Moderated taiwan invasion war game

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weasel1962

New Member
Would a 25 ~ 35 m blast radius creat a 60~70m hole in the ground? I don't think so.
Well, one way (which I'm too lazy to do) is to measure the holes that the black buck missions created at stanley airfield (using 500lb bombs I think but that's from memory again). There are pics on the web on that. That'd give some idea.

Also, even a miss is going to create some debris on the runway which would have to be cleared up. That's where the bulldozers come in as well.

He asked about battleship warfare. Hence I said that Japan got its experience in the Russo-Japanese war. For carrier warfare, would you say that Japan's carrier warfare effectiveness was at its peak then, and not after they gained more experience further into the war?
Agreed, but what I think crobato is trying to illustrate is that one doesn't have to be at the peak to sink ships or lob bombs successfully. China may not have the experience of the USAF but that's no indicator to say that its incompetent either.
 

Gollevainen

the corporal
Verified Defense Pro
Corsair hit the nail. I've often withness these comparisons tangleling to penny comparasions over some minor details, taken from vague sources and then twisted and twisted over and over again and finally someone's stance prooves out to be the best...but what was the issue again:unknown

Thats pretty much the mentality in which computer games works. Different weapon systems have slighlty different performance data on paper and they recieve "points" dependned on that. The weaponsystem with the biggest ammount of points is the victor and the player with the total ammount of points comming from various weapons is the winner the the entire game...

...Real life sadly isen't that simple.

Like Corsair said the marginal or even clear superiority in the terms of equipment isen't the sole factor that determines the outcome of the war. To add to those examples take a look of our WWII battles. In 1939 we had less than 30 tanks, AT-guns for every 15 km of frontline and none of the guns adequate to destroy the latest soviet tanks, hardly any AA guns, less than 200 fighters, hardly even uniforms to each mens (around 500 000) and we were against almoust two million soviets with over 2000 tanks and even greater artillery power, complete superiority in both air and sea...And most importantly, over 1000 km's of landborder...And what did happen?

In Taiwanese case the odd's are far more even and there sea between the opponents gives the conflict overhelming complexity in every sinlge move comming from the Chinese side.

Its irrelevant how much damage ballistic missiles can inflict to airstrips, they are never mented to do stirke there anyway without nuclear warheads. The key is how can the opponent force bring enough troops to the shore's of Taiwan, keep the beachheads, create working supplylines and deal over million size army waiting it in the small Iland in which the defender knows inch by inch and can benefit from static and relatively short supply lines and huge reserve? How can the attacker provide constant fire support if it's ability to transport even the manuvering units is limited to one brigade of only mens in one sortie? How can you manuvre against 10 times larger defender without artillery support?

Why don't you guys focus on these issues rather than KD-88's and co. Becouse without solving those proplems, the discussion what you are having is just "My missile's are bigger than yours" type rampling...
 

Rich

Member
Thank you Gollevainen. For pointing out that an Island cant be taken with a missile. And for pointing out that "this is better then that" type banter has very little practical value.

Recently the USA has come out and said that the mainland Chinese are incapable of taking the Island of Taiwan by force. And actually, when looking at PLAN construction and procurements, it would appear that the "take Taiwan" strategy is not the driving force behind their military modernization. Taiwan has no super-carriers ,so its rather obvious the PLAN is not modernizing with the Taiwanese navy in mind.

Rather the Chinese strategic goal is to have a navy capable of securing its trade routes, and, capable of projecting a blue water force in Asia as a whole. I guess they figure that once they can claim the Asian oceans from the USN that the Taiwan issue will take care of itself.

Building IRBMs is cheap. Building a amphibious force capable of taking that Island is not, and doing so would divert funds from its blue water navy. So why do that? Most of all when diplomatic pressure and threats have coerced the rest of the world, except for America, to abandon Taiwan? Taiwan used to buy military equipment from 20 western countries, and now, the only one who hasn't knifed them in the back is we Yanks.
 

Falstaff

New Member
Taiwan has no super-carriers ,so its rather obvious the PLAN is not modernizing with the Taiwanese navy in mind.
Please forgive my ignorance, but why do you assume no super-carrier -> Taiwnese navy not in mind? Not that I'd disagree, I just don't see the point.

For simplification I concentrated on only one issue and tried to sum up the Chinese amphibious assets from sinodefence and if I assume they use them in a single wave and only use them to transport tanks and nobody hinders them they would be able to land ~ 451 tanks. If they purchased 8 Zubrs these number would rise by 24 MBTs. I didn't count in the LHD they're currently building.
Large landing ships
5x Type 72, 5 tanks each
11x Type 72-II, 10 tanks each
7x Type 72-III, 10 tanks each
Medium Landing ships
10x Type 74, 2 tanks each
11x Type 73-III, 6 tanks each
32x Type 79, 5 tanks each
Zubr
8x Zubr, 3 MBTs each
==============
475 tanks

Not too impressive, I think, and certainly not sufficient. Especially since these landing ships are rather slow and have to come quite close to the coast in order to unload. In addition they certainly would carry a mix of vehicles rather than MBTs only.

