The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[KipPotapych]

I await your next blog on the subject.

How was my blog on the subject?

I posted before "wondering" who's got any leverage, maybe Zelenski still believes that he can fight this war without NATO.

I’d narrow it down to the US rather than NATO in general.

To be more precise, they can fight without the US, but the timeframe would be (probably significantly) shorter. Don’t think the outcome would be much different at this point.

Without “NATO” as a whole - that is, the members of the Alliance actively supporting Ukraine and the Alliance itself organizing, coordinating, etc - it is, of course, out of the question. I don’t think even he believes they can though.

Ukraine did not receive any warning before Russia launched its first barrage of ballistic missiles on Tuesday evening.

Ukrainian soldiers in combat have access to Starlink satellite internet restricted

Outage of terminals managed by Elon Musk’s SpaceX comes as Russia launches ballistic missiles at Ukraine without any advance warning from US

www.theguardian.com

Trump was asked if the US is still supplying Ukraine with intelligence and he answered yes. I guess the question was broad enough to answer positively even if some intelligence sharing has been cut off. It could also be the case that it didn’t happen and all went as it usually does. For example:





While I do not track these events, I am fairly certain this would not be the first time that the ground-strike missiles fired out of S-400/300 made a hit without a warning.

Don't bite the hand that feeds you. I wonder if Zelenski got the hint.

He did not.



In fact, this is shaping up to be quite a clustefuck, potentially. Musk has likely had nothing to do with any of it. Starlink was probably never restricted more than it was before this “incident”. He didn’t even let Fedorov pump himself up for more than a few minutes:



Starlink has been restricted to 160 km/h for a while now (since 2025 or earlier?). If someone (like Zelensky) thinks that Musk can just apply restrictions to Starshield, they should get their head examined. There was this specific separation made for this very reason (we had a discussion back in 2022-23 about it right here). So Churchill is talking at least some nonsense there. It could be the case that he himself does not understand the distinction?

While English is not his native language, that whole bit is a disaster, in my opinion (as are many of the other chunks from the interview).

Edit
(Ukraine’s systems picked up the missiles only as they were nearing the city.) "This is absolutely unjust". Zelenski.
Why? He does not have the means, that is the war that he is fighting. Tantrums and delusions seems to be his forte.

According to the reports, the sirens were activated after the explosions had taken place, not while the missiles were approaching the city.

The “most unexpected” thing here is that no one can replace the American early launch warning system for Ukraine. Epic ingenuity and “we can distinguish by sound the type of missiles coming in”, French can replace the US, and whatever other exciting innovations only remain such in the “theoretical” reporting. This not me making shit up, by the way. Here is John Foreman telling it like it is, for example, or part of it:

‘It’s important to get to the facts’ on Starlink restriction in Ukraine, says diplomat

We spoke to John Foreman, a former UK military attache in Kyiv and Moscow, whose previous military career included commanding Royal Navy warships and asked him who is behind that decision to restrict Ukraine's US satellite access.

www.channel4.com

Someone should draw a parallel to the advertised hypothetical Russian-“European” war here.

At least the good news is that Ukraine is going to have their own Starlink - UASAT or whatever it is that I mentioned recently - with dozens or hundreds of satellites launched by the end of this year and then some. Probably will take care of that early-launch detection as well and will be a saviour of the entire continent and all democracies alike in the world.

 

[KipPotapych]

A couple of other things.



“Withholding all US assistance”, “helping fund the Russian war machine”, “kill as many civilians as possible”…

A reminder:



If the goal was to kill as many civilians as possible, we would probably see numbers closer to -insert almost sny other conflict of your choice-. Over a million followers though.




No one knows what happened yet, but “Ukrainian sources confirm”! I mean people are not even kidding and his face is probably is as serious as it could ever be.




New!!! I don’t know WTF is going on, but “a source in Ukraine tells me”!

Yet, we talk about Russian bots and Yandex. Laughing.

