What are we talking about? The both wars in Gulf showed everything. When during only one tank battle Saddam’s tank division lost near 100 machines and US corps lost only one “Bradley”, the situation is clear. Off course, much depends on soldiers teaching, tactics etc., but if 25-mm. “Bushmaster” gun penetrates tanks armour, it indisputable means that this tank is not the best. T-90 is a modernization of T-72, which covered its own name by the shame in Iraq. As for me, the best soviet tank was T-64 and its modernizations – T-80 and Ukrainian T-84. The strong side of T-84 is that Ukrainians used some foreing equipment – Franch backsightes for example. But by its mane characteristics even T-84 is far away of the leaders – Leo II, M1A2, Merkava IV. Few years ago I have seen some the docs with the results of one tank tender, where the T-90, T-84, Leo’s and Leclerk took part. The results of night shooting were the most impressive. From 20 shots Western tanks missed 3 or 4, ex-soviet - 16-18. All of you can make your decisions independently.
T-90 in Comparison to Western Armour
- Status
As always it is a very long shot to compare some Iraqi Republican Guards divisions equipped with T-72M(1)s getting shredded by superior (in all aspects) coalition forces with current Russian or former Soviet forces.
There is a fundamental difference in how a 3rd Shock Army would have engaged NATO forces on the North German Plain and how the Iraqis got hammered by coalition forces.
The Ts were mostly designed for a special kind of warfare. An all out sluggin match in central europe.
Thinking that indiviually some western designs may have some advantages over the Ts of the time is unimportant in the great sheme of things.
A NATO tanker in Germany in the '80s would have to worry about alot more things than if the Ts on the other side can match his track in some hypotetical 1on1 duell...
Besides a T-90M is at least as capable as any modern T-64 or T-80 version out there although some of the fundamental deficiencies of the Ts still remain.
There is a fundamental difference in how a 3rd Shock Army would have engaged NATO forces on the North German Plain and how the Iraqis got hammered by coalition forces.
The Ts were mostly designed for a special kind of warfare. An all out sluggin match in central europe.
Thinking that indiviually some western designs may have some advantages over the Ts of the time is unimportant in the great sheme of things.
A NATO tanker in Germany in the '80s would have to worry about alot more things than if the Ts on the other side can match his track in some hypotetical 1on1 duell...
Besides a T-90M is at least as capable as any modern T-64 or T-80 version out there although some of the fundamental deficiencies of the Ts still remain.
One of the main problem of soviet tanks (in addition to its lack of good electronics, bad backsights and stabilization) is its dangerous composing. Ist ammunition detonate inside by tanks penetration by enemys shell. Look at the pictures from Iraq, Georgia and Chechnja - allmost all the tanks were destroyed completely. If enemies shell penetrates armour, crew dont have chances to survive because of detonation of its own armunition. Probably it is a result of soviet doctrine and attitude to people's life, which formulates such: "People don't matter, women will born more" :drunk
Not to mention it has the obvious advantage of being in production.
Teren I would suggest that you consider the following; tanks don't exist in an abstract empty battlefield where they compete against other tanks. They exist as part of combined arms units. The NATO means of dealing with Soviet tanks would not have been mass tank battles, it would've been close air support and tank-hunting helos. Similarly the Soviets weren't counting on out-gunning M1s, they were counting on operational level breakthroughs and strategic encirclement. Soviet tanks were a tool of operational, and operational-strategic maneuver.
I'm not sure which tender you're referring to but the thermals on the T-90A (presuming that's what was used in the night shoot) are French Catherine-FC.
In regards to picture from Georgia and Chechnya, I dare say the way the tanks were employed had far more to do with it then the types of tanks used. If all the T-72s during the first battle of Grozny had been M1A2s, there would have been little difference to the outcome.
While I agree that crew protection is not a strong side of the Ts, the Abrams is the only other tank were all of the ammunition is safely seperate from the crew.
Penetrate a Leo, Challi or Leclerc at the right spot and the end result will be similar to a Ts ammunition getting hit.
And as said before, have a look at combined arms maneuver warfare and not on 1on1 tank duells.
Who cares if your leading MotRifle divisions suffer heavy attrition when they still manage a breakthrough which can be exploited by the operational maneuver group following them.
