The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Ananda

The Bunker Group

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Colonel Cassad claim that the Russian manage to attack Ukrainian forces that hide under Antonovsky bridge. I post this more to the pictures of conditions on the bridges. From my amateur perspective, I don't see the need for either side to fight for control of the bridge on either side. Just don't see it useful anymore.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update on Zaporozhye.

It appears Ukraine has changed tactics to attacking with small groups of infantry to make incremental gains. It's possible this is related to the rains reported there recently that have made it harder for things like MRAPs and other wheeled vehicles to move across the fields. After the fall of Rovnopol' it appears Russian forces have pulled back to positions north of Priyutnoe. It's likely Makarovka is now under Ukrainian control with Russian lines running on the outskirts of Staromayorskoe. In the Orekhov area, no other Ukrainian activity near Pyatihatka was reported, while another Ukrainian probing attack towards Rabotino was reportedly repulsed. All in all it appears Ukrainian forces are taking an operational pause to regroup for the next major effort.


Russian forces have apparently captured a Ukrainian BMR-64 mineclearing vehicle. In general the supply of mineclearing vehicles in Ukraine is relatively small, so losing them is arguably more impactful then even losing MBTs, at least in the context of chewing through Russia's defense lines.


Ukrainian counter-battery radar getting taken out in Zaporozhye region. One thing this war has shown is how vulnerable these assets are against a peer power that has ELINT assets and loitering munitions.


In other interesting tidbits; Russian artillery is using 1939 vintage 152mm shells. Note they are likely being used by D-1 howitzers (unless something older got pulled from storage). Reportedly the shells are still in working condition and have already been used in action.

 

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
In other interesting tidbits; Russian artillery is using 1939 vintage 152mm shells. Note they are likely being used by D-1 howitzers (unless something older got pulled from storage). Reportedly the shells are still in working condition and have already been used in action.

I saw that on Project Owl, and thats quite shocking. If the shells had been stored at proper temperature and kept clean, then maybe you only have an increased chance of duds or misfires. However, those dont look like they have been stored in Class A storage.

1939 ? I am tempted to think there is a serious ammo shortage if you have to dig that deep.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I saw that on Project Owl, and thats quite shocking. If the shells had been stored at proper temperature and kept clean, then maybe you only have an increased chance of duds or misfires. However, those dont look like they have been stored in Class A storage.

1939 ? I am tempted to think there is a serious ammo shortage if you have to dig that deep.
Quite possible. We've seen '23 vintage shells on the front line too. And that's a sign that older stuff isn't available. Generally you would put the newest stuff in the warehouse and pull the oldest stuff out. And of course there's Iranian shells, freshly imported.

 

Dex

Member
Now that I think about it, just retaining shells from 1939 is madness. What filler did 1939 Russia use ? PETN ? TNT ?
Knowing Russia, it was probably stored in some random small town gym after WW2 and was completely forgotten until they discovered it this year when searching for any weapons in storage.
 

rsemmes

Member
I read some posts (somewhere else) about a bridge "demolished" because there was a (HIMARS) hole in it, I also read about the Thanh Hoa Bridge. I was thinking more about the first than the second, a hint from Russia saying that both sides can play that game. It seems that we don't have any clear indication why they have decided not to do that; maybe not worth the risk, just that.

So, no army engineers around to confirm if it's possible to breach a dam with that kind of equipment/operation.

I am surprised they didn't use all 152mm ammo available in 41-42.

No need for the bolshie attitude.
This is what I call a misunderstanding.
"There's a big difference between a concrete bunker and a dam."
That was your post, you didn't provide the thickness of concrete, you didn't say anything about construction; I thought you were trying to be funny.
 

rsemmes

Member
"According to the Russian MoD (RuMoD), on the night of June 23, 2023, Russian Aerospace Forces launched long-range, precision strike missile salvo at an AFU foreign-made hardware and weapons depot.
The Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) confirmed the strike on its Facebook page, stating that the Russian attack was directed at the Viysk airfield near the Khmelnytskyi region. According to the UAF statement, Russia used its Tu-95MS strategic bombers to launch 13 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles from over the Caspian Sea, most of which were directed toward the Khmelnytskyi region.
The UAF states that Russia additionally used two drones, one of which was of an unidentified type. During a salvo strike, Russia often mixes slow-moving drones with cruise missiles to confuse the enemy and locate air defense systems." eurasiantimes.com
I see the point now.