Wouldn't China be better off using a naval blockade to cut Taiwan from its supply lines and export routes, at the same time using missiles to intimidate the Taiwanese people and to convince them joining mainland china?
 

weasel1962

New Member
Re:

The key is how can the opponent force bring enough troops to the shore's of Taiwan, keep the beachheads, create working supplylines and deal over million size army waiting it in the small Iland in which the defender knows inch by inch and can benefit from static and relatively short supply lines and huge reserve? How can the attacker provide constant fire support if it's ability to transport even the manuvering units is limited to one brigade of only mens in one sortie? How can you manuvre against 10 times larger defender without artillery support?
Note first, I'm not saying China can achieve this but what China will probably need to do if it is to achieve a successful invasion. Just summaries.

1. Naval ((vi) Prevent ROC naval assets from interference)
1.1 China will need to maintain a broad front of 3-400kms across the length of the straits free from naval and submarine vessels. What it could attempt to do is to use Taiwan itself as a buffer (as naval vessels can't cross the island). Anything less and the red force naval elements will be able to launch ASMs.

1.2 Accordingly, it will probably station ASW and naval assets north and south of the straits to intercept enemy subs. This could be supplemented by land-based ASW assets eg Ka-27 helos for ASW purpose. North sector will probably be from Shanghai and south from Hong Kong/Zhanjiang.

2. Airforce ((vi) Prevent ROC airforce assets from interference)
2.1 China will need to prevent ROC airforce attack elements from entering the 3-400kms length that would interfere with naval resupply elements. This will require:

(a) suppression of airfields;
(b) defensive air operations to handle any elements that do take off.

Unlike 1.1 and 1.2, this can come from 3 directions. North and South will be supplemented by Air Defence ships eg 52Cs.

2.2. This is complicated by the breath of the Straits which allows standoff air attacks to be made from anywhere within Taiwan airspace. Further, this airspace is also defended by ROC SAM elements (although not in every direction). Accordingly, SAM elements must be suppressed to allow air superiority operations to be conducted over Taiwan.

2.3 As 2.2 is more difficult to achieve than 2.1(a), accordingly, I would surmise that 2.1(a) will have to be accorded priority before ship operations can begin.

If assuming 2.1(a) can be achieved.

3. Ground based defenses
3.1 China will need to eliminate ground based defences (primarily

(a) ground based anti-ship missiles,
(b) artillery
(c) shore based ATGMs and finally
(d) ground based troops

in that order.

3.2 To eliminate (a), China has its disposal,

(a) Ground based SSMs;

This is likely to be prioritised to 2.1(a) because of the higher priority.

(b) Ground based artillery (eg WS-2)

This can only reach coastal regions and may not reach SSM sites within Taiwan proper.

(c) Air units

This requires removal of SAM units.

(d) Naval bombardment units

This in turn would be subject to SSMs so unlikely to be used.

3.3 In view of 3.2, China will need to rely upon air units as the primary function. Unlike 2.2, China does not need to remove SAM units across the entire Taiwan proper. Instead, it may only need to remove SAM units along a sector of defenses (facing the Taiwan straits) possibly about 100km stretch.

Assuming it can eliminate (a)

3.4 Elimination of (b) to (d) is significantly less problematic. Artillery will not be consistent (due to ammo limitations). Ground based defenses will be challenged by landing tanks and opposing forces (eg attack helicopters).

I would highlight that ground defenses will not be the "million" ground army. ROC defenses will either be concentrated (in which case actual shore defenses will be initially less) or spread out (in which case shore defenses will initially be more but reinforcements will take longer). I would estimate 1-2 divisional sized defences at best initially around each individual potential attack point.

To be continued.....
 

Gollevainen

the corporal
Verified Defense Pro
Transporting 457 tanks to the enemy shore is quite useless. What you imagine to do with those tanks? Tanks, if used in the Guderian way are the key to push trough enemylines and spread havoc in the rear part of the battlefield. But without infantry it cannot "take" the invaded ground and hold it. They are like cockroaches charging against an ant-nest. ANd not to mention about the supplies and support. The more mechanised units you have, the larger is the need for extensive and constant support units. If you are about to send your tanks only in the first wave, the seccond wave goes to the support run.

In order to make a succesfull landings, you need to have at least the minimum size complete fighting unit with organic support units. Basicly thats a battalion. But if you are able to send only a battalion size unit, you are limited to what the soviets used to say "tactical landings" which are merely tacktical manuvres made in the defenders flank in order to support the main units moving via land. It's suecide to make such a small scale landing against army size defender without the possipility of getting relief from the main units of your own.

To awnser weasel...
Yeas those are the things in general that PRC needs to do in order to get its troops ashore due its limitations. But its completely another thing wether it actually can do that. With even the basic knowlidge and most importantly, understandment of warfare you can see that the task its quite impossiple.