The problem for current T users (and I include Russia in this) is that they cannot bring the same combined arms onslought to bear like the WarPac was able to do.
This in some way emphasizing the deficiencies of the Ts as creating a breakthrough is much more dependant on the individual tank.
But theres also the question of costs. A modern T-90 is still cheaper than contemporary western models so it's a question of critical mass? Is an army searching for a new tank really better of with buying a western model when it could get 2-3 times the number of T-90s for the same money?
For many countries this is easy to answer...
Penetrate a Leo, Challi or Leclerc at the right spot and the end result will be similar to a Ts ammunition getting hit.
And as said before, have a look at combined arms maneuver warfare and not on 1on1 tank duells.
Who cares if your leading MotRifle divisions suffer heavy attrition when they still manage a breakthrough which can be exploited by the operational maneuver group following them.
The problem for current T users (and I include Russia in this) is that they cannot bring the same combined arms onslought to bear like the WarPac was able to do.
This in some way emphasizing the deficiencies of the Ts as creating a breakthrough is much more dependant on the individual tank.
But theres also the question of costs. A modern T-90 is still cheaper than contemporary western models so it's a question of critical mass? Is an army searching for a new tank really better of with buying a western model when it could get 2-3 times the number of T-90s for the same money?
For many countries this is easy to answer...
Given that the T-90 is also in large scale production (iirc ~350 units last year) there is economies of scale, and the design has a good future in terms of uprades, ahead of it.
I would argue, Waylander, that Russia can bring combined arms to bear, but on a much smaller scale. They might not be able to have tank armies as operational maneuver groups, but they can certainly pull off similar things with a tank brigade.
They may not have had that ability 5 years ago, but since then they have recovered much.
I would argue, Waylander, that Russia can bring combined arms to bear, but on a much smaller scale. They might not be able to have tank armies as operational maneuver groups, but they can certainly pull off similar things with a tank brigade.
They may not have had that ability 5 years ago, but since then they have recovered much.
I totally agree with you that Russia is still able to perform combined arms maneuver warfare albeit on a much smaller scale than what the Soviet Union/WarPac was able to do.
The problem is that western designs are IMO more suited for smaller armies and limited operations.
The problems of the Ts (poor ergonomics, less growth potential, crew protection, gun elevation,...) are becoming more important the smaller the tank force becomes.
In a cold war turns hot slugfest those deficiencies wouldn't matter much but nowadays they become more and more important as armies tend to shrink.
It is even more important for countries which don't even come close to the combined arms warfare Russia is able to wage today. In their case the individual tank becomes even more important as he has to fullfill a much more important role than a tank in the 3rd Shock Army of the cold war and even a more important role than a tank in the current Russian force structure.
The problem is that western designs are IMO more suited for smaller armies and limited operations.
The problems of the Ts (poor ergonomics, less growth potential, crew protection, gun elevation,...) are becoming more important the smaller the tank force becomes.
In a cold war turns hot slugfest those deficiencies wouldn't matter much but nowadays they become more and more important as armies tend to shrink.
It is even more important for countries which don't even come close to the combined arms warfare Russia is able to wage today. In their case the individual tank becomes even more important as he has to fullfill a much more important role than a tank in the 3rd Shock Army of the cold war and even a more important role than a tank in the current Russian force structure.
But if Soviets were counting on operational level breakthroughs, what advantages their tanks had against Western in this angle? What is the specific of this kind of war operations? Soviet tanks had to take part in this attack in two roles. First, when motorized infantry had to break holes in NATOs defense, tanks should help them (in front of every motorized company there was a tanks platoon). Second, tanks were planned to be flinged in this holes to destroy NATOs communications and rear.
Let's suppose that the second role was more important. We need to compose a list of requirements for tank, which mission is to take part in such operational level breakthroughs.
1) Manoeuvrability and shipping quality (because of Soviet vans could capture only 60 tons not more);
2) High speed;
3) Autonomous (to have an opportunity to fight far from their bases);
4) Ergonomically (crew need a very comfortable tank because of they almost lived their for a long term);
5) Good devices for reconnaissance and information acquisition to coordinate with their activity;
6) Let's suppose that its electronics, thermals, gun and armour are not so important (but I'm sure they are important anyway).
