of June.

As for the Russian equipment losses (including the link I posted a few days ago). While this is all great and informative, I do not believe it represents the whole picture. The biggest elephant in the room is probably the number of storage facilities that seems to be increasing by the counters (who do an excellent job) constantly (I follow most of them and those that I don’t are regularly cited by those that I do). While the pot has the bottom, I’d say that we simply do not know where that bottom is. Even the British MoD reported (granted, 6 months ago) that the Russians can replace their current battlefield losses and continue the current level of offensive for the foreseeable future.



Then consider what Feanor said a few posts above. Another thing to consider is whether the Ukrainian losses are being replaced in a timely and sufficient manner (I doubt).

The (maybe?) good news for Ukraine is the arrival of F-16s. A whole 6 of them. Another good news is that Putin has doubled the signing “bonus” for volunteers to fight the war. Does this suggest the recruitment issues or simply doubling down to increase recruitment? I don’t know.

More to say, but this is it for the time being. I’ll maybe make another post tomorrow.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Down at Ocheretine direction at the same time, the Russians appear to be moving with about the same steam. I didn’t really understand the significance of the loss of Progres village (town?),
If you look at the map and follow the pattern of the offensive, Russia is pushing mainly along the rail line, the one that runs out of Avdeevka and to Pokrovsk (which at this rate will get renamed back to Krasnoarmeysk). The significance is that the rail berm is a high ground and the rail line itself was laid down along the high ground. The villages are typically in the gullies, as that land was less usable for farming than the larger flat fields on the higher ground. Taking the rail berm section by section gives you the high ground, taking a few fields around the rail berm becomes easier, and as you approach villages you've got the high ground over them as well. That's the significance. Russia is capturing a section of high ground, and then expanding an area of control around it, and then capturing the next section of high ground. This has allowed them to bypass the Volchya river, and many of Ukraine's defenses there, and because of the way the rail line curves southward is actually threatening Ukrainian forces south-east from the Zhelannoe area all the way to the last Ukrainian positions outside of Yasnobrodovka with encirclement.
 

Fredled

Active Member
Feanor said:
The arrival of F-16s won't reverse the pattern of who can drop more ordinance on the other side. That will still be Russia. So why would it reverse the course of the war?
Because it will address one of the biggest problem of the Ukrainian forces. How many soviet era jets does Ukraine still have? Not a lot.
This is a problem as important as with artillery shells. Russians use FABs more and more to compensate from their losses in artillery guns which are being decimated or worn out by intensive use. The FABs are maybe more effective than artillery barrages. The fact is that Ukrainians are forced to retreat because of them.
If F16's are able to down Russian bombers, maybe it will not change the course of war because the numbers will still be not enough, but it will remove some advantages the Russians currently have.

Feanor said:
A lot of people have talked about Russia running out of armoured vehicles, and this has been an ongoing pattern of people counting "boxes" left at storage bases, and trying to project trajectories of losses. I've always found this a bit questionable.
Yes. Counting how many things Russians are using without understanding that Russia is able to increase their production is stupid.
Yet, we are lucky that Russia's war economy is not as effective as in 1940. There are several reasons for that. 1/ The complexity of technology doesn't allow fast increase in production. 2/ The social structure and job complexity, meaning that you can't move millions of workers into the war industry as fast as before. 80 years ago, you could pick anyone and put him or her on an assembly line and they would do they job with little learning. Today, a worker who is not specialised for a specific task is useless. The same is true for machine tools.
________________

Interresting report from Ukrinform today:
Ukrinform said:
Over the past day, the invaders have launched two assaults in the Orikhiv direction and six assaults on the left bank of the Dnipro in the temporarily occupied Kherson region in the Krynky area. Having suffered losses, they retreated to their original positions
Ukrainians had been supposed to have left the left bank a few weeks ago. If this report is true, there could still be some Ukrainian soldiers there. Or that they came back.

Submarine struck again:
Ukrinform said:
The submarine was seriously damaged in a Ukrainian missile attack on September 13, 2023.
It's not clear to me whether it's the same submarine that was hit by a Storm Shadow and deemed irreparable or another one...
Anyway... It seems that Ukrainians waited for the Russians to finish the repair to hit it again.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Kharkov front.

It appears at some point Ukraine retook positions along the border north-west of Staritsa, but it's unclear exactly when. Russia forces also withdrew from their positions across the Volchya river.


Russia downs a Baba Yaga bomber drone with an FPV drone.


Another Krab howitzer taken out by a Russian loitering munition.


