The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

STURM

Well-Known Member
I'm seeing shockingly little Russian fixed-wing activity. With the good work Su-34s and Su-30SMs did in Syria, it really makes me wonder.
What about UASs? I would have assumed that these are being extensively employed at a tactical level; yet we've seen no footage of them.
 

Toptob

Active Member
The video of a Russian chopper mi-35/24 taking out the buk system right beside driving civilians was insane.

Overall, its very impressive how Russia has been hitting so many military targets while keeping civilians casualties to such a minimum. During the Georgian war, I don't recall Russia having such precision. They have really upped their precision strike game.



This has been extremely odd, I havent seen any reports or videos of Su-34s being used. Is Russia that scared of losing a few of these units to anti-air. I thought they had over 100 of these operational. In Syria we saw how much damage just a few Su-34s did, would this not be the best system to batter up Kyev with before an Assault?
It does look surreal seeing all those video's being shot by people from their apartment or from their car showing some pretty hardcore combat. One of the videos in Feanor's latest update showed incoming tracers, presumably from a machine gun looking at the number, and the dude is just standing there... I was thinking DUDE get down!!! However it's still a war and things like this still happen.

I do have to say real quick that the dude in the last photo in this series with the long coat looks like a total chad! But the pictures of armed civilians look very bizarre though. I did notice that they're carrying AK-74's as far as I can see, and as far as I know the Ukrainian military still operates AKM's with the reserves. So why would they distribute AK-74's to civilians? (BTW I'm not a firearms expert and I had to look it up, so correct me if I'm wrong. but the shoulder stocks and muzzle devices make me think they are AK-74's).

And as far as I'm aware they prepositioned somewhere between 30 and 40 Su-34's around Ukraine. So I don't know why we're not seeing more fast air activity, but looking at what they prepared they looked to be light on fixed wing air power to me. I also haven't really seen much about ISR assets being employed, only something about two A-50's taking off at some point. And while I understand that ISR and SIGINT assets aren't meant to be seen or leave evidence that they've been operating somewhere. The Russians do have a bunch of drones and if we look at other recent conflicts then there's usually a bunch of reports of all different kinds of drones being shot down.

Like Feanor, I'm very much interested in what lessons from Syria the Russians are applying in this conflict.

EDIT:

Exactly @STURM ! You'd think that one of those things would have met a manpad or some flak by now, in Libya it was like all kinds of UAV's where just dropping from the sky and those guys had a lot less in the way air defense.

And they do seem to have deployed a boatload of assorted artillery @Boagrius ! I don't think there's any European army that could such a high ratio of artillery with their units.

But we know that Russian conops are artillery heavy. Maybe they really are hesitant to engage the Ukrainian air defenses because they envision controlling the airspace with surface to air assets and they plan to keep their fast air for stand off strikes and or selective, targeted interdiction missions and limited air support with the Su-25's when they feel it's really necessary or if they have a good opportunity. It does look like the attack helicopters get to hunt down targets, maybe because they operate them at such low altitudes that they can avoid a lot of the heavier air defenses and that's what they're really being careful of. This is all speculation of course, but it is well known that the old red army's conops had all but given up on winning the war in the air and relied heavily on GBAD and artillery for support fires. What do they say? A leopard doesn't lose it's spots?

EDIT 2: I don't want to spam so I'll keep editing some more

Things are happening so fast, I just saw this. Apparently the Netherlands is sending 200 stinger missiles to Ukraine.
 
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Rock the kasbah

Active Member
In a military sense, we speak of numbers and assigned categories of violence to assess the situation. On a human level, however, every life lost is one life too many.

My sense right now fear for the worst. The harder the Ukrainian resistance, the more likely that Putin will unleash hell and be indescriminate to achieve his goals.

Time is not on his side. I can't see Russia continuing beyond 3, 4 weeks as the cost both militarily and financially would be unsustainable. I understand the goal of the Ukrainian defenders is to make the Russian forces bleed for every inch of ground they take and rightly so. But the toil would be extremely high, especially on the civilians and infrastructure.

