The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
It's unlikely that a short circuit causes the explosion or the fire of a fuel tank wagon. So gazoline could take fire on the surface but that would not cause any immediate explosion if any.
If firefighters are operating in the tunnel, no other train is able to pass. It's a one track way.

If it's confirmed as a SBU sabotage (as Ukrinform confirmed), that would be yet one more embarrassement for Russians.
They already reclassified it as a terrorist attack. Via Google translate:

Investigators of the Eastern Interregional Investigation Department for Transport opened a criminal case under the article on the terrorist attack after the explosion and fire of a train on the Baikal-Amur highway, in the Severomuysky tunnel.[…]

According to the sources, the case was initiated against unidentified persons. Investigators previously established that the tank caught fire when an unspecified explosive device was blown up. It could have been under the car.

Baza sources reported that unknown persons blew up a freight train of 50 cars on the Itykit-Okusikkan section. The locomotive crew said that during the passage of the tunnel the tension was removed, the train braked. After a while, heavy smoke began in the tunnel - the brigade consolidated the train and left the tunnel.

As a result of the explosion, 16 tanks burned out. A breakdown was found in two tanks in the drain area. Previously, the fuel spilled over an area of 150 square meters.


 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
A little more info on the incident and operation of the tunnel from a better source, via Google translate:

The Eastern Interregional Investigation Department of Transport of the TFR opened a criminal case under the article on the terrorist attack on the fact of the explosion with the subsequent ignition of a freight train inside the Severomuysky tunnel on the Baikal-Amur Mainline (BAM). According to official information, one of the cars of the train, carrying mainly diesel and aviation fuel from Taishet to Tynda, "burned and smoked." Traffic inside Russia's longest railway tunnel is currently suspended, trains are bypassed. The incident is called "SBU operation" in foreign media. Meanwhile, Russian State Duma deputy Andrey Gurulev called for a return to the Soviet practice of a "colossal security system" on the railway.

Investigators of the second department for the investigation of particularly important cases of the Eastern Interregional Investigative Department on Transport of the TFR initiated a criminal case under Part 1 of Art. 205 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (terrorist act) on the explosion and fire of a freight train that occurred on November 29 in the Severomuysky tunnel. The incident occurred on the 1365th kilometer of the Itykit-Okusikykan section of the East Siberian Railway. According to a Kommersant source familiar with the progress of the investigation, the case was initiated "against unidentified persons".

The Severomuysky tunnel is located on the BAM in the north of Buryatia. Traffic in the tunnel has been open since 2003. With a length of 15.3 km, it is the longest railway tunnel in Russia. Its construction allows heavy freight trains to cross the North Muysky Range without the need to unlink them and move them in parts along the bypass path, as was practiced before the opening of the tunnel. The facility is electrified, equipped with video cameras at the entrance-exit and is guarded. The tunnel is equipped with radiation and seismic control and communication systems, as well as special gates that can be opened only for the passage of the train.

"The ignition of a fuel tank as part of a freight train was the result of the explosion of an unidentified explosive device, which was allegedly planted under the cars," the Kommersant source reports.

It is known that the freight train №2412, which ran from Taishet station in the Irkutsk region to Tynda station in the Amur region, consisted of 50 cars, including 41 tanks with diesel fuel, 3 tanks with aviation kerosene and 6 gondola cars with metal structures. After the incident, 14 cars with diesel and aviation fuel were towed from the tunnel. 36 cars remained inside the tunnel due to rail deformation and fuel filling.

Earlier it was reported that the Navy on transport conducts a pre-investigation check under Part 1 of Art. 263 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (violation of traffic safety and operation of railway transport). JSC Russian Railways officially announced the "smoke of one of the fuel tanks" while the train was moving through the tunnel. The company noted that after the incident, part of the train "was brought out of the tunnel", and traffic on the BAM was organized along the bypass section.

The Kommersant source adds that initially a "short circuit in the tunnel" was considered as one of the versions of the incident. At the scene of the incident, at first there was severe smoke, high temperature, and a visual inspection of some tanks revealed gaps or traces of rupture in the area of the drain valve. In the future, after the inspection of the scene by explosive specialists from Ulan-Ude and Irkutsk, the version of the incident changed. Currently, it is planned to bring out the remaining wagons in the tunnel in order to inspect them more carefully in natural light.



It appears that the tunnel itself is pretty secured, but clearly cannot be protected against the IEDs strapped to train cars without thorough inspections.

