The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Y

Here is another bit: perspective of what is happening by two different people, both are probably familiar to many who follow the war on Twitter and elsewhere, really (well, maybe not Vitaly for the elsewhere part):



It is extremely hard to agree with Vitaly there. I mean it has been at least 7 months (conservatively speaking) since the Russians began their counterattack in Robotino and 14 months since Ukraine began their counteroffensive in that direction. Then add the time when things were quite - the time when Russia built their, apparently hard to break, defences through the entire front line.

A couple of things more I was going to mention on this latter part, thinking out loud, but the thoughts had left the building for the time being, it appears.
It's complete bullshit. Russia took the southern parts of Zaporozhye in spring of '22. They basically sat there for over a year, until Ukraine's offensive started. That year offered plenty of time for Ukraine to build defenses. There's also no real sign that Russia was prepared to advance northward in a major way. There were some very minor pushes early in that summer, but they weren't anywhere near even the small town of Orekhov. Ukraine had all the time they could reasonably need, and then some, to build defenses. And they did build defenses. Their offensive has nothing to do with the need for time and space. Ukraine's goal there was to break through to Tokmak and ideally Melitopol' to sever the "land bridge" to Crimea. The writer here is bending himself into weird shapes to avoid facing the conclusion that the offensive in question had turned out to be a massive waste of resources.
 

Fredled

Active Member
The Ukraine War spred to Africa:
Mali has decided to break off diplomatic relations with Ukraine over the role of the country's intelligence service in the elimination of Wagner mercenaries.
Ukrainians have shown in the past that they will strike their ennemy anywhere anytime they are given a chance.
But it's the first reported involvement in Mali.
It makes sens since Wagner fighters have been moved from Africa to Ukraine.
Mali is also one of the rare country diplomaticaly supporting or not condemning Russia.

Investigation on the murder on Maidan 10 years ago.

F16's officialy presented at Ukraine air base. They will have modern avionic to hit air targets and radar stations.
Means for Targeting ground targets, other than radars, will be added in the future.

Leopard 2A4 teams being trained in Poland. For the next counter-offensive?
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Feanor said:
Russia is also not mobilizing on the scale they did in that war (WW2). We're not seeing the kinds of efforts that were made back then. Quite the opposite in much of Russia you can live and pretend there is no war. This is on purpose. I don't believe Putin has complete domestic support for the war.
That's true. The mobilisation doesn;t even come close to that of WW2. And as you said, it's a hidden one.
But the industrial complex is or was supposed to be much more involved. The current Russian leadership would like to have an industrial military production akind to that of WW2. But they can't. I think for the reasons I stated above.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Ukrainian defenses around Toretsk are crumbling... again. I'll try to do an update later today once the dust settles, but it looks like Ukrainian forces inside Novogorodskoe are at threat of encirclement as Russian troops pushed through and took the hill in the west side, that has the school on it. There's also information about Ukrainian forces withdrawing from the positions along the old front line east of Novogorodskoe. Meanwhile in Pivnichnoe (former Kirovo) Russian forces have almost all of the town. There's still quite a bit of finishing fighting to go, but the assault on Toretsk proper is probably about to begin.

In the meantime Ukraine has launched a cross-border attack into Kursk region. The scale is relatively small at this point (btln-strength reportedly) and the situation is murky so far.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Kursk-Sumy regions.

Ukraine has launched a cross border attack into Russia. So far it remains unclear what exactly the scale and purpose of the attack is. Estimates seem to vary from btln-strength to two brigades, but none seem particularly reliable. Initially Russian MinDef sources reported the attack repulsed, and this is likely in response to the northern thrust mentioned below, but they later edited their statement. There are reports of Russian soldiers surrounded in the village of Oleshnya, and Ukraine took some Russian conscripts prisoner.


Several Ukrainian armored vehicles were knocked out near the border, Kursk region, and then finished off with an Iskander strike. This column was hit near a road 7 kms from the border, well north of Sudzhi. It's one of the things that makes it hard to be sure if we're looking at multiple small attacks or the beginnings of one large one across a fairly wide area.


Ukrainian FPV drones destroyed two Russian T-62s on trailers, near Sudzhi.


Russian lost a Ka-52 in the fighting, though both pilots allegedly survived.


Russian loitering munitions strike a pair of knocked out Ukrainian vehicles. It's unclear why they're disabled, mines perhaps?


Russian Iskander strike takes out a Ukrainian Buk, Russian sources are claiming two were destroyed.


Russian cross border airstrikes, Sumy region.


