The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
UK Forces News item on Ukrainian claim for the world record longest range kill. It's a beast of a weapon and the ammo has a huge large powder charge and small round. Certainly would ruin someones day.

A look at the Ukrainian USVs.

A look at some Ukrainian battlefield technology. Ukrainian source so the usual caveats apply.

We talk about Russian draft dodgers, but this is an item on Ukrainian draft dodgers. Personally, I don't have any time for draft dodgers, but I do understand why Russians want to given that their govt started the war. However, I have absolutely no time for Ukrainian draft dodgers because their country is in an existential fight for its survival.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
If you have a problem how a post is moderated take it up via PM either with the individual Moderator or another.

PM sent.

WRT either Russian or Ukrainian sources you cite, add a rider that they should be read / viewed with caution. We note that both sides of the conflict are very prolific in their propaganda. Also given the history of Russian and other nations control of their media and other politically biased media sources, we have not accepted the likes of TASS, RT, Peoples Daily, Global Times, Fox, Sky News Australia, The Sun etc., as reliable sources.
Just wanted to point out something here in case others also have an issue with my sources or otherwise. And I think this important in general.

I do not post rubbish sources, as a rule (or I state that the source is/may be rubbish). I believe, for example, Kommersant is a reliable enough source and I stated here so previously. I did reference TASS 3 or 4 times here previously. One was a page or two ago talking about the alleged Armenian delivery of missiles to Ukraine and I specifically indicated that I could not find a better source for the information cited (if I was verse in Armenian, I am sure I would not have such an issue, but we are all limited with the language barriers when dealing with such circumstances). In that situation, however, I also provided the reasoning (my own), with outside references supporting my reasoning and the numbers I provided, indicating why the information is likely valid. That reasoning was also a very brief analysis of the relationship Armenia has with Russia which supported the conclusion that the “leaked info” (Armenia supplying Ukraine with Tochka missiles) was likely false. In my personal opinion, that post, along with the reference to TASS, made this place more informed on the subject matter. If someone believes otherwise or has better information or something I am not aware of to present, that would be great and we can have a reasonable discussion.

The other few times I cited TASS was likely for direct quotes of Putin’s speech, or other Russian politicians. In those cases, it doesn’t matter if it was TASS or Reuters. In fact, TASS would likely be the preferred choice in that case because it would be quoting the exact words the man said, not some (often wild) interpretation of those words. This is the basics of any research and just common sense, really.

Having said above, I rarely quote Kommersant as well because I would very much rather have a western source (that I find reliable) myself and provide such a source presenting the very information I found scrolling through Kommersant.

I have been reading Russian news since they became available on the internet, so I know a thing or two regarding their reliability. I also quoted Lenta here a few times. That one used to be a good outlet, but for the past few years (way before the war, so I guess many years now) the quality declined greatly. However, I would have zero hesitation providing it as a source for what the Russian media is saying about any particular event because that is likely the exact intent of the entire post. Such was the case, for example, with the train derailment in the tunnel a few days ago, for which I also later provided a link to a Kommersant article once I saw it and stated that this is a better source. I also usually provide the Google translate of the articles I cite rather than my own interpretation for three reasons: simply for the convenience of the reader, not to feed the clicks to the outlet, and I provide Google translate vs my own interpretation for consistency and “repeatability” in case others desired to verify it; I also make a separate note if the translation by Google is bad enough that it changes the meaning or some other issue.

I do not believe I had ever posted any of the other sources Ngatimozart mentioned in his post, unless they are hiding in the “etc”, haha (but I very much doubt). However, if circumstances were such that I ran into information provided by those sources that I thought was honest and relevant, I would not hesitate to use any of them. Most obvious examples of such circumstances would be Putin giving an interview to RIA Novosti, Trump giving an interview to Fox or Biden to CNN, other worthy individuals being interviewed by the Sun and it can be a scholar or someone else whose opinion is worthy of reading. This is as opposed to providing the same sources for a few quoted sentences spoken by the same individuals that were specifically presented to the readers in order to promote a certain narrative. Again, this is just common sense and I do not believe there is much confusion about it if any at all.

Nowadays (though it was always the case), pretty much anything reported by any news organization, no matter how reputable, should be taken with caution and application of common sense and critical thinking is a prerequisite to reading. But if we want to label all news outlets of any particular nation as not trustworthy and unreliable, we can do that too, officially. Most, if not all of us, likely have those markers for various nations in our minds to begin with anyway. However, not all of us followed any specific set of news agencies to know the actual difference.