I read about the bypass yesterday a bit. Seems like a pretty complex way to travel, but was used for decades prior to the construction of the tunnel, which on its own took decades as well. From the initial reports though, it doesn’t appear that there was significant damage to the tunnel itself. But who is going to release that information anyway.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Here is the alleged geolocation of the second incident I mentioned on the previous page (per Baza telegram channel). Sorry, Feanor (and others?), I only got Twitter for this one.


The map from the same Twitter post for those that do not have Twitter account:



I didn’t look at the Russian Telgram channels for a few days now, but have not seen anything referring to this incidents in the RU news outlets.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
didn’t look at the Russian Telgram channels for a few days now, but have not seen anything referring to this incidents in the RU news outlets.
Yes don't see this on Rybar. You can say whatever on Rybar, but so far his channel are more dependable then Ukrainian ones on progress in the ground. Rybar so far also not hiding any Ukrainian attack (if any) happening deep in Russian territory. So unless we got more independent confirmation, this in my opinion needed to be regarded with huge level of salt.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
Yes don't see this on Rybar. You can say whatever on Rybar, but so far his channel are more dependable then Ukrainian ones on progress in the ground. Rybar so far also not hiding any Ukrainian attack (if any) happening deep in Russian territory. So unless we got more independent confirmation, this in my opinion needed to be regarded with huge level of salt.
Kommersant newspaper of Russia is cited of an attack on the train
Investigators find train in Russian tunnel was blown up in 'terrorist act' - newspaper | Reuters
in regards to Rybar I understood and have placed a previous post on a founder of this organisation being personally decorated by President Putin for his work on propaganda
 
Seymour Hersh published a new story saying that zaluzhni and gerasimov are allegedly engaging in peace talks.


anybody is subscribed and has access to the full article?
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
regards to Rybar I understood and have placed a previous post on a founder of this organisation being personally decorated by President Putin for his work on propaganda
Off course Rybar running Russian line, everybody playing propaganda in this war. Ukrainian do, Russian also, and Western Mainstream mostly following Ukrainian ones. Only lately some in West begin to take not all the same as Ukrainian line.

However Rybar still shown more or less what's happening in the ground more reliably then Ukrainian ones. So either they don't see this as really a sabotage yet, or they want to put this as irrelevant. Something that not ussual as so far Rybar and other Russian Telegram not shy away on showing Ukrainian sabotage in Russian territory. After all it is fall on their agenda as part on showing Ukrainian 'terrorist' act.
 

Larry_L

Active Member
Off course Rybar running Russian line, everybody playing propaganda in this war. Ukrainian do, Russian also, and Western Mainstream mostly following Ukrainian ones. Only lately some in West begin to take not all the same as Ukrainian line.

However Rybar still shown more or less what's happening in the ground more reliably then Ukrainian ones. So either they don't see this as really a sabotage yet, or they want to put this as irrelevant. Something that not ussual as so far Rybar and other Russian Telegram not shy away on showing Ukrainian sabotage in Russian territory. After all it is fall on their agenda as part on showing Ukrainian 'terrorist' act.
Do you have a link to a version that you trust? I am open to an alternate version from what I have found. It feels to me that the truth is being hushed up in Russia. I tend to lean towards what Ukraine is saying.
 

T.C.P

Well-Known Member
Do you have a link to a version that you trust? I am open to an alternate version from what I have found. It feels to me that the truth is being hushed up in Russia. I tend to lean towards what Ukraine is saying.
The best way to is to get information from both and add appropriate levels of salt. In most cases, we know about the reality of advances a couple of days after they are stated. Both Rybar and Suriyaki maps (Russian sources) have jumped the gun a bit during offensives, but both to their credit recitfy their mistakes in a day or two.

For information, the best sources are from Telegram, but you have to do a lot of filtering, because a lot of these channels are full of bs and propaganda. I use ther/credibledefense subreddit to curate a lot of the incoming info, as they have heavy moderation but allow Russian sources to state their information as well. In particular there is a poster named u/Larelli who goes through a plethora of telegram channels to provide updated deployments of the various Russian and Ukranian Units.