Ukraine takes out a depth-charge MLRS on a T-72B chassis. This is at least the third such vehicle we've seen, previously we saw one a T-80 chassis and one on a truck. Both were around Chasov Yar.


Russian TOS fires near Staritsa and air strikes on Volchansk.


Russian strikes on crossings across the Volchya continue.


Ukraine continues drone strikes against civilian vehicles and public transportation in Belgorod region, this time hitting some cars and a bus in Shebekino. On the bus several civilians including the driver were reported wounded. Ukraine also hit a residential building in Shebekino, allegedly with a cluster munition MLRS.


Russian BM-27 from battlegroup north in action.


Oskol front.

Russia has made another gain east of Sin'kovka.


A Ukrainian counter-attack has recaptured much of Makeevka. The village remains contested. There is also a map correction from suriyakmaps near Sergeevka, where positions that were previosly thought to be Russian are under Ukrainian control. It's not immediately obvious when they changed hands, possibly last year.


Russia burns a Ukrainian Humvee in the area of Sin'kovka.


Russia hit two M113s near Kupyansk, one parked, and one in motion. Results are unclear, and we see active EW causing interference in the second strike.


Russia continues to pummel the Oskol crossings.


A destroyed Leo-1A5 near Krasniy Liman. This is only the second such tank we've seen destroyed. I'm reasonably confident it's not the same one as last time, based on the location. That one got knocked out in an open field, in the Kupyansk-Oskol area by a near-miss artillery. This doesn't look like that. We know Ukraine has gotten either high double digits or low triple-digits of Leo-1s, and they haven't really been active on the front lines. This allowed us to infer that Ukraine had some reserves. If Leo-1s are being committed to the fight, it means those reserves are being used.


Chasov Yar.

Russia has crossed the channel across a wide front, and there are now reports Russia used under ground pipes to do this, but I have some serious doubts. The neighborhoods immediately across the channel are all small private homes. They're unlikely to have large underground systems around them. If the pipe runs to the factory, Russian forces would be in the center of the town. But they're not. Maybe Russian forces used the pipes that the channel itself goes into, and something got lost in the broken telephone of war reporting. But in that case the pipes wouldn't be the means of crossing, just a spot of cover.


Minor Russian gains south of the main action in Chasov Yar, and continued indecisive clashes in the hills west of Klescheevka.


Gorlovka-Toretsk.

Russian forces have captured almost all of Zheleznoe. They've reached the southern outskirts, opening the road to potentially linking up with troops in Novogorodskoe, or pushing on Nelipovka. They've also crossed Central St. and are now likely going to push into Toretsk. Sources seem to disagree about whether Russian troops are actually inside Toretsk proper or not, but the difference seems to be about the exact borders. The maps all look about the same. In Novogorodskoe Russian forces are wrapping around the Phenol factory in the center of town, a Ukrainian strong point, and in the east are not far from friendly forces in Zheleznoe.


Russia takes out a Marder in Zheleznoe. Presumably this is evidence of a new unit active in the area, since we haven't seen these vehicles here before.


Russia takes out a MaxxPro international near Novogordskoe. Based on the location it suggests that Ukrainian forces are still in the space between the old front line and the Russian salient, a very dangerous position, where they are at definite risk of encirclement.


Russian gliding bomb lands in Toretsk.


Ukrainian Bradleys and other light armor in Toretsk. I suspect these Bradley's belong to the 57th Mech, as the 47th is still engaged on the Pokrovsk axis.


Allegedly Ukrainian POWs taken as part of Russian advances near Toretsk.


In Gorlovka allegedly 2 Ukrainian FPV drones hit 2 trams, killing one civilian.


Pokrovsk axis.

Russian forces have crept up to Zhelannoe, and have broken into Sergeevka, they've also taken Timofeevka and then expanded their area of control west of it, and taken a number of treelines around the area. They're also moving southward along the Volchya.


Russia takes out a Bradley, the passengers and crew bail out.


A destroyed Ukrainian Humvee near Nevel'skoe, also with a small shed on top.


Russian forces hit an alleged Ukrainian staging area in Pokrovsk/Krasnoaremeysk.


Russian T-80BVM with a robust drone cage, Avdeevka area.


Russian Supercam UAV ops, Avdeevka area.


Konstantinovka-Ugledar.


Russian forces have finally cut the Konstantinovka-Ugledar road in at least one spot, a little bit south of Konstantinovka itself. Russian forces are liklely to keep pushing on the road along all the other treelines too, since this is really only the first step towards taking Ugledar. Russian forces also continue to gain ground inside Konstantinovka, and have pushed southward out of Pobeda.


