Why ASEAN matters - in the era of great power competition

[OPSSG]

ASEAN’s self inflicted wounds to make it matter less

1. At a speech at the 77th United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 26 Sep 2022, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Retno Marsudi put forward a "New Global Paradigm" for a transformative solution:

• A paradigm of win-win not of zero-sum
• A paradigm of engagement not of containment
• A paradigm of collaboration not of competition

2. While Retno Marsudi proposed the paradigm of collaboration, she also warned that "mini-lateral groupings" are undermining stability as many have "become part of a proxy war between major powers".

3. Given that at its 46th Annual Meeting for Foreign Ministers on 23 Sep 2022, Retno Marsudi underlined a number of points for G77 and China, he speech at the UNGA is clearly hostile to an unnamed party (aka Australia). At the Annual Meeting for Foreign Ministers at the G77, she said Indonesia hoped to:

• reignite the spirit of peace
• strengthen resilience of food and energy supply
• accelerate energy transition
• stronger collaboration among members

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1574701016825708544

4. Good grief — the UNGA comment on 26 Sep 2022 about "mini-lateral groupings" was so unnecessary — ASEAN in 2023 not going to be more relevant, with this approach, as Indonesia is the de facto leader.

5. In response to the US and others (including Britain, Canada, Denmark Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) presenting a draft proposal at the ongoing 51st session of the Human Rights Council (HRC) to hold a special debate over the human rights situation in China's Xinjiang region at the council's next session in early 2023. China and Pakistan on behalf of over 68 cross-regional countries delivered a message for the HRC that said:

​

“Respect for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign states represent basic norms governing international relations. Xinjiang, Hong Kong and Tibet related issues are China’s internal affairs. We oppose politicization of human rights and double standards, or interference in China’s internal affairs under the pretext of human rights.”​

7. 3 ASEAN member states that endorsed China's latest joint statement with Pakistan at the HRC include Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar. Without reform during Indonesia’s turn as Chairman in 2023, these 3 members of ASEAN will always be indirectly under Chinese control.

 

[KrustyKoala]

It's a shame she said that. If there was real stability already, groupings like the QUAD or AUKUS would not need to exist.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 2: ASEAN talk-shop agrees to talk even more

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1590944881731833858

1. I wish this was a joke but it is not. ASEAN has agreed “in-principle” to admit Timor-Leste as the 11th member of the regional bloc, according to a statement by ASEAN leaders.

2. ADMM has matured with limited upside, as such Singapore will shift focus a bit, so as to reach another forum. Likewise, for Jokowi, the G20 will be more impt to Indonesia over time. Singapore’s policy on Timor Leste has changed from years ago. Wikileaks (09SINGAPORE852):

Prof. Tommy Koh told Keith Luse in 2009 tt, "Timor Leste will not become a member of ASEAN as long as Singapore is a member. [Koh] said admitting Timor Leste would take us back 30 years.”​

3. The admission of Timor-Leste into ASEAN must be seen in the light of Indonesian plans for the Indonesia-Pacific Forum for Development meeting; related to this, there are 3 points of focus for cooperation that can be strengthened between ASEAN and Australia.

​

First, concrete cooperation in the Indo-Pacific context.​

​

Second, Australia can be a bridge to strengthen communication between ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum.​

​

Third, Jokowi invited Australia to attend and contribute to the Indonesia-Pacific Forum for Development meeting.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1591258041068187649

4. Interesting to see Vivian put some skin in the game; but Singapore will need all the help we can get from Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Australia & Japan (to avoid a repeat of the 2012 Cambodia fiasco, in the days ahead).

5. Without reform, this is could be tragic for ASEAN credibility — Timor-Leste has the potential to be a great addition — but the country could also be manipulated by a great power (at a crucial time).

