NZDF General discussion thread

[Rob c]

You would need to start with threats though and I just can't see them.

Certainly no threats to survival, and threats to vital interests would need to be met with international coalitions anyway.

Realistically a single frigate contribution to a task force, a battalion-sized battlegroup or a 1-2 MPA or transport aircraft to an international operation would be the limit.

Rough thinking would be:

3 Frigates
4 OPV
1 lift ship

1 multi-role brigade - 2 inf battalion, 1 ACR, 1 artillery regiment

6 MPA, 6 transport, maritime & lift helicopters

That's about it - looks roughly similar to what NZ has now.

Should be possible within 1% GDP?

Point by t68 on investment requirements well made though.

Regards,

Massive

The reason we don't see threats is that we cannot see into the future and would not see one even if it is there. a significant number of conflicts have appeared at very short notice and while hindsight has said we should have seen it coming , the reality is that we didn't. Even the large conflicts have been not forecast, a year before WW2 the British PM said "peace in our time" and while it sounds crazy now , it did not then. I think that the primary consideration for our defence should be the ability to control the sea and air approaches to NZ, Second would be to fulfill our obligations to the pacific islands (Samoa, Cooks etc) and then the broader region.

 

[Massive]

The reason we don't see threats is that we cannot see into the future and would not see one even if it is there. a significant number of conflicts have appeared at very short notice and while hindsight has said we should have seen it coming , the reality is that we didn't. .

I hear you on this Rob.

Always the issue that defence expenditure is known but impact is not.

That said - what critical capability is there that NZ would need to develop NOW to provide a basis for expansion to deal with currently unknown future threats?

NZ has a modern defence force - so what would need to be added is reasonably limited:

+ Mine laying and counter measures
+ BAMS UAV
+ Tracked armour
+ Massed fires
+ AAW (Mistral in storage, beyond Mistral?)

Of these, I would have thought only the mine warfare and BAMS are critical to introduce now.

Once you start thinking about supporting international operations it gets broader but I am generally not convinced that NZ defence posture is that misguided.

Regards,

Massive

 

[Todjaeger]

I hear you on this Rob.

Always the issue that defence expenditure is known but impact is not.

That said - what critical capability is there that NZ would need to develop NOW to provide a basis for expansion to deal with currently unknown future threats?

NZ has a modern defence force - so what would need to be added is reasonably limited:

+ Mine laying and counter measures
+ BAMS UAV
+ Tracked armour
+ Massed fires
+ AAW (Mistral in storage, beyond Mistral?)

Of these, I would have thought only the mine warfare and BAMS are critical to introduce now.

Once you start thinking about supporting international operations it gets broader but I am generally not convinced that NZ defence posture is that misguided.

Regards,

Massive

There are several aspects which make up the NZ defence posture which, over the years, I have mentioned as being either current or potential future issues.

One of the largest (which only now seems to be starting to change) is the perception/misperception of NZ's security situation. More specifically, it is the (IMO) false notion that only direct threats to NZ proper constitute a threat to NZ and her interests. If one looks at the current NZDF and how it is and has been sized and kitted out over the last 20+ years, then one can see how it has been transformed into what is more a policing and international peacekeeping force, as opposed to a proper defence force.

In terms of direct action, NZ has had a comparatively shrinking capability to detect, as well as engage targets, and has to get closer and closer to do so, while globally there have been expansions in standoff detection and engagement capabilities.

The above, when coupled with the increased impact globalization has had, has shown numerous times when events elsewhere in the world can have negative impacts on NZ, with NZ having little or no ability to prevent, respond, or mitigate either the event or impact. If one plays the "what if" game, where various scenarios are war gamed along with their potential outcomes and impacts, there is the potential for NZ to face some very damaging consequences, with little or no ability to manipulate the outcome in NZ's favour.

This is largely the result of repeated policy and budgetary decisions which have led to reductions in the size and capability of the NZDF, and also the relative capability of the NZDF to other forces.

