The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I now read the Radio Freedom article cited above. The $886M number referenced in the tweet attaches above has no legs (though the poster is one of the authors from my understanding). The numbers presented in the article are $658M and $863, being lower and upper estimated ranges of the damage, respectively. It is mentioned that this represents 0.5% of the Russian oil revenues, as I, apparently correctly, estimated above.

The article also explains why we do not see many attacks on gas storage and other facilities. This is probably a learned behaviour. For instance, the article provides two examples of such strikes, one causing a total estimated damage of $74K and the second $250K. In other words, it is almost certain that the assets used for the attack are worth substantially more than the damage they cause. It should be noted here that the monetized damage estimates include the cost of replacement equipment and repairs (in all estimates, not just these two above), as well as potential lost revenue due to the time of stoppage or low volume production for the estimated repair times.

Another subject that the article discusses is the impact of the Ukrainian strikes on the military facilities. The following diagram represents the damage sustained by the military facilities in these strikes (via Google translate):

IMG_9107.jpeg

It is claimed that at least 67% of all Ukrainian strikes (both, military and energy targets) are successful. I am not sure what success means here, but the diagram above shows that it is certainly not the case, at least for the military targets. Which probably led to another learned behaviour, where the strikes on the energy infrastructure have been increasing over time, while the opposite has been true for the military targets. According to the article,

If at the beginning of the period we are considering, Ukrainian strikes were more often on military facilities (mainly ammunition depots), the vector gradually shifted to oil or gas storage facilities, as well as oil and gas refineries: in January, two-thirds of all verified strikes fell on them.

I am really not sure what the train of thought is though (on the part of the Ukrainian planners) since it is quite obvious from this report that the damage caused by the strikes on oil and gas facilities are completely insignificant. Show and hype, demonstration of imaginary success? Perhaps. It seems to me, however, that even if the probability of truly successful impacts on the military facilities is… I don’t want to say low, because it is clearly not that low, judging by the graphic attached above… rather lower, the resources would be much better used striking these facilities with direct consequences transferring to the battlefield, be it ammunition, logistics, command, etc. There certainly would not be as many televised pretty explosions and such, but the returns would actually be significant, or at least more so.

Another note, in their statistics, they include the “unknown”, among which are sitings of Ukrainian drones flying over the Russian territory, for example, without knowing why and where and what happened. Not sure what the purpose for inclusion of those is. Not sure if all of those are sitings of Ukrainian drones either. Don’t think it has any relevance to any of the stuff presented in the article though, aside from making the map look more saturated. It would be relevant if they calculated the cost of these attacks (that would be a pretty interesting experiment, to provide the estimated cost vs damage on any particular strike).


On the subject of the meme I attached in my post above. While completely unrelated, one of the main things revealed in this leak (beside the “stupidity” of the participants) is that it showed that what is expressed in public by these individuals is actually better than what they believe and say in private (if you don’t count the reporters invited to the private chats, lol). Example is what was said about Europe. So their feelings are actually quite genuine. And so is the intent. This can obviously be transferred to the Ukrainian issue as well. I was just thinking about this today. Like sometimes you question whether these guys are for real or not. Well, they are. And what they actually think is possibly (in fact, likely) worse.
 

Fredled

Active Member
Current Ukrainian counter attacks don't seem to me to be a major change in tactic or in the dynamic of the battle field. Ukrainians always wanted to push back the Russians as soon as they got a chance. But there is an important evolution in the way Russians attack Ukrainian lines. In the last six months, large "meat assaults" where hundred of Russian soldiers would die in a matter of hours have been replaced by micro assaults by platoons as small as 2 men, but all the time, everywhere. Russians still make larger assaults but much less often. This new tactic forced the Ukrainian to change to be more proactive. Before, to kill a maximum of Russian soldiers, Ukrainians just had to wait for an infantry charge and fire. Now, if they wait, they won't inflict as many losses on Russians. Russians can secure new position by sneaking in where they ar not detected with minimal forces involved in each operation at the initial stage, but when each small group add up, the number of troops involved is still the same as in a major offensive.
I think that this forced the Ukrainian to make counter attacks to retake the positions instead of waiting in the trenches. The small successes they had recently are not enough to speculate about some major change in strategy or a major reallocation of troops.

Of course the rate of depletion of Ukrainian troops remain the main question as it has been for over a year and half. While human losses on the Russian side doesn't seem to affect neither political decisions inside Russia nor the morale of the Russian troops, nor on the recruitment rate. While Ukrainians are pushed up to their limits, Russians know no limit no matter how much they lose. Russians don't seem to be effected by the huge losses in military vehicles neither. They keep on moving forward with whatever they have.

This limitless will to conquer Ukraine, even if it's largely motivated by the high pay for the soldiers, has direct influence in the peace talks, or lack of peace talks to be more exact. When Trump is lamenting on human suffering and the dead and wounded, Russians don't give a damn. They don't give a damn neither for Ukrainian soldiers, nor for their own soldiers. Russians ar involved in an historical battle to recover the lost glory of the USSR. In their mind it's a war for eternity. That's why Trump and his team don't understand the situation.