@rsemmes Provide a link to the the sources.
Ngatimozart
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
@Feanor in such a case can't Russia use an Iskander to take otu the position. I know they are running low on those, but they should have enough to take out such an important bridgehead no?
I think Russian general staff reads your posts. As requested, here's an Iskander strike on Ukrainian positions under the Antonov bridge.


Update on the Oskol Front. Rybar is reporting some excitement on the Kremennaya-Krasniy Liman axis. It appears Russian forces are continuing to advance southwards through the forest towards the river. In the meanwhile a major Ukrainian counter-offensive is reported against the Russian salient near Torskoe. Reportedly elements of 6 brigades are involved.


Other interesting tidbits. Russia's 40th Marines continue to haul away the wheeled vehicles knocked out and abandoned by Ukrainian forces near Novodonetskoe. Here's a Husky TSV. Wheeled vehicles are particularly vulnerable since they're easier to immobilize. Note the vehicle is definitely significant damaged, and though likely repairable it's unlikely Russia will be able to effect the repairs.


An Leo-2A4 knocked out and substantially damaged after encountering a landmine. Most knocked out and destroyed Leopards up until now were of the A6 variety, at least from what I've seen. This is Zaporozhye area.

EDIT: Khlopotov says this MBT hit a land mine and was finished by a Vikhr ATGM.


When you're a young MT-LB and you're unsure whether you want to be an MLRS or a self-propelled mortar when you grow up. I can't tell whether this is Russian or Ukrainian. I'm tempted to assume the former by the presence of the 2B9.

EDIT: Military observer says it's Russian.


For those interested in antiques, here's a Russian soldier showing of a vintage 1944 DShK. Of course this has nothing on Ukraine's DP-27s and Maxim guns, but it's still a very respectable age for a piece of steel to still be at war.

 
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T.C.P

Well-Known Member
I think Russian general staff reads your posts. As requested, here's an Iskander strike on Ukrainian positions under the Antonov bridge.

Ha ha. It was the only logical weapon left. Their normal artilley wasnt doing it, they even brought up thermobaric MLRS and that was ineffective. They mentioned they could not get close enough for glide bombs due to S-300s being moved up and the Ukr S-300 crews are experienced in shooting down cruise missiles so that would rule out the effectiveness of their Kalibres, Kh-22s are inaccurate and this is is not worth a Kinzhal.

With russia digging up T-54s, and shells from 1939 and I still surprised in not seeing any Tochkas. Did Russia destroy their entire stock? They should have produced thousands during the USSr days and thse systems would have been great in a tactical usage sense. If nothing else, masss lobbing tochkas would help degrade Ukr defenses faster.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Ha ha. It was the only logical weapon left. Their normal artilley wasnt doing it, they even brought up thermobaric MLRS and that was ineffective. They mentioned they could not get close enough for glide bombs due to S-300s being moved up and the Ukr S-300 crews are experienced in shooting down cruise missiles so that would rule out the effectiveness of their Kalibres, Kh-22s are inaccurate and this is is not worth a Kinzhal.

With russia digging up T-54s, and shells from 1939 and I still surprised in not seeing any Tochkas. Did Russia destroy their entire stock? They should have produced thousands during the USSr days and thse systems would have been great in a tactical usage sense. If nothing else, masss lobbing tochkas would help degrade Ukr defenses faster.
Russia has used some Tochka missiles. It appears a single bde set of them was rolling around. Some were also used up in Syria. Mostly the question is, what does Russia lack? Is it the operational-tactical level? I.e. is there a shortage of Iskanders? Or is it regular artillery?
 

T.C.P

Well-Known Member
Russia has used some Tochka missiles. It appears a single bde set of them was rolling around. Some were also used up in Syria. Mostly the question is, what does Russia lack? Is it the operational-tactical level? I.e. is there a shortage of Iskanders? Or is it regular artillery?
Shortage of Iskanders has been clear for some months now. their usage really dried up since hte start of the year. I mean if they really were trying to buy Iranian short tange ballisitic missiles, then it does expose a shortage.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Shortage of Iskanders has been clear for some months now. their usage really dried up since hte start of the year. I mean if they really were trying to buy Iranian short tange ballisitic missiles, then it does expose a shortage.
I haven't honestly tracked it, but you might be right. Their use has been less advertised which might suggest there has been less of it overall. I can't explain it except to say that you can't replace tens of thousands of artillery shells every day with a stock pile of maybe a few thousand missiles total.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Ukrainian update: Part 1.