But you are rigth, the Russian sources are a lot less objective since Putin's crackdown of them. So far the only channel I still find thatcan get away with mild criticism of the Russian authorities is the fighterbomber telegram channel.
 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
Out of curiosity does anyone know of members of the media in Ukraine jailed for not going with the government line ?
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group
you have a link to a version that you trust? I am open to an alternate version from what I have found.
Just added what @T.C.P wrote and clarified again what I wrote. Both Russian and Ukrainian sources are full of propaganda. However on movement in the ground, Russian telegram like Rybar are somewhat more reliable then Ukrainian ones.

Again this is only on movement in the ground, and not about their other opinion or report that like the Ukrainian ones are frames on each sides agenda.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Yes don't see this on Rybar. You can say whatever on Rybar, but so far his channel are more dependable then Ukrainian ones on progress in the ground. Rybar so far also not hiding any Ukrainian attack (if any) happening deep in Russian territory. So unless we got more independent confirmation, this in my opinion needed to be regarded with huge level of salt.
There are certainly events that had been omitted by Rybar. Not sure I can think of some particular examples to provide at the moment though. Overall, I have no issues with Rybar’s reporting knowing what they are. Their maps are certainly on point. Most Ukrainian sources don’t come close, in my opinion: there is way more positivity than there should be, their maps are lagging and unreasonably so, they portray completely meaningless things as if they would result in if not winning the war completely, than at the very least as a major setback for Russia, they report things that did not happen or the opposite of what had happened, etc. I understand and can live with the two former, but have zero interest in the two latter characteristics. There are only a couple of Ukes on Twitter that provide more or less good info, but also lack a bit in objectivity. Who doesn’t though?

The main thing, of course, is not to follow any of them as a believer would follow a bible. I am a realist and like cold hard facts. I do not need to see every tank hit in the war, neither piles of dead bodies with the other side proclaiming their superiority. But they all together help to get a general sense of what is happening and where things are going. Sometimes I am wrong, sometimes I am right. In reality though, it doesn’t matter. Which is why I like the discussion here. All the same I disagree with some, agree with the others; most I would think disagree with me and all that is fine. Most will probably disagree with a good chunk of the following paragraph, for example.

I do not follow the Russian MoD’s reports and haven’t since the first couple of weeks or so into this conflict. I also do not follow what the UK MoD says either anymore. Unless either one is quote or cited elsewhere. Many may disagree, but I think there are more similarities than differences between the two, as far the coverage of this conflict goes (and that disagreement is completely fine). I liked Gen. Mark Milley, but he isn’t there anymore to cautiously provide his (official) views. I don’t mind Zaluzhny most of the time, but find Zelensky hard to stand as of late and he brings nothing of substance; constant lies do not help his case either. And he is delusional - I was thinking it was an act, but he probably actually believes it, and I am not sure which is worse (likely the latter as it would be with any radicals). Still can’t believe he talked about the Russians cutting children’s heads off in the interview I cited a few pages back (and that no one called him out on it, but that is not that unexpected).

Anyway, back to the railroad subject. Only the first (the tunnel) incident was ever mentioned in the RU news; the alleged second incident (on the bypass) was not. Whether it took place or not is not clear, but I tend to think it did, though certainly not on the crucial bridge that UA reported. Regardless, both incidents (if two took place) were again largely meaningless as opposed to the claims of the Ukrainians and media sensationalism. Just like all other train derailments, because there is about zero impact on what is happening on the ground in Ukraine where the actual fight that matters is. Via Google translate:

Train traffic in the Severomuysky tunnel on the Itykit-Okusikian section in Buryatia was fully restored after the explosion and fire of the train that occurred on November 29. The first train passed through the restored tunnel at 18:20 Moscow time today, December 2, the press service of Russian Railways in Telegram reported.

"More than 120 people and special equipment were involved to resume railway communication, as well as to eliminate the consequences of the incident. The movement of trains was not interrupted, it was organized along a bypass section with a slight increase in travel time. All passenger trains have been put on schedule," the Russian Railways said in a statement.



As you can see even here, the Russians are saying that the traffic via bypass was never interrupted, implying there was no second incident. No idea, really. But again, it doesn’t matter if there was one. And the tunnel is now reported to be fully operational again.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Some of you guys make pretty weird conclusions from the this conversation, in my opinion.


As per Baza telegram channel, there were two separate incidents. Via Google translate:

The cause of the fire in a freight train in the Severomuysky tunnel, according to preliminary data, was a short circuit in the cable network.

A freight train of 50 cars began to enter a tunnel near the Okushikan station in Buryatia when the driver heard a bang. A fire started in one of the carriages. The train driver and his assistant were not injured. As a result of the incident, three tank cars were damaged - one of them burned out completely.