Q: Post 2023, what is Indonesia going to do (to manage this risk)?​

6. PLUS ASEAN has agreed to having a mechanism where Myanmar is at an arms length.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1591258474041995264

(a) This is not a solution that NUG supporters want to hear but it is a workable (and sub-optimal solution). ASEAN is slowly changing to cope with China’s rise.​

​

(b) ASEAN needs reform, prior to any acceptance of Timor-Leste as a member. Timor-Leste is going to be prone to voting to those who give more $ or loans, with Beijing having the deepest pockets. It will take the combined aid efforts of Australia, America & Japan to counter.​

​

(c) Management of the Myanmar problem, will be central to retaining relevance for ASEAN. No one in ASEAN (especially the NUG) will be happy with the progress of ASEAN’s 5 point consensus, in 2023; but it is THE roadmap forward.​

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 2: ASEAN talk-shop agrees to talk even more

7. The way to provide context for Singapore’s shift with regard to ASEAN Leaders’ Statement on the Application of Timor-Leste for membership is to understand the increasing importance of FOSS to the country and the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP). The four areas of cooperation from the AOIP are:

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1573174842903433223

• Maritime Cooperation
• Connectivity
• UN Sustainable Development Goals 2030
• Economic and Other Possible Areas of Cooperation

8. In Jun 2022, the terms of reference of the Singapore-hosted ADMM Cybersecurity and Information Centre of Excellence (ACICE), was adopted. ACICE was established in 2021 to share information & build capacity against threats in the cyber & information domains, for ASEAN members.

 

[Ananda]

After 25 years in waiting Anwar Ibrahim finally a PM. I put in here not in Malaysian thread, cause I do see this is part of changing landscape of ASEAN constituences voting. Yet, also not changing much. Malaysian youth just like youth in other ASEAN is become forces of changes. Not surprising consider most ASEAN do have young population pyramide.

However Youth votes, does not mean liberal votes. Considering big portion votes from milenials in Malaysia goes toward Conservatives Islamist. One of reasons why Islamist party like PAS gaining more seats. This is also being seen in Thailand, Indonesia and Philipines where young votes not necessary goes to Liberal (or "progresive") political movements.

While older professionals voters like many of Malaysian colleugues goes to where they believe less tainted by corruption scandals. The old guards still holds sway on more traditionals sometimes rural voters (that ussually benefits from popular perks being handed by rulling parties closer to ellections).

Thus the kinds of trend in Malaysia seems also happen in other ASEAN, which in sense voters shown want changes but not too much. This is why Anwar as long time opposition need to cut deals with some of old guards. Remain to be seen how stable his administration will be.

This is also means changes in ASEAN way of thinking will happen on slow shifting (if any can happen). Even in Indonesia, where when Jokowi's being voted to power, many analysts from locals to international ones shown this is massive changes to Indonesia. In reality it is not. It is some shifting on ussual ways on doing things. In fact one of Jokowi's Senior Minister call some times (like corruptions) even taking back step compared 'even' to Authocratic Rule of Soeharto.

Perhaps this is shown the trend of the voters in Southeast Asia tend to go to something familiars (thus consider) less risky. Big changes are deemed too risky.

 

[OPSSG]

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1605973073600974848

1. What Thailand, Cambodia, Laos & Vietnam did recently, is not only a bad move for themselves, it was a move that undermined ASEAN’s collectively, credibility. In particular, Thailand & Cambodia are doing is as a tag team is both harmful to ASEAN & themselves.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1605919440029220864

2. Other ASEAN members like Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia did not attend the event hosted by the Thai MFA. I wish Indonesia, as the ASEAN Chairman, good luck in managing this mess.

 

[Ananda]

After 12 Years, Indonesia and Vietnam Agree on EEZ Boundaries

The dispute had led to clashes over illegal fishing, and hamstrung the establishment of a united front against China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea.

thediplomat.com

Indonesia, Vietnam conclude EEZ negotiations

Indonesia and Vietnam have completed negotiations on the determination of their Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) boundaries, which lasted 12 years. ...

en.antaranews.com

After 12 years negotiations, Indonesia and Vietnam make agreement on boundaries of each overlaping EEZ in SCS. Eventough on teritorial waters (based on continental shelf) Indonesia and Vietnam already sign it 15 years ago in 2007, but EEZ still not resolve, which sometimes creates fisheries tensions in Natuna and SCS waters.

With this, Both now hope can make concentrate effort on same possitioning negotiation with the elephant in the room. Creating EEZ negotiations with China is another set of different stories.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 1 of 2: Marcos Jr.'s 1st state visit to China

A series of agreements & MOUs were reached during talks between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Philippine President Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos Jr. Both sides agreed to conduct cooperation in the four key areas of agriculture, infrastructure, energy, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges, President Xi said, calling for further efforts in fostering development dynamics and creating new highlights in these areas.