To conclude this post, if anyone has issues with the information presented in my posts, I encourage you to explain what those issues are. This is how we learn and grow. If you think my source is not reliable or there are other issues with it, please speak up. Because I would do the same. To provide an example for the latter, see my reply to Vivendi’s (I think it was) post a couple of pages ago talking about some alleged Russian war crimes in regards to starvation of Ukraine by stealing the grain and oilseeds or some such: I showed with supporting facts why the article was rubbish to begin with and, again with supporting facts, why the allegations by the whatever organization were likely nonsense as well.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Here is another example. This is an outlet that I would never cite as a source of my info unless, such as this case, it quotes the entire chunk of Zelensky’s interview to a Ukrainian outlet. This is his latest take on retaking Donbas and Crimea, via Google translate, along with my comments:

President Vladimir Zelensky believes that liberating Crimea will be easier because there were no hostilities there, but de-occupation of Donbas will be more difficult due to 10 years of Russian power, the militarization of this territory and separatism.

Again with the delusion in regards to Crimea. Even more so if he is implying that it would be liberated with no hostilities. The area has also been militarized for centuries.

"It may happen that we return the territories before we return these people. It may be so. For example, if we take Donbas, people live there for 10 years, live in another space and this is a long process. It may be different. I think which is more difficult with Donbas.

My partners once told me: it will be almost impossible for you to return Crimea and very difficult to return Donbas. And in my opinion, if we are talking about people, the territories will still return with people, if people don’t want it, it will be very difficult...

And even now, when Russia is fighting against us, the toughest separatists are standing, the Russians are fleeing, but these are standing. This also says something. But there were no hostilities in Crimea, so I believe that Crimea is waiting for a return, Donbas is also waiting, but it will be very difficult, because most of this territory was occupied and militarized to the maximum.”



So he is admitting that people in Donbas do not want to return to Ukraine. He is also suggesting that it is the separatists who are giving the hardest fight and not the Russians. Yet, he is convinced that they are waiting for a return. He also has clearly never seen any polls in regards to the opinion of people in Crimea (I posted a couple here previously, I believe, and the lowest percentage of population with pro-Russian stance that I have seen is in the mid seventies). This delusion will surely kill many more people be they from Ukraine, Donbas, or Russia. But we/they have what we/they have.

At the same time, and here is another example and caution should surely be taken here (I have no idea who the pollster they are referring to is), but this is possibly the best numbers we have at the moment, via Google translate:

In November, Ukrainians were almost equally divided on how to end the war.

This is evidenced by the data of the "Rating" group survey.

In particular, 44% of respondents believe that it is necessary to look for a compromise solution in negotiations involving other countries. At the same time, another percent urged to agree to the requirements of the Russian Federation.

48% are in favor of abandoning negotiations and fighting before the liberation of territories. Last winter and summer, the number of supporters of this point of view was 60%.

There are more supporters of compromise among the younger age group - 18-35 years (45%) and in the east of the country (51%). Supporters of the continuation of the war - in the older group of 36-50 years and in the west of the country (50% each).



According to the article, the number of supporters of what is happening, ie keep on fighting, shrank by 20% since last winter. Even after the “lightning counteroffensive” the number still stood at 60%, as per the article.

Interestingly, though I am not entirely sure what they mean but they are implying that, only one percent are ready to accept the Russian demands. The article doesn’t indicate what the Russian demands actually are, so I am taking it as a complete capitulation. 44% are for the negations and compromise though, where again it is not stated what the expectations are from such process. So while not very informative, it does provide a bit of an insight into what the Ukrainians are thinking, given the poll has any validity to begin with.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
The WH says that funding for Ukraine will run out by the end of this year. Republicans in Congress are blocking an emergency request from Biden to support Ukraine, Israel and some countries in the Indo-Pacific. US funding for Ukraine set to run out by end of the year, White House warns

At the same time EU is struggling to reach an agreement on a EUR 50-billion package to Ukraine. However one EU official says the "doom and gloom" is exaggerated and they will not let Ukraine default. FT: €50 billion allocation to Ukraine is at risk due to EU budget disputes (yahoo.com)

I hope the politicians in Brussels and Washington are coming to their senses and realize this is not the time to play these political games. Ukraine must be supported in their existential fight.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
^ I would agree with the EU official about the exaggerated doom and gloom. I have little doubt that the funds for Ukraine will be approved in both, the USA and the EU, maybe late, but it will happen. Perhaps, the greatest doom and gloom, I think, is hitting those that were a little detached from reality prior.


There were a couple of great articles in WP providing some great detail of the preparation and execution of the latest counteroffensive. Those who can read the articles behind the paywall, I would strongly suggest doing so. Some of it is repetition of the stuff that was already reported previously, but goes into greater details, some of it is something I haven’t heard of before. I will provide very detailed summaries of both, starting here with the first.


