Yes the actual url. Precisely for the reason that people don't have to copy and search.
The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread
- Thread starter Feanor
- Start date
Interesting interview with a UK specialist in NBC (Nuclear, Chemical & Biological) warfare. He's discussing the possible nuclear fallout result if the Russians destroy all, or part of the Zaporizhzhia NPP.
Ukrainian update.
ISW update 1/2.
www.understandingwar.org
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four sectors of the frontline on July 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the Bakhmut area and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces made marginal gains near Rozdolivka (18km north of Bakhmut) and unspecified gains near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[2] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts and made gains southwest of Velyka Novosilka.[3] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations south and southwest of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast, with one milblogger claiming that Ukrainian forces made gains up 1.5km deep and 6km wide in the direction of Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv).[4] Other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are still at least 1.5km north of Robotyne as of July 1, consistent with ISW’s current assessment of the control of terrain in the area.[5]
US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley acknowledged that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations will take longer than some Western observers had expected. Milley stated that Ukrainian forces are deliberately working through difficult minefields and advancing from 500m to 2,000m a day.[6] Milley reiterated that he expects Ukrainian counteroffensive operations to last up to 10 weeks and urged people to realize that the Ukrainian counteroffensive will be a long and likely costly operation.[7] Russian sources are increasingly claiming that Ukrainian forces are currently conducting assaults in southern Ukraine with smaller infantry groups and fewer armored vehicles than during earlier counteroffensive operations.[8] Russian sources also claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations in southern Ukraine in even smaller groups, some of them allegedly with seven to nine personnel.[9] These claims about Ukrainian operations suggest that Ukrainian forces are not currently attempting the kind of large-scale operations that would result in rapid territorial advances. Ukrainian officials have routinely indicated that Ukrainian forces have yet to commit a substantial portion of their forces to counteroffensive operations and have yet to launch the main phase of the counteroffensive.[10]
Russian officials and sources celebrated claims that Russian forces defeated small-scale Ukrainian landings in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on July 1 as if they had won a major victory. Kherson Oblast Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo claimed that servicemen of the Russian “Dnepr” Group of Forces cleared areas near the Antonivsky Bridge on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River after special forces elements conducted a surprise landing on Ukrainian forces’ rear positions overnight.[11] Saldo claimed that elements of a “Storm” detachment, the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet), the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps, Black Sea Fleet), the 127th Reserve Brigade (likely a new reserve unit), and the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District [SMD]) participated in the operation that decisively repelled Ukrainian forces from their position near Antonivsky Bridge. Saldo also claimed that Ukrainian forces no longer have any “bridgeheads” on the eastern bank, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces were able to advance to the dacha areas near the Antonivsky Bridge after launching an Iskander ballistic missile at the bridge on June 30.[12] A Crimean-based Russian blogger also claimed that elements of the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault (VDV) Division using T-72 tanks also participated in an attack against Ukrainian positions near the Antonivsky Bridge.[13] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces eliminated a Ukrainian sabotage group that attempted to land on the island north of Oleshky (9km southeast of Kherson City) - likely referring to the Antonivsky Bridge area.[14] The Russian MoD also demonstratively awarded servicemen of the 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) - a unit within the Russian “Dnepr” Group of Forces - for destroying Ukrainian military equipment in Kherson Oblast.[15] The Russian MoD also published an interview with the commander of the 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade who claimed that Russian forces fully restored their positions along the coast of the Dnipro River and along the islands and repelled all Ukrainian attempts to cross the river.[16] Russian sources notably did not provide any evidence that Russian forces regained control over coastal areas and many Russian sources reported that clearing operations near the dacha areas adjacent to the Antonivsky Bridge are still ongoing as of July 1.[17]
The exaggerated Russian praise for defeating a small Ukrainian landing suggests either that the Russian military command sincerely fears a Ukrainian attack on east bank Kherson Oblast or that it is desperate for an informational victory following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion or both. Russian sources previously claimed that a grouping of around 70 Ukrainian servicemen held positions near the Antonivsky Bridge and that the Russian “Dnepr” Group of Forces’ military command had been consistently ordering Russian forces to eliminate the Ukrainian “bridgehead” despite significant personnel and equipment losses.[18] The Russian “Dnepr” Group of Forces is reportedly headquartered in Rostov-on-Don likely within the SMD headquarters.[19] Wagner forces notably surrounded the SMD headquarters during the armed rebellion on June 24, and the Russian MoD is likely trying to recover the headquarters' reputation. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also expressed concern that Ukrainian forces will continue to conduct small unit sorties across the Dnipro River and will launch a large-scale attack to reach Oleshky to break through to southwestern Kherson Oblast.[20] ISW makes no effort to forecast Ukrainian operations, but the milblogger’s statements suggest that the Russian military command may be increasingly concerned over a potential Ukrainian landing on east bank Kherson Oblast.
Russian forces are likely responding to Ukrainian operations around Bakhmut by pulling forces from elsewhere in Ukraine. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on July 1 that Russian forces recently transferred an unspecified Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) regiment from the Lyman direction (the area west of Kreminna) to the Bakhmut direction.[21] Geolocated footage published on June 30 shows the 137th Guards Airborne Regiment (106th Airborne Division) operating south of Rozdolivka (18km north of Bakhmut).[22] A Russian milblogger also claimed that elements of the 98th VDV Division are now operating in the Bakhmut direction.[23] ISW has previously observed elements of the 237th Air Assault Regiment (76th VDV Division) and the 331st Airborne Regiment (98th VDV Division) operating in the Lyman direction, although ISW has not seen any visual confirmation of elements of either formation near Bakhmut recently.[24] Cherevaty reported that Russian forces replaced the VDV regiment in the Lyman direction with unspecified territorial defense forces, indicating that Russian forces may be redeploying more elite units to the Bakhmut area and replacing the elite units with inferior formations.[25] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar previously stated that Russian forces transferred some of their most-combat capable units from the Kherson direction to the Bakhmut and Zaporizhia directions in the week following the start of Ukrainian counteroffensives on June 4.[26] Cherevaty stated that Bakhmut continues to offer Russian forces more propaganda value than military benefits and suggested that Russian forces may be concentrating elite forces in the Bakhmut area to preserve the perceived informational victory resulting from the capture of Bakhmut on May 21.[27] If Russian reinforcements already sent to Bakhmut are insufficient to hold Russian gains in the area the Russian command may face difficult choices about whether to risk creating serious vulnerabilities in Kherson or Luhansk oblasts or to begin drawing forces away from southern Ukraine.