That's why Russians see "energy ceasefire", "sea ceasefire" as short term tools to push the chess pawns forward. The "energy ceasefire" has never been formally agreed, let alone signed, and in so far not being put into effect. Russians have not been firing at Ukrainian power station and power plants all the time. They do it usually at the beginning or during the winter. Now, it's not the season for that. But they can say that they abide with the "energy ceasefire".

As the "sea ceasefire", Putin, again, sets unrelated conditions such as lifting of sanctions. It would be the worse thing for the West and Ukraine. This is a very dangerous moment when Putin can manipulate Trump. At the same time, it won't change much the situation on the Black Sea. So, for both side, accepting the "sea ceasefire" is the cheapest way to show good will to Trump.

The fact the Putin's first demand was to stop attacks on oil facilities show that these attacks have an effect.
KipPotapych said:
This is a joke, right? $0.9B? This is a laughable number and the effect is completely negligible in any universe.
The value of the damages from satellite picture doesn't show the financial losses and the real disruption in fuel supplies. Repairs can take from a few days to a few months. During this time fuel supply is reduced regionally. Ukraine also cut with these strikes the little exports remaining toward Europe.

That Putin's second demand was lifting sanction, and (Hoo-Ha!), lifting the ban from SWIFT, shows that these things also have an effect, despite some people reporting that the Russian economy is booming and everything is fine.

crest said:
I don't rule out but highly doubt the e.u will put troops on the ground without the Americans, with the Americans I think it's a fast yes on there part. A interesting question is u.s air support e.u troops. But I'm not sure the u.s will risk that I mean if Russia doesn't risk it's air force over Ukraine relatively decent air defence, does the u.s.a really want to challenge Russian anti air full board?
European suddenly realised their dependence to the US for critical elements in a large scale military operation: Satellite intelligence, air refuelling, air logistic, spare parts, and lately they discovered the ability for the US to remotely reduce the efficiency of the F35. For this reason, US support for a significant deployment is essential even if they don;t participate on the ground. Europeans can still make smaller deployment without the American but it won't have much effect.

Feanor said:
How about a handover of the rest of Donetsk region, Russian withdrawal from all parts of Kharkov region, a full peace with a new state border along the line of contact and official US recognition of all Russian gains, with a plug pulled on all US sanctions, thus undermining EU sanctions pretty profoundly. It allows Putin to sell the thing as a victory, it avoid the completely unreasonable demands for the cross-Dnepr territories or Zaporozhye city, and it gives Russia a nice territorial boost in the process.
There are many ways Putin could sell any arrangement as a historical victory, and many ways he could have done it already several times.
Instead he is humiliating Russia by hiring Norht Koreans and forcing his own troops to drive lada and "buretchka" minivans. The problem is that he personally doesn't consider a peace deal based on the line of contact as a victory. He sticks with his maximalist demands. There are many ways Russia could get out of this marasm. Unfortunately Putin's inability to take a rational decision prevent us to foresee the chance of a peace deal and which terms could be agreed upon.
 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
But there is an important evolution in the way Russians attack Ukrainian lines. In the last six months, large "meat assaults" where hundred of Russian soldiers would die in a matter of hours have been replaced by micro assaults by platoons as small as 2 men, but all the time, everywhere. Russians still make larger assaults but much less often. This new tactic
You must be following some other war. This “new tactic” has been implemented for much longer than 6 months. It was discussed in this thread as well.

What happened now was Ukraine stopped their completely unreasonable creation of new brigades and sent the reserves to the frontline. The changes you see now are the result of that.

They do it usually at the beginning or during the winter. Now, it's not the season for that. But they can say that they abide with the "energy ceasefire".
They hit some facilities year round. Production requires energy, including MIC. In the winter, the intensity of the attacks increases greatly though. They also start striking the heating system in the winter that is mostly centralized.

The fact the Putin's first demand was to stop attacks on oil facilities show that these attacks have an effect.
Putin didn’t demand that. You are upside down again. That was him “kicking the ball back”. Remember when Europe and then Zelensky proposed ceasefire at the Black Sea and “air”? This is a variant of exactly that, but with terms acceptable to Russia. Like I said a couple of weeks ago or whenever that was, it would be dumb for the Russians to agree to ceasing all arial attacks and I explained why that would be the case. If, and this is most certainly the case (or at least very likely), the sea ceasefire includes port infrastructure, Ukraine is the one gaining here and quite a bit, clearly. Therefore, Russia wants stuff in return. The same goes for the energy infrastructure: if this turns into anything more permanent than a month, Ukraine is the one gaining here and greatly. Russia inflicts a lot more damage there that is felt quite a bit more than the Ukrainian strikes in Russia that are worth not very much at all in the grand scheme. This is clear as day to me. Hence, Russia wants stuff in return. The very least they can ask for is sanctions removed from the Agricultural Bank (to start). See the grain deal falling apart for reference. There is nothing extraordinary here at all. In fact, we have been through something similar a couple of years ago or so.