To just highlight some of the defaults in your arguments, here's few things I wish to you to awnser..

to eliminate Taiwanese artillery Ground based artillery (eg WS-2)
How do assume that you can eliminate the entire artillery branch of every brigade and army corpes of ROCA? how do you aguire the the target data for such a operation? How do you expect that with a system that is a) not yet in full operational redyness and b) is not mented for such a task becouse its virtually impossiple to do it? Do you have any understandment of MRLs role in general?

(c) Air units
How do you hit a ATGM crew from air? How do you find the ATGM crew from the air?
Just to be clear, do you really think that PRC commanders have some sort of computerscreen where they see the enemy's exact positionining?
With less than 20 DDGs which have over 100mm cannons you assume that they are enough to eliminating the
(d) ground based troops
? Are you serious?

Unfortunelty this "analyze" of yours is "schoolbook" example of the computergame type of thinking that most of you seem to have. Again you take weaponsystems out of their contest by imagining gee those SSMs can propaply do it...what SSMs?
In the 1999 Serbian campaing, NATO had complete airsuperiority. They managed to perform their operations without being vunarble to the aging SAM fleet of Serbian army and outcluding few well-know seperate incidence they managed to keep almoust 0 % of lost planes. And yet despite this huge advantage and the abcent of natural obstacles like the sea, NATO wasen't able to start the land operation. Why? Becouse the total ammount of destroyed serbian land force equipments were less than one brigade and the bombings took months.
 
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Falstaff

New Member
Transporting 457 tanks to the enemy shore is quite useless. What you imagine to do with those tanks? Tanks, if used in the Guderian way are the key to push trough enemylines and spread havoc in the rear part of the battlefield. But without infantry it cannot "take" the invaded ground and hold it. They are like cockroaches charging against an ant-nest. ANd not to mention about the supplies and support. The more mechanised units you have, the larger is the need for extensive and constant support units. If you are about to send your tanks only in the first wave, the seccond wave goes to the support run.
I know, just wanted to illustrate that the current capabilities aren't sufficient.

What do you think about a blockade tactic instead of a direct attack?
 

corsair7772

New Member
Verified Defense Pro
@ Falstaff
I was under the impression that if China built a carrier it would use it to safeguard its trade routes in the South East and Indian Ocean.

Secondly, weasel1962 asked if i have a reasonable yardstick for measuring the training level of China and Taiwan. Here goes,

First you have to split the personnel into High command and officer/private class. You could roughly measure their training level by looking at their performance in recent conflicts. (this has its limitations i agree).

But since i cant recall any recent conflicts which could demonstrate the changes in chinese revolution in military affairs or Taiwans current military status, i have another idea.

In chinas case, you could go about analysing the equipment influx and changes in doctrine. China seems to be performing well in this case, changing its army into a smaller, more mobile and high tech force dealing with local theatres, and the influx of high technology, focus on indigenisation etc, the entire program seems to make sense in transforming china into an independent military power of the new age. There also seems to be evidence that the high command is "reacting to lessons learned in afghanistan and Iraq. Compare this with the militarisation programs of the Shah of Iran and India which made no sense and showed an obsession with gadgetry and high technology at the expense of the nation. Like china they were superpower focussed i think, but the lack of indigenisation and buying more than what was needed, all in an uncordinated fashion......what a waste!

So the chinese high command seems competent enough.

As for the personnel, your pilots, officers and stuff, well here the things get a little bit more fuzzier. China has carried out recent wargames but im not sure wether they were israeli style (with initiative and intelligence testing and some degree of realisim) or soviet style (preplanned fashion shows :p). One way you could determine wether its officer\soldier class is of good standard is by looking at the performance of its Intelligence agencies as this is a good demonstration of atleast a sample of a countries soldier initiative, intelligence etc.

Ofcourse all this is my own assumption and logic. As for taiwan, im not acquainted with that countries military history and etc so i wont pass judgement on that.
 

Gollevainen

the corporal
Verified Defense Pro
Well it could be possiple, and actually far optimal for PRC than direct attack. But in order to make it efficient, PLAN would have to have real blue water ability in order to make the blockade work. At the moment PLAN cannot deny all foreing shipping coming to the iland and/or effectivly contering the escort units.
 

weasel1962

New Member
How do assume that you can eliminate the entire artillery branch of every brigade and army corpes of ROCA? how do you aguire the the target data for such a operation? How do you expect that with a system that is a) not yet in full operational redyness and b) is not mented for such a task becouse its virtually impossiple to do it? Do you have any understandment of MRLs role in general?
Actually I don't in respect of the elimination of artillery. As you can see, I've basically glossed over 3.1(b) to (d) in point 3.4. My points in 3.1 to 3.3 are basically to counter ground based ASM which are normally sited in fixed sites.
Wanted to paint a better picture but haven't got the time.