Ukrainian update.
ISW update 1/2.
Institute for the Study of War
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four sectors of the frontline on July 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the Bakhmut area and
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least four sectors of the frontline on July 1. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian assaults in the Bakhmut area and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.[1] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces made marginal gains near Rozdolivka (18km north of Bakhmut) and unspecified gains near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[2] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts and made gains southwest of Velyka Novosilka.[3] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations south and southwest of Orikhiv in western Zaporizhia Oblast, with one milblogger claiming that Ukrainian forces made gains up 1.5km deep and 6km wide in the direction of Robotyne (12km south of Orikhiv).[4] Other milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are still at least 1.5km north of Robotyne as of July 1, consistent with ISW’s current assessment of the control of terrain in the area.[5]
US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley acknowledged that Ukrainian counteroffensive operations will take longer than some Western observers had expected. Milley stated that Ukrainian forces are deliberately working through difficult minefields and advancing from 500m to 2,000m a day.[6] Milley reiterated that he expects Ukrainian counteroffensive operations to last up to 10 weeks and urged people to realize that the Ukrainian counteroffensive will be a long and likely costly operation.[7] Russian sources are increasingly claiming that Ukrainian forces are currently conducting assaults in southern Ukraine with smaller infantry groups and fewer armored vehicles than during earlier counteroffensive operations.[8] Russian sources also claim that Ukrainian forces are conducting reconnaissance-in-force operations in southern Ukraine in even smaller groups, some of them allegedly with seven to nine personnel.[9] These claims about Ukrainian operations suggest that Ukrainian forces are not currently attempting the kind of large-scale operations that would result in rapid territorial advances. Ukrainian officials have routinely indicated that Ukrainian forces have yet to commit a substantial portion of their forces to counteroffensive operations and have yet to launch the main phase of the counteroffensive.[10]
Russian officials and sources celebrated claims that Russian forces defeated small-scale Ukrainian landings in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast on July 1 as if they had won a major victory. Kherson Oblast Occupation Head Vladimir Saldo claimed that servicemen of the Russian “Dnepr” Group of Forces cleared areas near the Antonivsky Bridge on the eastern bank of the Dnipro River after special forces elements conducted a surprise landing on Ukrainian forces’ rear positions overnight.[11] Saldo claimed that elements of a “Storm” detachment, the 61st Naval Infantry Brigade (Northern Fleet), the 126th Coastal Defense Brigade (22nd Army Corps, Black Sea Fleet), the 127th Reserve Brigade (likely a new reserve unit), and the 205th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (49th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District [SMD]) participated in the operation that decisively repelled Ukrainian forces from their position near Antonivsky Bridge. Saldo also claimed that Ukrainian forces no longer have any “bridgeheads” on the eastern bank, and a Kremlin-affiliated milblogger claimed that Russian forces were able to advance to the dacha areas near the Antonivsky Bridge after launching an Iskander ballistic missile at the bridge on June 30.[12] A Crimean-based Russian blogger also claimed that elements of the 7th Guards Mountain Air Assault (VDV) Division using T-72 tanks also participated in an attack against Ukrainian positions near the Antonivsky Bridge.[13] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces eliminated a Ukrainian sabotage group that attempted to land on the island north of Oleshky (9km southeast of Kherson City) - likely referring to the Antonivsky Bridge area.[14] The Russian MoD also demonstratively awarded servicemen of the 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade (14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) - a unit within the Russian “Dnepr” Group of Forces - for destroying Ukrainian military equipment in Kherson Oblast.[15] The Russian MoD also published an interview with the commander of the 80th Arctic Motorized Rifle Brigade who claimed that Russian forces fully restored their positions along the coast of the Dnipro River and along the islands and repelled all Ukrainian attempts to cross the river.[16] Russian sources notably did not provide any evidence that Russian forces regained control over coastal areas and many Russian sources reported that clearing operations near the dacha areas adjacent to the Antonivsky Bridge are still ongoing as of July 1.[17]
The exaggerated Russian praise for defeating a small Ukrainian landing suggests either that the Russian military command sincerely fears a Ukrainian attack on east bank Kherson Oblast or that it is desperate for an informational victory following the Wagner Group’s armed rebellion or both. Russian sources previously claimed that a grouping of around 70 Ukrainian servicemen held positions near the Antonivsky Bridge and that the Russian “Dnepr” Group of Forces’ military command had been consistently ordering Russian forces to eliminate the Ukrainian “bridgehead” despite significant personnel and equipment losses.[18] The Russian “Dnepr” Group of Forces is reportedly headquartered in Rostov-on-Don likely within the SMD headquarters.[19] Wagner forces notably surrounded the SMD headquarters during the armed rebellion on June 24, and the Russian MoD is likely trying to recover the headquarters' reputation. A Kremlin-affiliated milblogger also expressed concern that Ukrainian forces will continue to conduct small unit sorties across the Dnipro River and will launch a large-scale attack to reach Oleshky to break through to southwestern Kherson Oblast.[20] ISW makes no effort to forecast Ukrainian operations, but the milblogger’s statements suggest that the Russian military command may be increasingly concerned over a potential Ukrainian landing on east bank Kherson Oblast.
