Why ASEAN matters - in the era of great power competition

[STURM]

So that people in power cannot take revenge against him for what he has done?

More convoluted than that. PM me if you want to discuss this further; I'll explain.

My point is, if he is staying because he feels his work is not complete, then that is pretty much a self serving reason rather than for the greater good of Malaysia.

The point you're making is a point I was driving at in my previous posts .... As for being 'self serving' every politician is 'self serving' to an extent; part of the profession.

 

[Ananda]

Video in Jokowi and Putin meeting yesterday. Day before that, Jokowi meet Zelensky. One thing I'm notice is Putin gesture to visit from non western leader. Not only with Jokowi, but also with Senegal President as African Union Presidency, Putin shown more close contact. No large table between them.

The speach of both Putin and Jokowi. Basically talking more on trade between both countries, especially to enhance grain and fertilizers. Yesterday Jokowi talk with Zekensky to bring up Ukraine grain export coridor. In this meeting with Putin Jokowi told in his speach of Putin assurance that Russia will open that coridor and will let Ukraine grain export through that.

Seems Putin want to shown his intentions to speed up Russian own food and fertilizers export toward developing world.

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

Myanmar MiG-29 violates Thai airspace

A cross-border violation by a Myanmar Air Force military aircraft engaged in military operations on 30 June prompted a scramble by Thai fighter jets.

www.janes.com

Remarkable incident, it happened on 30 June at the Myanmar-Thai border. The border/airspace violation was maybe accidentally, or the Myanmar pilots thought "just for two minutes, no problem".

Does someone knows if such airspace violations often happen between Myanmar and Thailand?

 

[OPSSG]

Does someone knows if such airspace violations often happen between Myanmar and Thailand?

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1542829959060033537

1. As I understand, it happens from time to time, during the fighting season against the rebel groups.

2. Thailand is aware of the problem — they have not committed their F-16Cs to scramble at each and every intrusion but the Thais really do not like to have their hands forced in this manner.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1542489604283961345

3. Thailand has made a token effort to show resolve with a flight of F-16Cs and I think Myanmar will back off from cross border strikes for a few months.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 2: Malaysia’s Petronas to fight seizure of Luxembourg assets

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1548151554418839552

1. The Paris Court of Appeal allowed an application by the Malaysian Govt for a stay; finding that enforcement of the award could infringe the country’s sovereignty, Malaysia’s law minister Wan Junaidi Tuanku Jaafar said — this was following a French arbitration court ruling in Feb 2022, ordering Malaysia to pay US$14.9 billion to the heirs of the last sultan of Sulu.

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(a) Former attorney-general (AG) Tommy Thomas sent a letter in which he expressed regret that Malaysia had not paid the claimants since 2013 after the Lahad Datu intrusion. According to the letter, AG Thomas offered to settle the multi-billion dollar claim with an RM48,000 compensation payment.​

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(b) Bailiffs seized Petronas’ two Luxembourg-registered subsidiaries, on behalf of the so called Sulu sultan’s heirs. If you read paragraph 5 below:​

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(i) who is deemed an heir is very problematic; and​

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(ii) the British also did not pay the sums claimed on the basis that the Sultanate of Sulu has already been dissolved and the British Chartered Company no longer exists​

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(c) Subsequently, the Malaysian government said it had obtained a stay order against the enforcement of the French arbitration court ruling that ordered the government to pay US$14.92 billion to the heirs of the Sulu sultanate. Petronas also said the action taken against it was “baseless”. It added that the units had previously divested their assets in Azerbaijan with the proceeds already repatriated.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1549301181755060225

2. Intra-ASEAN politics is complex. The Philippines has a fake claim on Sabah, Malaysia — that resulted in a 2013 Lahad Datu incursion. Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob in Mar & Jul 2022 said he pledged to fight the French court ruling, saying his government would not entertain anyone else’s claim over the state. Malaysia is also preparing to have the ruling set aside. My prediction on Sabah becoming an issue came true, much faster than expected.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1547493884192002049

3. The alleged heirs of the Sultan of Sulu sought to amend the interpretation of the Jan 1878 agreement: from Sabah as a 'ceded territory' to a 'leased territory'. It is plain from the English text of the documents tt the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu DO NOT have a lease, & the judgement in Paris based on a translation error by the claimants — it takes a great deal of legal incompetence for the case to be handled thus.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 2: Malaysia’s Petronas to fight seizure of Luxembourg assets

4. In the Feb-Mar 2013 Lahad Datu incursion, over a hundred armed invaders travelled by sea to Lahad Datu, terrorised locals & killed 2 Malaysian Police in a shootout. This resulted 68 of these murderers being killed in clearing operations by 6,500 Malaysian Security Forces. Another 443 individuals were held for various offences.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1556942804881793025

5. This of course has some support from Philippine law makers.

6. A proprietary claim of a fake descendant of Sultan of Sulu over Sabah, is a personal proprietary claim. It is not a matter of Philippines to intervene.