The value of the damages from satellite picture doesn't show the financial losses and the real disruption in fuel supplies. Repairs can take from a few days to a few months. During this time fuel supply is reduced regionally. Ukraine also cut with these strikes the little exports remaining toward Europe.
You should read my other post. Even better, read the article.

That Putin's second demand was lifting sanction, and (Hoo-Ha!), lifting the ban from SWIFT, shows that these things also have an effect, despite some people reporting that the Russian economy is booming and everything is fine.
Upside down again. I didn’t see anyone here saying that everything is fine. What has been suggested is that there is no doom and collapse is not happening any time soon. They can and do manage.

It is very clear that sanctions have an effect. One would either completely lack understanding or be lying if they said there was no effect. They could also be completely delusional, like their counterparts on the other side of things, and truly believing they speak the truth, while being completely disconnected from the reality.

lately they discovered the ability for the US to remotely reduce the efficiency of the F35.
Now straight to the conspiracy stuff, eh?

There are many ways Putin could sell any arrangement as a historical victory, and many ways he could have done it already several times.
Is that so? Because most others disagree. Also, if one thinks he can actually win, why would they try to sell anything.

Instead he is humiliating Russia by hiring Norht Koreans and forcing his own troops to drive lada and "buretchka" minivans.
Again with humiliation and stuff. Quite literally, nobody cares and it is irrelevant, completely.

What’s “buretchka”?

The problem is that he personally doesn't consider a peace deal based on the line of contact as a victory. He sticks with his maximalist demands. There are many ways Russia could get out of this marasm. Unfortunately Putin's inability to take a rational decision prevent us to foresee the chance of a peace deal and which terms could be agreed upon.
What Russia is doing now is very rational. They have not been in a stronger negotiating position than they are today since at least the very beginning of the conflict, while “we are all in this together” trying to get Ukraine an “upper hand” and have been for the past… well, 3 years. Mark Milley was right in 2022.

Americans are shifting their priorities, which was expected regardless of the results of the elections, and, moreover, have their internal issues to deal with; the biggest disruption within NATO since its creation, trust between the US and Europe are at the lowest it had ever been; Ukraine, while not collapsing, is loosing the war (lost already, in my opinion, and long ago) and there is nothing that can change that, really; Europe is displaying its impotence and indecisiveness; right wing and, what they call, pro-Russian parties are gaining speed in the west; after over three years of war and the shenanigans of the past couple of months, there is still no strategy of even goals formulated by anyone on the western side (as opposed to Putin’s irrationality?); and so on. To paraphrase Trump, Putin has all the cards. He can ask for whatever he wants and see what sticks, then he can decide if what sticked is acceptable or not.

Sure, some can wait for some just peace and rainbows in the sky. All in complete oblivion. I really have no idea what people are thinking and how their thought process works. The real world is completely different from that oblivion.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
What’s “buretchka”?
I think he means buhanka, or loaf in Russian. It's slang for the UAZ-452 van. Despite the colorful advertising, it's a very simple, even primitive vehicle. It's advantages lie in its low price, ruggedness, ease of maintenance, and availability. It's an example of Soviet auto-prom at it's best.

 

crest

Member
Putin didn’t demand that. You are upside down again. That was him “kicking the ball back”. Remember when Europe and then Zelensky proposed ceasefire at the Black Sea and “air”? This is a variant of exactly that, but with terms acceptable to Russia. Like I said a couple of weeks ago or whenever that was, it would be dumb for the Russians to agree to ceasing all arial attacks and I explained why that would be the case. If, and this is most certainly the case (or at least very likely), the sea ceasefire includes port infrastructure, Ukraine is the one gaining here and quite a bit, clearly. Therefore, Russia wants stuff in return. The same goes for the energy infrastructure: if this turns into anything more permanent than a month, Ukraine is the one gaining here and greatly. Russia inflicts a lot more damage there that is felt quite a bit more than the Ukrainian strikes in Russia that are worth not very much at all in the grand scheme. This is clear as day to me. Hence, Russia wants stuff in return. The very least they can ask for is sanctions removed from the Agricultural Bank (to start). See the grain deal falling apart for reference. There is nothing extraordinary here at all. In fact, we have been through something similar a couple of years ago or so
I don't think its tilted in Ukraine favour as much as you may think if it goes on for more then a month.
Yes Ukraine would be getting it's power back but alot of it is provided from out of country tho it's going to help alot with whatever wartime production they have. and for sure with being able to sell there grain. Not to mention the ports in Odessa will presumably be struck less. These are all helpful but as they get power from beyond there boarders the effect is limited, and Odessa as a safe port is definitely useful ther are plenty of supply lines leading to Ukraine. well Ukraine may have no navy Russia doesn't exactly have controle over the black sea here. There giving that up here

But Russia will also be able to sell there grain and this when I think about it comes with some sneaky bonuses for them. One it means that they will presumably be able to insure those cargo haulers again, something that has a tally been causing some bit of problems with there tanker fleets. It would also by default give access to the swift system. I do not know enough about it say for sure, but i think that in and of itself may unfreeze some of those sized funds? Not to mention this frees up alot of options for Russia even in trade along goods that are sanctioned and with its b.r.i.c.s partners these are some big wins for Russia. It's also worth mentioning winter is just ending there so grain exports don't make as much sense if the idea is a 30 day halt.. im sure there some exporting of grain but it's definitely a odd time to be talking about that product in particular


In truth I think it's a aspect of this war is something Navy's around the world should pay alot of attention to the Russians have been in effect shut down here to the degree they have moved there fleet location what twice now? And are currently hiding behind masses of air defence with very little sailing done, the Ukrainian successes in the black sea has been in my opinion there clearest victory (excluding there survival of the initial invasion).