Russian forces are likely responding to Ukrainian operations around Bakhmut by pulling forces from elsewhere in Ukraine. Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported on July 1 that Russian forces recently transferred an unspecified Russian Airborne Forces (VDV) regiment from the Lyman direction (the area west of Kreminna) to the Bakhmut direction.[21] Geolocated footage published on June 30 shows the 137th Guards Airborne Regiment (106th Airborne Division) operating south of Rozdolivka (18km north of Bakhmut).[22] A Russian milblogger also claimed that elements of the 98th VDV Division are now operating in the Bakhmut direction.[23] ISW has previously observed elements of the 237th Air Assault Regiment (76th VDV Division) and the 331st Airborne Regiment (98th VDV Division) operating in the Lyman direction, although ISW has not seen any visual confirmation of elements of either formation near Bakhmut recently.[24] Cherevaty reported that Russian forces replaced the VDV regiment in the Lyman direction with unspecified territorial defense forces, indicating that Russian forces may be redeploying more elite units to the Bakhmut area and replacing the elite units with inferior formations.[25] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar previously stated that Russian forces transferred some of their most-combat capable units from the Kherson direction to the Bakhmut and Zaporizhia directions in the week following the start of Ukrainian counteroffensives on June 4.[26] Cherevaty stated that Bakhmut continues to offer Russian forces more propaganda value than military benefits and suggested that Russian forces may be concentrating elite forces in the Bakhmut area to preserve the perceived informational victory resulting from the capture of Bakhmut on May 21.[27] If Russian reinforcements already sent to Bakhmut are insufficient to hold Russian gains in the area the Russian command may face difficult choices about whether to risk creating serious vulnerabilities in Kherson or Luhansk oblasts or to begin drawing forces away from southern Ukraine.
ISW Update 2/2.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russians might initiate an intentional radioactive leak at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) as part of a potential Russian strategy to freeze the war. Zelensky stated in an interview with Spanish news outlet El Mundo published on June 30 that Russian forces may attempt to remotely detonate the ZNPP if Ukrainian authorities are able to pass control of the ZNPP to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[28] Zelensky stated that Russian forces may cause a radiological incident to halt maneuver warfare and buy more time for Russia to recruit more personnel and produce more military equipment.[29] Zelensky also reported that about 5,000 Russian forces remain at the ZNPP with military equipment. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains unlikely to cause a radiological incident at the ZNPP since Russia would not be able to control the impacts of the incident, which would degrade Russia’s ability to operate and govern in occupied southern Ukraine.[30] Russian forces could conduct various possible man-made radiological incidents at varying levels of severity; however, ISW continues to assess that the consequences of a Russian radiological incident would outweigh any benefit for Russian forces at this time.[31] Russia is likely continuing to use the threat of a radiological incident to constrain Ukrainian counteroffensive actions and degrade Western military assistance support for Ukraine.
Russian propagandists are likely conducting an information campaign to destroy the Wagner Group’s reputation as a uniquely effective fighting force in support of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) effort to dismantle the Wagner Group and integrate former Wagner fighters into MoD structures. Russian state TV channel Rossiya-1 aired a segment on June 30 trivializing the Wagner Group’s effectiveness in Ukraine, calling into question the “constructed myth about the Wagner Group’s [high level of] effectiveness.”[32] The segment implied that there is a popular misconception in Russia that Wagner forces are extraordinarily effective and argued that regular Russian forces are more effective than the Wagner private military company (PMC). Rossiya-1 argued that regular Russian forces captured a geographically larger and more important city of Mariupol (in 71 days) much faster than Wagner Group forces were able to capture Bakhmut (in 224 days). Many Russian milbloggers – including Wagner-linked milbloggers – decried the report as a shameless rewriting of history and part of a “vile agenda” designed to “consign [Wagner PMC] feats to oblivion.”[33] The Kremlin media apparatus is likely targeting Russian public perception of the Wagner PMC to decrease the group’s popularity as the MoD may seek to effectively disband the Wagner Group in Ukraine and reorganize its elements within the Russian MoD.[34] This segment is likely a supporting effort within Russian President Vladimir Putin’s assessed campaign to destroy Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s personal reputation.[35]
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that the Russians might initiate an intentional radioactive leak at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) as part of a potential Russian strategy to freeze the war. Zelensky stated in an interview with Spanish news outlet El Mundo published on June 30 that Russian forces may attempt to remotely detonate the ZNPP if Ukrainian authorities are able to pass control of the ZNPP to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[28] Zelensky stated that Russian forces may cause a radiological incident to halt maneuver warfare and buy more time for Russia to recruit more personnel and produce more military equipment.[29] Zelensky also reported that about 5,000 Russian forces remain at the ZNPP with military equipment. ISW continues to assess that Russia remains unlikely to cause a radiological incident at the ZNPP since Russia would not be able to control the impacts of the incident, which would degrade Russia’s ability to operate and govern in occupied southern Ukraine.[30] Russian forces could conduct various possible man-made radiological incidents at varying levels of severity; however, ISW continues to assess that the consequences of a Russian radiological incident would outweigh any benefit for Russian forces at this time.[31] Russia is likely continuing to use the threat of a radiological incident to constrain Ukrainian counteroffensive actions and degrade Western military assistance support for Ukraine.
Russian propagandists are likely conducting an information campaign to destroy the Wagner Group’s reputation as a uniquely effective fighting force in support of the Russian Ministry of Defense’s (MoD) effort to dismantle the Wagner Group and integrate former Wagner fighters into MoD structures. Russian state TV channel Rossiya-1 aired a segment on June 30 trivializing the Wagner Group’s effectiveness in Ukraine, calling into question the “constructed myth about the Wagner Group’s [high level of] effectiveness.”[32] The segment implied that there is a popular misconception in Russia that Wagner forces are extraordinarily effective and argued that regular Russian forces are more effective than the Wagner private military company (PMC). Rossiya-1 argued that regular Russian forces captured a geographically larger and more important city of Mariupol (in 71 days) much faster than Wagner Group forces were able to capture Bakhmut (in 224 days). Many Russian milbloggers – including Wagner-linked milbloggers – decried the report as a shameless rewriting of history and part of a “vile agenda” designed to “consign [Wagner PMC] feats to oblivion.”[33] The Kremlin media apparatus is likely targeting Russian public perception of the Wagner PMC to decrease the group’s popularity as the MoD may seek to effectively disband the Wagner Group in Ukraine and reorganize its elements within the Russian MoD.[34] This segment is likely a supporting effort within Russian President Vladimir Putin’s assessed campaign to destroy Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin’s personal reputation.[35]
An ex US SOF guy is fighting in Ukraine for the Ukrainians. He's quite long in the tooth, but is pulling his weight in combat. He has been asked some questions which I think is quite informative. C, another US military veteran is his section commander.
