Which could have resulted in enough long range AGMs for PLAAF's needs that they didn't require a large buy of KD-88s. The simple fact of the matter is you have no idea how many long range PGMs are in China's inventory.
And as a matter of fact, you don't have any idea if they are short or not. Do you have any evidence at all of their number? Don't project ROCAF shortages into the PLAAF situation. They have more money (besides the official budget); they manufacture the munitions, whch means lower procurement costs with less middlemen. The only factor that may reduce the number of one type of munition, is because of the development and pending introductions of even more advanced smart munitions.
There is no clear boundaries between the surface capabilities of the PLAAF and the PLANAF, except on the primary assignment. This does not mean that the PLAAF is capable of antiship attacks as their secondary assignment or the PLANAF won't do bomb attacks on their secondary assignment. The capabilities of the aircraft remain the same. And it does not appear that the JH-7A may be the only aircraft that will use the KD-88.
All you see is a pod and you determine that that pod has a geo-location capability?
I have seen the pod that goes with the LGB, and its a very different one. That rules out FLIR/IT. The YJ-83s and optically guided KD-88s do not use the pod at all which rules out an extended datalink. The pod is only first seen with the YJ-91 and now with the passive KD-88, so chances are good, it is a rangefinding RWR.
Looking at the system as a whole, if it is doing its job of repelling enemy air strikes, who cares whether the radars are blinking?
If its blinking, its not repelling an air strike. It won't be capable of air search and it cannot track targets or guide missiles. Simple as that. Either you want to survive or you want to do your job.
When China makes a large scale mobilisation, whether for war or a claimed 'exercise', do you think the Taiwanese will be foolish enough to sit on their bums?
Of course, we know the Taiwanese always respond. But its hard to say when you are crying wolf, and when its the actual thing. They always respond ritually to China's ritual mobilizations, and the end result is that its the "same boring, this tmie of the year again, let's get our jets ready."
All the SRBMs leaving their bases, all the tanks getting loaded on the LSTs, do you really believe Taiwan is going to believe that to be an innocent 'exercise'? You really believe only China has spies and not Taiwan?
YOu don't even need spies to spot SRBM trucks leaving their bases. LOE sats can do that. I'm pretty Taiwan has its spies, PLA has gone into record executing some of them. The thing is, even in exercises, SRBMs leave their bases, and tanks are loaded into LSTs. What makes you think that an exercise does not incorporate these as well? An exercises is made to recreate wartime conditions. Somehow you think that an exercise means an SRBM staying at home, and tanks are only hypothetically played out... Heh..
China can only do that against fixed radar sites.
No. You can do this against mobile sites as well.
Trying to divert attention? Wasn't this about experience in using PGMs?
You make me laugh. You seem to think the mainland people are that stupid, given the annoying suggestively racist arrogance in your tone of debate. You think they just fly up in the air, fire a PGM or too, and be done with it? (Heck in the ROCAF, they don't even have enough live missiles to fire for practice).
The PLA conducts large scale, Blue vs. Red Flag joint exercises. One typical execise would have JH-7As in the Blue Flag group try to bomb the airfield of Red Flag group, and the J-10s would try to intercept them.
And yet fragmentation is not uniform. Considering also that ROC airbases are hardened, nothing short of a direct hit will suffice in many cases.
Take a look here:
http://www.nautilus.org/archives/napsnet/dr/0105/MAY23.html
Shows you how much Taiwan has prepared, and what Boyne says runs directly counter to your claim that fighters cannot be repositioned. It seems that is exactly what ROC plans for its expanded and hardened airbases like Chihang and Chashan.
Old old report. What 2001? You have a base designed for the "old" PLAAF, never one to anticipate rapid changes. As if you think the air war is still conducted by MiG-21s dropping iron bombs.