Free movement in the black sea is one of the few really valuable things the Ukrainian government has to offer the Russians. I think the Russians just gained via this cease fire the only part of the battlefield that they can't at this time take militarily least for as long as this holds, and they did it without giving up the ability to make advances anywhere else. Well both sides get some relief in this deal I think it does more for Russia then it does Ukraine. At least so far as serving there interests in achieving there goals. (Still assuming Russia isn't looking for peace unless it's strictly on its terms)
 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I don't think its tilted in Ukraine favour as much as you may think if it goes on for more then a month[…]
Perhaps, you misunderstood what I was saying (or I am misunderstanding you here).

There is nothing extraordinary about the argument that Russia is trying to tilt it in its favour. Why wouldn’t they? What I was saying is that provided no additional conditions, Ukraine would benefit much more from the proposed “Black Sea and energy infrastructure” ceasefire. There is every reason for Russia to demand more in return. It’s rational. They have the upper hand here and it would be irrational to make “sacrifices” here in the name of… of what? They have to come out on top in any negotiation. This is just the nature of things. Hence, they put forward conditions they think will put them there.

This is the thing I am having hard times understanding: what is the reasoning behind the idea that the process must be fair and both sides need to benefit/concede equally? To continue this thought, what is the definition of “fair” and “equality” here? Is it fair for the side having advantage to make concessions that would provide the other side benefits that they are unlikely to achieve otherwise? How much should that side concede? On the other hand, should the disadvantaged side make concessions in order to avoid potentially being in a worse position in the foreseeable future? If these “fairness” and “equality” principles were true and real possibility of such negotiations existed, why have we together been trying to “put Ukraine in a position where they have an upper hand” for the past couple of years (after switching from “this war must end on the battlefield”)? It is always the side with less or no leverage that is going to make concessions, not the other way around. And this situation in particular is no different. Hence, Russia is demanding additional conditions on any concessions they would be willing to make. In other words, for example, the strikes on energy infrastructure are not equal because Russia causes more damage in such strikes, especially if we consider proportionality -> Russia demands additional benefits to equalize, or come on top. This is a rational approach.

Another idea that is constantly repeated by various parties is that Russia evidently does not want peace because they do not accept our unconditional ceasefire proposals and demand something else. This is ludicrous. Note that, at the same time, these parties demand Russia to fully withdraw from the internationally recognized territory of Ukraine, pay reparations, send a whole bunch of Russians, including Putin, to Hague, etc. This is completely irrational. They certainly want peace, but it is not unconditional and it will be the peace they want or something that resembles it and they find acceptable. Otherwise, there would be no war to begin with or it would end long time ago. Again, I have no idea what the thought process is here. I realize that politicians talk big for the sake of talking, but an average person should be able to rationalize and process the environment better than many seem to do. It is just plain weird to me. This is why Mark Milley, after seeing the mobilization efforts of the Russians and the Ukrainian Kherson counteroffensive, almost casual withdrawal of the Russian forces from the right bank, etc said that the time to negotiate was then because it would all be downhill from there on. Nobody listened.

Another thing to consider is what I talked about years ago: commitments. Under no circumstances Russia will commit to concessions in the initial stage of any negotiations. The reason for this is extremely simple - there will be expectations for them to make further concessions in the later stages, which they will have to make or negotiations will simply stall and go no further. This is trivial and most basic strategy that every decent car salesman is well-versed in. This is how Ukraine got from Javelins to F-16 without “nuclear strikes” and the like. This is why they were now fully expecting (and rightfully so, well strategically played) security guarantees of their choosing, leading to NATO membership, and whatever else. This, in turn, puts Russia into position to demand even more, even it sounds unreasonable.

Yes Ukraine would be getting it's power back but alot of it is provided from out of country tho it's going to help alot with whatever wartime production they have
It’s not just about getting power back. It is also about steps to returning to “normality”, “self-sufficiency” (in quotes because Ukraine has never been actually self-sufficient in their independent state), and so on. This is the easiest thing to do for both sides. There is nothing that Ukraine will be losing in their ability to resist on the battlefield. Neither will Russia. Ukraine will gain more favourable production conditions for their MIC and, perhaps, better rationing for their air defence. Russia may gain in the logistics department, but that is easier to disturb. Of course, provided the sanctions relief is accepted (it won’t be), Russia will have additional revenue to invest into their MIC complex if deemed necessary. And so on.