The summary, post 1 of 2:

  • on June 15, Austin and other high rank Americans were “grilling” Reznikov about Ukraine’s decision-making in regards to not using mine-clearing equipment and smoke grandes to conceal their actions, suggesting that Kremlin troops weren’t invincible; Reznokov’s response was that landmine density and tank ambushes, along with Russian drones, helicopters, and artillery destroyed UA armour and did not allow for any maneuver.
  • Failure of the counteroffensive that was born in optimism is raising deeper questions regarding the Ukrainians’ ability to recapture any meaningful amount of land.
  • Most senior military officials in Ukraine acknowledge the conflict has reached a stalemate.
  • The article was written based on the interviews of more than 30 senior officials in Ukraine, US, and Europe.
  • 8 major tabletop war games were played by the Ukrainian, American, and British militaries to plan the counteroffensive, but the US overestimated how the UA forces could be transitioned into the western ways of warfare.
  • The US and Ukrainian brass disagreed on strategy, tactics, and timing: Americans wanted the counteroffensive to start mid-April, while Ukrainians deemed they weren’t ready.
  • The US officials were confident in the success of the full frontal attack with the equipment provided to UA and estimated the Azov Sea to be reached within 60-90 days.
  • The Americans insisted on the single axis attack, while Ukrainians opted for three: Melitopol, Berdyansk, and Bakhmut.
  • The US intel had more pessimistic prognosis, assessing that there was a 50/50 chance of the offensive being successful, citing Russian defences.
  • Russian abilities to defend were underestimated by all parties.
  • Ukrainians feared catastrophic losses, while Americans believed the losses would otherwise be significantly higher without the decisive frontal assault.
  • The current mood is much more depressing than it was at the beginning of the year and the outlook is many years of war and destruction is more likely than victory.
  • According to a British security official, if taking back territory (1991 borders) is at all possible, it would take years. Questions are being asked now that were asked here previously concerning manpower, economic implications, as well as the support of Western backers.
  • In the fall of 2022, Zaluzhny said to Austin he would need 1,000 armoured vehicles and 9 new brigades trained in Germany in order to succeed in the spring offensive; Lloyd didn’t think the requested equipment and training was necessarily possible to provide.
  • The Americans “squeezed the allies hard” to provide mechanized vehicles.
  • Each war simulation lasted several days, using specialized war-gaming software, simple spreadsheets, as well as old-fashioned piece moving on top of the map.
  • “There should be no Russian who goes to sleep without wondering if they’re going to get their throat slit in the middle of the night. You gotta get back there, and create a campaign behind the lines.” Mark Milley said to the UA special OP troops in his speech.
  • Ukrainians hoped to recreate success of the fall offensive, attacking 3 lines; as already mentioned, Americans believed they should concentrate all effort on cutting off the land supply line to Crimea and break to the Sea of Azov.
  • At several points in time, the Ukrainians were told “I know you really, really, really want to do this, but it’s not going to work,” according to a US official, but at the end of the day it was Zelensky, Zaluzhny, and other UA officials making the call.
  • As already mentioned, the most optimistic scenario was a frontal attack in Zaporozhie, reaching the Sea within 60-90 days and estimated losses of personnel and equipment were placed to be at 30 to 40 percent, but the losses were believed to reach much higher if turned into the war of attrition.
  • The Americans thought it was unwise to concentrate on Bakhmut, but Zelensky backed Zaluzhny’s reasoning that if they let up, Russians would be able to occupy some of the Kharkiv region and advance in Donetsk; on that end, they held more forces around Bakhmut than on the main axis south, as well most capable units.
  • Zaluzhny’s plan also included stretching the Russian forces, who they thought to have problems with morale, logistics, etc, over the entire frontline somehow expecting to gain an advantage that way.
  • At the end, Americans let them have things their way because they knew the terrain and it was their war.
  • On Feb 3, there was a meeting of “the top echelons of the State, Defense and Treasury departments, along with the CIA”, with the goal to discuss the Ukraine’s plan and express the support or reservations and reach a consensus before advising Biden.
  • Milley and Austin concluded that “Ukraine, to be successful, needed to fight a different way,” one senior administration official closely involved in the planning recalled.
  • A complete overhaul of the UA military was needed and the training (combined arms) that usually takes the US troops over a year was to be squeezed into a few months for the Ukrainian new brigades.
  • In early January, Biden announced delivery of Bradleys and UK of Challengers; later in the month a promise of Abrams was made followed by the hundreds of Leopards from the European guys.
  • The 155mm artillery rounds were a major problem with the Americans estimating the need of about 90,000 rounds per month, while the US production still sat at just over a tenth of that.
  • South Korea was seen as a potential donor of the shells, being able to supply estimated 330,000, but they were reluctant to do so directly (and their laws prohibited them of such actions); eventually, at the beginning of the year, they were convinced by the US and the shells started (indirectly) leaving for Ukraine, making South Korea a larger supplier of ammo than the entire EU.
  • An alternative to the South Korean shells was the cluster munitions, but the idea was put aside after Blinken’s strong objections.
  • The US intel’s pessimism (predicting a 50/50) frustrated the Pentagon and they reminded them that they also predicted Kiev folding within days of the Russian invasion.
  • “Part of it was just the fact of the sheer weight of the Russian military,” CIA Director William J. Burns later reflected in an interview. “For all their incompetence in the first year of the war, they had managed to launch a shambolic partial mobilization to fill a lot of the gaps in the front. In Zaporizhzhia” — the key line of the counteroffensive if the land bridge was to be severed — “we could see them building really quite formidable fixed defenses, hard to penetrate, really costly, really bloody for the Ukrainians.”
  • Two weeks after Biden was briefed, the US intel released an updated top secret report that concluded that Kiev “would probably fall “well short” of its counteroffensive goals”.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
The summary, post 2 of 2:

  • By the early 2023, the US military officials knew that 130,000 UA troops were killed or wounded; at the same time, estimated losses of the RU forces comprised of 200,000 killed and wounded. To note here, the article specifically says “knew” in regard to the UA losses, while uses the word “estimated” when talking about the Russian losses - wether it actually means anything as far the numbers go, I do not know.
  • Both sides now lacked experienced troops, but, while some in the UA command expressed doubts about the counteroffensive, the Americans assessed that “The plan that they executed was entirely feasible with the force that they had, on the timeline that we planned out.” They also didn’t believe that the Russians have enough resources to defend the entire line of conflict.
  • The article then talks about the Russian defense lines that had already been talked about numerous times here and elsewhere, so I will not go into details. Basically they are saying while the lines were fairly primitive in the beginning, they were improved and perfected before the Ukrainians finally moved in. Unlike Russia’s offensive efforts early in the war, these defenses followed textbook Soviet standards. “This is one case where they have implemented their doctrine,” a senior Western intelligence official said.
  • As per one former officer of the RU forces who bailed, “Putin’s army is experiencing shortages of various arms, but can literally swim in mines,” Yefremov said in an interview after fleeing to the West. “They have millions of them, both antitank and antipersonnel mines.”
  • Some unsubstantiated talk about the “blocking units behind the Russian troops to prevent them from retreating” referencing the same unsubstantiated sources that was also discussed at length here previously.
  • The Americans thought it was crucial that the Ukrainians start the counteroffensive in April, while Zelensky insisted they weren’t ready, estimating preparedness at 80-85% by the end of the month.
  • Kiev also insisted that that they lacked equipment and weapons; the British provided Storm Shadow missiles in May.
  • The demands for the F-16 were turned down on the basis of their cost - a lot more urgent equipment and ammunition could be supplied instead, including air defences - as well as the concern over the Russian AD system. As one senior official put it, “If you could train a bunch of F-16 pilots in three months, they would have got shot down on day one, because the Russian air defenses in Ukraine are very robust and very capable.”
  • Kiev was hesitating, frustrating the western backers, and kept providing different dates of the “d-day”; pressures grew.
  • A senior UA official suggested that they only received 15% of the promised MCLCs and lots of provided equipment was unfit for combat.
  • Response from the Americans was that while the list of the UA wishes may have been longer, but “by the time the offensive began, they had received nearly two dozen MCLCs, more than 40 mine rollers and excavators, 1,000 Bangalore torpedoes, and more than 80,000 smoke grenades. Zaluzhny had requested 1,000 armored vehicles; the Pentagon ultimately delivered 1,500.”
  • As for the equipment the Ukrainians deemed to be unfit for combat, the Pentagon concluded that the UA forces simply failed to properly handle and maintain the equipment after it was received and directed to provide some further help in that department.
  • By June 1, the frustrated Americans were asking questions, but weren’t getting any answers.
  • When the counteroffensive finally began in the beginning of June, a very quick run into the reality check took place.

There is another article, a part two, that I will try to summarize tomorrow. The first went into details about the planning, the second goes now into the execution.
 