Source: “Untreated mortality is around 90%, somewhat short of C—’s standards.”
Source: “Untreated mortality is around 90%, somewhat short of C—’s standards.”
"Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, which emerging technologies, innovations or equipment have had the greatest impact on the course of the war, and why?
Up front I need to point out that my view and understanding of things is relatively narrow and limited by information I either see or get on a bit of a need-to-know basis. I am always hesitant with word-of-mouth info that does not come from an official source – and in a war of disinformation and misinformation (in the latter often amplifying misinformation to leverage it as disinformation, part of the confusion matrix, often from social media/OSINT sources) – even that source sometimes has to be taken with a grain of salt.
These are in no order of ranking per effectiveness or extent of use.
Disinformation and leveraging of misinformation: Some percentage of our job is spent working on the field nuts-and-bolts to enhance the ability to leverage these things on the battlefield. I can’t get into all aspects of it, but it basically uses real and false information to create the illusion that something else is happening, often something falsely claimed by people on social media. This has also been used on a wider scale, and seems to have been effective, both in forcing the enemy to react to something that does not exist, or just creating confusion in their ranks and effecting their timing and force commitment. This is not new, however, what is new is how it is developed and used in a multi-faceted way, from recon teams to regular forces, drones, cyber hacking, satellites, false messaging, and leading social media to say what you want them to say, then leverage these resources to make it seem real, or at a minimum, possible and thus requiring attention from enemy planners as well as field commanders.
Artificial Intelligence: AI, although in its current form is neither the technological panacea nor the doomsday tech some claim, it is being to put to significant use on the battlefield. Recognition and ID engines can use drone photos and combine that with other intel to get a picture of what units are in a particular area (examples being unit signs/patches, equipment type), and even possibly how large the force is. Geometry recognition engines can discriminate human-made shapes from natural ones, and in some cases use the pattern to ID equipment and trenches obscured by trees. We use it in the field on a small scale to modify battle maps.
With inputs from our observations, from drones and assumptions or solid intel on file, we can get a good statistical look at our surroundings. The issue here is jamming reduces the capability of gathering some intel, and all this stuff needs to be processed real-time to be most effective. I use a type of AI called fuzzy logic to help identify drones from presets and noise factors, which is about 50% successful.
Drones: Outside of highly effective military systems, drones are probably the star of the show, as far as machines go. I won’t go into detail of the commonly known things, but will touch on some fairly unique uses.
In addition to intel and direct attack, drones are used in diversionary tactics. Not only can they transmit false messages, they can create a false area of interest by their volume and emissions, if only for that reason. Munition dropping drones can also be used for diversion. We do not normally have munition-equipped drones with us, but we usually do have one observation drone and a few micro drones. Since we do not have a quick means of escape, we can sometimes sacrifice a micro drone by crashing it on their position and diverting attention, possible long enough to vacate the area, or to use surprise and heavy fire to reduce their combat effectiveness so we can withdraw.
In response to heavy EW jamming, drones are being modified to lock-in on a strong EW signal and crash into the source. The issue is they have to be able to get a lock from a flying position where they are still functional, and often have to deal with multiple jamming sources. This is where AI comes into play to parse signal strength and radiated direction.
Novel use of older tech: This type of “regression” is commonly looked-down upon by military experts and analysts. But, in circumstances where new technology is not available, it is often the most efficient method to leverage what you have on-hand. Weaponized drones are certainly not new, and the use of drones to drop older grenades as AP and AV/AE (anti-vehicle/anti-equipment–Ed.) munitions is also not new. What is new is their utilization rate and their multiple operational roles in a single platform.
An example is one drone can be used for injecting misinformation into the enemy comms, while taking intel photos and also carrying a munition. This leveraging of the platform means they can be designated single or multiple mission roles up-front, and their mission can be changed while they are in-flight. In a less dressed-out configuration, they can be used to drop supplies to troops. Their limit here is weight, of course, but we have been supplied multiple times by drones, almost always rifle ammunition.
Another use of older tech is moving to comms systems out of the frequency range of Russian jamming. This means less efficient comms, but adequate comm is much better than no comm. One way around this is by using drones as repeaters, and by using old school wire antennas that can be deployed and packed-up quickly. Some micro-drones are capable of ascending with a tiny wire antenna.
And which ones are promising, but employed in too small a scale to make an impact? Which of these have failed?
I would say the Switchblade 300 system was a significant failure – as compared to expectations- by both numbers provided and the small warhead and limited range. It is however useful for small teams to take-out antennas and personnel. The Switchblade 600 is more effective, as is the Phoenix Ghost, but the latter is by word of mouth, I have no experience with it.
And, although one of the biggest success stories, drones are to some degree also a failure. The reason for that is jamming. So, their success is really down to timing. Once the Russians started wide-area jamming and GPS stunting, drones became overall much less effective. The use of low-level flying, using active devices on the ground for route mapping, inertial in some systems and more sophisticated comm links have helped.
The best solution would be to reduce the jamming assets, but that requires weapons Ukraine does not have except for combating their very forward systems. On the flip side, the Russian jamming also effects some of their own drones."