Russian Ka-52 day and night operations against Ukrainian forces in Kursk region. Note the footage is bad, and we don't really see it do much. It's more a confirmation that they're still operating in the area then anything else.


A pair of Su-25s pass overhead at very low altitude while a civilian truck burns.


Ukrainian forces using a rare Stryker ESV, presumably to clear a path through the minefields.


Ukrainian forces in the area are using a new triangular tactical marking. Russian drone operators observe Ukrainian movements and drone munitions.


A Russian UAV watches 6 Ukrainian Strykers moving in a column. Unlike the previous attempt, Russia was apparently not ready to strike targets, otherwise we should have a small gaggle of videos of this column getting shredded. Note they are less then 2 kms from the Russian border.


Ukraine shelled Sudzhi heavily, footage of damage seems to be mostly residential buildings.


There are reports of a Ukrainian drone strike hitting a civilian ambulance in Sudzhi. Two medical personnel are reported killed, one wounded.


Allegedly Ukrainian sources are spreading a deepfake video of the Russian governor of Kursk region calling all men to report to their local military commissariat to receive weapons. The intent is obviously to cause panic.


Kharkov front.

Russian Ka-52 operations, Kharkov front. Note while the post talks about Vihkr ATGMs, we only see it lobbing rockets from low altitude.


A Stryker flips near Volchansk, and is then finished off with Russian drone strikes.


Russian strike hits a Ukrainian SP howitzer, allegedly a PzH-2000.


A Ukrainian artillery piece somewhere in Kharkov region getting hit.


Russia hit the Ukrainian border guard building in Kharkov that was allegedly being used as a staging area for troops. Not much of a stretch to be honest.


Russia hit the Turboatom factory in Kharkov that produces turbines, including ones for nuclear power plants. With continued Russian attacks against energy infrastructure, the inability to produce replacement turbines might be an issue.


Ukrainian social media is calling for blood donations in Kharkov, claiming a deficit of some blood types. This is a sort of indirect confirmation of fairly hefty Ukrainian losses.


A Ukrainian drone reportedly hit a bus injuring 3 passengers, Belgorod region.


In Shebekino a Ukrainian FPV drone hit an apartment killing a 75 year old woman. I initially assumed the apartment double-tap in Orel was a mistake, but perhaps not?


Chasov Yar.

A rare command M113 (M577G) variant being used as a MEDEVAC by Ukrainian forces in Chasov Yar.


Russian forces gaining ground in the heights west of Klescheevka.


Gorlovka-Toretsk.


Russian forces have taken the school building in the northern part of Novgorodskoe. This threatens Ukrainian forces in the eastern part of the village with encirclement, and the intent may be to force Ukraine to withdraw from the well defended phenol plant without a frontal assault. North from Novgorodskoe lies the village of Nelepovka with few significant buildings. West of Zheleznoe is the electric substation. The fall of those two locations will likely make an organized withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Novgorodskoe impossible. Therefore I suspect Russia will try for one or both of those locations, and the fall of one of them will trigger a Ukrainian withdrawal. This is only my guess based on the map.


In Zheleznoe Russian forces are advancing in the northern side of the town, making a move to envelop the refuse mound from the north. Two large refuse mounts need to be taken before pushing into Toretsk proper.


Ukraine's 28th Mech operating a robot dog on the outskirts of Toretsk.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Pokrovsk axis.

Russian forces are closing on the village of Zhelannoe from 3 sides, and continuing to push south along the Volchya river. They've also taken the fields west of Timofeevka, pushing all the way up to Lisichnoe, and have expanded their area of control along the rail line.


Russia hits a Marder and MaxxPro with drones.


Russian FPV drone strikes a Bradley, is veers off road, and the occupants bail out. There's white smoke rising, unclear if it burns or not.


Russian strike on allegedly Ukrainian munition storage, Mirnograd.


A Ukrainian M1, now with a low roof cage, very reminiscent of the T-90M low roof cages. For comparison, the second link has one without this new roof cage.


Russian soldier poses with a knocked out Bradley. Note these aren't newly destroyed vehicles, but rather a continued slew of photos as Russian forces advance on this axis.


Krasnogorovka-Mar'inka.

Russian forces made gains in north-western Krasnogorovka.


Konstantinovka-Ugledar.

Russian marines using a MT-12 on MT-LB improvised SP gun near Ugledar.


Zaporozhye front.

Russia continues to collapse the Rabotino salient.


Russian forces have taken some fields east of Urozhaynoe, and are pushing north out of the village along a tree line.


A Ukrainian D-20 getting hit by an FPV drone, somewhere in Zaporozhye.


Strikes.