Strategically, does it make sense to keep Kiev or to declare it an open city after a period of resistance? It is symbolic, yes. But as long as the Armed Forces/political structure remain, they remain a viable player (supported by the west) in any post war situation.
Dunno about your supported from the west
Looks to me like the people of kyiv are having a go on their own
I could be wrong perhaps those molotov cocktails are filled with imported fuel
Either way I did notice they're bowling from a short run up
 

denix56

Active Member

Probably the answer to why some of the civilians use firearms that differ from Ukrainian military.

The short analysis of the possible future of Russian social media as the relations with West deteriorates.

It seems (if video is true), that some of the soldiers are relatively low experienced as he is a private (google says that they get next rank after 5 months, please correct if I am wrong). It is even highly possible that he is a conscript as he says he was born in 2002, so it is unlikely he has a diploma making him possible to join army as a contractor from the beginning.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 1 of 3: Prep work to slow an advance & for urban war
What about UASs? I would have assumed that these are being extensively employed at a tactical level; yet we've seen no footage of them.
1. The Russians have them; if the Ukrainian Army is seen by any Russian UAS, they know an artillery strike is to follow. You are not seeing footage, because those who stick around to film them tend to die. Ukraine has them too but they don’t want to draw attention to their UAS operations.

2. More interestingly is the open call for drones by Ukraine as they dig into fight within the city centres. Using Molotov cocktails, is a sign of desperation — it’s a very short ranged weapon — a whole bunch of Ukrainian throwers can be machine gunned down. My preference is to make command wire triggered IEDs, or lay anti-tank mines when fighting armour. This is a tactically superior solution to the last ditch use of Molotov cocktails.

3. In an effort to hinder Russian advance, the Ukrainian Army is blowing up bridges and this includes of the bridge over Seym river. Most importantly, we should not be making assumptions on how this war will progress based on the opening 24-48 hours.
 
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STURM

Well-Known Member
The The Russians have them; if the Ukrainian Army is seen by any Russian UAS, they know an artillery strike is to follow. You are not seeing footage, because those who stick around to film them tend to die. Ukraine has them too but they don’t want to draw attention to their UAS operations.
In the eastern Ukraine years ago the Rsssians integrated tactical UASs with arty/MLRSs to enable a very effective strike/recce complex. Recursion is, are the Russians able to deploy and operate UASs effectively in the past. Also, have the Ukrainians invested in jammers and other stuff to counter them?
.
Using Molotov cocktails, is a sign of desperation — it’s a very short ranged weapon — a whole bunch of Ukrainian throwers can be machine gunned down.
It's Indeed a sign of desperation and also poltically symbolic in that it shows the lengthts the Ukrainians will go to defend themselves. Just as desperate and politically symbolic as the move to issue anyone with an assault rifle, even those who lack the training and who are above a certain age group.
 
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OPSSG

Super Moderator
Staff member
Part 2 of 3: Prep work to slow an advance & for urban war
Just as desperate and politically symbolic as the move to issue anyone with an assault rifle, even those who lack the training and who are above a certain age group.
4. My approach has always been keeping these discussions at a technical level. The Ukrainians lack communications, so they can’t have effective armed over watch and these gangs of armed but untrained men are not effective against armour. I see bravely without organisation — a lot of armed men walking around but not building fighting positions or running communications wires to command posts.

5. The available avenues of advance is predictable. There are lots of things civilians can do in an urban war zone, over a 72 hour period, without needing to take up a weapon, for example:
(a) runners can help with food, water and ammo delivery and medics can provide first aid to combatants;​
(b) carpenters can build and prep. of hidden fighting positions in flats and houses, by filling thousands of sandbags, to reinforce walls, as primary and alternate firing positions for the Ukrainian Army in each defence sector;​
(c) builders can help create holes in walls, for key hole shooting, to increase death toll of Russians in an urban fight;​
(d) mechanics can help keep motor vehicles or IFVs running; and​
(e) everyone can dig anti-tank ditches to reduce avenues of approach and funnel the enemy to a kill zone.​

6. Some minimum effort fortification at avenues of advance will force the Russians to destroy numerous buildings (selected clusters of buildings), which is bad for Russian PR and optics. Finland has this figured out down to a science — on how to use civilians to aid the military effort. Not everybody needs to be a shooter.