The rest can be read at the source. I think that the points he makes are quite important, especially because of his background and the fact that he isn't a desk bound analyst, nor an officer.Yes, the actual URL you're citing -that way the article you're referencing can be examined and discussed. It's common for sources to cite the same text, unattributed unfortunately, in what I'd describe as circular reporting.
rsemmes
Member
I see the point about using those operations on different targets, not on the accuracy of the article. The war is still going on, no claim/report is going to be that truthful.I find it hard to take anything this reporter says seriously. Much of it is sheer speculation directed at people who will want to believe this narrative. The report is sprinkled liberally with speculative phrases such as (I quote him here): Italics are mine.
"British personnel supporting UAF Storm Shadow operations likely work at the airfield."
"there were rumors that some British personnel had to be evacuated from the airbase due to serious injuries sustained during the attack."
"The pause was likely aimed at lulling Russian AD to lower its guard."
"The much-hyped Ukrainian counteroffensive, which started with probing attacks on June 4, has failed to intensify as Ukrainian forces have not breached Russian defensive positions. Ukrainian armor and mechanized infantry have hit a veritable steel wall of steel, confronting well-organized Russian forces."
"Russia likely struck the Khmelnytskyi airbase with Kh-47 and Kh-22 missiles, not Kh-101/Kh-555 missiles."
This is the first I have heard of British personnel in Ukraine working on Storm Shadow. I would be very interested in any reputable sources that cover British personnel in that role.
As of yesterday there were reports on ISW of storm shadow usage in Berdyansk.
Quote: "Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched six Storm Shadow cruise missiles at targets in the vicinity of Berdyansk and that Russian Pantsir-S air defense systems shot down some or all of the missiles.[81]'
You will note the number following the reference to the report. This is a footnote so you can actually read the source yourself.
The following is the link to the ISW report from yesterday. It seems that according to this fairly well documented report that the shaping operations for the counteroffensive are going fairly well. I might say that the "steel wall of steel" has a few dents in it of several kilometers in various places.
Institute for the Study of War
Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the frontline on June 30. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Melitopol (western Zaporizhia Oblast) and
rsemmes
Member
Yes, like a reference in more than one book, when they are all referring to a very casual interpretation of limited data. Myself, I would try to find that article and any other reference to the issue, I would do a critical reading, like Larry_L did, and then discussed it, if I am interested.
Preliminary Lessons in Conventional Warfighting from Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine: February–July 2022
This study of the early phases of the 2022 war sheds light on Ukraine's strengths and vulnerabilities, and the need for further Western support.
rusi.org
Redlands18
Well-Known Member
How being right hand drive is fuelling the demand for British pick-up trucks in Ukraine (msn.com)
The art of adaptation in warfare, the Ukrainian's have very quickly worked out that R/H drive vehicles are better, due to Russian snipers aiming for the L/H front seat to take out the driver. They are even setting up mannequins to fool them.
The art of adaptation in warfare, the Ukrainian's have very quickly worked out that R/H drive vehicles are better, due to Russian snipers aiming for the L/H front seat to take out the driver. They are even setting up mannequins to fool them.
Being a Brit and having fluffed that up in video games so many times, and shot out the passenger, that brings me much amusement and comfort
They're crafty buggers those Ukrainians.
KipPotapych
Well-Known Member
So what’s going to happen at the next NATO summit? Ukraine is “threatening” with Zelensky absence from the summit basically if they don’t get an invite. “Threatening” is in quotes because it is not a real threat due to the fact that it is against the interests of Ukraine. I also want to say that another reason is “who cares if the guys is absent”, but we are in the position (which is crazy on its own) where Ukraine can actually dictate and throw “threats” to the entire Western world, as well as call the leaders of the latter various names and… well, get away with it and pack hundreds of billions of dollars in military, financial, humanitarian, and you name it help.
Regarding the threat of Zelensky not going:
Ukraine wants to receive an invitation to begin the process of joining NATO at the military alliance's summit next month, and President Volodymyr Zelenskiy will not attend if leaders do not show "courage", a presidential aide said on Thursday.
Chief diplomatic adviser Ihor Zhovkva told Reuters that Kyiv wanted the July 11-12 NATO summit in Vilnius to deliver a response to the application for NATO membership that Ukraine filed on Sept. 30 last year.[…]
"What we are asking for is to start the procedure," he said, banging the table at one point to drive his point home.
He also compared Ukrainian situation with that of Finland and Sweden:
Zhovkva pointed to the cases of Finland and Sweden who applied for membership last year. Finland has already since become a member.
"When Finland and Sweden submitted an application for membership last year, immediately in June last year the allies responded to the application ... inviting them to membership with NATO," he said.
Sometimes, when reading these articles/interviews, I wonder if the people making the statements are actually in their right mind, pretend to be out of it, or completely lost it. The almost Khrushchev style “driving his point home” was a nice touch. This is from the Reuters article from a couple of days ago, before I forget:
/cloudfront-us-east-2.images.arcpublishing.com/reuters/2VOKHI7K2BIUVLDKI6WGI2JANM.jpg)
www.reuters.com
I would predict that Zelensky will attend the summit. He will get more promises of support, probably another few billion worth of military assistance, maybe even ATACMS from the US. There will be no invites to join NATO, of course, because… well, it would be asinine, in my opinion. We will see what happens. The whole “spectacle” is probably aimed at getting more rather than less. I have a feeling it will be ATACMS and it will be called courageous enough.
Another interesting read in the past couple of days was the article from Washington Post suggesting that Ukraine has some ambitious plans to retake huge chunks of land, break the land bridge to Crimea, move the artillery and missiles to threaten Crimea and Russia itself by the fall and open the negotiations before the end of the year. That’s quite a plan and the way things have been going suggest that the plan is pretty optimistic as well, especially given we are already in July. The rest of the articles talks about basically the same, with Rob Lee suggesting that the plan is very ambitious, but not impossible, heavy losses, NATO frustration, etc I’ll only quote the main part I outlined above as the article is behind a paywall:
During a secret visit to Ukraine by CIA Director William J. Burns earlier this month, Ukrainian officials revealed an ambitious strategy to retake Russian-occupied territory and open cease-fire negotiations with Moscow by the end of the year, according to officials familiar with the visit.