Edit:

 

[KipPotapych]

Maybe they can wiggle out some air defence out of it as well, but I would not count on that either […]

More on my “blog”:

Asked whether Ukraine would be open to halting energy strikes as a way of repairing relations with the White House, Zelenskiy told the newspaper he could agree only if in return he were given more US-made Patriot interceptors, calling it the “minimum” that would be acceptable.

https://www.reuters.com/world/zelenskiy-says-ukraine-will-resume-strikes-russian-refineries-ft-reports-2026-10-15/

Soon Winston may be celebrated as a great guy again by Trump (though I would not bet on that).

 

[rsemmes]

Zelenski had an "interesting" meeting at the White House. Does he believes that pointing his finger, publicly, at Trump is going to make him suddenly blush and start doing whatever Zelenski says?

 

[rsemmes]

More on my “blog”:

Asked whether Ukraine would be open to halting energy strikes as a way of repairing relations with the White House, Zelenskiy told the newspaper he could agree only if in return he were given more US-made Patriot interceptors, calling it the “minimum” that would be acceptable.

https://www.reuters.com/world/zelenskiy-says-ukraine-will-resume-strikes-russian-refineries-ft-reports-2026-10-15/

Soon Winston may be celebrated as a great guy again by Trump (though I would not bet on that).

Why does he say that he is going to do it instead of doing it? Does he believe that he is threatening Trump? All that should be negotiated behind the scenes, unless he, Zelenski, is starting a reelection campaign; not the best moment, I would say.

 

[KipPotapych]

^ They hit the refinery in Ryazan earlier today, after his statements.

Everything has to be public and cited in as many media outlets and social media posts as possible. Even if it pisses someone off (and, extremely weirdly, it works more often than not). See recent South Korea incident and a bunch of other examples. Talking trash about Trump is a retarted plan though and is going to backfire. He thinks he can manhandle the orange man this way, but he is wrong.

I read yesterday, before these latest proclamations, that Trump was furious and planning to actually stop intel sharing with Ratcliffe trying to talk him out of it. Trying to think where the report was, but failing at the moment.

What’s funny is that UA strikes in Russia would not be going as “well” as they are going now if Trump cuts the access. Repeated strikes on the existing routes would be ongoing until they don’t work anymore, but anything new will be more problematic. The situation is something like this:

- You can use the intel I provide and my satellite infrastructure to hit targets in Russia but you need to avoid these particular ones.
- Here are my conditions for me to avoid them.
- You better listen!
- Make me, idiot!

Edit: this is a paywall-free Zelensky's interview with Financial Times, via Irish Times:

Zelenskiy defies Trump as Ukraine resumes strikes on Russian refineries

Ukrainian president expresses anger at withdrawal of US intelligence sharing as Musk says Starlink military technology is `controlled’ by US government

www.irishtimes.com

 

[KipPotapych]

To add to my post above on why Zelensky's current approach is likely going to backfire badly. I didn’t want to expand on it because too many words for some, but here is Vlad Vexler puts it pretty much on point:



Link to the post in case someone wants to explore how the question came up:

Vlad Vexler (@VladVexler) on X

Yes, European leaders need to understand that if you criticise Trump, he will get much more narcissistic supply from the time you praise him. Because Carney has stood up to Trump, Carney telling Trump “I enjoyed my phone call with you” means something to Trump. He gets narcissistic supply from it.…

x.com

Since I am making a post anyway:



Jake’s story (paywalled but avoidable via a reader mode “hack” on a mobile device):

US tech is powering Ukraine's drone war. Officers fear it's created a serious vulnerability for Kyiv.

Ukraine's drone war relies on US tech, like Elon Musk's Starlink, creating an edge but also vulnerabilities Kyiv can't fully control.

www.businessinsider.com

Christopher Miller (FT Ukraine) confirms what I said yesterday regarding Starlink vs Starshield claims:

 

[vikingatespam]

Four Su-34 claimed destroyed by a Neptune strike (with sat. pics)

4 Su-34 claimed destroyed by a Neptune strike at Borisoglebsk Airbase. The pic indicates possible poor dispersion of airframes.