Video on NATO airpower for Ukraine.

This is a summary of the video with the appropriate time stamps.

Air superiority is crucial for Ukraine to win the war. Without control of the skies, ground forces are vulnerable to devastating attacks from the air.
Currently, Ukraine lacks the necessary air power to secure control of the skies.

01:20 The Need for Western Air Power Support
Importance of Western Air Power
Historical experiences have shown that being attacked from the air can be devastating for ground forces.
Ukraine is currently facing a counter-offensive from Russia without adequate air power.
Having Western air power on its side would have been a major advantage for Ukraine's offensive.
Limitations of F-16 Fighter Jets
While there has been discussion about providing Ukraine with F-16s, these aircraft alone cannot guarantee air superiority.
Operating state-of-the-art F-16s effectively requires extensive training and support systems beyond just fast jets.
The Russians would focus their efforts on wiping out any Ukrainian force equipped with F-16s.

03:18 Experience Flying F-16 Fighter Jets
Flying the F-16 was a straightforward transition due to previous experience with other fast jets. Intensive training courses were required to become familiar with operating the aircraft effectively. Transitioning to upgraded versions involved additional training but built upon existing knowledge and experience.

05:27 Challenges of Acquiring F-16s
Acquiring F-16s alone would not be sufficient for Ukraine to achieve air superiority. The Ukrainian Air Force lacks the experience and infrastructure necessary to fully utilize these advanced aircraft. Western air power support goes beyond just providing fighter jets, encompassing a range of capabilities such as surveillance, intelligence, and electronic warfare. In conclusion, while the acquisition of F-16 fighter jets could potentially enhance Ukraine's air power capabilities, it is important to recognize that air superiority requires more than just advanced aircraft. Comprehensive training, support systems, and a range of other capabilities are essential for effective utilization.

06:13 Challenges of Integrating New Technology with National Systems
The integration of new technology with a national system can be challenging, especially if the system is not prepared for such input. While there is often a fascination with fast and agile aircraft, combat capabilities rely heavily on technology, radar, electronic warfare systems, and regular upgrades. The operational capability of older aircraft may be significantly reduced over time. Integrating new technology with a national system that may not be prepared for it can pose challenges. Combat capabilities are not solely dependent on the speed and agility of an aircraft but also on the technology, radar, electronic warfare systems, and regular upgrades. The operational capability of older aircraft tends to decrease over time.

07:13 Effectiveness of Older F-16s in Ukraine
The F-16s that go to Ukraine will likely be older models rather than brand new state-of-the-art ones. Countries like the Netherlands and Denmark have recently retired their F-16s, making some previously used aircraft available. However, even the most modern F-16s available may still be around 30 years old. It's important to consider that while older F-16s may still be capable platforms, their overall operational capability may be reduced compared to newer models. Retired F-16s from countries like the Netherlands and Denmark could potentially be made available.
Even the most modern available F-16s may still be around 30 years old. While older F-16s can still be effective platforms, their overall operational capability may be reduced compared to newer models.

08:35 Concerns about Providing State-of-the-Art Missiles to Ukraine
The West may be cautious about giving Ukraine state-of-the-art air-to-air missiles. There may be similarities in capacity between Ukrainian MiG-29 missiles and some Western counterparts. Providing the very latest technology poses risks of it falling into enemy hands or exposing Western technology. Technological advantage is an important factor for the West, making it a difficult balance to strike.

09:20 Example of Equipment Given to Ukraine
An example of equipment given to Ukraine is the Storm Shadow missile, which has been highlighted by the press. While this missile is still capable, it is nearly 30 years old. Upgrades are planned for only a few of these missiles, while others will need disposal. Giving older but still capable equipment can save on disposal costs but does not provide state-of-the-art technology.

10:33 Combat Missions and Sorties
During combat missions in Iraq, strategic long-range sorties were carried out from the United Arab Emirates. These missions targeted various locations in and around Baghdad, including commander control centers, weapon storage facilities, and power facilities. The missions involved a large package of fighter escort and airborne command and control support.

12:14 Close Air Support Mission with F-16s
The speaker discusses the effectiveness of using F-16s for close air support missions during the war. They highlight how these aircraft were able to identify specific targets and provide effective support without having troops on the ground.