Russia hit Brovary, near Kiev, with possibly DPRK KN-23 missiles. The target is unclear. Russian sources are claiming an unspecified military industrial target.


Russia hit a Ukrainian airbase near Martynovka, Nikolaev region, destroying an air shelter.


A Russian Su-25 parked on top of its painted counterpart.


Ukraine claims they destroyed a recently repaired submarine, but the factory it was being worked on in doesn't seem to show the kind of damage this would entail.


Ukraine struck Lugansk, results are currently unclear. Reportedly 8 ATACMS and 4 Storm Shadows were used. Impacts were reproted around the old pilot school.


Interesting bits.

We have one Leo-1 getting hit by a loitering munition, and another being shelled by artillery. It seems these tanks are back on the front lines.


A Russian BMP-2M with extra armor. This was the sensible path forward for the BMP-2 fleet, if only it were applied consistently, 15 years ago.


Two of Ukraine's new F-16s were identified as UA 80-3596 and UA 80-3599.


Meanwhile some sources suggest that the F-16s shown up close in Ukraine were decoys. The paintjob looks different from the flying ones, and the gun is missing. It's entirely possible old F-16 airframes taken out of service might end up in Ukraine as decoys. It's also possible Ukraine produced decoys though in the latter case they probably wouldn't want to show them off up close. Of course they are carrying PIDS+ and ECIPS+ systems, so it's going a little overboard for decoys in my opinion.


Ukraine's 225 Air-Assault btln gets Marders.


A Rheinmetall Skynex in Ukraine.


Russian authorities have issued permits for the first apartment building in Kherson region since annexation, in the town of Genichensk. Note this town is very far from the front, practically next to Crimea.

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Thanks for the update, Feanor, on the Kursk especially.

Haven’t seen a thing in the media I read daily about Kursk (our media, that is). Just scrolled though the Reuters, Washington Post, New York Times, etc, front pages again and there is nothing there. Saw an eggplant bolognese recipe at the NYT though. I am sure all of them have an article on the subject somewhere, but it surely isn’t placed on their front pages. Maybe tomorrow, when things clear up a bit.

It does look like Ukraine has been able to move in quite a bit and it appears this is for now for real as opposed to the previous attacks on the Russian territory. Just a random map I saw without claims of any validity to it:

IMG_6440.jpeg

I wonder how this is going to develop. I have a strong feeling this will end up being a nothing burger, as previously. Maybe Russians will level a village or two of their own as a result. Maybe the rate of gliding bomb drops will decrease in the Kharkiv region for a week or two as a result. Maybe Ukrainians will get a “stronghold” or two and Russians will waste an unreasonable amount of resources pushing them out instead of containing the situation and doing their thing elsewhere. Not sure what else can be accomplished here. I guess we will see in a couple of days what it is and where it is heading. So far, the reactions from the Ukrainians and pro-Ukrainian sources is very negative. A couple examples from the most prominent guys (all from the same thread by Tatarigami, which is the first image below):







There are many more, but the sentiment is exactly the same. Surely, some are suggesting that this will draw the resources from Donbas, but that is a whole lot of wishful thinking, in my opinion. Especially because it was reported numerous times (and I believe I cited Tatarigami’s thread here as an example previously on the subject) that Russia had reserves accumulated for the Sumy incursion. I guess we will see what happens. I also wonder how it weakens the capabilities of Ukraine if, when (if?) this attack is repelled, Russia decides to go full on to Sumy, for example.

Here are Rob Lee’s preliminary thoughts on this offensive



One last thought or observation rather. Lately, I see a lot (like really a lot, relatively speaking) of comments in the clearly (strongly) pro-Ukrainian Twitter segment, where the posters are accused of being the spreaders of Russian propaganda, vatniks, orc supporters, and other such. The posters include the three guys cited above and pretty much everyone else, except for the “good news no matter what” crowd. There was always an occasional specimen (bot?) with similar accusations, but it seems to be pretty systemic now.

Almost forgot to mention it again. A few days ago (a couple of weeks or so?) there was an article in the NYT talking about the call Belousov made to Austin in regard to the Russian intel that Ukrainians were plotting something and Belousov insisted in the call to the Pentagon that the Americans discourage Ukrainians from doing whatever it is that they had planned (with the American blessing, according to the Russians).


I thought this something was maybe an attack on the Russian nuclear or deterrence facilities/installations. Now the Russians claim that the Ukes were plotting to assassinate Putin and Belousov during a parade in Sankt-Petersburg on July 28.