Unfortunelty this "analyze" of yours is "schoolbook" example of the computergame type of thinking that most of you seem to have.
You'd be surprised how many operations are exactly the kind of textbook operation that appear in computergame type of thinking. The broad strategies are basically the same. Ops Iraqi Freedom and Desert Storm weren't exactly breathtaking genius level strategies. Just simple tactics supported by genius level logistics.

Again you take weaponsystems out of their contest by imagining gee those SSMs can propaply do it...what SSMs?
I made no assumptions except that the PLA will probably use its SRBMs to suppress airfields. I make no claims on its effectiveness. Something that doesn't seem to get into some thick skulls...

In the 1999 Serbian campaing, NATO had complete airsuperiority. They managed to perform their operations without being vunarble to the aging SAM fleet of Serbian army and outcluding few well-know seperate incidence they managed to keep almoust 0 % of lost planes. And yet despite this huge advantage and the abcent of natural obstacles like the sea, NATO wasen't able to start the land operation. Why? Becouse the total ammount of destroyed serbian land force equipments were less than one brigade and the bombings took months.
The assumption being that NATO had any intention to go in with ground forces which it did not. I could write a dissertation on why it did not but that's for another thread. For the moment, forgive me if I prefer to focus on the topic. Will be glad to follow this up later.
 

weasel1962

New Member
Re:

My earlier thread has illustrated a broad strategy that some would assume would be the requirement for a successful landing. As we all recognise, there are severe limitations in achieving a safe zone of 300-400 km in depth. There are of course alternative strategies that have been discussed.

(1) blockade scenario

A favourite scenario amongst armchair analysts. However, my assessment is that China does not ascribe to this possibility for several reasons.

(a) It won't work. Allied naval and air superiority will defeat any blockade in the long run. A blockade will merely temporarily inconvenience the Taiwanese. The ultimate result will be Taiwan's permanent cessation from China which is an unacceptable conclusion.
(b) China's strategic thinking has never resorted to half measures.
(c) A blockade will hurt China far more.
(d) A blockade has no historical precedent of success. No island has ever been starved into submission.
(e) The chinese are not stupid.

Even if China had the naval resources eg subs to effect a blockade, it could never have sufficient resources to establish an air blockade like the 1950s berlin. US P3s will break a submarine blockade. US carriers will support convoys that China will not be able to defeat unless the war is escalated. The ROCAF will be able to operate with US support. An escalation is thus inevitable and China will have to counter US intervention eventually. Game theory dictates that the payoffs will always be significantly lower than an invasion theory. If China is logical and it is, it will either gamble on invasion or nothing.

(2) Focussed invasion tactic

Going back to the earlier thread...

Rather than attempting to establish a safety zone that will allow unimpeded LOCs across the Taiwan straits, it is more likely that elements of the PLA will have specific objectives. I believe this is a more likely scenario.

The current assumptions are that air mobile/airborne troops are unlikely to be able to take Taiwan by itself. That is highly correct (though those in the 101 will probably disagree). However, the underlying assumption that their objective will solely be to take Taiwan is of course potentially erroneous. If the former holds true, the objective of landing air mobile/airborne can only be to support operations that can effect the landing of sufficient forces to affect the force ratio.

Accordingly, air mobile or airborne troops will likely be tasked to occupy key objectives such as airbases, ports or landing beaches so as to enable heavy assets to be landed.

The landing points will of course be contested. Again, the hypothesis will be that China will attempt to clear a landing point for this AM/ABN assets. The landing points are likely to be close to key objectives but not close enough to be heavily defended. Again, the misconception that Taiwan is strong in every single part of Taiwan will be perpetuated but reality is that there will be sectors which will be less defended than others. As pointed out, supporting a singularly fixed objective is far likelier to succeed than a broad invasion scenario.

If a successful drop can take place, PLA resources will likely be tasked to support these forces in taking the key objectives.

Logistics
AM/ABN elements are likely to be tasked to accomplish their objectives in a fairly short time to avoid logistical problems. Being light forces, they would able to internally carry sufficient logistics to accomplish their objectives within the short time frame. However, it is acknowledged that these forces will eventually need to be supplied.

The prevailing view that Taiwan will be able to deny overall air/sea superiority is a fair one. Therefore, in order for China to land supplies/troops onto Taiwan proper, it will need to fight its way to Taiwan. As mentioned, establishing a safety corridor is a difficult to achieve 24/7. There will be leakers.

The alternative would thus be a convoy system protected by naval and air assets. Hence, instead of having a north south protection line, China can instead provide a "bodyguard" system to escort convoys. This is supported by the current doctrine to protect LOCs. Naval assets are not seen as area denial units but more point protection escorts. Whilst China has a large merchant fleet, it is undeniable that a single ship sunk will still mean a large proportion of supplies lost. Accordingly, a convoy system is more likely than not to be implemented.

A convoy system has also several advantages. Air units are not required to establish air superiority. ROC naval assets will have to be dispersed across several potential routes (particularly when there aren't many subs to go around). Fewer units can defend a larger group of vessels.