China, Philippines agree to handle disputes 'peacefully', boost cooperation — Reuters

1. Joint action plan for 2023-2025 on agricultural and fisheries cooperation between the Department of Agriculture and China’s Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs
2. MOU on cooperation on the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
3. Handover certificate of the Philippine-Sino Center for Agricultural Technology-Technological Cooperation Phase III (PHILSCAT-TCP III)
4. MOU between the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of China and the Philippines’ Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) on digital and ICT cooperation
5. Protocol of phytosanitary requirements for the export of fresh durians from the Philippines to China between the DA and China’s General Administration of Customs
6. Handover certificate of two China-aid bridge projects in Manila, the Binondo-Intramuros bridge and the Estrella-Pantaleon bridge
7. Framework agreement for the Renminbi-portion of the loan financing for three priority projects of the DPWH
8. Four loan agreements for the mixed-credit financing (US Dollar and Renminbi) of three priority bridge projects under the public works department
9. Implementation of the MOU on tourism between the Philippines’ Department of Tourism and the Ministry of Culture and Tourism of China
10. MOU between the DTI and the Ministry of Commerce of China on electronic commerce cooperation
11. MOU between the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and China’s International Development Cooperation Agency on the Development Cooperation Plan 2023-2025
12. Agreement on economic and technical cooperation between China and the Philippines
13. Mutual recognition agreement between the General Administration of Customs of China and the Bureau of Customs (BOC) of the Philippines on authorized economic operator program
14. Arrangement for the establishment of a communication mechanism on maritime issues between the DFA of the Philippines and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China

China-Philippines deals include new channels to resolve maritime disputes — SCMP

Under item 14, a bilateral agreement signed by Philippine Foreign Minister Enrique Manalo and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi – aims at “establishing direct communication between the foreign ministry of both country at various levels.”

DFA Assistant Secretary Nathaniel Imperial, who handles Asian and Pacific Affairs, said the deal was made “to avoid miscalculation and miscommunication in the West Philippine Sea,” the part of the South China Sea that belongs to the Philippines but is claimed by China.

China is also a major source of the Philippines' official development assistance, and the second largest source of tourists before the COVID-19 pandemic.

 

[Vivendi]

DFA Assistant Secretary Nathaniel Imperial, who handles Asian and Pacific Affairs, said the deal was made “to avoid miscalculation and miscommunication in the West Philippine Sea,” the part of the South China Sea that belongs to the Philippines but is claimed by China.

Thanks for an excellent post.

What does the above actually mean?

A friend of mine was visiting central parts of Vietnam summer of 2022. He talked to several of the locals who told him that the local fishermen could only venture out "a few kms" before they are being harassed by the Chinese. Thus, if correct, it seems that at least for central parts of Vietnam, the local fishermen have already been closed out of most of their traditional fishing areas.

I wonder what the situation is for the "West Philippine Sea" when it comes to fishing?

I understand the Philippines are taking these steps -- on the other hand, it does not change the fundamentals. China can (and no doubt will) "renegotiate" and modify these deals whenever and however it pleases them. China also will not let this deal hinder them in taking whatever steps they deem necessary to take full control over whatever parts of the South China Sea they want to control. Only the US would have the capabilities to temper and influence their actions in a meaningful manner.

 

[OPSSG]

Part 2 of 2: Marcos Jr.'s 1st state visit to China

China and Japan are important players in 15 member the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is a trade agreement that benefits the Philippines. There is only ONE game in town, if a developing country wants rapid infrastructure growth — things like railways, bridges and new roads.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1610980810223456258

This was shown when Marcos Jr.'s state visit to China generated US$22.8 billion worth of investment pledges, his office said. This means China gets a vote on any serious expansion of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Americans.

What does the above actually mean?

Basically, it’s a hotline or directory (to call each other).

IIRC, China has agreed to something similar with Brunei but in a crisis, the Chinese side just won’t pick up, unless you have leverage. It’s not in the interest of the Chinese counterpart to pick-up, to bring a difficult issue up the seniority chain, when things go pear shaped.

IMO, the diplomats from the Philippines, not seen as the smartest within ASEAN, but they sure can talk and sound good — the Pinoys plucked a low hanging fruit but I don’t really think it moves the needle. There are unresolved tensions that Marcos Jr wants to avoid.

 

[OPSSG]

The government of the Philippines are not supporting these actions, especially the so called descendants of the Sultanate of Sulu.

Trying to enforce such weak claims would make them no different that China and their 9DL claims.

Agreed.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1621072852995956736

Malaysia has won the case, as the appointment of the arbitrator was held to be invalid.