Another thing to mention is that there was the third article released by the Kiev Independent about their investigation into the international legion and their wrongdoings. I think I did cite the other two here previously, but not entirely sure now as it has been a while. Regardless, the links to the other two are in the article for those interested:

 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
BDA at Morozovsk airbase:


This follows up satellite imagery of the strike on this airbase, and confirms 1 Su-34 destroyed. Other pics in the video show that the ammo dump explosion was catastrophic.
 

Fredled

Active Member
Ukrinform one more time, talked about repelling two enemy assaults on the left bank of the Dnipro River .
It's not clear where on the left bank, and how south on the bank it is. We all know that they are not in the Krinky area anymore. So it must be somewhere else. Maybe on an island of the delta...

They also reported a raid on the occupied Tendra Spit (real name: Ostriv Tendrivska Kosa).
When you see where it is, they were very brave to go there.

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"Rostov on the Don" Submarine: The submarine that Ukrainians have claimed to have sunk is the same as the one they hit one year ago and was deemed irreparable. The Russians spent one year repairing it anyway. Then Ukrainians destroyed it again.
Ukrinform still report 1 submarine destroyed. Which indicates that they didn;t destoy another one.
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Russia is building a second bridge along the Kerch bridge. Just a question of time and available missiles to destroy both of them.
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Niger joins Mali in the diplomatic protest against Ukraine. Ukraine gave intel support to the Touareg rebels, The Touareg killed 87 Wagners. The problem is that they also killed Malian soldiers.
Kyleba should tell them not to hire criminals tu avoid such problem.
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Estonian citizen charged with treason for working for Rossiya Segodnya while this journal was under ban.
It seems that she wasn't just simply a journalist. But a propaganda professional.
Ukrinform said:
It was established that Burceva completed her master's studies at Sevastopol State University in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine in 2019-2021, where she enrolled in a program on information and hybrid conflicts, supervised and directed by a former FBI (I think they mean FSB - LOL - ) counterintelligence officer and head of a private intelligence firm registered in Russia. The two-year master's program aims to train international media workers and analysts to be at the forefront of combating hybrid threats Russia faces, noted the prosecutor.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
So far, the reactions from the Ukrainians and pro-Ukrainian sources is very negative.
Several examples of pro-Ukrainians that are not very negative, here are some:
Phillips P. OBrien on X: "It’s important that people instead of instantly jumping to negative conclusions about the Ukraine raid, actually wait for the operation to work itself out and details of the troops used becomes clearer. This is important" / X

Fabian Hoffmann on X: "Possible Russian reactions to this Ukrainian incursion: 1. No response (possible) 2. Punishment directed at innocent civilians, such as a large-scale missile strike (likely) 3. Nuclear escalation (extremely unlikely) Most importantly, the Ukrainians have considered these" / X

Erlend on X: "Waiting for the basement guys to geolocate more videos, but the Ukrainian offensive into Kursk Oblast has totally taken russia by surprise. Peoples takes on this before we have verified information about the chain of events and how the current situation is has been, eh amusing... https://t.co/6UWWjR75Pr" / X

Peter Öhman on X: "Sett en del utländska twittrare kritisera Ukrainas offensiv mot Kursk med motiv att de istället defensivt bör stärka andra hårt ansatta frontavsnitt. Principiellt (jag repeterar PRINCIPIELLT) har de fel. Man vinner inte utan att ta initiativ och det sker sällan utan risk." / X

Mykola Bielieskov on X: "In war there are some situations when if you don’t try you don’t know whether it works or not. Only those who sit idle don’t make mistakes. Or it’s very easy to be wise in hindsight. Especially if you bear zero responsibility." / X
 
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Fredled

Active Member
I think Ukrainians try spectacular operations with high psychological impact. Operations which were deemed impossible or at least highly unexpected. Showing the Russians that war has consequences for them too.

The invasion into the Kursk Oblast, it's also another diversion, far from the high intensity zones. It looks like Krinky. They don't go very far. They are not able to do much. But Russians have to divert forces to simply prevent to suddenly lose large areas.
By moving 1000 men (perhaps much less) into Russia, trough maybe the last area where they found no minefield, they will force Russians to move 2 or 3000 men to counter the attack.

The other nicety is that it forces the Russians to bomb their own villages. Make the locals see how funny is the Russian tactic. Will they use FAB500? Rain of shells?

They went only 7 km deep onside Russia. 15 km by some accounts. It has no strategic meaning. But everybody is talking about it... except Ukrainians themselves.