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(a) The first charter was signed on 29 Dec 1877 between the Sultan of Brunei with Alfred Dent and Baron de Overbeck; followed by the second charter on 22 Jan 1878 when Sultan of Sulu made an agreement with Alfred Dent and Baron de Overbeck.​

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(b) The agreements, were made by the same two individuals, Dent and Overbeck with the Sultan of Brunei in 1877, and the Sultan of Sulu in 1878 which was just a few weeks apart. The contents in the agreement refer to the same territory beginning at the Pandasan River to Paitan, Sugut, Bangaya, Labuk, Sandakan, Kinabatangan, Mumiang and all the other territories as far as Sibuco River. The only difference was the date the agreement was signed and the name of the sultan who signed it. It seems that the British knew Brunei had more right and they went to Brunei first.​

(c) Looking back, in Jan 1878, the Sultan of Sulu had no credibility, no stand, no sovereignty to make an agreement since he was already colonised by the Spanish and the Spanish did not recognise him. In other words, the Brunei agreement is more valid than the Sulu if we were to look at it today. On record, the British government never paid compensation. Why not? Because they say the Sultanate of Sulu has already been dissolved and the British Chartered Company no longer exists.​

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(d) The last recognised Sultan of Sulu was Sultan Jamalul Kiram II and based on historical records in Malaysia, Philippines and Brunei, he died in 1936 and had 7 daughters but no son — under their laws daughters can’t inherit. Jamalul Kiram III, is but one of the many claimants to the throne of the Sultanate of Sulu and 20 Oct 2013, he died of multiple organ failure in Simunul, Tawi-Tawi, Philippines.​

7. The third charter was when the British gave the North Borneo Chartered Company the power to administer Sabah on 1 Nov 1881, followed by the fourth charter on 9 July 1963, when Sabah signed an agreement to join with Sarawak, Singapore and the Malay Federation to be free from colonisation.

 

[koxinga]

The government of the Philippines are not supporting these actions, especially the so called descendants of the Sultanate of Sulu.

Trying to enforce such weak claims would make them no different that China and their 9DL claims.

 

[STURM]

Well it remains to be seen what the position of the new government is; it probably will maintain the status quo; not officially dropping the claim but not actively pursuing it.

As it stands the issue of Sabah resonates mainly with Tausugs but they are a minority confined to a few specific areas in the country [the Tawi Tawi area and parts of Mindanao]. The majority of Filipinos in other parts of the country have far more important things to be concerned about. The issue of Sabah is not in their collective mindset the way the Malvinas is with many Argentinians.

 

[STURM]

In the Feb-Mar 2013 Lahad Datu incursion, armed invaders travelled by sea to Lahad Datu, terrorised locals & killed 2 Malaysian Police in a shootout. This resulted 68 of these murderers being killed in clearing operations by 6,500 Malaysian Security Forces. Another 443 individuals were held for various offences.

The policemen were taken by surprise whilst at a seaside village; hacked and reportedly mutilated. My guess is their attackers were under the influence of shabu. Quite a bit of the kidnap raids on Sabah were by shabu influenced individuals. On the Lahad Dato attackers some had Malaysian ID cards; having previously lived in Sabah. They knew the area.

A Malaysian soldier was also later killed. Another Malaysian casualty was a soldier killed in a road accident in the area. Also killed was a teenager who was in the "red zone" and was mistakenly shot.

 

[Sandhi Yudha]

|"Both sides will implement consensus reached on China-ASEAN Special Summit to Commemorate the 30th Anniversary of China-ASEAN Dialogue Relations, uphold open regionalism, and advance China-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Peace, Security, Prosperity, Sustainable Development and Amity."|

Of course...

|"Both sides also committed to the completion of the Jakarta-Bandung High-speed Railway on schedule as a flagship project, "|

As expected this useless expensive prestige project is getting full attention and priority.

Joint Press Statement on the Bilateral Meeting between President of the People's Republic of China and President of the Republic of Indonesia

At the invitation of H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People's Republic of China, H.E. Joko Widodo, President of the Republic of Indonesia, paid a visit

www.presidenri.go.id

 

[Ananda]

Marcos Jr first foreign visit is to Indonesia, and then follow to Singapore. This's part of Marcos effort to shown under his office, Philippines will shown focus to strengthen ASEAN internal co-op to build combined positioning.

In short ASEAN as individually consists of small-middle power, knows well the Geopolitical situation now make them need to band together more. Question now for ASEAN is what to do with Myanmar.

 

[OPSSG]

Question now for ASEAN is what to do with Myanmar.