Consider for example, air defence and/or the ability to control NZ airspace. At present has virtually no ability to do so. What capability currently exists consists of Mistral MANPADS (currently in storage and not in any maintenance or training programme IIRC), small arms/trashfire, and the self-defence capabilities of the ANZAC-class FFH's which are due for upgrade. That means the NZDF has precious little ability to engage any hostile inbound, either around NZ or on a deployment away from NZ. Even something as simple as a man-packed drone could be beyond the ability of Kiwi troops to engage without outside help.

Or as another example, the RNZN realistically has a very limited ability to conduct anti-ship operations, especially at safe/standoff ranges. With only two proper warships, (again, both are due for upgrades) there are very few units available under the best of circumstances. When those same warships have to either rely upon a naval helicopter firing an AShM from within ~37 km of the target, or using the frigates own 5"/127mm naval gun and/or LWT to engage a hostile ship...

Putting those two deficiencies together, imagine how NZ would be able to become involved if a conflict broke out between India and the PRC and impacted the SLOC from the Mideast to Asia? Or Iran for some reason decided to restrict passage through the Straits of Hormuz? What if piracy off Somali and/or around the Straits of Malacca increased again, due to global preoccupation with a more significant danger/threat, like the current situation between North Korea and the US?

In many situations around the world, other nations will be impacted and become involved, however those other nations will (generally) be acting in their nations' respective best interests, which may not be beneficial to NZ. Further, there will most likely be times when other nations are not going to be interested in being involved, or are only willing to provide support but not take any leading role. If NZ is unable to 'step forward' if or when needed, then NZ will have little voice in outcomes, or perhaps even none at all.

Having the ability to perform HADR, as well as constabulary and international peace-keeping operations is very good. Configuring a defence force around just those roles is a potential invitation for non-friendly nations to exploit such limitations.

 

[MrConservative]

That said - what critical capability is there that NZ would need to develop NOW to provide a basis for expansion to deal with currently unknown future threats?

The new policy push is in the areas of ISR, (NCW) C4I, and EW/EP. The other is to build upon the extant platform capabilities with reference to the above and interoperability with the four other eyes.

 

[MrConservative]

If NZ is unable to 'step forward' if or when needed, then NZ will have little voice in outcomes, or perhaps even none at all.

That is probably the main change between the previous government who wanted to be the 'New' Ireland and the current one who have worked out the significance of this.

Having the ability to perform HADR, as well as constabulary and international peace-keeping operations is very good. Configuring a defence force around just those roles is a potential invitation for non-friendly nations to exploit such limitations.

HADR is virtuous in itself and in terms of 'marketing' to the public. The NZDF has quietly evolved away from the 'New Ireland' posture over the last decade. The elephant in the room is not yet reversing the culling of air combat and reduction of surface combatants in 2000. That perception will always dog us even if significant improvements are made in other areas.

 

[Novascotiaboy]

Like the fire service the military is not thought of by the citizenry until the day they need those specific services. No one ever thinks they are going to have a fire. No nation thinks it's going to have to send its men and women into harms way to defend interests or values. But those of us who live in the world of "what if" know that at some point that "if" will become reality.

When that happens you have to be prepared. Equipment and training, procedures and policies. In our society today I personally feel that our elected representatives place to much emphasis on what the electorate may think. Those elected to positions have to understand that their job is to make decisions on our behalf. Provide the service with resources so that when it's needed it will be available. It's the cost of doing business. No sense calling yourself a fire department if you can't afford fuel for the truck or protective clothing for the crew. Same goes for armed forces. A couple of boxes of 7.62 for the machine gun on a Hilux doesn't constitute an army.

Basing defence policy decisions on public comment is ludicrous. The military needs the resources to do its job it's the governments obligation to supply the right kit in appropriate numbers with funds to operate and support said items so they will work when needed. I am not advocating a gold plated service but one that is fit for purpose.