Post 1 of 2: Malaysia’s Petronas to fight seizure of Luxembourg assets

1. The Paris Court of Appeal allowed an application by the Malaysian Govt for a stay; finding that enforcement of the award could infringe the country’s sovereignty, Malaysia’s law minister Wan Junaidi Tuanku Jaafar said — this was following a French arbitration court ruling in Feb 2022, ordering Malaysia to pay US$14.9 billion to the heirs of the last sultan of Sulu.

(a) Former attorney-general (AG) Tommy Thomas sent a letter in which he expressed regret that Malaysia had not paid the claimants since 2013 after the Lahad Datu intrusion. According to the letter, AG Thomas offered to settle the multi-billion dollar claim with an RM48,000 compensation payment.

(b) Bailiffs seized Petronas’ two Luxembourg-registered subsidiaries, on behalf of the so called Sulu sultan’s heirs. If you read paragraph 5 below:

(i) who is deemed an heir is very problematic; and

(ii) the British also did not pay the sums claimed on the basis that the Sultanate of Sulu has already been dissolved and the British Chartered Company no longer exists

(c) Subsequently, the Malaysian government said it had obtained a stay order against the enforcement of the French arbitration court ruling that ordered the government to pay US$14.92 billion to the heirs of the Sulu sultanate. Petronas also said the action taken against it was “baseless”. It added that the units had previously divested their assets in Azerbaijan with the proceeds already repatriated.

2. Intra-ASEAN politics is complex. The Philippines has a fake claim on Sabah, Malaysia — that resulted in a 2013 Lahad Datu incursion. Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob in Mar & Jul 2022 said he pledged to fight the French court ruling, saying his government would not entertain anyone else’s claim over the state. Malaysia is also preparing to have the ruling set aside. My prediction on Sabah becoming an issue came true, much faster than expected.

…

Ideal outcome for Malaysia — all the other legal actions will cease. Glad to see that a proprietary claim of a fake descendant of Sultan of Sulu over Sabah has failed.

 

[Musashi_kenshin]

China’s put-upon maritime neighbours are pushing back

China can no longer count on getting its way in the South China Sea

www.economist.com

In contrast to the agreement with the Philippines, China's having a tougher time with other countries in the area. Malaysia made an application for anextended continental shelf in 2019. Vietnam is working on fortifying its own outlying islands. Indonesia and Vietnam have reached an agreement on their respective economic exclusive zones - it's easier for China if its neighbours also dispute each others EEZs.

U.S. to Boost Military Role in the Philippines in Push to Counter China (Published 2023)

Washington and Manila announced a plan to give the American military access to four new locations in the Southeast Asian country, a growing strategic partner in the region.

www.nytimes.com

The US has also signed an agreement with the Philippines that allows it to position military equipment and build facilities in nine locations across the country. These aren't permanent bases but presumably assets can be placed there very quickly as and when the need arises.

I suppose this is a sign that it's over-simplistic to suggest President Marcos is "pro-China". Rather he's happy to make economic deals with Beijing but doesn't trust it in terms of foreign/military policy.

 

[koxinga]

The US has also signed an agreement with the Philippines that allows it to position military equipment and build facilities in nine locations across the country. These aren't permanent bases but presumably assets can be placed there very quickly as and when the need arises.

While clearly relevant for the SCS situation, these bases are more likely meant as forward staging positions for US forces in a TW contingency. The five bases, if I recall are in Northern Luzon.

I suppose this is a sign that it's over-simplistic to suggest President Marcos is "pro-China". Rather he's happy to make economic deals with Beijing but doesn't trust it in terms of foreign/military policy.

It is the consistent position of all ASEAN nations to keep trade and disputes separate. There are legitimate trade interests and China is a significant market as well as source of FDI, and ironically enough, a safe haven for Chinese money/businesses fleeing the mainland.

The interdependency means using one as leverage over the other serves offers little value.

Disillusioned at home, super-rich Chinese set their sights on Singapore

Singapore has long been a haven for ultra-rich foreigners. But it has seen a fresh influx of wealth since 2021 after it became one of the first Asian cities to significantly ease pandemic restrictions.

www.reuters.com

HKTDC Research

research.hktdc.com

 

[Ananda]

Both now hope can make concentrate effort on same possitioning negotiation with the elephant in the room. Creating EEZ negotiations with China is another set of different stories.