12:37 Ukraine's Air Capabilities and Future Use of Ethic Scenes
The speaker discusses how Ukraine could best utilize ethic scenes (presumably referring to F-16s) in their air capabilities. They mention the importance of securing air superiority first and then transitioning to an air-to-surface role. Additionally, they discuss the challenges Ukraine may face in acquiring enough aircraft to make a difference.

Utilizing Ethic Scenes in Ukraine's Air Capabilities
Securing air superiority is crucial before transitioning to an air-to-surface role.
Ethic scenes would require communication, position data, and understanding of ground operations to be effective and safe against opponents.
Acquiring a sufficient number of ethic scenes may be challenging for Ukraine, as it requires at least 40 to 60 aircraft.
13:39 Importance of Package Deals for Acquiring Ethic Scenes
The speaker discusses how smaller NATO member countries like Romania acquire ethic scenes as part of package deals. They also highlight the significance of being a NATO member, which allows countries to contribute collectively. However, since Ukraine is not currently a NATO member, it needs to develop its own autonomous air power capability.

14:58 Effectiveness of F-16s in Ukraine's Air Capabilities
The speaker discusses the effectiveness of F-16s in Ukraine's air capabilities compared to what the Russians currently have. They highlight the performance, altitude, and radar observability advantages of F-16s. However, they also mention that the timing of acquiring these aircraft is crucial and should be considered for post-war recovery.

15:40 Building Ukraine's Air Power Capability
After the war, it is important for Ukraine to have its own air power capability for security reasons. Training pilots takes time, so starting the program early can expedite the process.

17:11 Vulnerabilities of F-16 against Modern Surface-to-Air Missiles
The speaker discusses the vulnerabilities of F-16s against modern surface-to-air missiles. They mention that while the F-16 is resilient, it must have vulnerabilities against advanced Russian missiles. However, they do not provide specific details about these vulnerabilities.

18:30 Missile Systems and Electronic Warfare
This section discusses the capabilities and vulnerabilities of missile systems, particularly radar-guided missiles, and the importance of electronic warfare in countering them.

20:05 Suite of Capabilities and Air-to-Air Combat
This section emphasizes the importance of having a comprehensive suite of capabilities for achieving air superiority. It also discusses the significance of detecting enemies first in air-to-air combat.

21:34 Challenges and Vulnerabilities
This section highlights some challenges and vulnerabilities associated with F-16 aircraft, including runway conditions and engine intake issues.

24:18 Simulator Training Benefits
In this section, the speaker discusses the effectiveness of simulation and simulator training for pilots.

24:59 Simulator Training Benefits
The speaker talks about the advantages of using simulators for pilot training and shares an example of intensive simulator training.

25:54 Time Required for Pilot Readiness
The speaker discusses the time required to get pilots physically and mentally prepared for flying F-16s. Pilots with prior experience in fighter-type aircraft will have a higher level of fitness and readiness. The experience they bring with them plays a significant role in their ability to adapt quickly during training. The duration of physical and mental preparation varies depending on individual experience levels.
 

ngatimozart

Super Moderator
Staff member
Verified Defense Pro
Part 2.

27:06 Pilot Training Process
The speaker explains the training process for pilots, including technical training and simulator programs. Pilots undergo intensive technical training to understand the aircraft's systems and how to handle various situations. Simulator training is a crucial part of the program, allowing pilots to practice procedures in a controlled environment. In the past, simulators were not available, so pilots went directly from classroom learning to flying, increasing the intensity of their training.

27:45 Effectiveness of Combat-Ready Pilots
The speaker discusses what it means for a pilot to be effective and combat-ready after completing their training.

29:20 Complexity of Radar Operation
The speaker reflects on the complexity of operating an aircraft's radar system and its importance in air combat scenarios.

30:12 International Cooperation in Defense
The importance of international cooperation in defense and the need for a smarter way of training. Most nations spend their own defense money on their own defense budgets and priorities. Ukraine needed help because most countries would not be able to protect themselves if invaded. The West needs to improve its ability to operate as a joint force and effectively train together. Creating a networked ecosystem for training is crucial for operating effectively in international coalitions.

30:34 Integration and Communication in Military Training
The need for better integration and communication in military training. The West is still very stovepipe, lacking integration between different military simulators. There is a need to find a smarter way of training that allows for linking different simulators. A common language and architecture are necessary for effective training in international coalitions.

30:54 Training limitations and the importance of simulator-based training.
Live environments for training are heavily regulated with limited risk-taking opportunities. Simulator-based training allows exploration of limits, pushing beyond them, and understanding operational capabilities. Finding a common language and architecture for simulator-based training is essential.