T.C.P

Well-Known Member
The summary, post 2 of 2:

  • By the early 2023, the US military officials knew that 130,000 UA troops were killed or wounded; at the same time, estimated losses of the RU forces comprised of 200,000 killed and wounded. To note here, the article specifically says “knew” in regard to the UA losses, while uses the word “estimated” when talking about the Russian losses - wether it actually means anything as far the numbers go, I do not know.
  • Both sides now lacked experienced troops, but, while some in the UA command expressed doubts about the counteroffensive, the Americans assessed that “The plan that they executed was entirely feasible with the force that they had, on the timeline that we planned out.” They also didn’t believe that the Russians have enough resources to defend the entire line of conflict.
  • The article then talks about the Russian defense lines that had already been talked about numerous times here and elsewhere, so I will not go into details. Basically they are saying while the lines were fairly primitive in the beginning, they were improved and perfected before the Ukrainians finally moved in. Unlike Russia’s offensive efforts early in the war, these defenses followed textbook Soviet standards. “This is one case where they have implemented their doctrine,” a senior Western intelligence official said.
  • As per one former officer of the RU forces who bailed, “Putin’s army is experiencing shortages of various arms, but can literally swim in mines,” Yefremov said in an interview after fleeing to the West. “They have millions of them, both antitank and antipersonnel mines.”
  • Some unsubstantiated talk about the “blocking units behind the Russian troops to prevent them from retreating” referencing the same unsubstantiated sources that was also discussed at length here previously.
  • The Americans thought it was crucial that the Ukrainians start the counteroffensive in April, while Zelensky insisted they weren’t ready, estimating preparedness at 80-85% by the end of the month.
  • Kiev also insisted that that they lacked equipment and weapons; the British provided Storm Shadow missiles in May.
  • The demands for the F-16 were turned down on the basis of their cost - a lot more urgent equipment and ammunition could be supplied instead, including air defences - as well as the concern over the Russian AD system. As one senior official put it, “If you could train a bunch of F-16 pilots in three months, they would have got shot down on day one, because the Russian air defenses in Ukraine are very robust and very capable.”
  • Kiev was hesitating, frustrating the western backers, and kept providing different dates of the “d-day”; pressures grew.
  • A senior UA official suggested that they only received 15% of the promised MCLCs and lots of provided equipment was unfit for combat.
  • Response from the Americans was that while the list of the UA wishes may have been longer, but “by the time the offensive began, they had received nearly two dozen MCLCs, more than 40 mine rollers and excavators, 1,000 Bangalore torpedoes, and more than 80,000 smoke grenades. Zaluzhny had requested 1,000 armored vehicles; the Pentagon ultimately delivered 1,500.”
  • As for the equipment the Ukrainians deemed to be unfit for combat, the Pentagon concluded that the UA forces simply failed to properly handle and maintain the equipment after it was received and directed to provide some further help in that department.
  • By June 1, the frustrated Americans were asking questions, but weren’t getting any answers.
  • When the counteroffensive finally began in the beginning of June, a very quick run into the reality check took place.

There is another article, a part two, that I will try to summarize tomorrow. The first went into details about the planning, the second goes now into the execution.
I have the archived versions of the two articlees, to get past paywalls-



Will delete if this is not allowed

In other VVK news. Su-34s can now carry 4 Fab-500s and possibly 6, previously the limit was 2, so this is quite a leap. If the VVk can now drop double the UPMKs on a single sortie, this should help reduce the exhaustion of their airframes.Note as per fighterbomber the FAb-1500 is limited to 3 per aircraft.
On UPMKs-


A good analysis of their development by Tom cooper. I recommend you give this a read. I did not know about Russia's lack of retarded fuses. He also mentions how the angle of the FAB reduces their impact on fortifications.

Tom cooper mentions in the article that as of last month, UKr sources believe that the accuracy of the UPMK is between 200-300 metres, Russians claim 3-5 metres. But he admits that the UPMK is ever improving, and that the newer batches are much better than the older ones and even have jamming resistant chips in them now.

The Russians are now dropping around 1000 FABs a month now, and the impact is being felt. If the rate keeps on increasing and the accuracy keeps on improving, its becoming worrisome for the Ukranians as they still have no counter measure for this.

Also note- SU-24s are now capable of carrying UPMK glidebombs, so the number of available airframes for such missions is pretty high for the VVK.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Will delete if this is not allowed
If allowed, that would sure save me some great amount of time, haha. It takes a while to write up a detailed summary and only include a few quotes rather than copying and pasting the entire article, which is a no go.

But those are great reads.
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
A good analysis of their development by Tom cooper. I recommend you give this a read. I did not know about Russia's lack of retarded fuses. He also mentions how the angle of the FAB reduces their impact on fortifications.