Later, 200 meters of cable line was discovered to have burned out on one section of the route. Fuel began to leak from one of the cars.

At the moment, recovery and firefighting trains are operating in the tunnel - there are no delays in the movement of passenger trains. Law enforcement agencies are working at the scene. The Severomuysky tunnel is the longest in Russia for railways - 15,343 meters.



And

The explosion of two fuel tanks caused a fire on a freight train in the Severomuysky tunnel in Buryatia.

According to Baza, the freight train was traveling along a bypass track when diesel fuel tanks detonated and six cars caught fire. At the moment, 4 cars are not extinguished.

The causes of the explosion are unknown. According to preliminary data, this time there were also no casualties. A fire train went to the scene to extinguish the fire.


The conclusions reached by others are valid because they are probable, as is the conclusion that the Russian electrical system is suffering rapid unexpected disassembly. There have been a lot of "electrical short circuits" in Russia lately. Makes one wonder why the Russian electrical system is suddenly short circuiting. So how about you try some analysis rather than parroting Russian propaganda. What are the causes for increase in Russian electrical short circuits?
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Latest ISW Update. 1/2
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 2, 2023
Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 2, 2023 | Institute for the Study of War (understandingwar.org)

Poor weather conditions continue to slow the pace of Ukrainian and Russian combat operations across the entire frontline but have not completely halted them. Ukrainian Ground Forces Command Spokesperson Lieutenant Colonel Volodymyr Fityo stated that Russian forces actively use aviation in the Bakhmut direction when the weather permits it.[1] Fityo added that weather does not significantly affect Russian artillery fire in the Bakhmut direction. Russian milbloggers, claimed on December 1 that strong winds near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast prevented Russian forces from using drones and artillery over the past two days, however.[2] A Russian milblogger claimed that although light rain allows Russian forces to conduct aerial reconnaissance near Verbove (9km east of Robotyne) the muddy terrain makes it challenging for infantry and wheeled vehicles to advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[3] The milblogger added that Russian forces can only move on tracked vehicles and that Ukrainian forces continue intense artillery fire despite the poor weather conditions in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Zaporizhia Oblast occupation official Vladimir Rogov amplified footage on December 2 that shows muddy roads on the Robotyne-Novoprokopivka-Verbove line in western Zaporizhia Oblast and claimed that these conditions have practically immobilized Ukrainian wheeled vehicles, forcing Ukrainian troops to conduct infantry-only attacks.[4] Rogov amplified additional footage showing an infestation of rats and mice in a Ukrainian trench in Zaporizhia Oblast, which he claimed was the result of the cold weather in the region.[5]

Russian forces launched another series of Shahed 136/131 drone and missile strikes targeting southern Ukraine overnight on December 1-2. Ukrainian military officials reported that Russian forces launched 11 Shahed drones from Cape Chauda in occupied Crimea and a Kh-59 cruise missile from the airspace over occupied Zaporizhia Oblast.[6] The Ukrainian military officials reported that Ukrainian forces shot down 10 Shahed drones over Odesa Oblast and the Kh-59 cruise missile over Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.[7] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that a Russian Shahed drone struck an unspecified infrastructure object in Odesa Oblast.[8] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian Shahed drones targeted the Chornomorsk and Kiliya ports in Odesa Oblast.[9] The milblogger added that Russian forces also conducted missile strikes, including at least one Iskander ballistic missile strike, in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia oblasts. ISW cannot verify the milblogger’s claims.

Ukrainian and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials reported that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) completely disconnected from all external power sources for five and a half hours on the night of December 1 to 2, marking the plant’s eighth complete black out — all under Russian occupation. The Ukrainian Energy Ministry and the IAEA reported on December 2 that the ZNPP lost connection with both of its operable external power lines from 0230 to around 0800 local time on December 2. The ZNPP, during the black out, automatically switched to diesel generators to cool its reactors and power essential functions.[10] The IAEA reported that the power loss disrupted the coolant pumps of reactor no. 4 and that the ZNPP is currently bringing the reactor back to a hot shutdown state to continue generating steam for ZNPP operations and provide heat for Enerhodar. Ukrainian nuclear energy operator Energoatom President Petro Kotin stated that Russia is not interested in the safety of the ZNPP, as evidenced by Russian authorities' failure to follow the norms and rules of nuclear and radiation safety.[11] The IAEA stated that an external grid failure far away from the ZNPP caused the power failure.[12] IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi stated that this most recent power outage is “yet another reminder” about the plant’s precarious nuclear safety and security situation.[13]