Recent purchases such as the MHOV is a good example of a correct purchase. Good numbers, support, interoperable, military design and application. The myopic acquisition of just five AW10LUH is the opposite example. Good purchase but numbers make it a waste. Fully militarized and armoured but no weapon system other than a pintle FN MAG. Here was an opportunity to provide aerial fire support or armed RECCE capability at a minimal overall cost. At least twice as many aircraft should have been purchased.

Let's hope going forward that the senior military has the ability to very clearly provide rationale for the acquisition of the proper military replacements in numbers more than minimums for the FAMC and the FASC programs. The military personnel serving the country deserve the resources to to their job of protecting the citizens of New Zealand.

As to some comments about air interdiction this to me is an easy fix. Either retrofit some of the existing Texans or acquire dedicated AT6 aircraft and armaments appropriate for the threat. No one is capable of a fast jet attack on NZ territory for obvious reasons but domestic aerial terrorism is a possibility. Aircraft are in service and pilots and support are there. The AT6 with a gun armament and the ability to fire rockets or drop munitions in support of ground troops makes sense and is affordable and supportable to the citizenry.

Lets hope that NZ and Canada can avoid getting involved in any major conflicts as both countries have adopted the same inclusionary form of government that stymies decision making and allows dithering.

 

[John Fedup]

I personally think NZ is doing a better job than Canada. As for the pollies, I can't believe NZ's current gang is even close to the level of incompetence found in Ottawa. As for electorates both live in the kumbya world.

 

[Rob c]

As some of you will know I believe that a significant improvement can be had in area control around NZ by the addition of a modest AFC.( Does not have to be top line ) and enough P3 replacement aircraft with a reasonable AEW ability to do 24/7 coverage. Most of the current suggestions would also be very beneficial.

 

[Rob c]

That is probably the main change between the previous government who wanted to be the 'New' Ireland and the current one who have worked out the significance of this.



HADR is virtuous in itself and in terms of 'marketing' to the public. The NZDF has quietly evolved away from the 'New Ireland' posture over the last decade. The elephant in the room is not yet reversing the culling of air combat and reduction of surface combatants in 2000. That perception will always dog us even if significant improvements are made in other areas.

Totally agree with the sentiment. The pollies in Ireland (and possibly Canada ) know that they sit right next door to a major power and there is no way in hell that the major power would allow an unfriendly take over. This is not the situation NZ finds its self.

 

[t68]

As to some comments about air interdiction this to me is an easy fix. Either retrofit some of the existing Texans or acquire dedicated AT6 aircraft and armaments appropriate for the threat. No one is capable of a fast jet attack on NZ territory for obvious reasons but domestic aerial terrorism is a possibility. Aircraft are in service and pilots and support are there. The AT6 with a gun armament and the ability to fire rockets or drop munitions in support of ground troops makes sense and is affordable and supportable to the citizenry.

AT6 as an interceptor is not going to happen, unless someone is sailing a task force past Australia your most likely aircraft that needs intercepting will be either international flights or domestic flight with faster cruise speed than even the speed of Super Tucano.

Agree an Armed AT6 Wolverine should be in NZ interests as CAS/reconnaissance aircraft with training capabilty for NZ Army in Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTAC) but even then once the replacement for HMNZS Canterbury come online in the future I see a rotary asset in the role as being far more beneficial than an up armed trainer aircraft.

 

[kiwipatriot69]

Totally agree with the sentiment. The pollies in Ireland (and possibly Canada ) know that they sit right next door to a major power and there is no way in hell that the major power would allow an unfriendly take over. This is not the situation NZ finds its self.

Given the current tensions between North Korea and the USA, and in the South China Sea, doesn't that factor at least a small part in defence policy,? as it certainly hadn't been improving, certainly not under the Trump administration.

Was surprised to see Gerry Brownlees comment to the media about Nz not willing to give military assistance to USA unlike Austrailias commitment to any such conflict, siting ANZUS. Surely Nz too to bound by that agreement too? We will know in only a few days too if North Korea is bluffing or not, if they strike Guam as they detailed, morally could Nz justify remaining neutral?