31:14 Operational capability versus equipment in warfare.
In war, operational capability is more important than equipment. \Well-trained, motivated people, logistics, doctrine, etc., contribute to operational capability. Clear objectives are necessary for success in warfare.

32:08 Wake-up call regarding complacency and shortcomings in defense.
Taking on nations like Russia has revealed significant shortcomings in stockpiles, weapon regeneration, and international operations. The West needs to make significant changes in defense as a result of this wake-up call.

German Equipment sent to Ukraine.

Destruction of a Russian T-62 VBIED.

Western kit survivability

Cope cage overdosing.

Report of Russians evacuating the Zaporizhzhia NPP. This is concerning considering that the Russians have mined it.
https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1674713097913749507

Russian T-62M battling with anti tank mines and coming second.
https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1674811978408132611

Russian T-62M joining the great tank lagar in the sky. I think that this is the VBIED mentioned above.
https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1674949296179798017

Orban (Hungary) whinging about the EU 50 billion Euro support package for Ukraine.
https://twitter.com/nexta_tv/status/1674788869907300361

Destruction of Russian sabotage team on banks of Kherson River. WARNING imagery of death and bodies.
https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1674822069148581889

CV90s in Ukraine.
https://twitter.com/general_ben/status/1674742325732339713

Vicious Ukrainian Army ammo guard.
https://twitter.com/InUAOfficial/status/1674121232797650945
 

ImperatorOrbis

New Member
At this point I think it is clear that war of attrition is the name of the game and not some blitzkrieg maneuvers to gain a lot of ground. Neither side can really push while the other has artillery and drones zeroed in on you. So the big question is how much stock does Russia have left and can they get supplies from Iran/China/NKorea and if NATO will step up its support for Ukraine. This is looking more and more like Iran-Iraq war. Ukraine should focus more on killing than gaining dirt.
 

rsemmes

Member
"According to the Russian MoD (RuMoD), on the night of June 23, 2023, Russian Aerospace Forces launched long-range, precision strike missile salvo at an AFU foreign-made hardware and weapons depot.
The Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) confirmed the strike on its Facebook page, stating that the Russian attack was directed at the Viysk airfield near the Khmelnytskyi region. According to the UAF statement, Russia used its Tu-95MS strategic bombers to launch 13 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles from over the Caspian Sea, most of which were directed toward the Khmelnytskyi region.
The UAF states that Russia additionally used two drones, one of which was of an unidentified type. During a salvo strike, Russia often mixes slow-moving drones with cruise missiles to confuse the enemy and locate air defense systems." eurasiantimes.com
I see the point now.

@rsemmes Provide a link to the the sources.
Ngatimozart
Excuse me, you mean the actual url, not just the source that everyone can copy and search?
 

Larry_L

Active Member
That?
I find it hard to take anything this reporter says seriously. Much of it is sheer speculation directed at people who will want to believe this narrative. The report is sprinkled liberally with speculative phrases such as (I quote him here): Italics are mine.

"British personnel supporting UAF Storm Shadow operations likely work at the airfield."
"there were rumors that some British personnel had to be evacuated from the airbase due to serious injuries sustained during the attack."
"The pause was likely aimed at lulling Russian AD to lower its guard."
"The much-hyped Ukrainian counteroffensive, which started with probing attacks on June 4, has failed to intensify as Ukrainian forces have not breached Russian defensive positions. Ukrainian armor and mechanized infantry have hit a veritable steel wall of steel, confronting well-organized Russian forces."
"Russia likely struck the Khmelnytskyi airbase with Kh-47 and Kh-22 missiles, not Kh-101/Kh-555 missiles."

This is the first I have heard of British personnel in Ukraine working on Storm Shadow. I would be very interested in any reputable sources that cover British personnel in that role.

As of yesterday there were reports on ISW of storm shadow usage in Berdyansk.

Quote: "Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces launched six Storm Shadow cruise missiles at targets in the vicinity of Berdyansk and that Russian Pantsir-S air defense systems shot down some or all of the missiles.[81]'

You will note the number following the reference to the report. This is a footnote so you can actually read the source yourself.
The following is the link to the ISW report from yesterday. It seems that according to this fairly well documented report that the shaping operations for the counteroffensive are going fairly well. I might say that the "steel wall of steel" has a few dents in it of several kilometers in various places.

 
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