Make them ‘think twice’: what Beijing can do as rivals unite on South China Sea

As rivals try to settle sea boundaries before a legally binding code of conduct is in place, Beijing must boost ‘deterrence’ of acts that provoke its legitimate interests, Chinese analyst says.

amp.scmp.com

The effect on Vietnam and Indonesia settling their EEZ dispute, being seen by China as potential of SEA neighbors in SCS will band their position together. Actually it is expectable that those SEA in SCS will solve their problem with each other first, before settling with elephant in the room.

Each SEA now invest more on Coast Guards infrastructure to patrol and guard resources. Thus each parties Coast Guards facing each other also more reasonable then sending each other Naval forces. It's basically shown faces of maritime constabulary instead military. After all this is Asia, and level of face in confrontation and negotiation is important.

 

[Ananda]

Indonesia akan perkuat kapasitas ASEAN respons tantangan kawasan

Keketuaan Indonesia pada Perhimpunan Bangsa-Bangsa Asia Tenggara (ASEAN) tahun ini akan fokus memperkuat kapasitas organisasi regional itu dalam merespons ...

m.antaranews.com

In today meeting of ACC (ASEAN Coordinating Council) between ASEAN Foreign Minister, it is agreed upon them to take more action concerning Myanmar. However how it's going to do remain unclear, even tough Indonesian Foreign Minister as the country that hold ASEAN chair this year, reiterate the need for ASEAN to resolve Myanmar issue.

Indonesia memegang keketuaan ASEAN pada 2023 dengan mengusung tema "ASEAN Matters: Epicentrum of Growth."

This is one of matter in ASEAN, Economics Growth. That's the centerpiece and that's what the motto that being choose by Indonesian administration for their chairmanship this year. The question will always remain how to balance potential geopolitical conflicts with economics growth priority.

Myanmar membership is already problematic, bringing East Timor (which GDP of USD 3.6 bio is smaller then GDP of neighboring East Nusa Tenggara Province of USD 7.3 bio which's already one of the poorest province in Indonesia), also going to raise question whether it is going to bring another problematic members.

This is going to be interesting chapter on ASEAN future.

 

[Vivendi]

Each SEA now invest more on Coast Guards infrastructure to patrol and guard resources. Thus each parties Coast Guards facing each other also more reasonable then sending each other Naval forces. It's basically shown faces of maritime constabulary instead military. After all this is Asia, and level of face in confrontation and negotiation is important.

China is definitely stepping up it's coast guard infrastructure and presence in the "nine-dash line" area, which is inconsistent with UNCLOS.

Flooding the Zone: China Coast Guard Patrols in 2022 | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative

China’s coast guard presence in the South China Sea is more robust than ever. An analysis of automatic identification system (AIS) data from commercial provider MarineTraffic shows that the China Coast Guard (CCG) maintained near-daily patrols at key features across the South China Sea in 2022...

amti.csis.org

Do the ASEAN have anything similar to the Chinese "maritime militia" ships?

The Ebb and Flow of Beijing’s South China Sea Militia | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative

Analysis of satellite imagery from the past year shows that hundreds of Chinese militia vessels continue to operate in the Spratly Islands on a daily basis. The data confirms the massive scale of militia force in the Spratlys. It also shows a marked consistency in their movement and behavior...

amti.csis.org

How do the various ASEAN cost guards handle the presence of the Chinese coastguard and Chinese militia ships?

 

[koxinga]

Do the ASEAN have anything similar to the Chinese "maritime militia" ships?

Vietnam is playing the same game as the Chinese. E.g modified fishing vessels crewed by militia units

IP22040 | The Vietnamese Maritime Militia: Myths and Realities

The authors' views are their own and do not represent the official position of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, NTU. These commentaries may be reproduced with prior permission from RSIS and due recognition to the authors and...

www.rsis.edu.sg

Vietnam’s Maritime Militia Is Not a Black Hole in the South China Sea | Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative

A series of recent reports from the South China Sea Strategic Situation Probing Initiative (SCSPI) at Peking University’s Institute of Ocean Research have arbitrarily labeled Vietnamese fishermen as “maritime militia” based on limited AIS data without further supporting evidence. But without a...

amti.csis.org

They are also starting to build dedicated vessels that are disguised as fishing vessels ( TK-1482A-class )

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1326430969549611008

How do the various ASEAN cost guards handle the presence of the Chinese coastguard and Chinese militia ships?