1. I think the more important question is — can ASEAN expel Cambodia? As long as Cambodia is a member of ASEAN, we will never arrive at a consensus on Myanmar. Indonesia is the next ASEAN chair, please fix ASEAN as an organisation by creating a mechanism to expel a member state. Without it, 3 members of ASEAN will always be under Chinese control.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1572729283398991872

2. Words cannot describe my shame at the actions of the current ASEAN chair. Cambodia is not acting on the 5 point consensus.

 

[Ananda]

Indonesia is the next ASEAN chair, please fix ASEAN as an organisation by creating a mechanism to expel a member state. Without it, 3 members of ASEAN will always be under Chinese control.

Expulsion mechanism ? I'm afraid that will be a day when everyone agree significant changes on ASEAN charter, thus ASEAN motivation.

Even with Myanmar right now, what they are doing is basically quasy suspension on certain activity. More then that, is bit too much. Not something that ASEAN willing to do at this stage.

 

[koxinga]

The silent treatment (to some degree now), maybe suspension seems more likely than outright expulsion.

Even that is an issue because the Charter left no explicit provisions but left it to the ASEAN Summit to decide.

 

[ngatimozart]

I think that expulsion maybe a bit extreme, but as @Ananda suggests maybe a quasi suspension like they have done with Myanmar or a partial or full suspension. The other thing could be to threaten to suspend or to remove the PRC's status as an observer nation given that it is interfering within ASEAN affairs.

The three ASEAN member nations who howl the most at such a suggestion could also be threatened with suspension because they have placed the PRCs interests ahead of ASEANs interests, showing allegiance to an outside power rather than to the organisation and its members. It comes down to trust and the remaining members could cite a considerable lack of trust in the fidelity of those three members. After whilst ASEAN does require compromise in its dealings, compromise requires trust in all parties, by all parties.

 

[koxinga]

The three ASEAN member nations who howl the most at such a suggestion could also be threatened with suspension because they have placed the PRCs interests ahead of ASEANs interests, showing allegiance to an outside power rather than to the organisation and its members.

No one in ASEAN would be prepared to call them out. Afterall, their choice of alignment would be seen as an internal matter and they would probably throw the same charge at countries like Singapore as an American lackey for supporting this move.

That would split ASEAN irrevocably due to the loss of face.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 1 of 2: Seeking new sources of leverage

That would split ASEAN irrevocably due to the loss of face.

1. If you ask me, if the outcome is only to split ASEAN into 3:7 and I would suggest that its leaders must consider initiating reform to provide for such ‘divorce proceedings’ — to keep the founding 5 ASEAN countries + Brunei & Vietnam united.

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(a) I am certain that the Philippine decision to seek an arbitral tribunal ruling in July 2016 under UNCLOS between the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was funded and instigated by the Americans.​

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(b) The latest move and ‘suggestion’ is again the brain child of another American think tank. I say better more united and smaller 7 members (than slightly larger and totally ineffective 10 and easily manipulated by either the PRC or by USA).​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1570184910471561225

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(c) While Greg Poling may approve of the idea fronted by Imee Marcos, such an act is hostile to the national interests of both Indonesia and Singapore. More importantly, if Imee Marcos’ suggestion was adopted, the CoC negotiations with China will immediately fail — which suits the agenda of the Americans. In reality, a Philippine Senator has no seat at the table of ASEAN defence ministers — no response to her idea is even necessary and even if the Philippine Secretary of National Defence brings it up, there is no obligation on the Indonesia or Singapore Ministers to consider such a suggestion.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1539632064089030656

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(d) While Indonesia wants to position itself above South China Sea disputes, it has legitimate concerns about Vietnam’s and China’s fishermen intruding into its EEZ. Likewise, Singapore’s FIR is the largest in the South China Sea (SCS). It is a thankless task but it does not mean the country will allow others to dictate over flight over SCS. More importantly, SCS is part of Singapore’s SLOCs and it is the only ASEAN country that can defend its SLOCs, up to 1,000km from the main island.​

2. Let me add 3 points:

One, the conversation must be had — if not, the slow Cambodian rot as shown in 2012 & 2022 will ultimately make ASEAN irrelevant. Just having the conversation, will lead to change by 2032; and the conversation should at this time be limited only to Myanmar — so that current ASEAN states are no longer bound by the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation with regard to an army in Myanmar that has seized power from a country’s elected representatives.​

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Two, ASEAN may want to consider enhanced membership, where certain members if they are seen as not contributing ‘enough’ or acting in bad faith against an agreed ASEAN consensus, the chairmanship ‘turn’ can be skipped (to an alternate round) — in other words, Cambodia only gets to be chairman once every 20 years and next hold the role in 2052 (instead of 2042). There is already an example of this in 2006 (IIRC), where Myanmar gave up its turn.​

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Three, the leadership tandem of Singapore & Indonesia can move outside of ADMM when needed through the SAF & TNI (to help Indonesia assert its EEZ claims in Natuna Islands); but can the Philippines afford to do so with M’sia & Vietnam? Brunei & Singapore have a special relationship to ensure diplomatic moves are in lock-step with each other — at ADMM, the SAF helps Brunei lead successful ADMM Plus events. Because Brunei won’t agree with Imee Marcos’ idea to exclude Singapore from the CoC.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1572548224132546560

3. If even the UNSC rendered less effective by China and unable to reform, to odds of success in a regional organisation elsewhere must be lower.