The trip by Burns, which has not been previously reported, included meetings with President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukraine’s top intelligence officials. It came at a critical moment in the conflict as Ukrainian forces struggle to gain an early advantage in their long-awaited counteroffensive but have yet to deploy most of their Western-trained and -equipped assault brigades.[…]
Publicly, Ukrainian officials have expressed frustration with critics of the pace at which the counteroffensive has played out thus far. But in private, military planners in Kyiv have relayed to Burns and others bullish confidence in their aim to retake substantial territory by the fall; move artillery and missile systems near the boundary line of Russian-controlled Crimea; push further into eastern Ukraine; and then open negotiations with Moscow for the first time since peace talks broke down in March of last year, according to three people familiar with the planning.
“Russia will only negotiate if it feels threatened,” said a senior Ukrainian official.[…]
In preparation for the fall, Zelensky and top aides have begun thinking about how Kyiv can force an end to the fighting on terms that are acceptable to Russia and the Ukrainian people, who have been subjected to a year and a half of violence, forced displacement, atrocities, and food and electricity shortages.
The article:
At this point, it seems pretty clear that they are sacking Crimea at the very least. Unless they actually take everything else, there is very little hope that Russia will give up any of it either and, at least at this point, it seems to be quite a stretch for Ukraine to make any run and take anything of substance.
At the same time, and I apologize here because I lost the link to the source and don’t have the time to look for another at the moment, but Lavrov was talking about the negotiations that are not possible and any “freezing” of the conflict will definitely not work for Russia because it will simply give Ukraine time to regroup and, mainly, provide much needed time to the West to supply Ukraine with nowadays scarce weaponry and munitions, as well as, more lethal stuff. A few Russian “analysts” seem to agree from what I saw (or simply pulling the official line). From my perspective, I can say that it is hard to disagree with that line of thinking, except that it would probably not be in the West’s interests to freeze this thing over and have another run a few years from now. Or, who knows: Ukraine would likely be much better prepared by then, while Russia’s better preparedness would be questionable. Yeah… Not sure what to say, really. Quite a (sad) pickle.
Overall, it appears to me (and I could be wrong) that Ukraine is setting itself up for negations with a low hand, while Russia is currently in control. Remains to be seen if it changes in the next couple/few months. I have little doubt there will be some kind of talks rather sooner than later simply because it is impossible to have a country the size of Ukraine (both size and population wise) run from grants, loans, etc for an extended period of time, not that they really prospered and had been entirely self sufficient on a good day, but they literally cannot exist today as a state without a very substantial external monetary help (I am not talking about military assistance here).
Regarding the threat of Zelensky not going:
Ukraine wants to receive an invitation to begin the process of joining NATO at the military alliance's summit next month, and President Volodymyr Zelenskiy will not attend if leaders do not show "courage", a presidential aide said on Thursday.
Chief diplomatic adviser Ihor Zhovkva told Reuters that Kyiv wanted the July 11-12 NATO summit in Vilnius to deliver a response to the application for NATO membership that Ukraine filed on Sept. 30 last year.[…]
"What we are asking for is to start the procedure," he said, banging the table at one point to drive his point home.
He also compared Ukrainian situation with that of Finland and Sweden:
Zhovkva pointed to the cases of Finland and Sweden who applied for membership last year. Finland has already since become a member.
"When Finland and Sweden submitted an application for membership last year, immediately in June last year the allies responded to the application ... inviting them to membership with NATO," he said.
Sometimes, when reading these articles/interviews, I wonder if the people making the statements are actually in their right mind, pretend to be out of it, or completely lost it. The almost Khrushchev style “driving his point home” was a nice touch. This is from the Reuters article from a couple of days ago, before I forget:
Ukraine wants NATO invite at Vilnius summit, urges 'courage,' Zelenskiy aide says
Ukraine wants to receive an invitation to begin the process of joining NATO at the military alliance's summit next month, and President Volodymyr Zelenskiy will not attend if leaders do not show "courage", a presidential aide said on Thursday.
www.reuters.com
I would predict that Zelensky will attend the summit. He will get more promises of support, probably another few billion worth of military assistance, maybe even ATACMS from the US. There will be no invites to join NATO, of course, because… well, it would be asinine, in my opinion. We will see what happens. The whole “spectacle” is probably aimed at getting more rather than less. I have a feeling it will be ATACMS and it will be called courageous enough.
Another interesting read in the past couple of days was the article from Washington Post suggesting that Ukraine has some ambitious plans to retake huge chunks of land, break the land bridge to Crimea, move the artillery and missiles to threaten Crimea and Russia itself by the fall and open the negotiations before the end of the year. That’s quite a plan and the way things have been going suggest that the plan is pretty optimistic as well, especially given we are already in July. The rest of the articles talks about basically the same, with Rob Lee suggesting that the plan is very ambitious, but not impossible, heavy losses, NATO frustration, etc I’ll only quote the main part I outlined above as the article is behind a paywall:
During a secret visit to Ukraine by CIA Director William J. Burns earlier this month, Ukrainian officials revealed an ambitious strategy to retake Russian-occupied territory and open cease-fire negotiations with Moscow by the end of the year, according to officials familiar with the visit.
The trip by Burns, which has not been previously reported, included meetings with President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukraine’s top intelligence officials. It came at a critical moment in the conflict as Ukrainian forces struggle to gain an early advantage in their long-awaited counteroffensive but have yet to deploy most of their Western-trained and -equipped assault brigades.[…]
Publicly, Ukrainian officials have expressed frustration with critics of the pace at which the counteroffensive has played out thus far. But in private, military planners in Kyiv have relayed to Burns and others bullish confidence in their aim to retake substantial territory by the fall; move artillery and missile systems near the boundary line of Russian-controlled Crimea; push further into eastern Ukraine; and then open negotiations with Moscow for the first time since peace talks broke down in March of last year, according to three people familiar with the planning.