The ZNPP’s complete power outage occurred as Russia continued longstanding efforts to compel the IAEA and the international community to normalize Russia’s occupation of the ZNPP.[14] Russian state nuclear energy company Rosatom claimed on December 2 that Rosatom Head Alexey Likhachev and Grossi agreed on the sidelines of the United Nations (UN) Climate Conference to hold full-scale consultations about the safety and security of the ZNPP in early 2024.[15] Neither the IAEA nor Grossi have confirmed Rosatom’s claim of future consultations as of this publication.

The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three third party entities involved in the transport of Russian crude oil above the G7 price cap. OFAC announced on December 1 that it imposed sanctions on two United Arab Emirates-based and one Liberian-based shipping companies that own vessels that carried Russian crude oil above $70 barrel after the G7’s $60 price cap took effect in December 2022.[16] Russia relies on a “shadow fleet” of oil tankers without insurance from Western countries to skirt the G7’s price cap on Russian crude oil and petroleum products.[17]

The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) signaled that it likely intends to continue relying on crypto-mobilization recruitment schemes for any potential increase in the size of the Russian military. The Russian MoD responded to Russian President Vladimir Putin’s December 1 decree increasing the size of the Russian military and stated that the Russian military is implementing the increase in stages “on account of citizens who express a desire to perform military service under a contract.”[18] This language may refer to volunteers, whom the MoD has courted through a widespread crypto-mobilization effort in Russia, and suggests that the MoD may use volunteer recruitment for long-term force generation.[19] The MoD clarified that Putin’s decree does not portend a significant increase in the number of conscripted Russians nor a second wave of mobilization.[20] Putin‘s decree, which formally increased the size of the Russian military from 2.039 million personnel to 2.209 million personnel and total Russian combat personnel from 1.15 million to 1.32 million, is likely an official acknowledgment of the actual end strength of the Russian military and not an order for an immediate increase.[21] Partial mobilization, ongoing widespread crypto-mobilization efforts, the number of Russian personnel concluding military service, and Russian casualties in Ukraine can plausibly account for the net gain of 170,000 Russian combat personnel between the August 22 decree on the size of the Russian military and the December 1 decree.

The Kremlin’s policy towards the role of migrants in bolstering Russia’s industrial capacity continues to be inconsistent. Kremlin newswire TASS reported on December 2 that the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) is preparing a bill that will require Russian authorities to fingerprint and identify foreigners immediately upon entry to Russia and again upon exit.[22] Russian MVD Migration Affairs Head Valentina Kazakova previously stated that Russian officials will begin a trial run of fingerprinting and photographing migrants arriving at Moscow airports.[23] Russia already fingerprints and photographs migrants, although not immediately upon entry.[24] These new measures are not unusual immigration and travel policies but are notable in this case because they are likely a part of a wider set of anti-migration policies.[25] A Russian economic news aggregator claimed on December 2 that the Russian government has set a quota of 155,900 visa permits for skilled migrant workers in 2024, a 32,000 increase from 2023.[26] The economic news aggregator claimed that the Russian government is sending invitations and work permits to migrant workers, primarily those working in mining and construction.[27] This reported increase in migrant workers is at odds with a series of federal and regional policies in Russia that restrict migrants’ prospects for work.[28] The Kremlin increasingly appears to be pursuing mutually exclusive goals of relying on migrants to strengthen Russia’s strained industrial capacity while also pursuing force generation efforts and politically motivated anti-migration policies that reduce migrants’ ability to augment Russia’s labor force.[29]
https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/DraftUkraineCoTDecember%202%2C%202023.png
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Latest ISW Update. 2/2
Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s November 30 threat against Moldova may have emboldened certain pro-Russian actors to attempt to sow political instability and division in Moldova.[30] The pro-Russian head of Moldova’s Gagauzia region, Yevgenia Gutsul, claimed on December 1 that Moldovan state energy company Moldovagaz blocked Gagauzia from receiving gas from a Turkish supplier that the pro-Russian Gagauzia regional government had negotiated outside of state contracts.[31] Gutsul claimed that Moldovagaz sells gas at a higher price per cubic meter than the Turkish partner and accused Moldova of ignoring Gaguazia’s calls to provide its residents with cheap gas for the upcoming winter. Moldovan President Maia Sandu notably denied Gutsul’s request for a spot in her cabinet on November 13 because Gutsul is a member of the banned Shor political party, which Russia used to promote pro-Russian interests and political instability in Moldova until the Moldovan Constitutional Court banned the party in June 2023.[32] Shor Party head Ilhan Shor used the party to spark protests in September 2022-June 2023 ultimately aimed at toppling the current Moldovan government.[33] Moldovagaz Head Vadim Ceban stated that Moldovagaz does not have the physical or legal ability to block gas supplies at the Gagauzia border and that Moldovagaz has not received the necessary documentation to switch Gagauzia’s natural gas suppliers.[34] Sandu stripped Moldovan Party of Regions head Alexander Kalinin of his Moldovan citizenship on November 27 due to his extensive support of the Russian war in Ukraine, and Kalinin announced efforts on December 1 to recruit Moldovan volunteers to fight alongside the Russian military in Ukraine.[35] Russia conducted a likely campaign to destabilize Moldova in early 2023, and Russia may seek to revamp these efforts to distract international attention from the war in Ukraine.[36]