At the end of the day, there must be a beginning and there is no reason for this not to be it.

and for sure with being able to sell there grain. Not to mention the ports in Odessa will presumably be struck less. These are all helpful but as they get power from beyond there boarders the effect is limited, and Odessa as a safe port is definitely useful ther are plenty of supply lines leading to Ukraine.
Of the ports they have left, Odessa is the only one running. Mykolaiv, for instance, has not been operating since the invasion. There is much more to it than just Odessa.

well Ukraine may have no navy Russia doesn't exactly have controle over the black sea here. There giving that up here
Russia most certainly has more control over the Black Sea than Ukraine has even in the best imaginable terms.

But Russia will also be able to sell there grain and this when I think about it comes with some sneaky bonuses for them.
Russia has never stopped selling grain. I believe they had another record year for grain exports in 2024. They have been selling plenty of fertilizer too.

One it means that they will presumably be able to insure those cargo haulers again, something that has a tally been causing some bit of problems with there tanker fleets.
They don’t have issues insuring their fleet exporting grain and neither do the other parties hauling it. There are no sanctions against it. In fact, I do not believe it would be legal as far as international law is concerned.

It would also by default give access to the swift system.
This is it.

I do not know enough about it say for sure, but i think that in and of itself may unfreeze some of those sized funds?
It will have no affect on the frozen funds.

Not to mention this frees up alot of options for Russia even in trade along goods that are sanctioned and with its b.r.i.c.s partners these are some big wins for Russia.
I do not believe it would have any effect on the trade of sanctioned goods. Not directly, anyway.

It's also worth mentioning winter is just ending there so grain exports don't make as much sense if the idea is a 30 day halt.. im sure there some exporting of grain but it's definitely a odd time to be talking about that product in particular
Grain is shipped year round. It is actually a fairly complex system that differs very little from financial market.

Free movement in the black sea is one of the few really valuable things the Ukrainian government has to offer the Russians.
They have free movement in the Black Sea. With associated risks. It is the latter that both sides want to remove. This isn’t concerning their Navy. In fact, common sense suggest that Russia will no longer be able to launch missiles from the sea, which is another benefit to Ukraine and partial relief for the greatly stranded air defences.


Update: Not worry about any of it though since it will not go through because Europe already said no on their part:

The EU said it was not targeting trade in food, grain or fertilisers in any way and made clear it would not budge on sanctions while Russian forces remained in Ukraine.

"The end of the Russian unprovoked and unjustified aggression in Ukraine and unconditional withdrawal of all Russian military forces from the entire territory of Ukraine would be one of the main preconditions to amend or lift sanctions," a spokesperson for the European Commission said.



Note that they are saying that complete troop withdrawal from the entire territory of Ukraine (which includes Crimea) is only one of the preconditions to amend or lift sanctions. They are basically showing here that they have leverage too and must be a party in the negotiations (which is entirely reasonable). The statement itself is otherwise nonsensical, clearly.

Ukraine also said that sanctions relief is not part of the deal.
 

Fredled

Active Member
KipPotapych said:
Remember when Europe and then Zelensky proposed ceasefire at the Black Sea and “air”?
Yes: Zelensky proposed "silent sky" (and "silent sea" as an extension). That meant a no-fly zone over Ukraine. It was not clear whether it involved flying bombs on the front line, but it involved all types of flying object, including missiles and UAVs. Putin never agreed to this, of course.

After the Ukrainian delegation met with the Americans in Ryhad, Ukraine agreed to a complete ceasefire. Putin rejected this ceasefire. At the next meeting in Ryhad between Russians and Americans, the Russians demanded a ban on strikes on energy facilities. A complete different story. It's obvious that they wanted the strikes on their own oil and gas facilities to stop.

The funny part s that Russians announced that this ban was already in effect since the 18th or March, while nobody noticed a difference. The fact is that no agreement has been signed yet. Ukraine seems to have stopped their attacks on oil facilities a few days ago.

KipPotapych said:
Russia inflicts a lot more damage there that is felt quite a bit more than the Ukrainian strikes in Russia
Maybe. But the point is that Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil facilities are enough embarrassing for Putin to consider to force Ukraine to stop this practice in a so called "Energy Ceasefire". That Ukraine suffers more doesn't make the damages and losses on the Russian side any smaller.
You should also bear in mind that the "energy facilities" targeted in Ukraine are not the same as the "energy facilities" targeted in Russia. Ukraine targeted Refineries, pumping station and oil depots. Targets related to regional fuel supply and oil exports.
Russians targeted electric power plants, electric transformers and communal heating plants. The goal is to make the Ukrainian population suffer. The impact on the Ukrainian industry has been minimal to none. The Ukrainian militaro-industrial capacity has been only increasing continuously. Russians have also targeted Ukrainian oil depots. But these depot are not as big as the Russian ones and Ukrainians import their oil according to their need. Therefore the supply has not been cut off.

Russia has lost countless hundred of million of dollars, possibly billions of dollars because of the strikes. On top of the estimated damages. I said countless, because it's difficult to count. The disruptions have been mostly local. The cost effectiveness of these trikes is incredibly high. All the strikes on Russian territory combined since 2021 is something like $200 millions, IMO. Just look at their UAVs, Their cost is so laughable that it's not even funny. Only recently they used something resembling a cruise missile (upgraded Neptune) which may have cost a little bit more.
This in contrast with the prohibitive cost for Iskanders, Kinzhals, Kh-101 and other missiles which cost several times more than it takes to rebuild the destroyed targets.