In which components of this list Soviet tanks were good?
Manoeuvrability? Similar as Western.
Speed? Similar.
Reliability? More than doubtful (just look at Soviet cars and you will understand everything
).
Ergonomic? As one Russian general said, after two hours in soviet tank you lose 80 % of your physiological abilities. The volume of T-72/80/84/90s turrets is near 2,5 m3, the same for the Leo II – 5 m3.
Reconnaissance and information acquisition opportunities? Weak optics, no thermals (don’t know about quality of French ones, but now we are talking about Soviet tactics and tanks).
The advantages were weight and price only. I don’t know the exact price for T-90, but comparable Ukrainian T-84 costs 3.5 mln. $ and Russians press was writing about dumping from Ukrainian side. Suppose that their price is the same. The price of Abrams is 6,9 mln. $, Leo II – less than 6 mln., Merkava IV – 5 mln. $. The fact is, ex-soviet tanks are almost as cheaper, as lighter.
Let's suppose that the second role was more important. We need to compose a list of requirements for tank, which mission is to take part in such operational level breakthroughs.
1) Manoeuvrability and shipping quality (because of Soviet vans could capture only 60 tons not more);
2) High speed;
3) Autonomous (to have an opportunity to fight far from their bases);
4) Ergonomically (crew need a very comfortable tank because of they almost lived their for a long term);
5) Good devices for reconnaissance and information acquisition to coordinate with their activity;
6) Let's suppose that its electronics, thermals, gun and armour are not so important (but I'm sure they are important anyway).
In which components of this list Soviet tanks were good?
Manoeuvrability? Similar as Western.
Speed? Similar.
Reliability? More than doubtful (just look at Soviet cars and you will understand everything
).Ergonomic? As one Russian general said, after two hours in soviet tank you lose 80 % of your physiological abilities
. The volume of T-72/80/84/90s turrets is near 2,5 m3, the same for the Leo II – 5 m3. Reconnaissance and information acquisition opportunities? Weak optics, no thermals (don’t know about quality of French ones, but now we are talking about Soviet tactics and tanks).
The advantages were weight and price only. I don’t know the exact price for T-90, but comparable Ukrainian T-84 costs 3.5 mln. $ and Russians press was writing about dumping from Ukrainian side. Suppose that their price is the same. The price of Abrams is 6,9 mln. $, Leo II – less than 6 mln., Merkava IV – 5 mln. $. The fact is, ex-soviet tanks are almost as cheaper, as lighter.
The majority of NATO tanks right until the end of the '80s consisted of Leopard 1s, M48/60s Centurions, Challenger 1s and AMX-30s.
To them a T-64/70/80 is a monster. Even to early Leopard IIs and M1s a T-80U is a formidable enemy.
And you discount numbers much too easy. In order to be able to field several frontline armies one needs alot of tanks. That's not that easy if your tank is expensive.
The same applies to other countries. India could never get the same number of western models as it gets T-90s.
And you still concentrate too much on individual deficiencies of certain tank types.
The Ts were defenitely well enough for the battle they envisioned to fight in Europe.
Apart from lack of thermals I can't see a serious deficiency in the modern Ts fielded in the '80s, although this could have cost them badly.
To them a T-64/70/80 is a monster. Even to early Leopard IIs and M1s a T-80U is a formidable enemy.
And you discount numbers much too easy. In order to be able to field several frontline armies one needs alot of tanks. That's not that easy if your tank is expensive.
The same applies to other countries. India could never get the same number of western models as it gets T-90s.
And you still concentrate too much on individual deficiencies of certain tank types.
The Ts were defenitely well enough for the battle they envisioned to fight in Europe.
Apart from lack of thermals I can't see a serious deficiency in the modern Ts fielded in the '80s, although this could have cost them badly.
bruceb1959
New Member
Are you aware if there is an english language version of the page? ;-)
bruceb1959
New Member
T-90 in comparison to modern western Armour
Also on the cost /mass topic. Soviet doctrine called for massing overwhelming force at a small number of localised break- through points, so the view was many
reasonable tanks sorted their needs better than a smaller number of good ones.