That may explain why naval assets are not concentrated within the Taiwan straits itself but along its periphery.

That does not mean that airfield suppression activities will not take priority. Since air attacks are likely to cause significant defensive headaches, I believe airfield suppression will still be a priority for the PLA.

To be continued...

P.s. I disagree with Gol's view that just transporting tanks to shore will be useless. As demonstrated by the D-Day landings, maintaining whole units is not exactly an easy task. However, that does not mean that composite units cannot be formed. It is easy to mistake China as a typical soviet rigid formation type of army.
 
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Gollevainen

the corporal
Verified Defense Pro
You'd be surprised how many operations are exactly the kind of textbook operation that appear in computergame type of thinking. The broad strategies are basically the same. Ops Iraqi Freedom and Desert Storm weren't exactly breathtaking genius level strategies. Just simple tactics supported by genius level logistics.
well you can list what should be done and what should not, to the end, but
I feel a responsibility to offer all possible critisism that I can grasb, otherwise it would be just parade march. If you want your analyze to be fullfilled, you cannot such list that "these migth do it" and not analyze its effective.
Becouse by that logic, you could say that PLA is planning to throw rocks on ROCs missile launchers. perhaps they could brake vital eletronics in them...who knows, its not my part to analyze the consequences.

catch my point?:vamp

but then to the actual critisations:

As for the naval part, you have to take account that PLAN is just maturing from decades of obsolence into modern fleet, but it havent even replaced its former strength with modern units, far less begun to expand into a naval force that can carry out the burden the Taiwan invasion will lay upon it.

You have to remember that convoy escorts needs to have good ASW and AAW weapons, as well as good close in weapon systems. The ships that PLAN poses these capacities are its most potent spearhead, wich would be therefore tied to the convoy escorting role. These are 4 Sovs, 2 052C, 2 052B, 2 051C and the 2 or 4 054A, depending which date the fighting will begun. Of these only the two older Sovromenyys have been around long enough that their crews and the tactical doctrines to use them can be ready at 100% certainity. So in best possiple scenario, PLAN has 14 modern surface combatant suitable for the role and thats a heavy burden to the fleet, not to mention that the prestige value of these ships is severly putted into test. Can PLAN fighting morale take the risk that its most potent surface combatants are all in the same basket? with potential hungry fox looming near by?

If the remaining ships, Ludas, Jianghus, jiangweis and Luhus would have atleast modern sonars, sthill level AA system in each, they could be used in such role and keep the potent weapons ready to give PLAN the rigth to dictate when and where the ROCN forces are encountered.

But in overal, that would make the submarine force of PLAN the only one keeping Taiwanese navy busy, so we can expect that the most naval fighting will be concentrated into these convoys, as both parties aknowlidges its prestige to the campaing
 

Musashi_kenshin

Well-Known Member
Why don't you guys focus on these issues rather than KD-88's and co. Becouse without solving those proplems, the discussion what you are having is just "My missile's are bigger than yours" type rampling...
Wise words from the G-man! I think it is all too easy to get interested in fine details whilst missing the bigger picture.
 

Schumacher

New Member
............

I made no assumptions except that the PLA will probably use its SRBMs to suppress airfields. I make no claims on its effectiveness. Something that doesn't seem to get into some thick skulls...
.........
I suspect you're hitting brick walls with some simply because your analysis doesn't make a PLA attack on Taiwan as hopeless as they want to 'assume', despite them complaining about others making too many 'assumptions' about PLA capabilities. :)
Agree with Golly that 'big picture' analysis is critical, but that has to be based on sound knowledge of the weapon or equipment level capabilities.
 

Schumacher

New Member
...............
You have to remember that convoy escorts needs to have good ASW and AAW weapons, as well as good close in weapon systems. The ships that PLAN poses these capacities are its most potent spearhead, wich would be therefore tied to the convoy escorting role. These are 4 Sovs, 2 052C, 2 052B, 2 051C and the 2 or 4 054A, depending which date the fighting will begun. Of these only the two older Sovromenyys have been around long enough that their crews and the tactical doctrines to use them can be ready at 100% certainity. ........
You should elaborate more on how effective you think these '4 Sovs, 2 052C, 2 052B, 2 051C and the 2 or 4 054A' will perform in their roles you described.
'big picture' view is important, but as you see, it'll inevitably need to go down to system level analysis.
 

crobato

New Member
Reasonable motivations for purchasing more KD-88s, but there are also other reasons why KD-88s may not be fielded in the numbers you expect. First, are you really sure KD-88 is cheaper than the Kh-59? Second, are you sure the KH-59s bought have not already fulfilled a fair chunk of PLAAF long range missile requirements?
If that was the case, that would be a lot of Kh-59s. But even then they added 3 regiments of H-6H, which has the KD-63.

Again, another instance of extrapolating information. How do you know that the KD-88 features the capability to maintain lock autonomously?
If the system is similar to anything derived from the C701, which is an antiship missile that has to maintain its lock autonomously against fast sea moving targets, then it will maintain it autonomously. The Kh-59 does the same thing.