KipPotapych said:
I didn’t see anyone here saying that everything is fine. What has been suggested is that there is no doom and collapse is not happening any time soon. They can and do manage.
Some commentators on several channels in the West are regularly claiming that the "Russian economy is growing" which suggest that "everything is fine". This claim is based on IMF reports based on numbers provided by Russia. It was somewhat true at the beginning of the war. Not now,obviously. But they keep singing the same song.

I said:
lately they discovered the ability for the US to remotely reduce the efficiency of the F35.
KipPotapych said:
Now straight to the conspiracy stuff, eh?
No. This has been confirmed by the Emirates (UAE or Saudi, or both, I don't remember).
1/ The US can turn off remotely some low radar visibility devices used on the F35.
2/ If an F35 can't be connected to the ALIS server, after a few weeks or months, maintenance and operational capabilities may be compromised.
Many countries around the world and in Europe either have cancelled or would not renew orders for F35 for this reason, on top of Trump's imprevisibility.
It would be interesting to open a thread on this topic if there isn't one already.

KipPotapych said:
Again with humiliation and stuff. Quite literally, nobody cares and it is irrelevant, completely.
In the context of "making Russia Great Again" and Putin's desire to be remembered as the greatest Russian leader of all times, yes, it's relevant.

KipPotapych said:
What Russia is doing now is very rational.
No it isn't. Russia would be a far more prosperous country, with much more power and influence had they cut short their "Special Military Operation". All aspects of Russian political, international and domestic life are degrading by the day because of this war.
Just the number of soldiers they are losing daily is enough to make is irrational. Turning to war economy because the Soviet stockpiles are depleted is irrational. Letting them being depleted was irrational already. Firing an Orechnik at an Ukrainian city is irrational. Wasting 90% of the sovereign fund is irrational. Paying recruits with zero military qualification $2500 per months is irrational. Accepting all these sacrifices for ridiculous territory gains is irrational.

KipPotapych said:
Europe is displaying its impotence and indecisiveness; right wing and, what they call, pro-Russian parties are gaining speed in the west
Yes and no. Europe is decided. But European leaders are not turning words into deeds enough. They prefer to let others take the action. If they did what they said they would do, Russia would lose the war as fast as they started it.
But it's not impotent. It delivered 45% of military aid to Ukraine and 60% of financial aid. We always speculate about how fast would Ukraine capitulate without US aid. But without EU aid, Ukraine would fall as fast.

Right wing leaders are not too eager to defend Putin and bash Zelensky anymore. Trolls on social network still do thought.

KipPotapych said:
This is the thing I am having hard times understanding: what is the reasoning behind the idea that the process must be fair and both sides need to benefit/concede equally?
Eh... No. The idea is to make a peace deal as fair as possible for Ukraine. 100% fair, in all fairness, would be total withdrawal of Russian troops and Russia paying war reparation. Since the West is not able to force Russia to do so, western leaders explore what is feasible to minimize Ukrainian losses and then prevent Russia to attack again in the future. There is no such a thing as "both sides" or "the interests and demands of both sides".

Europe in not going to negotiate. Europe is going to defend it's eastern borders. And there is no discussion with the enemy on how this must be done or what the enemy finds acceptable.
Everything that Russia will get after the peace deal will be considered as stolen with acts of crimes against humanity. It will serves as a precedent for the future defence policy of the various European nations.

KipPotapych said:
They don’t have issues insuring their fleet exporting grain and neither do the other parties hauling it. There are no sanctions against it. In fact, I do not believe it would be legal as far as international law is concerned.
I think it's correct. However they may have issues being paid in dollars or other hard currency.

KipPotapych said:
Note that they are saying that complete troop withdrawal from the entire territory of Ukraine (which includes Crimea) is only one of the preconditions to amend or lift sanctions.
Saying otherwise would reward violence over the rule of civilised law.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
No. This has been confirmed by the Emirates (UAE or Saudi, or both, I don't remember).
Source?

1/ The US can turn off remotely some low radar visibility devices used on the F35.
Source?

2/ If an F35 can't be connected to the ALIS server, after a few weeks or months, maintenance and operational capabilities may be compromised.
If the United States does not provide spare parts for F-[insert number], maintenance and capabilities will be compromised.

Many countries around the world and in Europe either have cancelled or would not renew orders for F35 for this reason, on top of Trump's imprevisibility.
Many countries cancelled the orders? I guess I am going to ask for a source again. Keep in mind that I am from Canada though. We appear to have a solution too:

IMG_9122.jpeg

We are taking orders, by the way. If interested, I can send you the info where to send the money.


Edit: I am not going to reply to the rest because I believe I already have and quite extensively.

PS You keep saying, but I am 100% confident that the only people that care about the “embarrassment” are you and other likeminded individuals. No one else. Maybe some ultra-patriots in Russia as well. That is about it though.
 