The funny thing is that Ukrinform , the official press release center, has not published any official statement nor even mentioned it in their daily updates. Yet they published the reaction from a German military expert. So we got the news indirectly, so to speak.
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This evening I was watching a video explaining that the Rostov-on-Don submarine was hit last year by a Storm Shadow. The irony was that the missile crossed the submarine from one side to another and exploded behind it. That's why the damages were not that big despite being hit directly. I don't know how it's possible to cross a submarine without exploding, but that's explosive dynamics and perhaps a war head designed for another purpose.
They had the same surprise when they hit a bridge: The missile went through the bridge slab and exploded underneath instead of exploding on it. Making much less damage than expected.
(The video is in french, so I don't post it here)
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I think Ukrainians try spectacular operations with high psychological impact. Operations which were deemed impossible or at least highly unexpected. Showing the Russians that war has consequences for them too.
For once I completely agree with your assessment. The trouble with this approach is that it can be costly (the last few cross-border attacks were very much so) and doesn't necessarily change the course of the war. Even as Ukraine grabbed a solid chunk of ground in Kursk region, Russian forces continue to advance in other areas.

There is a difference here though. This is probably the most successful Ukrainian attack since Kharkov in '22. Double digits of Russian POWs, and nearly 200 sq kms taken in ~3 days of fighting. It remains to be seen how this plays out.

The invasion into the Kursk Oblast, it's also another diversion, far from the high intensity zones. It looks like Krinky. They don't go very far. They are not able to do much. But Russians have to divert forces to simply prevent to suddenly lose large areas.
By moving 1000 men (perhaps much less) into Russia, trough maybe the last area where they found no minefield, they will force Russians to move 2 or 3000 men to counter the attack.
There appear to have been minefields, but Ukraine likely made openings. The main is that they managed to achieve surprise on a fairly large scale. At this point Russian sources are discussing 2-5 Ukrainian brigades involved and the scale of the incursion is comparable to the Russian incursion in Kharkov region.

The other nicety is that it forces the Russians to bomb their own villages. Make the locals see how funny is the Russian tactic. Will they use FAB500? Rain of shells?
I suspect the locals will blame Ukraine regardless of whose specific shell hits their house. It really doesn't help that Ukraine has been attacking civilian targets in the border area.

They went only 7 km deep onside Russia. 15 km by some accounts. It has no strategic meaning. But everybody is talking about it... except Ukrainians themselves.
It might. There's a NPP near there, only ~60 km from the border. They're still very far from it, but 15 km is a quarter of the way there. Obviously you can't advance in a sausage. You would need to broaden the front.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
For once I completely agree with your assessment. The trouble with this approach is that it can be costly (the last few cross-border attacks were very much so) and doesn't necessarily change the course of the war. Even as Ukraine grabbed a solid chunk of ground in Kursk region, Russian forces continue to advance in other areas.
Case in point:

IMG_6444.jpeg

This isn’t “old news”.

I am also not sure about the “showing that the war has consequences for them too” part. People in these regions are well aware. Yes, perhaps, like I said in my other post, a village or two might (probably will) get levelled. Did happen before, over smaller incursions (this is more than an incursion, it appears, of course). I also don’t see how this will not work against Ukraine either. Sure, there is the “protector cannot protect us” angle, but at the end of the day this is an easy spin for the “protector” with probably minor consequences for him personally. In fact, use it as a mood builder for another round of mobilization if such is required (which I don’t think is). This is an assault on “Mother Russia” with an open use of the US made and provided equipment. I saw that at least one Marder made the headline as well. Wonder what the Germans are going to say (likely the same thing as the Americans, but if (rather when) things turn sour, it will have an effect on future deliveries).

There is a difference here though. This is probably the most successful Ukrainian attack since Kharkov in '22. Double digits of Russian POWs, and nearly 200 sq kms taken in ~3 days of fighting. It remains to be seen how this plays out.
What I found intriguing about the reaction to POWs in the Ukrainian segment is the claims in the sorts of now they have something to trade. This clearly suggests that there are many more Ukrainian POWs in Russia waiting to be traded.

This in itself is interesting because, in spite of all the Russians casualties reported, there is actually (allegedly) a stock of Ukrainians in the Russian captivity that are awaiting for the numbers of Russians to be captured in order to be released.

Sure is a lot of POWs on the photos that I saw though. I am assuming conscripts for the most part.