Russia hits something, allegedly a Leopard 2, near Ugledar. Whatever it is explodes.


Russia immobilizes and then finishes off a Leo-2 with ERA.


Russian LMUR strike on Prechistovka, a village west of Ugledar. This section of the front remains relatively quiet, but it will likely have to get active if Russia really plans to take Ugledar.


Zaporozhye front.

Russian forces have bitten off another piece of the Rabotino salient.


Russia takes out a T-64BV with a loitering munition, near the Vremyevskiy bulge area.


More footage of Russian drone strikes in Kamenskoe. I can't help but wonder if something is brewing in this area. Russia has made several surprise advances so far, reactivating previously quiet sections of the front. Another push here is theoretically a threat to the city of Zaporozhye, but would more likely be another diversion or opportunistic grab. I'd be surprised if they get as far as taking Orekhov.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Strikes.

Russia hit a fuel storage facility in Vinnitsa. Multiple impacts (4) reported. One may have hit as a double-tap aimed at rescue workers.


Russia hit a Ukrainian airfield in Nikolaev where allegedly Ukrainian pilots were training with foreign instructors.


Russia hits an ST-68 radar in Nikolaev region. Russia has this year been conducting a steady campaign of knocking out Ukrainian radars, but the pace is relatively slow.


Russia hit an Su-25 at Dolgintsevo airfield.


Some of Russia's new Gerber drones are apparently just decoys with no payload and minimal contents. Note these drones are made out of wood and styrofoam meaning they are likely very cheap to make.


We have confirmation from Russian sources of a Russian National Guard Mi-8 lost in a Ukrainian strike near Donetsk. The aircraft was reportedly being used as a CASEVAC.


Ukraine struck Kursk, some inbounds were intercepted, and some apparently landed causing a fire. Target is unclear.


Ukraine apparently hit a residentialy building in Orel, double-tapping it when the rescue crews arrived, with UAVs. However it's possible that this is not the intended target but rather the result of Russian EW causing problems for the navigation. the damage done was fairly minimal and there were no casualties.


More BDA footage of Morozovsk airbase in Russia shows that while Russia's removal of jets protects them fairly effectively, Ukraine managed to destroy a munitions storage facility.


Interesting bits.


Another downed Switchblade 600 loitering munition.


A destroyed Ukrainian Oto Melara mod 56 howitzer.


Russian SpN units operating in the border area remain active. Recently there was information that a Russian SpN team lost several members while in Chernigov area. What's interesting is that they're using Tayfun-K MRAPs.


A rare Russian Linza CASEVAC MRAP in the war. These have been in production since before the war, but quantities delivered appear to still be modest.


Russia has converted naval AK-130 guns into regular howitzers by mounting them on a carriage from an M-46 gun. This is likely because Russia has many such shells in storage, and the 956 destroyers, the primary ships carrying these guns, are almost completely out of service.


Russian forces using electric scooters to move around near the front line.


Russia has started armoring pickup trucks and SUVs with factory-produced armor kits, to protect from drones.


Another high quality Russian artillery decoy, this one a D-20. Note this is all being done by volunteers, not mass-produced by the defense industry.


Russia continues to operate a refitted captured Gyurza-M boat.


Russia shows off a new Baba Yaga variant they downed. It has the ability to use a laser to guide it's munitions to target.


We have reports of a motor-rifle regiment formed out of airforce personnel. I suspect this was an attempt to reshuffle contract service members who can serve in the war zone, replacing them with conscripts. I think this is bad practice.


Ukraine's 35th MarBde with their T-80BV, and their Indian-sourced shells.


Ukraine's 56th Motorized Bde shows off a captured BMP-3M, but without the extra armor kit. You can tell it's a BMP-3M by the sight box. It was allegedly captured two years ago near Ugledar.


Ukraine's 82nd Air Assault Bde poses with a Cougar MRAP. We haven't seen these vehicles in Ukraine. If this is their vehicle, it's the third armored troop transport option they've gotten, as they also ride Strykers and Marders.


Ukrainian volunteers manufacturing an F-16 decoy.


Ukraine has reportedly received their first 6 F-16s from the Netherlands.


Protests in Kovel', Rovno region, over Ukrainian mobilization efforts. Again this is more of a sample, incidents like this occur fairly frequently.