Tom cooper mentions in the article that as of last month, UKr sources believe that the accuracy of the UPMK is between 200-300 metres, Russians claim 3-5 metres. But he admits that the UPMK is ever improving, and that the newer batches are much better than the older ones and even have jamming resistant chips in them now.

The Russians are now dropping around 1000 FABs a month now, and the impact is being felt. If the rate keeps on increasing and the accuracy keeps on improving, its becoming worrisome for the Ukranians as they still have no counter measure for this.

Also note- SU-24s are now capable of carrying UPMK glidebombs, so the number of available airframes for such missions is pretty high for the VVK.
Do we know:
  1. How many FAB-500 are in stock?
  2. How many are reasonably useful?
  3. How many Russia produces per month?
Russia's ability to keep dropping FABs is not unlimited. Ukraine managed a few AA ambushes and may yet free up some anti air assets for longer range engagement for frontline action. In their current form, FABs don't have a particularly long range and require a significant drop altitude.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Do we know:
  1. How many FAB-500 are in stock?
  2. How many are reasonably useful?
  3. How many Russia produces per month?
Russia's ability to keep dropping FABs is not unlimited. Ukraine managed a few AA ambushes and may yet free up some anti air assets for longer range engagement for frontline action. In their current form, FABs don't have a particularly long range and require a significant drop altitude.
Those are certainly good questions to which I haven't seen any definitive answers. Here's my view on it. Russia definitely produces FABs of all varieties, and it's a munition from iirc the '50s. So in principle stockpiles should be absurdly large. But there's that pesky word "should". And of course we don't know what condition they're in. I think it's likely Russia can expand production of a simple bomb from the '50s to levels of hundreds if not thousands of bombs per month. At the end of the day it's not that complex of a munition. I wouldn't count on Russia running out of bombs or jets any time soon.
 

T.C.P

Well-Known Member
Do we know:
  1. How many FAB-500 are in stock?
  2. How many are reasonably useful?
  3. How many Russia produces per month?
Russia's ability to keep dropping FABs is not unlimited. Ukraine managed a few AA ambushes and may yet free up some anti air assets for longer range engagement for frontline action. In their current form, FABs don't have a particularly long range and require a significant drop altitude.
I have no idea about the number of fab-500s in stock, but since they have been produced for decades I would assume that the number is substantial. Whether older stock are still usable, you will know better than me. I have no military experience and don't know how long a dumb bomb lasts in storage. I remember last year there were raids in Karkiv with a lot of unexploded Fab-500s. This year the percentage of unexploded bombs seems to have decreased(from the evidence we have so far).

But all the Ukraine and Russian sources so far seem to indicate that 1000 Fabs a month is doable for Russia without putting a strain on the stock. The limitation is the UPMK kit numbers.

As for range, the numbers are still very fuzzy. Russian sources claim as much as 80km, Ukraine says around 40-50km.The UPMKs until recenty were almost artisinally built, so the discrepancy in numbers is not surprising. Now that they are in standardized production, we can get an answer on their range after a couple months of usage.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I have no idea about the number of fab-500s in stock, but since they have been produced for decades I would assume that the number is substantial. Whether older stock are still usable, you will know better than me. I have no military experience and don't know how long a dumb bomb lasts in storage. I remember last year there were raids in Karkiv with a lot of unexploded Fab-500s. This year the percentage of unexploded bombs seems to have decreased(from the evidence we have so far).

But all the Ukraine and Russian sources so far seem to indicate that 1000 Fabs a month is doable for Russia without putting a strain on the stock. The limitation is the UPMK kit numbers.

As for range, the numbers are still very fuzzy. Russian sources claim as much as 80km, Ukraine says around 40-50km.The UPMKs until recenty were almost artisinally built, so the discrepancy in numbers is not surprising. Now that they are in standardized production, we can get an answer on their range after a couple months of usage.
The UPMK isn't really even a single kit, there appear to be multiple versions of it with differences in the manufacturing process. It also gets applied to bombs from 250 to 1500 kg in scale so those factors probably matter too.
 

Larry_L

Active Member
Dueling Polls. As usual different poll's say different things. Support for Ukraine partially hinges on what people in the world think is happening. I would like to believe that the US, and NATO, among others will continue funding throughout the next year. It looks like the US defense department is firmly behind the effort. Air defense currently appears to be a priority among the coalition.





Russia has been keeping their aircraft far enough away from air defense. If this is true Ukraine may have installed a new system or several in the Odessa direction. Ukraine reports downing a SU-24 over the black sea.



 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Dueling Polls. As usual different poll's say different things. Support for Ukraine partially hinges on what people in the world think is happening. I would like to believe that the US, and NATO, among others will continue funding throughout the next year. It looks like the US defense department is firmly behind the effort. Air defense currently appears to be a priority among the coalition.