7. I prefer to focus on technical solutions and not worry about the PR angle.

(a) What Ukraine really need are anti-tank, anti-personnel and area defence mines to augment their campaign relative to the Russian axis of advance. But using mines is bad from a PR perspective, so the Americans and British will not supply them.​
(b) In any sector defence plan, I will use all the above, claymore mines and also make thousands of command wire IEDs of different shapes and sizes, to create kill numerous zones. In a kill zone, I will sprinkle nuts or other metal objects, on the ground, to give false positives to any attempted metal sweep.​
(c) These IEDs can be prefabricated by Chemists to look like bricks or other common rubble, in a workshop, where someone dips, the ball bearings, nails and rags (to be packed in the explosives and petrol), into rat poison — which makes basic first aid insufficient. The rags will help stick to the skin and keep burning for longer. A 8-person IED workshop, in a 7 day production run, will kill more Russians than 100 untrained men with guns.​

8. If at the last minute, a country decides to give guns to tons of civilians, you are going to have tons of friendly fire incidents, because they lack trigger discipline — PR moves do not save Ukrainian lives — technical solutions do.
 
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Stuart M

Well-Known Member
But we know that Russian conops are artillery heavy. Maybe they really are hesitant to engage the Ukrainian air defenses because they envision controlling the airspace with surface to air assets and they plan to keep their fast air for stand off strikes and or selective, targeted interdiction missions and limited air support with the Su-25's when they feel it's really necessary or if they have a good opportunity. It does look like the attack helicopters get to hunt down targets, maybe because they operate them at such low altitudes that they can avoid a lot of the heavier air defenses and that's what they're really being careful of. This is all speculation of course, but it is well known that the old red army's conops had all but given up on winning the war in the air and relied heavily on GBAD and artillery for support fires. What do they say? A leopard doesn't lose it's spots?
Ukraine air defence is of Soviet origin, it possible that as they are well aware of their capabilities, they don't want to send their jets against that when they don't have to?
If that's the case, it indicates that the Russians do have limited war goals and don't see the need to risk expensive assets, again, if they don't have to or other assets can do the job more or less as well?
 
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koxinga

Well-Known Member
@OPSSG

Arming civilians like this without tactical leadership is likely to lead to a lot of friendly fire from trigger happy/scared civilians, IMO

I don't see any evidence that the defenders in Kyiv are really prepared for urban fighting. When I mean prepared, the closest analog to that part of the world would be the battle of Grozny back in 1999 - 2001. Mining approaches, setting up ant-tank ditches, rat holes for exit and maneuver etc.

Grozny is at the Russian military's bad experience and would likely shape their approach to dealing with urban warfare, which would require massive demolitions, artillery barrages to eliminate these obstacles.
 

mrrosenthal

Member
Any ideas why they only fight at night?
My guess is they have night vision, Ukrainians don't and more importantly, Western satellites can't track attacks at night and give heads up to Ukraine.
 

Kasatka

Member
Any ideas why they only fight at night?
My guess is they have night vision, Ukrainians don't and more importantly, Western satellites can't track attacks at night and give heads up to Ukraine.
maybe but there's other methods of seeing through night/weather with satellites. especially SAR. and if the weather is good IR. your second point might be spot on. ukrainian military might have them, but the general populous doesn't, and it would add to confusion during night skirmishes in urban environments.
 

Ranger25

Active Member
Staff member
According to the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense:

The RF Armed Forces hit 821 objects of the military infrastructure of Ukraine

. Among them: 14 military airfields, 19 command posts and communication centers, 24 S-300 and Osa anti-aircraft missile systems, 48 radar stations.

Shot down: 7 combat aircraft, 7 helicopters, 9 unmanned aerial vehicles.

87 tanks and other armored combat vehicles, 28 multiple launch rocket systems, 118 units of special military vehicles, 8 military boats of the Ukrainian naval forces were destroyed.

The units of the Russian armed forces have established full control over the city of Melitopol.