There appear to have been minefields, but Ukraine likely made openings. The main is that they managed to achieve surprise on a fairly large scale. At this point Russian sources are discussing 2-5 Ukrainian brigades involved and the scale of the incursion is comparable to the Russian incursion in Kharkov region.
I think the biggest difference here is that the Russian Kharkiv incursion occurred when they were on the offensive basically everywhere else and not without success. So it was methodical and logical. We are still to see where this Ukrainian incursion takes us, but I really don’t see how this is going to pan out in favour of Ukraine. Yes, there is one way, which I mentioned in my previous post, and that is if Russia decides that it is imperative to get every Ukrainian troop out of the Russian borders and goes, call it, “batshit crazy” doing so. But they also have (what appears to be almost useless) Rosgvardia, other internal and conscripted personnel to achieve this scenario. Equipment is a big question, but we shall see.

The reasonable thing from the Russians, in my opinion, would be to contain the situation and continue as they were everywhere else. This will only hurt Ukraine in that case. Question is whether they can contain it. I have no idea, really. From the reports on the manpower and whatnot, they should be.

I suspect the locals will blame Ukraine regardless of whose specific shell hits their house. It really doesn't help that Ukraine has been attacking civilian targets in the border area.
Agreed. I also see that the existing damage from shelling is attributed to the Russians by the Ukrainian side and to the Ukrainians by the Russian side. It is pretty clear who the inhabitants will choose to believe.

It might. There's a NPP near there, only ~60 km from the border. They're still very far from it, but 15 km is a quarter of the way there. Obviously you can't advance in a sausage. You would need to broaden the front.
I think this is an overstretch, though, again, we are yet to see what happens.

Let’s assume they actually get to the plant. Common sense would suggest that it would be heavily protected by now (I mean it literally “by now”), but, given the way things are historically handled in this conflict, it may be not protected. So let’s say that Ukrainians take control of the plant. That would be on the side of miracles, in my opinion, but nonetheless. Then what?

Overall, it is quite a run that they have accomplished. What’s from it though? The run will stop at some point, obviously. Then what? Sure, the Ukrainian troops will dig in. Again, then what? They will clearly need resources. Including men. These resources are scarce, there is no question about it. Even if they keep occupying this part of Russia till their faces turn blue, then what? If the frontline collapses in Donetsk completely (not a farfetched scenario at all), then what? I saw some suggesting that this would be a bargaining chip in negotiations. How? If the front remains where it is, which isn’t the case.

Anyway, we are yet to see how this develops. In order for it to be some bargaining chip, this mass of land has to be held first and foremost. Running is easy (apparently proven by the Ukrainians in this case); holding the gains isn’t (yet to be proven otherwise).

A reasonable assessment of the situation, in my opinion:


Another one:


This is an interesting read on the tactical side of things.


Andrew Perpetua suggests that the Ukes have been destroying the electrical and communication infrastructure in the area for weeks:


Edit: I forgot to include the memorable mention:

IMG_6443.jpeg
 
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koxinga

Well-Known Member
For once I completely agree with your assessment. The trouble with this approach is that it can be costly (the last few cross-border attacks were very much so) and doesn't necessarily change the course of the war.
I don't think the intention of these raids was to be pivotal in changing the war. Other than psychological, it is likely to tied down troops else where instead of being send to active zones.

As to whether it is costly, it depends on the sort of outcome being achieved and to be cynical, Ukraine will lose troops anyway on the front. If they get a bigger impact out of actions like this, well, it is more useful use of lives.

However, I agree that the effectiveness of such raids, incusions will likely be blunted in the future. That will be the point when the loss outweighs the benefits.

War is a callous mistress, and it is sad that we weigh / use human lives in such an calculus.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
Is this offensive a road to nowehere ? What areas of operational importance are within reach ? A railway node, or hub of transport ? A logistical base ? Russia is effectively infinitely large and taking ground just to take ground is pointless.

At the very least you get a morale boost and good training in offensive operations as long as you dont suffer from much attrition.
 

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
Probably the greatest benefit will be to make the RU to commit more troops along the entirety of the border and and front line. This could reduce the amount of personnel available for offensive operations and make the RU more cautious in the future regarding their manning in non active areas of the border and front line. This may be the total intention.
 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
I have to wonder if Putin cares....after all, if there are no important operational targets within reach of the UKR, why defend it with any serious forces ? Kursk is a rail hub, but I doubt UKR can reach it. The UKR cant garrison large parts of captured RU territory for any long period of time, and unless you are gaining a superior defensive line, and avoiding serious attrition, are you doing the smart thing ?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Is this offensive a road to nowehere ? What areas of operational importance are within reach ? A railway node, or hub of transport ? A logistical base ? Russia is effectively infinitely large and taking ground just to take ground is pointless.