I quite agree. Another factor to take into account with regards optics/sighting quality and ultimate weapons ranges, is that any Armour on Armour engaements fought in Western Europe would have been fought over relatively shorter ranges - i believe i 've seen figures citing max combat ranges (in general) being no more than 1500 -2000 meters.
Also on the cost /mass topic. Soviet doctrine called for massing overwhelming force at a small number of localised break- through points, so the view was many
reasonable tanks sorted their needs better than a smaller number of good ones.
bruceb1959
New Member
I apologise now if the information below has already been cited/posted earlier in the thread. This is an extract from an excellent site :http:__//fofanov.armor.kiev.ua/]Vasiliy Fofanov's Modern Russian Armour Page
and the the extract below is an article by Robb Mcleod.
The development of Kontakt EDZ logically led to the development of a later version, called Kontakt-5, which was optimized to be effective not only against HEAT jets, but also APFSDS long rods. It was first deployed around 1985 on the first T-80Us. It is claimed that Kontakt-5 provides about 300 mm RHA equivalent of additional protection against APFSDS rounds, which corresponds to an increase of about 160% over the base armour of the T-80U (~720 mm total).
We've done a lot of work to analyze how effective Kontakt-5 is and by what methods it defeats the incoming APFSDS rounds. The results of the analysis are quite impressive in their own rough and limited way. We assumed that the Kontakt-5 brick was 10.5 cm wide by 23.0 cm long by 7.0 cm thick, with a mass of 10.35 kg. We arrived at a total mass of 2.8 t for the array. We later found out from Steven Zagola's literature that the array is supposed to be around three tonnes, so we were pretty happy. Assuming the use of Semtex for the interlayer, I found that the configuration was most likely a 15 mm plate up front, backed by 35 mm of explosive, and then a 20 mm plate. This assymetrical configuration had improved effectiveness because the APFSDS rod could still 'catch' the retreating rear plate while the front plate would retain a charateristic high velocity. This is completely opposite to the model that the US Army used in the late 1980s to discribe 'heavy' ERA. In their model, the front plate was on the order of 60 mm thick and the rear a standard 5 mm plate. They thought that the thick plate simply moved up into the path of the incoming long rod and forced it to make a 'slot' (thickness x height) rather than a hole (thickness). This is bogus; the front plate would tamp the explosive and would be barely set in motion.
Anyway, back to the point. Without getting into the actual math, after a couple of analyses, we arrived at our conclusion as to what defeat mechanisms were being imployed. These conclusions have not yet been conclusively proved and we hope to do that soon. We assumed that the massive areal density of the long rod perforated the thin plates with relative ease. Actual ablatic penetrator mass loss was set at about 2%. What we found was that we had these two plates, each individually with about 60% the momentum of the long rod penetrator, were moving oppositely up/down to each other, and that the path of the penetrator was such that it was moving between them. The forces exerted on the penetrator are apparently very large, so large in fact that they were in the region of plastic failure for most (read: all) metals. Essentially, when the penetrator touches the rear plate, the front plate guillotines off the first 5 - 6 cm of the rod. For a round such as the 120 mm M829A1 this represents a loss of about 8% of the total mass. More importantly, the nose is blunted. You would not believe how important that sharp point on the penetrator is. The difference in penetration between an equivalent hyper-sonic spike tipped penetrator and a blunt nose one is at least 20% (to a maximum of around 30%). This is mainly because a blunt nose is very inefficient in the initial phase of penetration before the ablatic shear phase can begin. The penetrator has to actually sharpen itself to the optimum Von Karam plastic wave theory shape for penetration of the target material before it can begin radially displacing the target material. This resolves itself in the form of a lot of wasted work and thus penetrator mass. The blunted penetrator also suffers structural damage and more mass loss as a shock wave travels down its length and blows spall off the tail. The main secondary effect of Kontakt-5 EDZ against APFSDS rounds is yaw induced by the front plate before contact with the rear plate is established. The total is about two to three degrees of yaw, which suddenly becomes a lot more in a denser material such as steel. Reduction in penetration due to a 2° yaw is about 6% and it grows exponentially worse from there, and on the 67° slope of the front glacis of the T-64/72/80/90, this is increased to about 15%.