You have no idea that PGM development has dramatically overtaken loser bunker strategies. PGMs can smash the entrances and openings of underground bases. They can hit vital parts of the runaways, rendering them useless until repaired. Cluster munitions, fragmentation, thermobaric warheads can render large areas of the base unusuable, and the larger the area made useless, the longer it takes to repair them. As if its easy to repair a base while you are still under bombardment.
China did not just import Kh-59ME, but also 500kg and 1500kg TV guided bombs like the KAB-1500kr. The 1500kg bomb is a true bunker buster. We know see that 500kg LGBs have become common place even in Q-5s. Yesterday, we have photo confirmation that the J-10 can use LGBs.
How long will it take to bulldoze unexploded munitions away from sensitive structures? Think about it yourself. Small craters are not a problem.
http://www.elastomer.com/polymer/bulletins/gatewayairport/gatewayairport.html
Pouring the fill and letting it dry takes about an hour. But how long does it take to prepare that. Cutting the sections like that is going to take more than an hour. Multiply that job with hundreds of craters on the ground. Then consider doing that job while being under fire.
Good luck.
Even the picture shows nothing but working on a crack. What about a big hole or a crater like 10 feed deep? If I opened up a crater, you need to fill it. Then you need to tamper the fill to the right density, before you start even putting two or three layers of fill. I've seen work on roads. They tend to take the better half of the day, and if its large areas, make it days.
How you even think that link is an example of fixing major bomb craters on the ground is beyond me.
Thermobaric weapons? How many warheads are equipped with those? What makes you think thermobaric weapons are so special? The effectiveness of thermobaric weapons are highly variable according to atmospheric conditions, and becaus ethey have little fragmentation effects, their effects are limited to the blast zone.
LOL. Thermobaric weapons do not explode like explosives do, and their radius for that matter is much greater. I am just shaking my head here how you think that thermobaric weapons will have the same radius as explosives would. Thermobaric weapons are fuel or jelly based. As one part explodes, it expands and throws the fuel outward, which in turn ignites and throws even more of it outward.
Give me a source, considering the report strikes me as more reliable than you.
[Admin: Text deleted. You've been on here long enough to know what is acceptable language. If you can't answer without resorting to the use of reproductive or scatalogical expletives, then don't answer at all]
Is that from BryanC making his speculation in the CDF? You can get the ORBAT of the 2nd Artillery from both globalsecurity.org and sinodefence.com. 2nd Artillery uses DF-15 and DS-21 SRBMs. Since there are only a small number of ICBMs, and a handful of nuclear weapons, the vast majority of the 2nd Artillery are conventional, the nuke or conventional warhead being selected and added to the SRBM.
There are 15 regular rocket brigades in the 2nd Artillery with 20 to 30 launchers each, not counting special test brigades.
These don't even INCLUDE the DF-11s facing Taiwan. The DF-11s are regular PLA units, and are NOT attached with the Strategic Rocket forces. The 900 missiles located near and aimed at Taiwan are referred to as DF-11s. What about the missiles from other parts of the country that can be called in?
Only the WS-2 will be able to reach taiwan's coast, and only under optimal conditions which allow for max range.
With a 200km range, that will certainly bring most parts of the coast and some part inward within range of the WS-2. Again, the WS-2 is not in the DF-11 total.
So at the end of the day, you have no proof, yet you chose to claim that China had training and advice from the Israelis. Thw way you refuse to consider that chinese could have just chosen to copy an Israeli training tactic shows how you choose to interpret things the way you want things to be and not how they are likely to be.
You seem to think there is a friggin boundary between tactical and technological data. When you have a group that is already willing to sell their expertise, what makes you think there is going to be a boundary between the technological and the tactical. If the Israelis sold weapons tech to China, they should clue the Chinese how to use it as well. Both tactical and technological expertise often goes together hand in hand, and it is difficult when to seperate the both. Get some common sense will you.
In the end, the result is PLAAF units practicing LGBs, EO, and sat guided weapons at carefully well recreated mock airbases and SAM defense units in the Gobi Desert.