 

[Feanor]

An interesting theory from Suriyakmaps. He states that Ukraine's recent success is because Ukraine has been sending more and more rear-end personnel to the front lines, and this is how Ukraine resolved their manpower issues. This isn't entirely unlikely, we saw something similar before though last time it was presumably on a smaller scale. Note this doesn't preclude the harsher mobilization measures that have been reported on anecdotally but if this is true it paints an entirely different picture of the situation. An interesting part is that he estimates Ukraine's armed forces at 880k-1mln men. This is far larger than estimates we saw last year, when they were estimated below 500k. It's unclear which estimate is accurate, if either.

If Suriyakmaps is correct, then Ukraine's current successes, and make no mistake they are successes, are both limited in time and ultimately undermine the long term war effort. And it would make sense that Ukraine would bank on the strategy of creating enough short term success on the front lines to try to better their negotiating position. On the other hand these counter-attacks have been going on for most of the year, and don't seem to be coming to an end. And again there's a sustainability question.

Suriyakmaps

The Ukrainian rear guard springs into action. There has been talk in recent days of Starlink’s temporary restrictions on Ukrainian forces, which affected the Ukrainians’ communications and logistics for a relatively short period. This recent incident highlights the strategic dependence on a...

t.me

Suriyakmaps

This new strategy follows two objectives: to contain the Russians until the arrival of autumn, when the rain and mud make it difficult for heavy vehicles to advance, forcing them to use secondary roads and significantly slowing down logistics and operations; and, secondly, to create a propaganda...

t.me

 

[Hoover]

... lines to try to better their negotiating position.

I think Putin doesn´t care about elatively small Ukrainian successes on regional areas. Putin has to win, and he will sacrifice hundred thousend soldiers more to archive that. All Ukrianian (and US and so on) attempts to get into negotiations were rejected by Putin. On the front line the Urkaine is not able to defeat the Russians. The only chance is to expand the attacks in Russian oil, data and supply chains to create pressure on Putin and his regime to negotiate. But Putin knows that with an retreating US from the supporters and an increasing pressure of his European rightwing puppets he only has to wait.

 

[rsemmes]

I think Putin doesn´t care about elatively small Ukrainian successes on regional areas. Putin has to win, and he will sacrifice hundred thousend soldiers more to archive that. All Ukrianian (and US and so on) attempts to get into negotiations were rejected by Putin. On the front line the Urkaine is not able to defeat the Russians. The only chance is to expand the attacks in Russian oil, data and supply chains to create pressure on Putin and his regime to negotiate. But Putin knows that with an retreating US from the supporters and an increasing pressure of his European rightwing puppets he only has to wait.

attempts to get into negotiations were rejected by Putin
I tend to disagree, Zelenski wants to negotiate in his own terms, just like Putin. Just like with Trump, Zelenski doesn't have the cards.
to create pressure on Putin
That is simply wrong. Looking at the (budget) situation and damages (and lack of repairs), who is under pressure already? Those "European rightwing puppets" still keep Zelenski from sinking.
As a point of note, how many Ukrainians has Zelenski sacrificed since 2023, when his NATO offensive failed? But you are right, Zelenski hasn't retaken Liman, he was just able to avoid its fall.

 

[rsemmes]

An interesting theory from Suriyakmaps. He states that Ukraine's recent success is because Ukraine has been sending more and more rear-end personnel to the front lines, and this is how Ukraine resolved their manpower issues. This isn't entirely unlikely, we saw something similar before though last time it was presumably on a smaller scale. Note this doesn't preclude the harsher mobilization measures that have been reported on anecdotally but if this is true it paints an entirely different picture of the situation. An interesting part is that he estimates Ukraine's armed forces at 880k-1mln men. This is far larger than estimates we saw last year, when they were estimated below 500k. It's unclear which estimate is accurate, if either.