Total loss in penetration amounts to about 2% + 8% + 22% + 6% = 38%, or in other words the penetrator is now only capable of penetrating 62% its original potential. Conversely we could say that the base armour is increased by the factor of the reciprocal of 62%, which is - surprise! - 161%.
So was I surprised by the results? Not really. I had expected penetrator yaw to be the primary defeat mechanism, but otherwise we had verified the effectiveness of Kontakt-5 before it became general public knowledge, which is great bragging rights.
I know that this is a bit off-subject but relevant in terms of overall armour effectiveness on the T-90 and its precursors.
and the the extract below is an article by Robb Mcleod.
The development of Kontakt EDZ logically led to the development of a later version, called Kontakt-5, which was optimized to be effective not only against HEAT jets, but also APFSDS long rods. It was first deployed around 1985 on the first T-80Us. It is claimed that Kontakt-5 provides about 300 mm RHA equivalent of additional protection against APFSDS rounds, which corresponds to an increase of about 160% over the base armour of the T-80U (~720 mm total).
We've done a lot of work to analyze how effective Kontakt-5 is and by what methods it defeats the incoming APFSDS rounds. The results of the analysis are quite impressive in their own rough and limited way. We assumed that the Kontakt-5 brick was 10.5 cm wide by 23.0 cm long by 7.0 cm thick, with a mass of 10.35 kg. We arrived at a total mass of 2.8 t for the array. We later found out from Steven Zagola's literature that the array is supposed to be around three tonnes, so we were pretty happy. Assuming the use of Semtex for the interlayer, I found that the configuration was most likely a 15 mm plate up front, backed by 35 mm of explosive, and then a 20 mm plate. This assymetrical configuration had improved effectiveness because the APFSDS rod could still 'catch' the retreating rear plate while the front plate would retain a charateristic high velocity. This is completely opposite to the model that the US Army used in the late 1980s to discribe 'heavy' ERA. In their model, the front plate was on the order of 60 mm thick and the rear a standard 5 mm plate. They thought that the thick plate simply moved up into the path of the incoming long rod and forced it to make a 'slot' (thickness x height) rather than a hole (thickness). This is bogus; the front plate would tamp the explosive and would be barely set in motion.
Anyway, back to the point. Without getting into the actual math, after a couple of analyses, we arrived at our conclusion as to what defeat mechanisms were being imployed. These conclusions have not yet been conclusively proved and we hope to do that soon. We assumed that the massive areal density of the long rod perforated the thin plates with relative ease. Actual ablatic penetrator mass loss was set at about 2%. What we found was that we had these two plates, each individually with about 60% the momentum of the long rod penetrator, were moving oppositely up/down to each other, and that the path of the penetrator was such that it was moving between them. The forces exerted on the penetrator are apparently very large, so large in fact that they were in the region of plastic failure for most (read: all) metals. Essentially, when the penetrator touches the rear plate, the front plate guillotines off the first 5 - 6 cm of the rod. For a round such as the 120 mm M829A1 this represents a loss of about 8% of the total mass. More importantly, the nose is blunted. You would not believe how important that sharp point on the penetrator is. The difference in penetration between an equivalent hyper-sonic spike tipped penetrator and a blunt nose one is at least 20% (to a maximum of around 30%). This is mainly because a blunt nose is very inefficient in the initial phase of penetration before the ablatic shear phase can begin. The penetrator has to actually sharpen itself to the optimum Von Karam plastic wave theory shape for penetration of the target material before it can begin radially displacing the target material. This resolves itself in the form of a lot of wasted work and thus penetrator mass. The blunted penetrator also suffers structural damage and more mass loss as a shock wave travels down its length and blows spall off the tail. The main secondary effect of Kontakt-5 EDZ against APFSDS rounds is yaw induced by the front plate before contact with the rear plate is established. The total is about two to three degrees of yaw, which suddenly becomes a lot more in a denser material such as steel. Reduction in penetration due to a 2° yaw is about 6% and it grows exponentially worse from there, and on the 67° slope of the front glacis of the T-64/72/80/90, this is increased to about 15%.
Total loss in penetration amounts to about 2% + 8% + 22% + 6% = 38%, or in other words the penetrator is now only capable of penetrating 62% its original potential. Conversely we could say that the base armour is increased by the factor of the reciprocal of 62%, which is - surprise! - 161%.