Shows how little you know about what you are talking about with your naive portrayal of the simplicity with which you assume this can be done on the PLAAF side. What fighter aircraft in the PLAAF has a RWR with geo-locationion capability? Which ARM missiles in PLAAF has a LOAL mode?
Most probably the JH-7A. With the use of YJ-91 and passive KD-88, a pod is seen with the aircraft that is not seen with other missiles. The LOAL mode should be with the passive KD-88.

What makes you think the ROC will so cooperatively light up all their radars? Why should they do so when they have an IADS? Ever heard of blinking?
Lol, with SAM radars, doing their job defending their country and survival have proven to be mutually incompatible goals. A radar that is blinking or going EMCON isn't one that. And if you blink, you involve the resources of two or more radars, and that means the equivalent number of radars that isn't doing their job shooting down other aircraft.

Blinking isn't going to work as well if the missile in question has a high endurance. In this case, the KD-88 is jet powered, not rocket propelled.


Yes, the all powerful Chinese spy who knows everything, but somehow others won't know anything about Chinese movements when they make a massive mobilisation for war.
Mobilization for war and mobilization for exercise isn't as clear cut as you think. In Pearl Harbor, much of the Japanese fleet wasn't even told until they are well within the operation.

HUMINT looking for radar sites is a very different matter, and don't even require infiltration of opposing forces. The main thing is to detect and locate the signals. Permanently stationed receivers in the Fujian coast can even do just that, since there is no natural barrier that exists between the Fujian and the Taiwan coasts. Its just like one big valley in between.

China was just so backward that in wars it got itself into with small countries like Vietnam, it didn't have them to use. :eek:nfloorl:
Actually China acquited itself fairly well in later encounters. Even in first encounter, China took territory, and they only used second line units at that. Their elite units are in the north facing Russia.

Wow, chinese 2000lb warheads have blast radius of hundreds of meters when a 2000lb JDAM has a blast radius of only 25m. :rolleyes: http://www.ausairpower.net/APA-SDB.html
Is that into the ground or up in the air? have you counted fragmentation and shrapnel effects?

http://www.cursor.org/stories/civpertons.htm

For 2000lb JDAM, safety is at least 400m from the blast site. The fragmentation is at least 3000 feet with shrapnel up to 1200 feet.


Scattered bomblets can be cleared easily with armoured bulldozers. Or do you not know how to read? SRBMs which find their limited number of targets will hinder, but will not be enough to shut down a base.
And how long will it take to clear the bomblets. Even then, the bomblets will still randomly explode, and even if the bulldozer is armored, everything _outside_ of it is not. That will leave multiple small craters, all sorts of shrapnel and fragmentation everywhere. Oh, and what about thermobaric weapons?

Hinder is more than enough if you want your aircraft strikes to go through and finish the job. Where is hat reasonable amount of time you are claiming about huh?

Impress us with your expertise then.
Really. 15 brigades with 20 to 30 launchers each. This does not include regular PLA rocket brigades or MLRS units, such as those that may be using WS-2 in the future.

Regarding experience, I have addressed that. And the japanese gained anti-ship warfare experience during the RussoJapanese War.
They did not gain long range carrier operation from that one. And the US didn't either.

Crobato: "No training? From a doctrinal point of view, the PLAAF already has one teacher, the same teacher accused of allegedly teaching techs to China---Israel."

From someone claiming ever so surely that Israel trained China, you now backtrack to 'cannot rule that out'. See what I mean by your assumptions of Chinese capability?
Mock airbases and SAM sites in the Gobi desert is so strikingly similar in practice to the ones in Negrev desert. Experience has shown there is nothing sacred, how much are the Israelis are willing to sell for the right price?
 
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Gollevainen

the corporal
Verified Defense Pro
ou should elaborate more on how effective you think these '4 Sovs, 2 052C, 2 052B, 2 051C and the 2 or 4 054A' will perform in their roles you described.
'big picture' view is important, but as you see, it'll inevitably need to go down to system level analysis.
well it dependes what the ROC throws at them. But if you look at the fact that they all have atleast Sa-n-7 as a standard SAM system, and 4 of them are Areal AAW vessels with long range SAMs, I would say they would do it rather well... the proplem is that they are in this case out of any other naval operations, expecially the 052Cs and 051Cs which would be essential to allow other chinese ships to operate in offencive mode against ROCN forces. if the ships are tied to the convoys, they obviously cannot do other task needed.


But for the issue in general, think we have had enough of these "system level analyzes" from those who hardly ever seen the a rifle in real life. Information taken from usually Sinedefence and then adjusted to somesort of layman impression of what some certain warfare might be. Thats why I've tried to advertise the need for understanding how the "big picture works" so at least then you can see how the system is really ment for do and what is its concept.