Key Takeaways:

  • Poor weather conditions continue to slow the pace of Ukrainian and Russian combat operations across the entire frontline but have not completely halted them.
  • Russian forces launched another series of Shahed 136/131 drone and missile strikes targeting southern Ukraine overnight on December 1-2.
  • Ukrainian and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) officials reported that the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) completely disconnected from all external power sources for five and a half hours on the night of December 1 to 2, marking the plant’s eighth complete black out - all under Russian occupation.
  • The US Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned three third party entities involved in the transport of Russian crude oil above the G7 price cap.
  • The Russia Ministry of Defense (MoD) signaled that it likely intends to continue relying on crypto-mobilization recruitment schemes for any potential increase in the size of the Russian military.
  • The Kremlin’s policy towards the role of migrants in bolstering Russia’s industrial capacity continues to be inconsistent.
  • Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s November 30 threat against Moldova may have emboldened certain pro-Russian actors to attempt to sow political instability and division in Moldova.
  • Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, near Avdiivka, west of Donetsk City, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and advanced near Avdiivka.
  • Radio Svoboda’sSchemes” and “Systems” investigative projects published a joint investigation on December 1 detailing how the Main Directorate of the Russian General Staff (GRU) created the “Redut” private military company (PMC) to recruit thousands of Russians for irregular combat service in Ukraine.
  • Ukrainian partisans reportedly conducted a partisan attack against Russian military personnel in occupied Melitopol, Zaporizhia Oblast, on December 1.
1701574696862.png
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
The conclusions reached by others are valid because they are probable, as is the conclusion that the Russian electrical system is suffering rapid unexpected disassembly. There have been a lot of "electrical short circuits" in Russia lately. Makes one wonder why the Russian electrical system is suddenly short circuiting. So how about you try some analysis rather than parroting Russian propaganda. What are the causes for increase in Russian electrical short circuits?
Which part of my post are you referring to to be Russian propaganda?

P. S. Pretty sure I posted some good analysis here previously. Maybe I will post a little more later today.

Edit: Also, you say that conclusions of others are valid because they are probable, but then referring to mine as a propaganda. Just to point this part out.
 
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ImperatorOrbis

New Member

Looks like the top dogs at NATO have the details and are preparing the public for bad news, whatever that means. My guess is they will gradualy explain that there is no way to kick the Russians out of Ukraine and start preassuring Ukraine into a peace deal. Which is realistic. We cannot really tell how the war of attrition is going but they sure know more. I still think it is a miracle (or Russian blunder) Ukraine did not capitulate at the start of the war.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Which part of my post are you referring to to be Russian propaganda?

P. S. Pretty sure I posted some good analysis here previously. Maybe I will post a little more later today.

Edit: Also, you say that conclusions of others are valid because they are probable, but then referring to mine as a propaganda. Just to point this part out.
If you have a problem how a post is moderated take it up via PM either with the individual Moderator or another.

WRT either Russian or Ukrainian sources you cite, add a rider that they should be read / viewed with caution. We note that both sides of the conflict are very prolific in their propaganda. Also given the history of Russian and other nations control of their media and other politically biased media sources, we have not accepted the likes of TASS, RT, Peoples Daily, Global Times, Fox, Sky News Australia, The Sun etc., as reliable sources.
 
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