So was I surprised by the results? Not really. I had expected penetrator yaw to be the primary defeat mechanism, but otherwise we had verified the effectiveness of Kontakt-5 before it became general public knowledge, which is great bragging rights.
I know that this is a bit off-subject but relevant in terms of overall armour effectiveness on the T-90 and its precursors.
In its English version there are no quotations from that Russian officers. But if to sum up their words, we can understand that they are greatly dissatisfied of this tank. The assistant of russian ministry of defense Popovkin have told that for his opinion T-90 is a deeply modernized T-34.
On top of having smaller number of tanks in its inventory, NATO ground forces faced bigger problems in the 1970's and 1980's than just obsolete tanks. The Soviet tank formations were deployed in tiers. Its forward deployed units in Warsaw satellite states composed of most a mix of T-62/T-72. The Russians predicted that most of the first wave of would be destroyed in combat with NATO forces, but would also wear out the enemy tank formation at the same time.
Second tier composed of T-64/T-80s would the the main punch after the first wave weakens NATO defences. The last and final tier, made up of mostly older T-10/T-55 models, would serve the purpose of mopping up. Even if they lost a tank for every NATO tank destroyed, they would still have won the war of attrition.
Of course, that was the ideal environment without taking into account NATO air support. I still don't think Western Europe could have halted the Soviet armor columns had war broke out though.
It's difficult to say who would have been victorious.
IMO if the war would have started as a "come as you are" event (Especially around public holidays) WarPac forces would have reached the channel before most western soldiers would even arrive at their barracks.
If the war follows a time of high tension and both sides have time to mobilize I would rate NATOs chances as much higher even when reforger wasn't complete before the outbreak of hostilities.
A fully mobilized Bundeswehr alone makes alot of a difference. I don't buy that NATO air forces would rule the sky right from the get go. If they manage to create some kind of air superiority it will take some time. Time in which the ground war might already be decided.
I also think that nobody was really prepared for the firepower the Soviets were able to bring to bear on a possible breakthrough sector.
On the other hand I heavily doubt the Soviets ability to really control their forces completely while their C3 network degrades due to EW, airstrikes and artillery.
The same applies to their logistics network.
A very interesting topic about one can go into very detailed discussions without ever really taking everything into account.
From personal experiences in maneuvers I can tell that I would not have wanted to face the red hordes. One cannot imagine how fast it can be over if the attacking force is able to get into the infight. The death of mech/armoured forces which loose cohesion and are overrun is fast and violent. And that was only simulated. Now imagine a real firewall before the attack columns...
Well, if the cold war would have gone hot my whole male family would have rode west as part of the NVA to bring peace and communism to the decadent imperialistic warmongers in the West...
PS: One would be happy to find fields of fire on the North German Plain that allow for firing at more than 1km. Most firing would be well below that. That's one of the main problems behind the idea of reducing enemy attack formations before they reach my position...
IMO if the war would have started as a "come as you are" event (Especially around public holidays) WarPac forces would have reached the channel before most western soldiers would even arrive at their barracks.
If the war follows a time of high tension and both sides have time to mobilize I would rate NATOs chances as much higher even when reforger wasn't complete before the outbreak of hostilities.
A fully mobilized Bundeswehr alone makes alot of a difference. I don't buy that NATO air forces would rule the sky right from the get go. If they manage to create some kind of air superiority it will take some time. Time in which the ground war might already be decided.
I also think that nobody was really prepared for the firepower the Soviets were able to bring to bear on a possible breakthrough sector.
On the other hand I heavily doubt the Soviets ability to really control their forces completely while their C3 network degrades due to EW, airstrikes and artillery.
The same applies to their logistics network.
A very interesting topic about one can go into very detailed discussions without ever really taking everything into account.
From personal experiences in maneuvers I can tell that I would not have wanted to face the red hordes. One cannot imagine how fast it can be over if the attacking force is able to get into the infight. The death of mech/armoured forces which loose cohesion and are overrun is fast and violent. And that was only simulated. Now imagine a real firewall before the attack columns...
Well, if the cold war would have gone hot my whole male family would have rode west as part of the NVA to bring peace and communism to the decadent imperialistic warmongers in the West...