“Russia will only negotiate if it feels threatened,” said a senior Ukrainian official.[…]
In preparation for the fall, Zelensky and top aides have begun thinking about how Kyiv can force an end to the fighting on terms that are acceptable to Russia and the Ukrainian people, who have been subjected to a year and a half of violence, forced displacement, atrocities, and food and electricity shortages.
The article:
At this point, it seems pretty clear that they are sacking Crimea at the very least. Unless they actually take everything else, there is very little hope that Russia will give up any of it either and, at least at this point, it seems to be quite a stretch for Ukraine to make any run and take anything of substance.
At the same time, and I apologize here because I lost the link to the source and don’t have the time to look for another at the moment, but Lavrov was talking about the negotiations that are not possible and any “freezing” of the conflict will definitely not work for Russia because it will simply give Ukraine time to regroup and, mainly, provide much needed time to the West to supply Ukraine with nowadays scarce weaponry and munitions, as well as, more lethal stuff. A few Russian “analysts” seem to agree from what I saw (or simply pulling the official line). From my perspective, I can say that it is hard to disagree with that line of thinking, except that it would probably not be in the West’s interests to freeze this thing over and have another run a few years from now. Or, who knows: Ukraine would likely be much better prepared by then, while Russia’s better preparedness would be questionable. Yeah… Not sure what to say, really. Quite a (sad) pickle.
Overall, it appears to me (and I could be wrong) that Ukraine is setting itself up for negations with a low hand, while Russia is currently in control. Remains to be seen if it changes in the next couple/few months. I have little doubt there will be some kind of talks rather sooner than later simply because it is impossible to have a country the size of Ukraine (both size and population wise) run from grants, loans, etc for an extended period of time, not that they really prospered and had been entirely self sufficient on a good day, but they literally cannot exist today as a state without a very substantial external monetary help (I am not talking about military assistance here).
So what’s going to happen at the next NATO summit? Ukraine is “threatening” with Zelensky absence from the summit basically if they don’t get an invite. “Threatening” is in quotes because it is not a real threat due to the fact that it is against the interests of Ukraine. I also want to say that another reason is “who cares if the guys is absent”, but we are in the position (which is crazy on its own) where Ukraine can actually dictate and throw “threats” to the entire Western world, as well as call the leaders of the latter various names and… well, get away with it and pack hundreds of billions of dollars in military, financial, humanitarian, and you name it help.
Regarding the threat of Zelensky not going:
Ukraine wants to receive an invitation to begin the process of joining NATO at the military alliance's summit next month, and President Volodymyr Zelenskiy will not attend if leaders do not show "courage", a presidential aide said on Thursday.
Chief diplomatic adviser Ihor Zhovkva told Reuters that Kyiv wanted the July 11-12 NATO summit in Vilnius to deliver a response to the application for NATO membership that Ukraine filed on Sept. 30 last year.[…]
"What we are asking for is to start the procedure," he said, banging the table at one point to drive his point home.
He also compared Ukrainian situation with that of Finland and Sweden:
Zhovkva pointed to the cases of Finland and Sweden who applied for membership last year. Finland has already since become a member.
"When Finland and Sweden submitted an application for membership last year, immediately in June last year the allies responded to the application ... inviting them to membership with NATO," he said.
Sometimes, when reading these articles/interviews, I wonder if the people making the statements are actually in their right mind, pretend to be out of it, or completely lost it. The almost Khrushchev style “driving his point home” was a nice touch. This is from the Reuters article from a couple of days ago, before I forget:
Ukraine wants NATO invite at Vilnius summit, urges 'courage,' Zelenskiy aide says
Ukraine wants to receive an invitation to begin the process of joining NATO at the military alliance's summit next month, and President Volodymyr Zelenskiy will not attend if leaders do not show "courage", a presidential aide said on Thursday.
I would predict that Zelensky will attend the summit. He will get more promises of support, probably another few billion worth of military assistance, maybe even ATACMS from the US. There will be no invites to join NATO, of course, because… well, it would be asinine, in my opinion. We will see what happens. The whole “spectacle” is probably aimed at getting more rather than less. I have a feeling it will be ATACMS and it will be called courageous enough.
Another interesting read in the past couple of days was the article from Washington Post suggesting that Ukraine has some ambitious plans to retake huge chunks of land, break the land bridge to Crimea, move the artillery and missiles to threaten Crimea and Russia itself by the fall and open the negotiations before the end of the year. That’s quite a plan and the way things have been going suggest that the plan is pretty optimistic as well, especially given we are already in July. The rest of the articles talks about basically the same, with Rob Lee suggesting that the plan is very ambitious, but not impossible, heavy losses, NATO frustration, etc I’ll only quote the main part I outlined above as the article is behind a paywall:
During a secret visit to Ukraine by CIA Director William J. Burns earlier this month, Ukrainian officials revealed an ambitious strategy to retake Russian-occupied territory and open cease-fire negotiations with Moscow by the end of the year, according to officials familiar with the visit.
The trip by Burns, which has not been previously reported, included meetings with President Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukraine’s top intelligence officials. It came at a critical moment in the conflict as Ukrainian forces struggle to gain an early advantage in their long-awaited counteroffensive but have yet to deploy most of their Western-trained and -equipped assault brigades.[…]
Publicly, Ukrainian officials have expressed frustration with critics of the pace at which the counteroffensive has played out thus far. But in private, military planners in Kyiv have relayed to Burns and others bullish confidence in their aim to retake substantial territory by the fall; move artillery and missile systems near the boundary line of Russian-controlled Crimea; push further into eastern Ukraine; and then open negotiations with Moscow for the first time since peace talks broke down in March of last year, according to three people familiar with the planning.
“Russia will only negotiate if it feels threatened,” said a senior Ukrainian official.[…]
In preparation for the fall, Zelensky and top aides have begun thinking about how Kyiv can force an end to the fighting on terms that are acceptable to Russia and the Ukrainian people, who have been subjected to a year and a half of violence, forced displacement, atrocities, and food and electricity shortages.