Combination of grey (navy) and white (coast guard) and fishery assets to show the flag.

 

[Ananda]

Indonesia to Send 30 Large Fishing Vessels to North Natuna Sea

The move is aimed at asserting Indonesia's sovereignty over a disputed stretch of ocean claimed by China.

jakartaglobe.id

Indonesia also mobilise its fisherman fleet mostly those who work in Java Sea to move in to North Natuna Sea.

Sebulan Melaut di Perairan Natuna, Nelayan Pantura Merugi | Ekonomi

Sebanyak 30 kapal cantrang nelayan dari Kota Tegal, Jawa Tengah sudah melaut di perairan Natuna, Kepulauan Riau untuk menjaga kedaulatan wilayah Indonesia dari kapal asing sejak awal Maret lalu. Bagaimana kabar mereka kini? Ketua Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia (HNSI) Kota Tegal Riswanto...

www.gatra.com

However for most fisherman, the area as part of SCS already crowded with neighborhood fishermens that many Javanese Fishermen found the catch not as abundance as Java sea (which is more guarded as it is Indonesian inland sea).

Siap Diberangkatkan ke Natuna, Ini Permintaan Nelayan Tegal | Politik

Pemerintah akan menggerakkan kapal nelayan Pantura Jawa Tengah ke laut Natuna untuk mengisi kekosongan dan menjaga kedaulatan di kawasan tersebut. Para nelayan di Kota Tegal yang siap diberangkatkan mengajukan permintaan. Ketua Himpunan Nelayan Seluruh Indonesia (HNSI) Kota Tegal Riswanto...

www.gatra.com

So the Javanese fishermen ask for fuel subsidies and other costs allowances. Which is basically what Chinese does to their Fishermen fleet.

Nelayan Natuna kesulitan dapatkan BBM bersubsidi

Nelayan Natuna mengaku masih mengalami kesulitan untuk mendapatkan Bahan Bakar Minyak (BBM) subsidi jenis Solar karena kelangkaan pasokan sejak awal tahun ini. "Dulu ANTARA News kepri kesra ...

kepri.antaranews.com

Local Natuna Fishermen also ask the same, and sometimes it is costing more to subsidies them as they're more logistically challenges then the Javanese Fishermen to get fuel subsidies.

This swarming fishermens approaches that Chinese, then Vietnamese and Indonesian done, is expensive in the end. Not all ASEAN in SCS seems can cope with that. Thus Philippines seems try more on legal approach agreement.

NSA Carlos recommends regional fishing agreement with China amid West Philippine Sea issue

National Security Adviser (NSA) Clarita Carlos on Friday suggested a regional regulatory fishing agreement with China amid its alleged continued activities in the West Philippine Sea (WPS).

www.gmanetwork.com

Which then raise questions whose going to "blink" first. In the end basically even Philippines that seems so far has more budgetary challenges to cope on the game in SCS also going to follow China and other ASEAN steps:

1. Build more presences of White Fleet supported by Grey Fleet
2. Build more fishermens presence,
3. Build more natural assets exploration and then potential production presences (if they found Hydrocarbon as Indonesian and Vietnamese done). Chinese off course shown the approach by build physical presences of Islands reclamation.
4. Build those as approach for more chips on bargaining with regional agreed conduct in SCS.

The #4 is what China wants. As thats in the end part of legally binding agreement on SCS sovereignty carving. However they off course insist on their term. Again as this is is Asia, then the nature are presences of "faces" first (#1 to #3) is always important to shown how far you willing to go. This is in the end part of bargaining.

 

[koxinga]

I wonder what the situation is for the "West Philippine Sea" when it comes to fishing?

Combination of grey (navy) and white (coast guard) and fishery assets to show the flag.

Here is a real example of what really goes down here in the West Philippines Sea, where you have BRP Magbanua (Philippines Coast Guard, white) and BRP Andres Bonifacio (Philippines Navy, grey) playing hide and seek with the Chinese maritime milita and Chinese Coast Guard (CCGV 5204) who was harassing local fishermen.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1621966172811067393

PH fishers' harassment at Ayungin Shoal probed

(UPDATE) THE Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) said on Saturday that it is currently investigating a recent incident of harassment at Ayungin Shoal (Second Thomas Shoal) in the West Philippine Sea involving a Filipino fishing boat and a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel.

www.manilatimes.net

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

Some nice photos of ASEAN-frigates...

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1656959365956640775