At the very least you get a morale boost and good training in offensive operations as long as you dont suffer from much attrition.
Probably the greatest benefit will be to make the RU to commit more troops along the entirety of the border and and front line. This could reduce the amount of personnel available for offensive operations and make the RU more cautious in the future regarding their manning in non active areas of the border and front line. This may be the total intention.
One curious theory I've read on a Russian site is that this is the first of possibly multiple misdirection blows, intended to divert Russian attention and slow Russian advance in the Donbas, before a Ukrainian counter-offensive attempt somewhere along the existing front line inside Ukraine. Ukraine has been very stingy with reserves for the Toretsk and Pokrovsk axes. This presumes significant resources available that Ukraine has chosen not to commit. I don't know if this is true but as an MDCOA type analysis it's interesting.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
It’s still hard to see where this is going. It’s not even possible to say what area Ukraine has actually captured at this point. Quite a bit of a run, which clearly isn’t sustainable or logical. Surely not with the reported up to a couple thousand troops. I doubt it is 2,000 troops though. 5K maybe?

I saw many theories proposed by various people. I am not going to provide any sources for this because I frankly don’t see the point and those interested likely heard of it all anyway. I’d rather have a very brief discussion of the few of these theories, but I will, of course, provide citations for any particular claims that aren’t mine (it will be the first google search result that reasonably fits and supports the claims though).

One theory can be thrown out right away, in my opinion, and that is to force Russia into negotiations. First of all, I think this does the exact opposite of “forcing Russia into negotiations”. I think I mentioned in my previous post that I don’t really see how this can have any effect on negotiations at all. Podolyak (Zelensky’s advisor) has spoken and suggested that a) this will boost the Ukrainian hand in negotiations and b) this will scare Russians and they will change their attitude towards Putin. Well, b) is a pure speculation that is not only baseless, but historically the evidence has indicated that any virtual attack on Russia had only boosted the support for the authorities and unite the population. I have little doubt that this will have the opposite effect of what Podolyak is suggesting there. What about a) though? This goes into the second theory, which is the “upper hand” that we heard and talked about so many times now. Let’s assume this is a viable theory in this case. To get it out of the way, this has only been going on for a few days and we have no idea how this will develop a few more days from now. But let’s say Ukraine takes more ground in this direction and digs in. I said above, this takes a lot of resources and a lot more to hold their positions. What then? In order to have that “upper hand”, you need be able to have a threat to be able to do more. Whether that is the case, remains to be seen, but it is highly unlikely once things settle down, in my opinion.

Having said the above and softly flow into another intersecting theory, Ukraine will attack Russia again within the next few days at another location. This makes more sense. Rylsk was proposed as another axis of attack and it makes a lot of sense. Except that Rylsk is quite a bit further from the border than Sudzha, for example. It is an option though. Reportedly, there was a convoy of Russian equipment destroyed in the Rylsk region:


No idea what was actually destroyed or what is burning in that video (the original source).

Anyway, this sounds like a viable theory. Except for the resources. A lot of resources. Which are scarce. This is somewhat supported by the fact that it would make a lot more sense to attack the two directions simultaneously, but that didn’t happen. We will see what happens there.

Next is the theory of Ukraine taking control of the natural gas metering station located in Sudzha. This pipeline basically supplies about half of the gas Russia is still selling to Europe. Ok, they allegedly took control of the site. So what? Ukraine controls the entire length of the pipelines going through its (controlled) territory. And they are making hundreds of millions of dollars via transit fees annually from this venture (about a couple billion dollars from all the pipelines, oil and gas, that head from Russia to Europe via Ukraine). So again, this makes very little sense. They have complete control of that far away from the front line.

Another theory suggests that this incursion will take the Russian forces out of Donbas in order to remove the Ukrainian troops from the Russian territory. I don’t think I have much to comment here, but I really don’t see how this is feasible. I see it on par with the “force Russia into negotiations” theory. I mean stranger things have happened in this war, but I just don’t see it.

Yet another proposition is this is going to be basically a trade that involves Russia giving up the Kharkiv area it currently occupies for the are Ukrainians are currently taking. I think this has traction in the sense that this is where the Russian troops might be pulled from. Perhaps, reduced pressure from the air in the Kharkiv direction and whatnot. I don’t know.

Then there is a theory of stretching the front line by the Ukes that has no validity at all, in my opinion, provided that they themselves are stretched way beyond the comfort level and are actually quite devastated in more than one direction.

Anyway, I think the part that is mainly missed by many observers is that, as I mentioned in my previous post, in the territory of Russia, there are tens of thousands of conscripts at the disposal of the MoD, there is Rosgvardia, probably tens of thousands more, MVD, FSB, and so on. It’s a lot of people, though most probably of very little use in situations like this. Equipment? Your guess is as good as mine.