If Suriyakmaps is correct, then Ukraine's current successes, and make no mistake they are successes, are both limited in time and ultimately undermine the long term war effort. And it would make sense that Ukraine would bank on the strategy of creating enough short term success on the front lines to try to better their negotiating position. On the other hand these counter-attacks have been going on for most of the year, and don't seem to be coming to an end. And again there's a sustainability question.

Suriyakmaps

The Ukrainian rear guard springs into action. There has been talk in recent days of Starlink’s temporary restrictions on Ukrainian forces, which affected the Ukrainians’ communications and logistics for a relatively short period. This recent incident highlights the strategic dependence on a...

t.me

Suriyakmaps

This new strategy follows two objectives: to contain the Russians until the arrival of autumn, when the rain and mud make it difficult for heavy vehicles to advance, forcing them to use secondary roads and significantly slowing down logistics and operations; and, secondly, to create a propaganda...

t.me

Undermine the long term war effort.
Not only that, Zelenski is already spending tomorrow's promised money, ruffling Trump's feathers and he doesn't know what will (EU) happen next year. He keeps digging his own (Ukraine's) hole but:

https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2026/01/ukraine-will-be-the-business-opportunity-of-the-decade.html

all's well that ends well... For someone.

Thinning the rear areas is always a good idea (REMF), if you have time to train them. Using them in an emergency (alert battalions) is a desperate measure. Is Zelenski deploying them to show off, like Hoover thinks, another 40 days and Russia will surrender? As you say, it is not a sustainable policy and it leads to collapse, reduce logistics when logistics are under pressure?

 

[personaldesas]

Bulgaria formally asked for help from NATO following suspected Russian drone attacks on commercial ships in the Black Sea. The Bulgarian defence minister requested combat aircraft and anti-drone systems. A ship sank and 11 sailors were missing following a drone strike off the Bulgarian coast earlier this week; Bulgaria summoned the Russian ambassador.

https://www.economist.com/the-world-in-brief/2026/10/16/ee9f904f-7510-4ae1-aaf9-40ed81ecb3b7

Looks like Bulgaria suspects Russia is behind the drone attacks on commercial ships off its coast. If Russia is responsible, this could fit the broader pattern German and Danish intelligence services have warned about: limited attacks intended to test NATO's resolve.

 

[Hoover]

Is Zelenski deploying them to show off, like Hoover thinks, another 40 days and Russia will surrender?

Sorry, but you are thinking in your own Russian world. Waste of time to answer.

 

[KipPotapych]

"And now we can see how cash will start flowing back into Russia through the diesel deal," Zelenskiy told a press conference on the sidelines of the summit.

I don’t want to tap the sign again, as I did in the second post on this page.

Furthermore, Russian diesel would sell regardless of anyone’s actions and it would sell for the same price it would now (possibly higher).

While EU leaders hit out at the US deal to buy Russian diesel, they are also grappling with how to tackle energy ⁠prices that have soared since the Iran war, exposing divisions between member states on day one of the summit on Thursday.

Oh, looks like I don’t even have to tap the sign, they are going to be the ones scooping up the very diesel again via third parties and then whine about justice and fairness.

"The war will cost €155 billion next year. And we need at least €70 billion more from you – for defence, for weapons, and for our resilience," Zelenskiy said in his address to the EU leaders, which he later posted on X.

"This is a realistic amount. And I ask you to find this support. It will help us hold Russia back."

Made it official and public. A realistic amount. While France is about to be bailed out by the ECB, some others not far behind. But hey,

"We ‌have a ⁠lot of gaps to fill, and this is a European mission to fill the gaps that Ukraine needs. Because always, at the start (and) at the end of every conversation, people need to be reminded that we are sitting in a warm room, lights are on, heating is on, the coffee is warm, and we cannot get tired of the war in Ukraine, because they are fighting ... for us."

“For them”, the “real leaders”.

EU leaders rallied around Zelenskiy after Trump again criticised Ukraine, calling its strikes on Russian refineries a "disgrace". On arriving at the summit, Zelenskiy pointedly referred to his counterparts there as "real leaders".