Russia has been keeping their aircraft far enough away from air defense. If this is true Ukraine may have installed a new system or several in the Odessa direction. Ukraine reports downing a SU-24 over the black sea.



Russian sources confirm the loss of the Su-24. Speculation is that it may have been attempting to drop longer ranged munitions on Odessa. Though it's also possible it got ambushed by Ukrainian SAMs.
 

Ananda

The Bunker Group

Pro Russian X account shown Russian TV coverage of one Ukrainian Bradley that according to them still relatively new and in good condition. Timing seems being use to emphasise Ukrainian counteroffensive failures.

Some Pro Russian telegram already speculating how they are going to trap Ukrainian M1 if they are begin to be send in to the front. Well Ukrainian say they will get latest T-90M, and Russian say they will get M1. Just another day of one side propaganda being counter by the other side.


In the meantime Putin begin his International visit to UAE and later on to Saudi. Clearly want to shown the West he is not isolated as West hope he is to be. At least Global South inculding in ME still engage with him.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Ilya Kiva, ex-lawmaker in Ukraine who “switched sides” when the war began, found dead in the Moscow region. I would think another “liquidation” by the UA.


Edit: It appears there some kind of confirmation that the SBU killed the guy.

 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Oskol Front.


Russian forces seem firmly insinde the village of Sin'kovka despite some Ukrainian counterattacks, though they only hold the northern outskirts. Even with Sin'kovka taken of cousre this won't set the stage for assaulting Kupyansk. That will require much more significant advances. Russian forces are also continuing incremental advances further east. There are no significant population centers there.


Russia destroying a pontoon bridge near Kupyansk. Note the pontoon bridge is near the destroyed actual bridge. These strikes are meaningful and make Ukrainian supply lines more precarious but this doesn't have nearly the impact it would with a larger river.


Near Terny positional fighting is continuing distinguished by the loss of the first Leopard 1 in action. Considering their drastically inadequate armor, this is no surprise.


Ukrainian Leopard 1 in Kharkov region.


Artemovsk/Bakhmut.

It appears Ukraine's counteroffensive at Artemovsk/Bakhmut is over and Russian forces are now on the offensive. Russian forces have reportedly taken Khromovo, a small village practically a western suburb of Artemovsk/Bakhmut. Note this was the major remaining Ukrainian supply line into the town while the fighting was ongoing though of course it has no such significance now. Note though this is an area Russia had never previously taken. Additionally Russian forces are advancing towards Bogdanovka, west of the town. Lastly in the south Russian forces have recaptured a tactically significant hill west-north-west of Klescheevka, likely as a prelude to retaking the village. Looking at the map the next likely target is Krasnoe, with an eventual push towards Chasov Yar, though that's probably a ways off.


Footage has appeared on Russia social media allegedly of the assault of Khromovo. However I believe the footage is staged. There are two shots of what appears to be corpses at the end but its hard to tell.


Avdeevka.

Russia is continuing to push on the flanks of the open Avdeevka pocket. They are pushing in the forest line south of Stepovoe presumably due to heavy resistance in the town. They're also still inching towards Novokalinovo. Presumably the plan is to take it and then push on Ocheretino. Rybar is also reporting Russian advances around Severnoe, but there is a distinct lack of corroboration from other sources.


It appears Russia has finally managed to haul away a knocked out Bradley, and with ERA too. It was almost certainly lost by the 47th Bde in recent fighting near Avdeevka. Reportedly Russia's first attempt to recover it went poorly with the ARV getting knocked out on a land mine wounding the driver, though later recovered. They then came in with two ARVs using poor weather as cover.


Russian forces gaining ground in the Avdeevka industrial park, in the south-east. Russia has captured either all or most of it. Note the advance here broke through some of Ukraine's strongest defenses, likely left under-supported due to the fighting being focused north and west near the opening of the pocket.


A Russian BTR-82A knocked out west of the rail berm. This is the first penetration of Russian vehicles there.


A Bradley gets hit, and munitions detonate. Overall these IFVs have shown themselves well but aren't a game changer at this point. It's possible larger quantities could make a bigger difference.


Russian MBT in Stepovoe (T-90M maybe from the turret shape) encounters a couple of Ukrainian tanks and falls back under fire, gets hit by an FPV drone but keeps moving.


Russian Su-25 operations near Avdeevka.


Russian forces using an unmanned tracked platform for resupply through a dangerous area.


Ukrainian forces got a MaxxPro and a Bradley into the underground at the Avdeevka chemical plant but it got hit by a Izd. 305 strike.


Donetsk Area.