Reports suggest that Ukraine threw at leas two of their most capable brigades at this, being the 22nd mechanized and 82 air assault brigades. There are reports of other participating groups as well.

So far, I see most commentators suggesting that this is either a genius planning and execution or an epic fail that is coming in the near future. So again, we shall see what happens.
 

koxinga

Well-Known Member
Well, for the moment, the Ukrainians are doing a better job of invading than the Russians did in '22. ;) Success would mean they could withdraw intact and not lose their primary units.
 

Fredled

Active Member
vikingatespam said:
Is this offensive a road to nowehere ? What areas of operational importance are within reach ? A railway node, or hub of transport ? A logistical base ? Russia is effectively infinitely large and taking ground just to take ground is pointless.
They certainly had a goal. Not just for the sake of it.

The best thing I can think of is that it allows Ukrainians to move artillery closer to the border with Russia and maybe inside Russia (but not too far inside). The coolest thing would be to bring long range missile launchers. Kursk would be within range if they pushed a little bit more.
They will be able to hit targets which could be reached only with drones so far and to destroy them more completely.

We can think of logistic warehouses, railways, depots, factories etc. They could also strike the artillery units firing at the Summy region.

The second possibility is to encircle some Russian troops deployed on the border. Taking some prisoners.

Feanor said:
I suspect the locals will blame Ukraine regardless of whose specific shell hits their house. It really doesn't help that Ukraine has been attacking civilian targets in the border area.
KipPotapych said:
Agreed. I also see that the existing damage from shelling is attributed to the Russians by the Ukrainian side and to the Ukrainians by the Russian side. It is pretty clear who the inhabitants will choose to believe
.
If locals see that their village is occupied by Ukrainians and the Ukrainians in their village are being bombarded, and that the sound of guns come obviously from inside Russia, they can have all the anti-nazy opinions that they want, they will be forced to admit that it's the Russians who are firing.

My question was will the Russian use the carpet dombing tactic on their own territory as they do in Ukraine? During stalinist times, this would not have even been a question. Today it will be interesting to see what they decide.

KipPotapych said:
Sure, there is the “protector cannot protect us” angle, but at the end of the day this is an easy spin for the “protector” with probably minor consequences for him personally.
IMO, the psychological effect is not directed at the Russian population. There is not enough Russian citizens affected by this and the area occupied by Ukrainians is not significant. For Russian people it's an event on the border. Nothing more.

The Russian population don't care that a S400 was blown up or that a bomb depot exploded at an air base. For them, these are events happening 2000 km away. Even assuming that they know what happens.
The only time they see that the war is affecting them is when a relative or a neighbour is KIA or returns home with severe physical or mental disabilities. Then only they understand that something wrong happens. But it doesn't affect the whole population.

The psychological impact of the Kursk invasion will be on the leadership, on the elite, on the generals and on Putin himself.

Ukes are striking refineries, air bases, oil depots, air defence, and so on, almost on a daily basis. They destroyed an early warning radar, finished off the submarine, and now there is this invasion of the Kursk Oblast.
Putin should start to feel doubts about the competency of his generals, his intelligence officers (this one spectacular intel failure by the Russians), his military technology... "How is it possible?". Not a single day when he shouldn't be asking this question.

Rob c said:
Probably the greatest benefit will be to make the RU to commit more troops along the entirety of the border and and front line. This could reduce the amount of personnel available for offensive operations and make the RU more cautious in the future regarding their manning in non active areas of the border and front line. This may be the total intention.
Feanor said:
One curious theory I've read on a Russian site is that this is the first of possibly multiple misdirection blows, intended to divert Russian attention and slow Russian advance in the Donbas, before a Ukrainian counter-offensive attempt somewhere along the existing front line inside Ukraine. Ukraine has been very stingy with reserves for the Toretsk and Pokrovsk axes.
This makes sens because bringing more reserves to the Pokrovsk axis, under rains of bombs doesn't help much. The more men they have deployed there, the higher the probability that one gets killed by semi-random bombing. So they keep just the necessary amount of troops to stop the Russian advance or slow it down. This just the right amount is already huge. Increasing it by 10 or 20% won;t change anything. So better use this 10% of available forces elswhere were the effect will be more visible.

One last thought: Thus incursion was made possible by the unofficial lifting of the ban on Western weapon use inside Russia. 3 months ago, the German would not agree that Ukes use their Marders inside Russia. Today, most of MATO partners (at least the most important ones) have supported the incursion because it;s limited to the border area.

links on the topic:
Al Jazeera
Reuters
 
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