 

[OPSSG]

Post 2 of 2: Seeking new sources of leverage

4. Further, I don’t think China will allow point one and will be actively hostile to the 7 in a manner ASEAN did not plan for, if we move on point 2.

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1518371696385818625

5. Since its inception in the mid-1990s following China’s occupation of Mischief Reef, a functional ASEAN-China Code of Conduct for the South China Sea (CoC) has remained elusive. Until a final CoC is agreed upon, pre-existing CBMs such as the Code on Unplanned Encounters at Sea could serve as a useful firebreak against untoward incidents between naval forces in the South China Sea. If ASEAN does not develop options to the CoC with China, it will reward China’s grey zone tactics.

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(a) Under Singapore’s chairmanship in 2018, ASEAN accomplished one of the most significant developments in the CoC process: the adoption of the Single Draft Negotiating Text (SDNT) as the capstone document for ongoing negotiations. Collin Koh argues that for all its short-comings, the CoC remains necessary to keep the confidence building mechanisms running. IMO, the CoC must be more than just the 2002 “DoC-plus”. But it can still be an "abject failure". The CoC needs to have clear and unambiguous provisions on the dos-and-don’ts for signatories to avoid being an "abject failure".​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1540548442484645888

(b) Alternatively, ASEAN should walk away from the CoC process because it is neither productive nor feasible. Instead, they should spend their diplomatic energy and resources to pursue more effective measures sanctioned under international law. This will not only strengthen UNCLOS but would also boost their domestic legitimacy and support abroad — Bich Tran argues that ASEAN should in fact walk away from the CoC process.​

https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1573423376336576525

6. I wonder what is the end game for Malaysia? They certainly don’t have leverage or carrots to help Thailand and Cambodia move from a non-intervention view point.

7. ASEAN’s approach to Myanmar from UN meeting sidelines are, as follows:

(a) some ASEAN members are not happy with 5PC progress;​

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(b) collectively, ASEAN still not interfering but “seeking Charter adherence”;​

(c) ASEAN still not seeking to expel Myanmar; and​

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(d) Cambodia as chairman is intensifying engagement.​

 

[STURM]

I wonder what is the end game for Malaysia? They certainly don’t have leverage or carrots to help Thailand and Cambodia move from a non-intervention view point.

Which is why they are trying to galvanise the United Nations Security Council and various members of ASEAN into taking a more proactive stance.

Malaysian PM laments lack of UN action on Myanmar crisis

Thousands have been killed since Myanmar’s military seized power in February 2021 from Aung San Suu Kyi’s government.

www.aljazeera.com

''Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob has expressed his disappointment with the United Nations Security Council over its response to the continuing political crisis in Myanmar. Ismail told the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on Friday that the Security Council had not taken “any serious action” in dealing with the situation in Myanmar and described the response as “very saddening''. “Some even see the Security Council as having washed its hands of [Myanmar] and handing the matter over to ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations],” he said. ''

''Malaysia is disappointed that there is no meaningful progress in the implementation of the ASEAN Five Point Consensus especially by the Myanmar junta. In its current form, the ASEAN Five Point Consensus cannot continue any longer,” he said. Malaysia has been leading calls for a tougher approach to Myanmar’s military administration, and has also called for ASEAN to engage with the National Unity Government (NUG) established by the elected politicians the generals removed from power. The Philippines, Indonesia and Singapore have also pushed for a firmer line with Myanmar’s generals.''

 

[koxinga]

Alternatively, ASEAN should walk away from the CoC process because it is neither productive nor feasible. Instead, they should spend their diplomatic energy and resources to pursue more effective measures sanctioned under international law. This will not only strengthen UNCLOS but would also boost their domestic legitimacy and support abroad — Bich Tran argues that ASEAN should in fact walk away from the CoC process.

I don't agree. But it is important to recognize two key points:
1) The CoC process was initiated by ASEAN along the core principles consensus; however you look at it, it will look like ASEAN failed.
2) I don't believe China is negotiating in the CoC in good faith and ASEAN should be realistic about it.

Personally, I don't think the ASEAN-CoC will lead to anything useful in itself. BUT the process itself shouldn't be overlooked and it seems to have become a test of patience between ASEAN and China, to see who would call the bluff.