 

[t68]

Given the current tensions between North Korea and the USA, and in the South China Sea, doesn't that factor at least a small part in defence policy,? as it certainly hadn't been improving, certainly not under the Trump administration.

Was surprised to see Gerry Brownlees comment to the media about Nz not willing to give military assistance to USA unlike Austrailias commitment to any such conflict, siting ANZUS. Surely Nz too to bound by that agreement too? We will know in only a few days too if North Korea is bluffing or not, if they strike Guam as they detailed, morally could Nz justify remaining neutral?

I'm not sure of the exact standing of ANZUS with the thawing of relation between those two countries, but I would expect NZ would intervene if KJU start lobbing nuc's at the US even if it's a superficial gesture of just stand with solidarity as Australia would if worst case was to happen. Not much either counter can do if it comes to that.

 

[MrConservative]

Given the current tensions between North Korea and the USA, and in the South China Sea, doesn't that factor at least a small part in defence policy,? as it certainly hadn't been improving, certainly not under the Trump administration.

Was surprised to see Gerry Brownlees comment to the media about Nz not willing to give military assistance to USA unlike Austrailias commitment to any such conflict, siting ANZUS. Surely Nz too to bound by that agreement too? We will know in only a few days too if North Korea is bluffing or not, if they strike Guam as they detailed, morally could Nz justify remaining neutral?

Not surprised. There is an election on and the public stance is neutral - the non public stance (the real one) is different and the alphabet soup agencies will be beavering away.

Furthermore we have an Orion in Guam and an Anzac was at recent standing in for the Fitzgerald in the 7th Fleet. That is what we would be sending anyway.

 

[Todjaeger]

HADR is virtuous in itself and in terms of 'marketing' to the public. The NZDF has quietly evolved away from the 'New Ireland' posture over the last decade. The elephant in the room is not yet reversing the culling of air combat and reduction of surface combatants in 2000. That perception will always dog us even if significant improvements are made in other areas.

I see no issue with a nation's armed forces engaging in HADR operations. Indeed the ability to operate in areas without needing to rely upon local infrastructure is often required for HADR operations, as events are likely to have taken that infrastructure offline. What I see as an issue, is when procurement decisions are made in reference to HADR and/or peacekeeping operations in place of core military capabilities. For example, looking at the NZDF logistics and transport support, how many of the aircraft and vessels either currently lack, or until recently have lacked capable, modern self-defence suites? Another example would be some of the M113 replacement programme criteria, which IIRC specified a wheeled replacement, as they were/are more efficient on road travel. There was an inference that future deployments of NZ troops would be similar to the last deployment of the M113's where their performance was so problematic, namely peacekeeping operations in developed areas. I am absolutely a proponent of "dual-use" capabilities which can be used for HADR, as well as to support troops during deployments. What I would like to see is a further change in upcoming procurement and force structure which moves the NZDF away from only being able to sustain low intensity deployments.

Totally agree with the sentiment. The pollies in Ireland (and possibly Canada ) know that they sit right next door to a major power and there is no way in hell that the major power would allow an unfriendly take over. This is not the situation NZ finds its self.

The issue I have with the above is that it again seems to be ignoring the impact NZ can/will feel following an incident or outbreak of hostilities far from NZ's local vicinity. Just imagine the economic havoc that NZ and much of the world would face if, during the transit of a "fishing" vessel through the Malacca Straits, said vessel deployed even a single sea mine. Or as a result of rising tensions in the SCS submarines belonging to opposing nations covertly laid mines in the channels to ports that belong to their opponent's, or along the SLOC. NZ might not be directly involved in the conflict, but the negative impact on trade routs will have a negative impact on normal, daily life in NZ. If NZ was a largely self-sufficient nation, able to meet basically all required domestic production, then a defence posture focusing on NZ and the regional approaches would make sense. Unfortunately, NZ is an exporter of some goods while having to import of others. This in effect means that the protective 'moat' around NZ which helps keep others out, can also serve to contain Kiwis.