Fredled

Active Member
I suggest we continue the F35 discussion on one of these two threads:
F-35 Program - General Discussion
F-35 - International Participation

Maybe " International Participation" better?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Sumy area.

I'm renaming this section to reflect the changes in the front lines here. Ukraine's Kursk salient continues to shrink as Russian forces gain more ground and they've actually reached the Sudzha border checkpoint. Russian forces have crossed the border into Sumy region in several spots, contesting the village of Veseloae, approaching the villages of Vladimirovka and Vodolagi, and expanding the area of control east of Basovka and Noven'koe. Ukrainian forces have entered Belgorod region just south of Sudzha contesting the village of Demidovka. Attempts towards Grafovka and Popovka have been unsuccessful so far. The attempts see to have started with larger mechanized assaults that made openings in the defenses but lost many vehicles. Ukraine then switched over to lighter vehicles, namely ATVs, to get infantry in quickly.


Russian strikes on Ukrainian vehicles trying to break into Belgorod region. We have a Bradley, a T-64BV, an MBT of unknown type, an abandoned ATV, and an engineering vehicle (IMR-2?). In the end we can actually see the path the vehicles took through the dragon's teeth at the border.


Ukrainian forces have been actively using ATVs to break through the border into Belgorod. Here are some getting hit by FPV drones and MALE UCAVs.


A Ukrainian HIMARS strike hit two Ka-52s and Mi-8s in a field in Belgorod region. The fate of the helos is unclear, but at the very least they're badly damaged. I suspect they're effectively destroyed.


Ukraine also hit two local bridges in Belgorod region, in an attempt to disrupt Russian logistics and troop movements.


Ukrainian Bergenpanzer-2 breaking through the border in Belgorod region gets hit. Also hit near Demidovka, an IMR-2 and an M113.


A Bradley gets hit on the border near Demidovka.


Russian attack helos engaging Ukrainian vehicles trying to break into Belgorod region.


A batch of destroyed Ukrainian vehicles on the Belgorod border, one of the attempts. We have two Bradleys, one BMP-1TS, 2 IMR-2s, a Wisent 1, something that might be an MBT. They all have the triangle tactical markings. Note there is some overlap between the footage, there's too much to sort it all out cleanly.


Russian strikes on Demidovka.


Ukrainian infantry dismounted near Demidovka.


Footage of Russian infantry engaged in Sudzha.


Russian TOS strikes in Sumy region.


A long video from Rubicon Center with many Ukrainian vehicles and positions hit, all in the Kursk border area. I won't ID the vehicles one by one since they do it in the video.


A Russian Forpost-RU drops a KAB-20 on a lone Ukrainian infantry-man near Mar'ino, Sumy region. Russian UCAVs are now operating across the border.


Russian strike on apparently a group of Ukrainian infantry, allegedly Sumy region.


Russian strike, allegedly Krasnopol' against a Ukrainian UAV operator staging area in Miropol'ye, Sumy region.


Russian Orion strike on allegedly a Ukrainian SP howitzer in Sumy region near Okop village.


Russian drone strike hits a 2S22 Bogdana allegedly in Sumy region near Petrushevka, and another strike by an Orion UCAV near Naumovka.


Russian FAB-1500 and 3000 strikes near Guevo.


Russian FPV drone takes out a Ukrainian CRARRV, a ARV on the CR-1 chassis.


Russian FPV drones double-tap either a 2S1 or a convincing decoy, Sumy region. The vehicle burns.


Ukrainian M777 hit near Ugroedy, Sumy region.


Ukrainian pickup truck gets hit by a Russian FPV drone near Mar'ino, Sumy region.


Ukrainian Leo-2A5 or 6 hit in Sumy region, and it burns. We know it's a real vehicle, we see crew, and the tank firing first. Allegedly the tank was doing indirect fires in support of Ukraine's push into Belgorod.


Russian strike on the hospital in Krasnopol'skoe, Sumy region. Russia claims it was being used as a troop staging area. Whether true or not, it's likely it was being used as a military hospital, and neither side has been shy about striking those in this conflict.


Another destroyed Bradley in Kursk area, with the remains of the foldable drone cage.


A destroyed Ukrainian Strela-10 in the logistics corridor near Basovka.


A destroyed T-72EA, Roshel Senator, and Stryker Kursk area, presumably all Ukrainian.


A destroyed T-72AV near Ol'govka, Ukrainian.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
An M577 either knocked out or abandoned, Kursk area near Mahnovka. A Humvee thoroughly destroyed, also Mahnovka (3rd link).


An abandoned Bradley inside Sudzha. I don't remember if we've seen this one already, it looks familiar.


An interesting moment, a Russian BTR-82A was attempting to swim across the Psel while loaded with cargo but started to sink. Reportedly the crew bailed out and Ukrainian drones finished off the vehicle.


We have our first confirmed BMP-1LB with Parus destroyed, Kursk area. The vehicle appears to be long to the 92nd Airmobile bde.


Russian soldier posts with a destroyed M1117, Kursk region.


Piles of destroyed Ukrainian vehicles near the village of Rubanschina, all ID'd in the posts linked.