Quotes from here:

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-leaders-rally-around-zelenskiy-trump-calls-ukrainian-strikes-russia-disgrace-2026-10-16/

Also, Ukraine was not the first order of business for the first time since the invasion and was moved to day two of the summit. What was the first order of business? Oh yeah, that was money.

 

[Feanor]

https://www.economist.com/the-world-in-brief/2026/10/16/ee9f904f-7510-4ae1-aaf9-40ed81ecb3b7

Looks like Bulgaria suspects Russia is behind the drone attacks on commercial ships off its coast. If Russia is responsible, this could fit the broader pattern German and Danish intelligence services have warned about: limited attacks intended to test NATO's resolve.

I don't know that there's much to doubt here. Shipping heading to Ukraine off the Bulgarian coast hit by drones? That's almost certainly Russia. Mystery small UAVs over a civilian airport that don't actually do anything? That could be hobbyists, or anyone really.

I think Putin doesn´t care about elatively small Ukrainian successes on regional areas. Putin has to win, and he will sacrifice hundred thousend soldiers more to archive that. All Ukrianian (and US and so on) attempts to get into negotiations were rejected by Putin. On the front line the Urkaine is not able to defeat the Russians. The only chance is to expand the attacks in Russian oil, data and supply chains to create pressure on Putin and his regime to negotiate. But Putin knows that with an retreating US from the supporters and an increasing pressure of his European rightwing puppets he only has to wait.

Russia losing momentum and the war looking like a stalemate might make Russia more amenable to negotiations. If 2026 went like 2025, Russia's position would harden. The real issue is sustainability. As of right now I think this war could go on for another 2 years with no dramatic changes.

 

[StevoJH]

Russia losing momentum and the war looking like a stalemate might make Russia more amenable to negotiations. If 2026 went like 2025, Russia's position would harden. The real issue is sustainability. As of right now I think this war could go on for another 2 years with no dramatic changes.

As long as the EU, IMF, World Bank etc keep the money flowing this could continue indefinately.

If that funding dries up, Ukraine will be in trouble relatively quickly.

If Russia gains access to foreign financial markets that would also make things much more difficult for Ukraine.

 

[rsemmes]

As long as the EU, IMF, World Bank etc keep the money flowing this could continue indefinately.

If that funding dries up, Ukraine will be in trouble relatively quickly.

If Russia gains access to foreign financial markets that would also make things much more difficult for Ukraine.

I think that "indefinitely" is too optimistic.
Ukraine still has 2m men hiding, I am not quite sure how effective they are going to be even if they are sent to the front. Are they going to desert, pull back or surrender as soon as they can or will they stay put?
Ukraine has to repair, and pay for it, a lot of things. Can Ukraine take infinite damage? It will need more money to keep less things working.
Feanor mentioned two years, Ukraine will survive this winter but, in what situation is going to be before next winter, even with those not yet promised €70bn?

 

[seaspear]

An interesting video off Utube with the premise of the story that Russia is stockpililing new modern tanks and IFV,S in previous bases that had been emptied ,and not commiting them to Ukraine war due too effectiveness of drones or perhaps waiting for an effective anti drone warfare to be acquired

 

[KipPotapych]

Bloomberg:

The soaring cost of moving oil around the world is making some long-distance crude trades uneconomical, threatening to disrupt flows at a time when fuel markets have never been tighter.
The jump is being driven by a shortage of available supertankers. In some parts of the world, there are barely any of the ships — each the length of three football fields — left for hire. The squeeze is making faraway barrels less attractive and encouraging refiners to snap up supplies closer to home if they can find them.