Given how far the NZDF has been allowed to be run down in terms of quantities as well as modern capabilities, it will likely take a good deal of long-term planning, as well as years (if not an entire generation) of sticking to a long-term regeneration plan. Some of what is needed is already under way, but IMO a joint effort by the services is needed so that regardless of the gov't of the day, the capabilities needed to ensure NZ sovereignty and NZ interests can met.

 

[Rob c]

I see no issue with a nation's armed forces engaging in HADR operations. Indeed the ability to operate in areas without needing to rely upon local infrastructure is often required for HADR operations, as events are likely to have taken that infrastructure offline. What I see as an issue, is when procurement decisions are made in reference to HADR and/or peacekeeping operations in place of core military capabilities. For example, looking at the NZDF logistics and transport support, how many of the aircraft and vessels either currently lack, or until recently have lacked capable, modern self-defence suites? Another example would be some of the M113 replacement programme criteria, which IIRC specified a wheeled replacement, as they were/are more efficient on road travel. There was an inference that future deployments of NZ troops would be similar to the last deployment of the M113's where their performance was so problematic, namely peacekeeping operations in developed areas. I am absolutely a proponent of "dual-use" capabilities which can be used for HADR, as well as to support troops during deployments. What I would like to see is a further change in upcoming procurement and force structure which moves the NZDF away from only being able to sustain low intensity deployments.



The issue I have with the above is that it again seems to be ignoring the impact NZ can/will feel following an incident or outbreak of hostilities far from NZ's local vicinity. Just imagine the economic havoc that NZ and much of the world would face if, during the transit of a "fishing" vessel through the Malacca Straits, said vessel deployed even a single sea mine. Or as a result of rising tensions in the SCS submarines belonging to opposing nations covertly laid mines in the channels to ports that belong to their opponent's, or along the SLOC. NZ might not be directly involved in the conflict, but the negative impact on trade routs will have a negative impact on normal, daily life in NZ. If NZ was a largely self-sufficient nation, able to meet basically all required domestic production, then a defence posture focusing on NZ and the regional approaches would make sense. Unfortunately, NZ is an exporter of some goods while having to import of others. This in effect means that the protective 'moat' around NZ which helps keep others out, can also serve to contain Kiwis.

Given how far the NZDF has been allowed to be run down in terms of quantities as well as modern capabilities, it will likely take a good deal of long-term planning, as well as years (if not an entire generation) of sticking to a long-term regeneration plan. Some of what is needed is already under way, but IMO a joint effort by the services is needed so that regardless of the gov't of the day, the capabilities needed to ensure NZ sovereignty and NZ interests can met.

Agree that far off incidents can have a very significant impact on NZ. However I still think that our primary responsibility is first to secure our primary security and then move outward. If we fail to maintain our sovereignty first and foremost then the ability to move into the wider defence environment is a wasted ability. Your primary security must always be your first priority. You are right that it will take a long time to rectify the current shortcoming, I would say at the very least, one to two decades.

 

[ngatimozart]

I hear you on this Rob.

Always the issue that defence expenditure is known but impact is not.

That said - what critical capability is there that NZ would need to develop NOW to provide a basis for expansion to deal with currently unknown future threats?

NZ has a modern defence force - so what would need to be added is reasonably limited:

+ Mine laying and counter measures
+ BAMS UAV
+ Tracked armour
+ Massed fires
+ AAW (Mistral in storage, beyond Mistral?)

Of these, I would have thought only the mine warfare and BAMS are critical to introduce now.

Once you start thinking about supporting international operations it gets broader but I am generally not convinced that NZ defence posture is that misguided.

Regards,

Massive

+ Mine laying and counter measures
The Moa Class IPC used to have the sidescan sonar for mine detection. They mapped the seafloor of the major harbours / ports creating a baseline from which they could compare subsequent sonar surveys to compare and contrast looking for any differences. This capability was introduced in the early 1990s when I was in.