Reportedly China will ban export of civilian drones that can be used for military purposes. Note I suspect this will be bypassed by Russia and may be aimed at Ukraine specifically, but it remains to be seen.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Because it will address one of the biggest problem of the Ukrainian forces. How many soviet era jets does Ukraine still have? Not a lot.
This is a problem as important as with artillery shells. Russians use FABs more and more to compensate from their losses in artillery guns which are being decimated or worn out by intensive use. The FABs are maybe more effective than artillery barrages. The fact is that Ukrainians are forced to retreat because of them.
If F16's are able to down Russian bombers, maybe it will not change the course of war because the numbers will still be not enough, but it will remove some advantages the Russians currently have.
I think we've said all there is to say. Time will tell how much or how little this matters to the overall direction of the war.

Yes. Counting how many things Russians are using without understanding that Russia is able to increase their production is stupid.
Yet, we are lucky that Russia's war economy is not as effective as in 1940. There are several reasons for that. 1/ The complexity of technology doesn't allow fast increase in production. 2/ The social structure and job complexity, meaning that you can't move millions of workers into the war industry as fast as before. 80 years ago, you could pick anyone and put him or her on an assembly line and they would do they job with little learning. Today, a worker who is not specialised for a specific task is useless. The same is true for machine tools.
Russia is also not mobilizing on the scale they did in that war. We're not seeing the kinds of efforts that were made back then. Quite the opposite in much of Russia you can live and pretend there is no war. This is on purpose. I don't believe Putin has complete domestic support for the war.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
If you look at the map and follow the pattern of the offensive, Russia is pushing mainly along the rail line, the one that runs out of Avdeevka and to Pokrovsk (which at this rate will get renamed back to Krasnoarmeysk). The significance is that the rail berm is a high ground and the rail line itself was laid down along the high ground. The villages are typically in the gullies, as that land was less usable for farming than the larger flat fields on the higher ground. Taking the rail berm section by section gives you the high ground, taking a few fields around the rail berm becomes easier, and as you approach villages you've got the high ground over them as well. That's the significance. Russia is capturing a section of high ground, and then expanding an area of control around it, and then capturing the next section of high gr positions outside of Yasnobrodovka with encirclement.
Yes. I actually saw a pretty good article on the subject with some great images and mapping, which I was going to cite in my post, but apparently lost it.


I saw some reports that Russians are either in or right by Toretsk. I think Feanor’s update mentioned it as well. There have been some geolocated Russian positions and infantry teams all around the area. Here is one example - a cropped image form the post on X talking about the geolocated drop from a Ukrainian drone on the Russian infantry:



There are a few sources claiming that the Russians are actually in Toretsk itself, but nothing to substantiate it with so far.

This is interesting too though. A proof, if you will, that Russian troops are still sitting in that plant in Vavchansk:



They’ve been sitting there for a while now. How is this going to turn out, I wonder? There were talks about that group being supplied with what they need via drones and whatnot.The area certainly got Ukrainian attention though.

It appears that there is “the usual” happening between New York and Zalizne:




Thoughts out loud kind of part of the post…

Pasi Paroinen’s post in regard to the measurable gains of the RU offensive this year vs Ukraine offensive in the summer of 2023. I don’t think he particularly chose the correct timeline because Russia has been grinding for almost a year now, but he chose the summer offensive and it is a fair comparison (should be readable to everyone):


On average, in this particular comparison, Russia appears to be to moving at nearly double the pace Ukraine did last year. Again, I don’t think this is a necessarily proper comparison since a lot had preceded the “rapid” movement by Russia before the summer took off. Regardless, in the grand scheme of things, here is another perspective:



I cropped the image from this:



Taken from this X post. Clearly, as visible from the cropped image, the red line represents the 2022 front line, green represents 2023, and blue - 2024. Looks like insanity from this perspective, doesn’t it? Yet here we are. Sure, the front could collapse, even then… Anyway…

Looks like I lost the next link I was going to mention…

Here is another bit: perspective of what is happening by two different people, both are probably familiar to many who follow the war on Twitter and elsewhere, really (well, maybe not Vitaly for the elsewhere part):



It is extremely hard to agree with Vitaly there. I mean it has been at least 7 months (conservatively speaking) since the Russians began their counterattack in Robotino and 14 months since Ukraine began their counteroffensive in that direction. Then add the time when things were quite - the time when Russia built their, apparently hard to break, defences through the entire front line.

A couple of things more I was going to mention on this latter part, thinking out loud, but the thoughts had left the building for the time being, it appears.
 
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