Re:
The key is how can the opponent force bring enough troops to the shore's of Taiwan, keep the beachheads, create working supplylines and deal over million size army waiting it in the small Iland in which the defender knows inch by inch and can benefit from static and relatively short supply lines and huge reserve? How can the attacker provide constant fire support if it's ability to transport even the manuvering units is limited to one brigade of only mens in one sortie? How can you manuvre against 10 times larger defender without artillery support?
Note first, I'm not saying China can achieve this but what China will probably need to do if it is to achieve a successful invasion. Just summaries.
1.
Naval ((vi) Prevent ROC naval assets from interference)
1.1 China will need to maintain a broad front of 3-400kms across the length of the straits free from naval and submarine vessels. What it could attempt to do is to use Taiwan itself as a buffer (as naval vessels can't cross the island). Anything less and the red force naval elements will be able to launch ASMs.
1.2 Accordingly, it will probably station ASW and naval assets north and south of the straits to intercept enemy subs. This could be supplemented by land-based ASW assets eg Ka-27 helos for ASW purpose. North sector will probably be from Shanghai and south from Hong Kong/Zhanjiang.
2.
Airforce ((vi) Prevent ROC airforce assets from interference)
2.1 China will need to prevent ROC airforce attack elements from entering the 3-400kms length that would interfere with naval resupply elements. This will require:
(a) suppression of airfields;
(b) defensive air operations to handle any elements that do take off.
Unlike 1.1 and 1.2, this can come from 3 directions. North and South will be supplemented by Air Defence ships eg 52Cs.
2.2. This is complicated by the breath of the Straits which allows standoff air attacks to be made from anywhere within Taiwan airspace. Further, this airspace is also defended by ROC SAM elements (although not in every direction). Accordingly, SAM elements must be suppressed to allow air superiority operations to be conducted over Taiwan.
2.3 As 2.2 is more difficult to achieve than 2.1(a), accordingly, I would surmise that 2.1(a) will have to be accorded priority before ship operations can begin.
If assuming 2.1(a) can be achieved.
3.
Ground based defenses
3.1 China will need to eliminate ground based defences (primarily
(a) ground based anti-ship missiles,
(b) artillery
(c) shore based ATGMs and finally
(d) ground based troops
in that order.
3.2 To eliminate (a), China has its disposal,
(a) Ground based SSMs;
This is likely to be prioritised to 2.1(a) because of the higher priority.
(b) Ground based artillery (eg WS-2)
This can only reach coastal regions and may not reach SSM sites within Taiwan proper.
(c) Air units
This requires removal of SAM units.
(d) Naval bombardment units
This in turn would be subject to SSMs so unlikely to be used.
3.3 In view of 3.2, China will need to rely upon air units as the primary function. Unlike 2.2, China does not need to remove SAM units across the entire Taiwan proper. Instead, it may only need to remove SAM units along a sector of defenses (facing the Taiwan straits) possibly about 100km stretch.
Assuming it can eliminate (a)
3.4 Elimination of (b) to (d) is significantly less problematic. Artillery will not be consistent (due to ammo limitations). Ground based defenses will be challenged by landing tanks and opposing forces (eg attack helicopters).
I would highlight that ground defenses will not be the "million" ground army. ROC defenses will either be concentrated (in which case actual shore defenses will be initially less) or spread out (in which case shore defenses will initially be more but reinforcements will take longer). I would estimate 1-2 divisional sized defences at best initially around each individual potential attack point.
To be continued.....