Moving a cargo from Houston to Asia now adds about $26 a barrel — $52 million a cargo — to the cost of supplying the world’s largest crude-importing region. That’s equal to roughly a quarter of the price of West Texas Intermediate futures. Before the war, shipping typically accounted for only a tiny fraction of the cost.[…]

The rally is minting fortunes for the small group of shipowners that dominate the tanker market[…]

But for oil traders, the risk is that shipping becoming prohibitively expensive. They’re concerned that the higher costs make it unprofitable for some refiners to turn crude into fuels, deterring them from buying cargoes that have to sail over long distances, even when demand to make diesel and gasoline is strong.

Via the archive:

https://archive.is/XSUjl

No one could have predicted that!

Quoting for continuity and adding:



Indeed, no one could have predicted that! Except…


This is a funny interpretation of the events that we had already somewhat discussed:



The author tries to show that there is no effect on diesel prices from the Ukrainian strikes. He is basically saying that Russian diesel does not matter. Even though the proposition is completely bonkers, let’s take a (very brief) closer look.

On his chart, Marc highlights the point in the middle of November, when Ukraine hit six RU refineries in a few days. Somehow - must be a miracle - diesel prices went down a couple of weeks later. Hmmm… Interesting, the lemming sense must be correct, there is no correlation! In reality, however, prices started going down because Russian exports of diesel began increasing and increased dramatically due to the drop in domestic demand and other factors, recording about 1 mbpd in December. Too far to dig or understand for this guy, but let’s continue.

So the price was gradually decreasing up until the middle of January or so for this very reason, until the Russian exports actually began to drop due to the ongoing Ukrainian strikes over the previous months. Eventually, the diesel price came back to… drum roll… the level we had seen before this Russian increase in seaborne exports. The chart illustrates this perfectly, in spite of being compressed (over the timeline) for propaganda purposes. It should be noted that there was no sudden price hike because there was no sudden shortage yet, information flows slowly (the exports volumes reports are not real-time info), there was uncertainty about the damage, repair times, etc, plenty of tankers were still at sea at any given time heading to their destination (or looking for one), softened demand, etc.

Then, at the end of February, Benjamin and Donald decided to wreck Iran, that, in turn, announced the Strait to be closed and sent some projectiles at the Gulf oil related infrastructure. Of course, market reacted immediately because, while Russian exports kept flowing at about 500 kbpd, the Gulf crisis was heading towards taking out nearly double that amount out of circulation in the near future - “the crisis we have not seen since the 1970s”. Lemming logic somehow can connect these events, weirdly distinguishing one diesel from another.

As things evolved, Benjamin and Donald (mostly Donald) had a revelation that things were not working out the way he thought they would, so tensions reduced, prices began to drop, naturally. Trump’s messaging, memorandum of understanding, and all that jazz.

Come mid or so June, speculation and Russian signalling about the potential diesel export ban (the direct result of the Ukrainian strikes) caused the upward pressure on diesel prices. This is still greatly illustrated in the chart that is not supposed to illustrate that. On July 8, shit hit the fan. The ban was implemented exactly on that day and strikes in the Middle East resumed, with blockade coming a week or so later.





Russian ban immediately and clearly, with utmost certainty, meant that over 400,000 barrels of diesel would disappear from the market in the near future. What was not certain was the longevity of the ban, though it was more or less predictable that, provided the UA strikes continued, the ban was to be extended to the end of the harvest season, even if there was marginal excess production. In other words, Ukrainian strikes on Russian refineries had a direct effect on the Russian diesel production capacity, which affected the volume of exports, which is directly (negatively) correlated with global diesel prices.

Someone should play around and build a chart where the effects on the US diesel price (as per the chart cited) of the Iran war were eliminated, while all else remained equal. Ideally, someone who can put aside their bias and has an understanding of causation and basic statistics. If I were to take a wild (though educated) guess, the total change in diesel price here was 30-40% effected by the RU exports and, naturally, 60-70% caused by the war with Iran. The correlation between the diesel prices and Russian exports would be nearly perfect.

The whole idea of differentiating between diesel that originates in Russia, Middle East or elsewhere is retarted. It is barrels that matter, not their origin (unless we want to expand the discussion to regional pricing an their dependency on Russia, Middle East, etc).