To go down to the systemlevel analyzes requires that we actually know bit more about the systems than the already mentioned SD information. In naval matters I'm as a layman as most of you so I hardly can give any deep proffesional insight, being the topic of artillery then it's completely different matter. If it comes down to keep it "big" rahter than inventing completely new ways of using for example MRLS and MRBMs based on absolutely nothing else that the need and desire to get your fantasies work, I seddle for the first one-

But to please you, would you like to give bit more spesific request of what "system level analyzes" you need, so I could give my layman obinion on that? And/or in the same time giving one of yourself and not just demanding others to do it...
 
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Transient

Member
(1) blockade scenario
I think Weasel1962 is right on his analysis of the likelihood of success of a blockade scenario.

(though those in the 101 will probably disagree).
I don't think anyone in the 101st is crazy enough to think they can take Taiwan by themselves.

Accordingly, air mobile or airborne troops will likely be tasked to occupy key objectives such as airbases, ports or landing beaches so as to enable heavy assets to be landed.
Heavy assets can only be landed through a port. Taking an airfield will not help, not when China lacks enough airborne assets to form the required airbridge, not when it cannot guarantee safe passage for them through the air.

The landing points will of course be contested. Again, the hypothesis will be that China will attempt to clear a landing point for this AM/ABN assets. The landing points are likely to be close to key objectives but not close enough to be heavily defended.
Likely ports and airfields will have their own defenses or have defense assets assigned to them.

Again, the misconception that Taiwan is strong in every single part of Taiwan will be perpetuated but reality is that there will be sectors which will be less defended than others. As pointed out, supporting a singularly fixed objective is far likelier to succeed than a broad invasion scenario.
http://img296.imageshack.us/img296/9180/taiwanterrainje3.gif

Look at the length of the Taiwan coast which is actually conducive to Amphibious operations for the PLA. Very limited. Mudflats mean LSTs and their vehicles will be bogged down and immobilised, leaving them out as a likely landing point. Urban areas can be defended with relatively few troops , and if the PLA lands in urban areas you will see them embroiled in urban warfare and house to house fighting, leaving lots of time for further reinforcements to arrive. That leaves just the plains in green, which will naturally be heavily defended with mines, fortifications and artillery etc.

If that was the case, that would be a lot of Kh-59s. But even then they added 3 regiments of H-6H, which has the KD-63.
Which could have resulted in enough long range AGMs for PLAAF's needs that they didn't require a large buy of KD-88s. The simple fact of the matter is you have no idea how many long range PGMs are in China's inventory.

Most probably the JH-7A. With the use of YJ-91 and passive KD-88, a pod is seen with the aircraft that is not seen with other missiles. The LOAL mode should be with the passive KD-88.
All you see is a pod and you determine that that pod has a geo-location capability?

Lol, with SAM radars, doing their job defending their country and survival have proven to be mutually incompatible goals. A radar that is blinking or going EMCON isn't one that. And if you blink, you involve the resources of two or more radars, and that means the equivalent number of radars that isn't doing their job shooting down other aircraft.

Blinking isn't going to work as well if the missile in question has a high endurance. In this case, the KD-88 is jet powered, not rocket propelled.
Looking at the system as a whole, if it is doing its job of repelling enemy air strikes, who cares whether the radars are blinking?

Mobilization for war and mobilization for exercise isn't as clear cut as you think. In Pearl Harbor, much of the Japanese fleet wasn't even told until they are well within the operation.
When China makes a large scale mobilisation, whether for war or a claimed 'exercise', do you think the Taiwanese will be foolish enough to sit on their bums? All the SRBMs leaving their bases, all the tanks getting loaded on the LSTs, do you really believe Taiwan is going to believe that to be an innocent 'exercise'? You really believe only China has spies and not Taiwan?

HUMINT looking for radar sites is a very different matter, and don't even require infiltration of opposing forces. The main thing is to detect and locate the signals. Permanently stationed receivers in the Fujian coast can even do just that, since there is no natural barrier that exists between the Fujian and the Taiwan coasts. Its just like one big valley in between.
China can only do that against fixed radar sites.

Actually China acquited itself fairly well in later encounters. Even in first encounter, China took territory, and they only used second line units at that. Their elite units are in the north facing Russia.
Trying to divert attention? Wasn't this about experience in using PGMs? :rolleyes:

Is that into the ground or up in the air? have you counted fragmentation and shrapnel effects?

http://www.cursor.org/stories/civpertons.htm

For 2000lb JDAM, safety is at least 400m from the blast site. The fragmentation is at least 3000 feet with shrapnel up to 1200 feet.
And yet fragmentation is not uniform. Considering also that ROC airbases are hardened, nothing short of a direct hit will suffice in many cases.

Take a look here: http://www.nautilus.org/archives/napsnet/dr/0105/MAY23.html

Shows you how much Taiwan has prepared, and what Boyne says runs directly counter to your claim that fighters cannot be repositioned. It seems that is exactly what ROC plans for its expanded and hardened airbases like Chihang and Chashan.