I dont think anyone truly has or is reporting any factual casualty numbers. Its all propaganda

for example the Ukraine MOD is reporting

603B413E-4682-47FF-B1BC-07956EB9CD55.jpeg




Hard to say what the truth is at this point but one can assume both sides are suffering heavy losses.
 

Kasatka

Member

I just wonder why the Russians took over the control of the Chernobyl nuclear reactor. It was even one of the first targets. As far as i know the whole powerplant is shut down.
my guess is as good as yours. imho the reason might be purely logistics (it was also one of the routes that the russian convoys took to get to Kiev). also, I seriously doubt anybody would attempt an arty barrage on that site, so that would be a good site to setup a logistics camp.
 

Capt. Ironpants

Active Member
Confirmation from Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs:

Edited to add this, so I don't glop up the thread with repeated posts:

On the refugee front, Poland reported 30,000 entered through their border crossings yesterday, with a backlog still waiting to cross. Just had a look at Google maps and traffic showing *long* backlogs at several border crossings. More here:


Second edit to add: German media reporting Germany has now authorized the Dutch to supply 400 Panzerfäuste to Ukraine. Not that these are significant in themselves (look like bazookas out of an old WWII movie to me). This shows a shift (however slight) in German policy, as only "protective" German-made materiel (helmets, APCs, etc) was permitted previously:

 
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SABRE

Super Moderator
Verified Defense Pro
I dont think anyone truly has or is reporting any factual casualty numbers. Its all propaganda

for example the Ukraine MOD is reporting

View attachment 48956




Hard to say what the truth is at this point but one can assume both sides are suffering heavy losses.
I doubt that Ukrainian sources are in a position to provide reliable information. This might be just a propaganda tactic. However, it does seem that Russian plans haven't exactly gone as planned. They might have been expecting the Ukrainian Army to surrender within 24hr-48hrs. That hasn't happened. And from what it seems there have been losses on the Russian side, which may be unacceptable. I think Russians underestimated the Ukrainians and overestimated themselves. Nevertheless, Russian victory is likely inevitable.
 

wittmanace

Active Member
I doubt that Ukrainian sources are in a position to provide reliable information. This might be just a propaganda tactic. However, it does seem that Russian plans haven't exactly gone as planned. They might have been expecting the Ukrainian Army to surrender within 24hr-48hrs. That hasn't happened. And from what it seems there have been losses on the Russian side, which may be unacceptable. I think Russians underestimated the Ukrainians and overestimated themselves. Nevertheless, Russian victory is likely inevitable.
It gets said alot the past couple of days, but if the Russians were underperforming to the extent being said, you wouldnt expect them to be holding back so much. Key things we havent seen so far including the artillery barrages we know they are capable of and favour, extensive UAS use including directed arty fires as seen until recently in Eastern Ukraine, heavy air to ground attacks from fixed wing (rotorcraft to a limited and degree and seemingly a rather specific circumstance so far it seems), amongst other things. They have also been remarkably quiet in terms of the information war.

Looking at both some of the units held back thus far (eg the earlier mentioned 76th VDV in Belarus) and the favoured historical russian methodology for mechanised warfare (second echelon release, both timing and role), the above issues make sense.

Id be wary if I were in Ukraine fighting, not least because of the recent history of the cauldrons like Debaltseve. I think it has been observed from just before hostilities began that the Russians would be seeking to pin Ukrainian forces in the South East Of Ukraine, for the obvious reasons including encirclement and removal from the fight elsewhere, where the Russian see greater strategic value. None of these points mean Russia isnt performing less well than expected or that they didnt underestimate the Ukrainians, but I think they are issues that give me greater pause for thought rather than the popular response where I am, where we simply assume "putin misjudged" things or the russians bit of more than they can chew.

Im very aware of the historical Soviet/russian application of deep battle theory, strategic depth and the use of reserves, with a key rule for the release of the latter being the identification of the optimal point for their use whilst the first echelon is holding the door open still, as it were. Im not sure where the idea of such great pressure on Putin or the pace of the forces comes from.....I mean, for a start its only a few days in. Given the spectrum of their potential objectives strategically, it may be that the release of all the forces and the above would have resulted in casualties on a scale that would preclude what Russia wants next. Or perhaps the russians are not under pressure (given it was clearly a war of choice including timing, largely) and the threat of the ability to constantly scale up or strike deep along the strategic axis after the ukrainian forces have exhausted themselves is something they think will provide a greater collapse? Im also interested in statements here that Russia must have expected mass surrenders...but perhaps they would only be expecting that after the encirclements have occurred actually, or after they have escalated to mass fires and involving fixed wing, UAS, and artillery in the ways we know they actually can.