The article:
At this point, it seems pretty clear that they are sacking Crimea at the very least. Unless they actually take everything else, there is very little hope that Russia will give up any of it either and, at least at this point, it seems to be quite a stretch for Ukraine to make any run and take anything of substance.
At the same time, and I apologize here because I lost the link to the source and don’t have the time to look for another at the moment, but Lavrov was talking about the negotiations that are not possible and any “freezing” of the conflict will definitely not work for Russia because it will simply give Ukraine time to regroup and, mainly, provide much needed time to the West to supply Ukraine with nowadays scarce weaponry and munitions, as well as, more lethal stuff. A few Russian “analysts” seem to agree from what I saw (or simply pulling the official line). From my perspective, I can say that it is hard to disagree with that line of thinking, except that it would probably not be in the West’s interests to freeze this thing over and have another run a few years from now. Or, who knows: Ukraine would likely be much better prepared by then, while Russia’s better preparedness would be questionable. Yeah… Not sure what to say, really. Quite a (sad) pickle.
Overall, it appears to me (and I could be wrong) that Ukraine is setting itself up for negations with a low hand, while Russia is currently in control. Remains to be seen if it changes in the next couple/few months. I have little doubt there will be some kind of talks rather sooner than later simply because it is impossible to have a country the size of Ukraine (both size and population wise) run from grants, loans, etc for an extended period of time, not that they really prospered and had been entirely self sufficient on a good day, but they literally cannot exist today as a state without a very substantial external monetary help (I am not talking about military assistance here).
I find the bolded actually offensive. I'm not sure where the "wests" priority's lie. While I understand people want to get re-elected the money and weapons the west is supplying Ukraine is insignificant IMHO simply because Ukraine is doing all of the Wests dirty work by hobbling a major Super Power and paying for it with blood. I'm sure the Ukrainians would have been quite happy to carry on as usual if not for Putin's 3 day Special Military Operation. Then the west could have dithered around for another decade or two on whether or not they wanted to step on Russia's toes by allowing Ukraine to join NATO.
You do realize that that was a unilateral, non-binding and within NATO universally opposed action by the president of a country who was on his way out of office at the time?
There was no such thing as an "invitation", and Bush could not have "issued" one either.
Or, for a quote at the time:
President Bush threw the NATO summit meeting here off-script on Wednesday by lobbying hard to extend membership to Ukraine and Georgia, but he failed to rally support for the move among key allies.
source: NYT
Larry_L
Active Member
Yes western support was insufficient to prevent Russia from establishing a "Land bridge" to Crimea. It was insufficient to allow Ukraine to establish air superiority. It was insufficient to completely prevent all missiles from hitting Ukrainian cities. It can be viewed as insufficient in many ways.
What would be sufficient for you?
I can envision that western support was sufficient within the parameters that kept Russia from escalating the conflict to a nuclear level. It was sufficient to disillusion Russian forces enough that a small group of forces took the headquarters in Rostov without a fight. It was sufficient in many many ways. It was a nudge at the Russian "Red lines" here and another there while keeping the grain deal going. I personally feel that more could have been done, however I do not have the responsibility for a country on my shoulders, as all of the leaders in NATO have.
The view was that Ukraine was not ready to join NATO. There were reports that the level of corruption there was almost equivalent to that in Russia. Even if Ukraine got an "Invite" to join NATO now they would not be able to join for many years. There standards that need to be met beyond the ability to fighr Russia to a standstill.
Hopefully the summit will provide exactly what Ukraine needs at this time within the parameters available. To me that means more long range strike capability, and the intel to use it efficiently. It means a clear path to providing modern western aircraft of sufficient capability in a timely manner.
A video of the the Bonus Mk2 in action, you can see the air bursts of the round. Very detailed but be careful as you can see a Russian soldier being burned to death-
Looks like the Ukr from the bridge have been dislodged, first time seeing an FPV hit on a speedboat. Very unique footage-
A view from the Su-34 dropping the glide bombs, first time seeing them from pilot view-
Looks like the Ukr from the bridge have been dislodged, first time seeing an FPV hit on a speedboat. Very unique footage-
A view from the Su-34 dropping the glide bombs, first time seeing them from pilot view-
Larry_L
Active Member
Here are a couple of reports of the movements on the southern flank of Bakhmut. They have been pushing on both the northern, and southern flanks with slow advances. It is also stated that yesterday, they were able to remove a fair amount of Russian artillery by counter-battery fire in the Donetsk, Bakhmut areas.
The situation must be quite dynamic, since Sladkov, mistakenly reported that Kleshcheevka had been taken and had to issue a retraction.
The situation must be quite dynamic, since Sladkov, mistakenly reported that Kleshcheevka had been taken and had to issue a retraction.
- Thread Starter Thread Starter
- #7,998
It appears a Ukrainian infantry element entered Klescheevka but was repulsed. Currently there are reports of combat at a strategic hill near the village. If that positions falls, Russia likely won't be able to hold Klescheevka.
Larry_L
Active Member
Ukraine is still sending drones to the Moscow region. Most are taken down by air defense, although there is still some damage from whatever falls from the sky. This report states that a drone downed by electronic warfare fell on one of the buildings of the 45th Separate Guards. It is reported as an administrative building, although the image displayed looks residential to me. The first link is the Russian report by Kommersant. The second is in English by a Ukrainian source.
www.kommersant.ru
ukrainetoday.org
Москва защитилась «Панцирем»
Стали известны подробности налета беспилотников на столичный регион
www.kommersant.ru
One of drones attacking Moscow Oblast falls on roof of administrative building of airborne troops brigade – Russian media - Ukraine Today .org
5 JULY 2023 One of the drones that attacked Moscow Oblast in Russia on 4 July, fell on the roof of an administrative building of the 45th Separate Guards Special Purpose (Spetsnaz) Brigade of Russia. Source: Russian media outlet Kommersant Quote: “One combat UAV, despite being targeted by the...
ukrainetoday.org
This is what I have hinted at earlier: use of tactical nuke will trigger a very strong response from some NATO countries (but initially not NATO as such, just the 3 with their own nukes):