Russian forces have made another incremental jump in Mar'inka, pushing through to the edge of town on the southern flank. This was accompanied by premature announcements of the town being taken. The north-western outskirt is under Ukrainian control. However unless something changes, it's only a matter of time before it's also taken. It's unclear what future goals are though there have been some Russian movements towards Novomihailovka, so that might be the next effort.


Near Novomihailovka Russia lost a T-80 and a MT-LB. Both are modified with anti-UAV EW.


Zaporozhye.

Russia has reportedly began counter-attacking in the Rabotino salient. It remains to be seen whether this is anything significant but overall Ukraine is shifting to a strategic defensive posture so it's possible this is something.


Ukraine allegedly struck a hospital in Tokmak. It's possible this was being used as a military hospital. Ukraine has struck those before.


Russian forces in Zaporozhye are reporting significantly reduced Ukrainian artillery fires. They're speculating ammo shortages but it could just as easily be that the units that were doing the firing are headed to Avdeevka or elsewhere.

 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Kherson Front.

Russia taking out 2 ST-68 radars, a 5I57 mobile power station, and a P-18 radar on the other side of the Dnepr. Russia has been regularly striking radars and air defenses in this area.


Russian counter-battery efforts near Krynki continue.


Reportedly Russia downed a Ukrainian Mi-8 near Tyaginki. This dovetails with reports that Ukraine was using one for rocket strikes in the area.


A couple of Russian Desertcross buggies knocked out near Krynki.


Aerial footage of the ruins of Krynki.


It appears Ukraine managed to get a bandwagn 206 across to the left shore of the Dnepr where they're using it as a CASEVAC.


Russia did another lancet strike on the Dolgintsevo airfield where they hit either an Su-25 or a very convincing mockup.


A shocking Russian erzats MLRS carrying a depth charge launcher on a truck bed.


Other interesting tidbits.

Another new Lancet variant striking a rare Dana howitzer.


A video from BARS 11 showing a Russian T-80 with a roof cage getting hit by an FPV drone, on the roof cage, and shrugging it off.


First use and first loss of new Russian Plastun-SN tracked all terrain vehicles confirmed in Ukraine. It's unclear if it's really in service and mass production is coming or just a few were purchased because something is better then nothing.


An extremely rare Ukrainian BMP-1TS getting taken out by a Russian FPV drone.


Russian use of guided submunitions continue, here we can see one striking a moving car. Presumably this is a front line area and it's a civilian car being used by Ukrainian forces, but of course there's no way to tell from this footage.


Russian cross border raids in the north continue with the occasional footage surfacing. The first two are allegedly Chernigov region, the 3-4th are Sumy. Warning footage of corpses.


Ukrainian Gepard crew shows off a downed black Geranium (Russian domestic Shahed clone).


One of the Geraniums used in the recent strikes on Kiev had a Ukrainian SIM card taped to it, and hooked up, presumably to use the Ukrainian cell grid to direct the munition.


There are unconfirmed reports that Ukraine has begun using their own Shahed equivalents.


A rare Ukrainian HVM Stormer with additional armor. It's unclear how many vehicles are left active but several were lost.


An unseen MT-LB variant, carrying the Tunguska combat module. It's likely due to damage to the chassis with plenty of MT-LBs available while the GM MTZ chassis is relatively rare. Interestingly enough one of the commenters speculates that this is actually a KDHR-1N Dal' chemical recon vehicle.


Russian GABTU directions on mounting roof cages and additional armor on various vehicle types. The design of these roof cages is clearly meant against drones, not against any top-attack ATGMs.


A new type of roof cage on a T-90M.


A Russian T-62 chassis with what appears to be a T-90M turret. Note the turret ring for T-62s and everything after is the same size.


An interesting improvised thermal sight for a BTR-(80? 70?). Reportedly it was tested successfully.


DP-27s captured from Ukrainian soldiers. The mix of old and new continues.


Russian Marines BTR-82AT near Ugledar.


Russian Desertcross buggy with an improvised machinegun turret.


Russian infantry near Ugledar has been spotted using strange shells to close with Ukrainian positions. Allegedly they don't show up in thermals. It's possible these are armored but they could also be just camouflage.


Russian 2M-3M MT-LBs now with roof cages.


Russian harbor defenses in Sevastopol' were damaged by the recent storm, but they appear to have been repaired.


Russia has started employing jammers that prevent satellite radar from scanning sensitive areas like Sevastopol'. This of course doesn't prevent regular optical satellites.


Russian MiG-35s were allegedly used in Ukraine. Confirmation is lacking and my suspicion is they either flew a defense CAP, or dropped standoff munitions from a safe distance.

 
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