Much of what I have seen actually suggests to me that Russia did NOT plan for a fast war in fact, but is rather pacing itself....

Id also note that Russia doesnt seem hugely focused on the PR/psyops aspect...examples like how long it took to release the snake island footage. That could have been a rapid embarrassment for Ukraine. Perhaps the audience just isnt this side of the Donbass
 

Ranger25

Active Member
Staff member
in what may be informational on the capabilities of the VDV, their ground force movements start at dawn and end at sundown mainly conducting daylight operations. this may be indicative of their NVG/Thermal tech for both infantry and armored units. As far back as 25-30 years ago most western Militaries and Especially the US Army prefer to conduct operations at night.

If we couldnt accomplish a mission at night, our units were considered untrained for that mission
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
  • Thread Starter Thread Starter
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It gets said alot the past couple of days, but if the Russians were underperforming to the extent being said, you wouldnt expect them to be holding back so much. Key things we havent seen so far including the artillery barrages we know they are capable of and favour, extensive UAS use including directed arty fires as seen until recently in Eastern Ukraine, heavy air to ground attacks from fixed wing (rotorcraft to a limited and degree and seemingly a rather specific circumstance so far it seems), amongst other things. They have also been remarkably quiet in terms of the information war.

Looking at both some of the units held back thus far (eg the earlier mentioned 76th VDV in Belarus) and the favoured historical russian methodology for mechanised warfare (second echelon release, both timing and role), the above issues make sense.

Id be wary if I were in Ukraine fighting, not least because of the recent history of the cauldrons like Debaltseve. I think it has been observed from just before hostilities began that the Russians would be seeking to pin Ukrainian forces in the South East Of Ukraine, for the obvious reasons including encirclement and removal from the fight elsewhere, where the Russian see greater strategic value. None of these points mean Russia isnt performing less well than expected or that they didnt underestimate the Ukrainians, but I think they are issues that give me greater pause for thought rather than the popular response where I am, where we simply assume "putin misjudged" things or the russians bit of more than they can chew.

Im very aware of the historical Soviet/russian application of deep battle theory, strategic depth and the use of reserves, with a key rule for the release of the latter being the identification of the optimal point for their use whilst the first echelon is holding the door open still, as it were. Im not sure where the idea of such great pressure on Putin or the pace of the forces comes from.....I mean, for a start its only a few days in. Given the spectrum of their potential objectives strategically, it may be that the release of all the forces and the above would have resulted in casualties on a scale that would preclude what Russia wants next. Or perhaps the russians are not under pressure (given it was clearly a war of choice including timing, largely) and the threat of the ability to constantly scale up or strike deep along the strategic axis after the ukrainian forces have exhausted themselves is something they think will provide a greater collapse? Im also interested in statements here that Russia must have expected mass surrenders...but perhaps they would only be expecting that after the encirclements have occurred actually, or after they have escalated to mass fires and involving fixed wing, UAS, and artillery in the ways we know they actually can.

Much of what I have seen actually suggests to me that Russia did NOT plan for a fast war in fact, but is rather pacing itself....

Id also note that Russia doesnt seem hugely focused on the PR/psyops aspect...examples like how long it took to release the snake island footage. That could have been a rapid embarrassment for Ukraine. Perhaps the audience just isnt this side of the Donbass
Good argument. Counterpoint - we are seeing quite a bit of footage of destroyed Russian vehicles, and several attempts to move fast have failed including the air-assault operation west of Kiev that faltered and had to wait for mechanized formations to arrive from the north. This doesn't suggest that Russia is pacing itself. This suggests that the Russian military is trying to move as fast as possible, at the cost of some additional losses and less recon and planning.
 
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