PS: One would be happy to find fields of fire on the North German Plain that allow for firing at more than 1km. Most firing would be well below that. That's one of the main problems behind the idea of reducing enemy attack formations before they reach my position...
bruceb1959
New Member
I believe that the article (?) in question was published in JDR .. i have seen reference to this on a site that i have recently quoted from. My understanding was that the testing occured after the fall of the berlin wall and was conducted in west germany ..tho whether by german army/US or as a NATO evaluation i do not not know. the quote runs something like this. ' the T72 (not sure of specific mark) when equipped with Kontakt 5 proved to be virtually impervious across the frontal arc ( i assume this to be glacis and turret?) to 120mm rounds' I will endeavour to supply the correct qoutation /link to it.
bruceb1959
New Member
The quote/artcle in question; Once again my apologies if I'm retreading old ground here. Also if this article has been previously debunked.
Jane's International Defence Review 7/1997, pg. 15:
"IMPENETRABLE RUSSIAN TANK ARMOUR STANDS UP TO EXAMINATION
"Claims that the armour of Russian tanks is effectively impenetrable, made on the basis of test carried out in Germany (see IDR 7/1996, p.15), have been supported by comments made following tests in the US.
"Speaking at a conference on Future Armoured Warfare in London in May, IDR's Pentagon correspondent Leland Ness explained that US tests involved firing trials of Russian-built T-72 tanks fitted with Kontakt-5 explosive reactive armour (ERA). In contrast to the original, or 'light', type of ERA which is effective only against shaped charge jets, the 'heavy' Kontakt-5 ERA is also effective against the long-rod penetrators of APFSDS tank gun projectiles.
"When fitted to T-72 tanks, the 'heavy' ERA made them immune to the DU penetrators of M829 APFSDS, fired by the 120 mm guns of the US M1 Abrams tanks, which are among the most formidable of current tank gun projectiles.
"Richard M. Ogorkiewicz"
Jane's International Defence Review 7/1997, pg. 15:
"IMPENETRABLE RUSSIAN TANK ARMOUR STANDS UP TO EXAMINATION
"Claims that the armour of Russian tanks is effectively impenetrable, made on the basis of test carried out in Germany (see IDR 7/1996, p.15), have been supported by comments made following tests in the US.
"Speaking at a conference on Future Armoured Warfare in London in May, IDR's Pentagon correspondent Leland Ness explained that US tests involved firing trials of Russian-built T-72 tanks fitted with Kontakt-5 explosive reactive armour (ERA). In contrast to the original, or 'light', type of ERA which is effective only against shaped charge jets, the 'heavy' Kontakt-5 ERA is also effective against the long-rod penetrators of APFSDS tank gun projectiles.
"When fitted to T-72 tanks, the 'heavy' ERA made them immune to the DU penetrators of M829 APFSDS, fired by the 120 mm guns of the US M1 Abrams tanks, which are among the most formidable of current tank gun projectiles.
"Richard M. Ogorkiewicz"
We had this quote here before.
Over at Tanknet the ones which actually own the Janes Review said that no such article actually exists in it.
A T-72B (Not to talk of A/M/M1) is not going to be immune to modern KE rounds although modern heavy ERA is affecting KEs. Note that modern KEs like DM53/63 or M829A3 are also developed with heavy ERA in mind.
Over at Tanknet the ones which actually own the Janes Review said that no such article actually exists in it.
A T-72B (Not to talk of A/M/M1) is not going to be immune to modern KE rounds although modern heavy ERA is affecting KEs. Note that modern KEs like DM53/63 or M829A3 are also developed with heavy ERA in mind.
bruceb1959
New Member
Note that modern KEs like DM53/63 or M829A3 are also developed with heavy ERA in mind
Does that mean that that lates gen KE rounds render latest gen. heavy ERA ineffective? I guess its the old game of 'anti armour rounds/weapons improve, armour tech improves, leading to improvements in the ant-armour weapons....'
Does that mean that that lates gen KE rounds render latest gen. heavy ERA ineffective? I guess its the old game of 'anti armour rounds/weapons improve, armour tech improves, leading to improvements in the ant-armour weapons....'
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