Strategy and numbers
The troop losses experienced in the south are riding the red line when it comes to acceptable losses for the countries involved and are way over this line for some other NATO countries (Like Germany...).
The reinforcements brought in by the US are needed to actually win back territory which was lost to the Taliban in the last month and to provide the security which is needed for the civil rebuilding programs.
It seems to me that before stating the troop losses are "riding the red line", one has to ask how that 'red line' is determined.
Usually losses are projected based on specific strategic, operational and tactical planning considerations for the theatre. They vary based on the posture of the forces, be it offensive or defensive.
What were these for NATO in 2001, and what are these now if they have changed?
As I see it the original strategy in Afghanistan was to:
a) defeat the Taliban led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
Government
and
b) to apprehend all members of Al Qaeda sheltering in Afghanistan.
The NATO posture was offensive, and forces conducting an offensive usually initially incur more casualties than the defender.
What seems to be forgotten is that the 2001 strategy was not executed with a sole NATO participation. While NATO contributed the firepower in the shape of aircraft, the ground fighting was done largely by the United Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (Northern Alliance) forces, i.e. Afghans. Even by mid-2002 there were only 10,000 NATO troops in Afghanistan, with most American troops at or around the larger air bases. Fully half of these troops were NOT ground combat elements, but air forces' operational and support personnel the other half was protecting.
After that (from 2003) the NATO forces had restricted themselves to small (company) operations by line units, or squad to platoon sized operations by special forces, in all cases supported by aircraft.
However, two things have to be realised.
Firstly the combined strength of the NATO forces in Afghanistan does not represent actual combat elements, but combat, combat support and operational support elements. The combat elements represent maybe a one third to two-fifths of the total force.
Secondly, the Taliban only have about 10,000 personnel in Afghanistan, of which maybe 10% are support personnel.
Much of the combat has been tactical, with NATO being mostly on the defensive, relying on intelligence to find infiltrating Taliban forces (never larger than small battalion (300) in strength). The operations have been largely about keeping ground communications clear of Taliban to allow ISAF/PRT traffic, and the usual patrolling around bases. NATO has no
offensive strategy in Afghanistan because that would require at least 30,000 GROUND COMBAT troops, and given the offensive operations require greater intensity of combat and operational support, these would require perhaps 60,000 additional non-combat personnel besides the air forces, a total of probably over 100,000 NATO troops in the country. These would allow some semblance of attempting an operational dominance of the Afghanistan's southern and eastern borders where the Taliban are infiltrating through the porous border security often provided only by air surveillance, and by drones at that. In fact the problem is only with the Nuristani, Pashtun and Baluchi populated southern and south-eastern areas of Afghanistan because the Northern Alliance is still around! They are keeping their half od the country secured virtually without any help from NATO, something that had gone unreported.
Strategically speaking we are only talking about keeping secure the 1,500km border with Pakistan.
For comparison, the GDR land border was 2292km, and was guarded by 47,000 border troops, with 18 regiments (about 2,000 each) of actual border troops for a total of about 36,000. Of course the differences in the borders of the DDR/FRG and that of Afghanistan and Pakistan are very different, but at least its a useful and relevant data from NATO history.
Based on the above, and using very rough arithmetic, I would suggest that at least 15,000
border control troops would be required for the 1,500km of the border.
Another 15-20,000 would be required to secure the southern and south-eastern provinces over perhaps a 12 month
offensive campaign.
Manning of the existing ISAF/PRT facilities will probably require about 5,000
base security combat troops.
The combat support personnel would be equal to about 50% of the number of troops engaged in combat duties (border security and inland security), or 20,000 troops.
The support personnel are likely to represent at least a doubling of this number, i.e. another 40,000 troops. So, I still get a very conservative 100,000 troops.
Interestingly the Soviet idea of border control involved border troops operating up to 100km beyond the Soviet-Afghan border, with 62,000 border troops serving on the border during the decade of the conflict. These troops are not usually included in the 40th Army total.
Instead we have the current total ISAF troops of about 55,000. These are largely performing the base security role (including area patrols). About 8,000 US troops and 5-6,000 NATO troops are performing both the border security and the offensive operations in trying to secure HALF of Afghanistan. Most NATO troops are not combat troops, and few seem to realise this. Of the larger contingents, the bulk are not combat troops either. The Australian contingent is a good example, including effectively only three combat-capable companies, of which one is a special forces contingent. Any person half-familiar with tactics by looking at the Australian area of responsibility in Orūzgān would realise that at least six line companies would be required to carry out
sustained offensive operations effectively in that terrain to deny entry of Taliban into the area. At least half of these would need to be mobile. Instead of these ground troops all the Australian troops can do is rely on the admittedly excellent reconnaissance intelligence to respond to incursions, but who has ever won a war by defending?
In effect the NATO command in Afghanistan had lost tactical, and eventually operational and strategic initiative to a much smaller force of Taliban sometime in 2003 and had never regained it. The cause: it has become focused on 'rebuilding' Afghanistan without having secured its borders, the first concern in establishing sovereignty.
I would agree that calls for change in strategy are warranted, but what strategy will it be, defensive or offensive?
Cheers
