Where is a need for a 'hunter-killer' system, even a 'semi hunter-killer system' will do wonders!!
There are those who will disagree with you on this.
Now the countries that buy these tanks have to employ them in the 'Russian' manner or else suffer the same fate as the ones in the Bekaa Valley and in the Gulf War - 1
Are you saying that to succeed on the battlefield, armies that operate Russian armour have to solely apply Russian tactics and operational doctrine? There were many factors involved in the Bekaa Valley and the 1st Gulf War that led to the Syrians and Iraqis taking heavy lossess, namely - MBT crews that were not trained to maneuver and the problem of facing opponents who were much better trained. The Syrians and Iraqis DID apply Soviet tactics, the problem is they applied it too rigidly, they took good Soviets tactics and made it bad. Soviet tactics did not call for MBTs to operate without maneuvering or exploiting any mistakes or enemy weaknessess, Soviet tactics did not call for infantry too remain huddled up in their BMP when they were meant to dismount - this is exactly what the Syrians and Iraqis did.
The T-72s were not their MBT, they had the T 84s. Similarly the T 90 is not their their MBT, the T 95 is. Regarding the upgrades, they learn their lessons and put the upgrades on their MBTs!!! That way they get simulated combat exposure for their MBTs!!
The T-84 is a Ukranian tank based on the T-80 and was not the main Russian tank. The T-90 is still the main Russian MBT not the T-95. I'm not claiming to be an armour expert so if I'm wrong here please correct me .......
When we compare tanks of the West with the Russian Tanks, we need to keep their philosophy of employment also in mind.
More importantly we need to keep their philosphy of design in mind.
''The issue of whether Soviet/Russian weapon systems are inferior to their European/North American/Scandinavian/Israeli counterparts is not the issue here. What has to be borne in mind is that Post World War II Soviet/Russian weapons were designed purely for one reason: to enable the Warsaw Pact to win a full-scale conventional or nuclear war within a very finite period (not exceeding one week). This in turn meant that all Soviet weapons design bureaux were not obliged to develop superlative systems, instead they were required to develop the weapons to certain performance standards that were totally in sync with the Warsaw Pact's operational requirements. Therefore, while in Soviet parlance the battlefield lifespan of the MBT was not meant to be more than 48 hours at most (with the lowest being 11 minutes when located in the Fulda Gap in Germany) and was considered sufficient enough to enable the Soviet General Staff to comfortably attain the operational campaign objectives on the ground, this is not the case when it comes to India. In other words, what was perfectly applicable for the Warsaw Pact-specific operational requirements does not automatically mean that the same applies to India.''
By Prasun Sengupta, Trishul blog.