And how long will it take to clear the bomblets. Even then, the bomblets will still randomly explode, and even if the bulldozer is armored, everything _outside_ of it is not. That will leave multiple small craters, all sorts of shrapnel and fragmentation everywhere. Oh, and what about thermobaric weapons?
How long will it take to bulldoze unexploded munitions away from sensitive structures? Think about it yourself. Small craters are not a problem.
http://www.elastomer.com/polymer/bulletins/gatewayairport/gatewayairport.html

Thermobaric weapons? How many warheads are equipped with those? What makes you think thermobaric weapons are so special? The effectiveness of thermobaric weapons are highly variable according to atmospheric conditions, and becaus ethey have little fragmentation effects, their effects are limited to the blast zone.

Really. 15 brigades with 20 to 30 launchers each.
Give me a source, considering the report strikes me as more reliable than you.

This does not include regular PLA rocket brigades or MLRS units, such as those that may be using WS-2 in the future.
Only the WS-2 will be able to reach taiwan's coast, and only under optimal conditions which allow for max range.

They did not gain long range carrier operation from that one. And the US didn't either.
And thus they were not as effective as they could be until they gained more experience. Which proves my point.

Mock airbases and SAM sites in the Gobi desert is so strikingly similar in practice to the ones in Negrev desert. Experience has shown there is nothing sacred, how much are the Israelis are willing to sell for the right price?
So at the end of the day, you have no proof, yet you chose to claim that China had training and advice from the Israelis. Thw way you refuse to consider that chinese could have just chosen to copy an Israeli training tactic shows how you choose to interpret things the way you want things to be and not how they are likely to be.
 

Schumacher

New Member
...........

But for the issue in general, think we have had enough of these "system level analyzes" from those who hardly ever seen the a rifle in real life. Information taken from usually Sinedefence and then adjusted to somesort of layman impression of what some certain warfare might be. Thats why I've tried to advertise the need for understanding how the "big picture works" so at least then you can see how the system is really ment for do and what is its concept.

To go down to the systemlevel analyzes requires that we actually know bit more about the systems than the already mentioned SD information. In naval matters I'm as a layman as most of you so I hardly can give any deep proffesional insight, being the topic of artillery then it's completely different matter. If it comes down to keep it "big" rahter than inventing completely new ways of using for example MRLS and MRBMs based on absolutely nothing else that the need and desire to get your fantasies work, I seddle for the first one-

But to please you, would you like to give bit more spesific request of what "system level analyzes" you need, so I could give my layman obinion on that? And/or in the same time giving one of yourself and not just demanding others to do it...
No more requests. :) Just wanted to emphasize that the long debates earlier in this thread is also useful just as your 'big picture' one is. It only becomes less useful when one side or the other becomes stubborn & refuse to accept what they don't know for sure, agree to disagree & move on.
Other than that, the posters involved do seem to be reasonably knowledgeable.
I asked for specifics from you because you did give the impression that you think they 'hardly ever seen the a rifle in real life.'. I was hoping for you pointing out areas where they were wrong because I couldn't see these from your posts.
 

Gollevainen

the corporal
Verified Defense Pro
Well all my somewhat denigrating comments towards the "others" are not tied to the participants of this thread but more to my earlier experiences with this same issue. In fact in this thread the level has been quite civilized since I came along.

But there are still few missknowlidges being spread around even in this thread. Mainly the usual missbelive of the role and usage of long range MRLS and the famous medium range ballistic missiles. Both are used by the side that belives PRCs triumph in this game in some sort of ducktape type of solution to whipe out almoust all aspects of ROCA. They seem to just look the public technical spesifications and then tought to be able to use them in the roles of almoust all surface strike missions from regimental level fire support, SEAD, accurate surcical strikes to anti-runway missions and anything in between.

Ballistic missiles have this gloomy reputation being the ultimate weapons, but thats due one and single factor solely, their ability and orginal idea of delivering nuclear weapons. If PRC would use its missiles in their dedicated roles, then yeas it would be able to do what the the fanboys expects them to do, whipe our ROCA and eliminating the defensive forces.
Despite their formidable looks, ballistic missiles are mainly huge engines and fuelcells tasked to deliver relatively small and light warhead to its ballistic trajectory. As the the task is done by rocket, the change to get the warhead to the exact course is rahter difficoult and thus the accuracy is not the benefits of these systems, why should it be? Nuclear warheads whipes out everyone from the CEP area and well beyond.
But when you suddenly are facing the situation where you can't use nuclear weapons these formidable weapons becomes almoust white elephants. They can only deliver small, usually 500 kg TNT warhead with relatively large CEP, worser than with the standart artillery pieces in PLA service. Their usefullness is as good as the V-2s in WWII, big fuzz, but the effect in the war is rather limited. (I already gave little comparisons of the total ammount of TNT that they can deliver) So every general must ask themselves, are they worth wasting for such low succesfull rate operations? They are extremely expensive and what happens when you waste your entire strategical deterence in missions that could be done with aeroplanes much cheaper and more accurately.
 
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