+ BAMS UAV
Ideally the MQ-4C Triton, but the NZG has not yet publicly released any RPAS (UAV) policy. At present point in time I think that the triton might be a tad expensive.

+ Tracked armour
Personally I do not believe that NZ will go down this route. The heaviest tank that the NZ Army operated was the Centurion many decades ago. IMHO 8x8 wheeled armour will be as good as it gets. TBH there aren't many places that a track vehicle can go to that 8x8 wheeled armour cannot access.

+ Massed fires
16 Field Regiment are the artillery unit, operating L119 105mm howitzers. We won't see HIMARS or similar wearing Kiwi tags. I would like to see some of our current NZLAV modified as SPGs with a 105mm turret replacing the current turret. That would give us mobile fire support.

+ AAW (Mistral in storage, beyond Mistral?)
Yep AAW is very parsimonious. If they fitted all the NZLAV with something like the SAAB UTAAS Tank and Anti-Aircraft System - Universal Sight and Fire-Control System, then they would be able to utilise the 25mm gun for AAA. Mounting something like Mistral or Stinger on the turret sides would add to that capability. Finally from my POV, they should invest in a GBAMD system based around the CAMM(L) - Land Ceptor missile. It is a modular system with a 12 missile launcher on the deck of a MAN truck being easily reloaded and / or mounted / dismounted quickly. It has the advantage of being highly mobile and easily concealable.

 

[Todjaeger]

Agree that far off incidents can have a very significant impact on NZ. However I still think that our primary responsibility is first to secure our primary security and then move outward. If we fail to maintain our sovereignty first and foremost then the ability to move into the wider defence environment is a wasted ability. Your primary security must always be your first priority. You are right that it will take a long time to rectify the current shortcoming, I would say at the very least, one to two decades.

IMO the direct threats to NZ's sovereignty are fairly limited, due to the local environment. There are of course areas of weakness which could and should see improvement, specifically in the areas of detection and response.

From my POV though, the capability improvements in those areas would both be able to make NZ's local sovereignty more secure, but also lend themselves to NZ being able to take active role in events away from NZ.

That ability to take an active role IMO is very important because while NZ has a great potential for defence in depth as a result of the tyranny of distance, an inability to have forces operating any distance away from NZ basically yields all that depth to any/all potential attackers.

Another area IMO which needs to be boosted, is just in the quantity of kit and qualified personnel to operate and maintain it. As an example, with the RNZN only having two frigates, availability can be very problematic, especially once a major upgrade programme is underway. A force of three, or preferably four frigates, would ease availability for planned and surge deployments, as well as meeting training, maintenance and upgrade cycles.

The same can be said basically across the entire NZDF. If NZ only maintains enough forces to sustain a small amount of low intensity operations, any increase in either the number or intensity of operations could possibly be met but only for a short period of time. If both the scale and intensity of operations increased at the same time, then NZ might, perhaps, be able to meet such requirements for a very brief period of time before needing to scale back operations to regenerate NZ forces. OTOH it is also possible that NZ forces might not be able to meet the demands.

 

[ngatimozart]

2015 / 16 Major Projects Report

The Defence 2015 / 16 Major Projects Report was released today. It is three pdf files of 80 - 90 pages each.

 

[40 deg south]

The Defence 2015 / 16 Major Projects Report was released today. It is three pdf files of 80 - 90 pages each.

Thanks Ngati.

Some very interesting reading there for those with an interest in the minutiae of defence procurement. Highly recommended.

 

[MrConservative]

Just to inform a bit of public information about your possible next government.

Check out their defence allocations on their fiscal forecast.

Fiscal Forecasts - New Zealand Labour Party

Looks like at a first glance Labour has funded only operational spending and tiny increases going forward. At the bottom their is a asterix line about unallocated capital spending of $5.5B through to 2022 - but that is to cover everything and is vapourware if as I expect the economic performance tanks under this fiscal plan.

Also no shopfront policy on foreign affairs, security and defence.

Our Vision - New Zealand Labour Party