Ukrainian vehicles destroyed near Zaoleshenka, we have a MaxxPro, an Abrams, a couple of civilian vehicles, and a destroyed MRAP I can't identify.


Another set of abandoned/knocked out Ukrainian vehicles, we have a MaxxPro, Stryker, a Humvee, and a Leo-2A6 Kursk area.


Russian forces found a M777 decoy near Kazachya Loknya.


Russian forces hauling away captured kit, we have an M777, unclear if the same we saw earlier, a VAB, an M1 Abrams (or two?), a Kirpi MRAP that looks intact, a Humvee, a Bradley, a Pbv302, a PTR-60PB, a couple of Strykers (condition unclear), a Bushamster PMV, a Biber bridge layer and other vehicles. Russian forces also captured a rare Bergenpanzer 2 in Mahnovka.


Russian forces hauling away two allegedly intact Bradleys, Kursk area.


Russian forces hauling away a damaged M777.


Our first confirmed Kirpi II sighting, and it appears to be captured by Russian forces intact in Kursk region.


An intact armored Humvee found parked in a garage in Sudzha.


Another M577 parked near the store in Sudzha. I wanted to spotlight this one because it's an example of what we saw in many spots, Ukrainian vehicles parked and then abandoned, seemingly intact. It suggests a rapid and poorly organized withdrawal where even taking the time to thoroughly destroy these vehicles wasn't an option, and cuts against the idea that Ukraine executed an organized retreat.


A captured M777 in the Kursk area, with ammo scatterred around it. Why they wouldn't just blow it before retreating is unclear.


Russian MANPADS firing, Sudzha. The target is reportedly a Ukrainian UAV.


More footage of Russia's 40th Marines Grad fires.


The gas transfer station in Sudzha has been hit. The sides blame each other but of course someone has a clear motive.


A Russian drone surveys the Sudzha border crossing.


Russian forces inside Goncharovka.


Russian airborne troops operating an armored Humvee in Kursk region.


Russian counter-UAS teams operating in the Kursk area.


Russian AGS-17 team in Kursk region. Note one has the Vepr-12 automatic shotgun, presumably for anti-drone duties.


Ukrainian forces pulling out a stuck armored car with an MT-LB, Kursk border area, and an excellent illustration of the advantages of tracks in this kind of terrain.


Ukrainian F-16 low altitude over Sumy. There was much hoopla over claims that Russia managed to shoot one down but it appears to be untrue.


Some footage of Ukrainian positions in Sumy region.


Yunakovka, Sumy region, we have a destroyed Ukrainian 2S1, and a T-64BV still alive.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Kharkov area.

Russian forces have recaptured a piece of north-eastern Volchansk.


Russian Lancet strike on a 2S22 Bogdana in the area of Dolzhanka village. The vehicle burns. It's not really near the Kharkov area, instead it's halway between that and the Kupyansk area.


Russian drones double-tap either a convincing and well hidden decoy or an M777 howitzer. Note the wooden cage above it for drone protection.


Ukrainian dragon's teeth lines in Kharkov region.


Kupyansk.

Ukrainian counter-attacks and Russian pushes continue back and forth in this area. Ukrainian force renetered the western outskirts of Dvurechye, the Sangunovka area, but were pushed out again. Ukrainian forces made small gains north and west of Zapadnoe. Ukrainian forces have retaken Figolevka, then Russian troops grabbed a piece of ground near it and made two secondary crossings near Krasnoe Pervoe and Kamyanka. On the left shore of the Oskol Ukrainian forces have completely pushed Russian forces out of Petropavlovka.


Russian drone strike hits a Ukrainian 2S1 or decoy. The vehicle burns pretty quickly, I can't tell if we're seeing secondaries or just fire. But its not shells cooking off, those would have ripped the vehicle apart.


Ukrainian BTR-80 getting hit repeatedly in the Kupyansk area. It's got a drone cage but out of netting of some sort.


Russian soldiers inside Dvurechnoe. Depite being a village, it's fairly large and spread out, so the rear areas aren't on the front lines, even as Ukrainian forces still occasionally re-enter the western outskirts.


Oskol front.

Ukraine has launched a major counter-attack south of the Peschanoe salient, pushing back Russian forces in the fields east of Zagryzovo, and retaking the village of Nadiya. Kopanki and Pervotravnevoe are contested.


Ukraine's counter-attack at Nadiya, allegedly the 3rd Assault Bde is at play. Claimed are M113s destroyed, I see one getting hit repeatedly, and another vehicle that I can't ID. From the Russian side we have the 752nd MRRgt, from the 20th MRDiv.


Russian forces are pushing south out of Yampolovka. Across the Zherebets Russian forces are continuing to expand their area of control north-westward reaching the south-eastern outskirts of Katerinovka and continues to bite off pieces around Novolyubovka, but still haven't connected with Russian forces in Makeevka.


Ukrainian BMP-1 near Yampolovka gets destroyed.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Seversk salient.

Russian forces have gained some ground north of Verkhenkamenskoe, likely the last results of taking the refuse mound in Belogorovka.


Russian drone strike hits a Ukrainian M113 that was allegedly doing troop rotations in the Serebryanskoe forest.


Russian strike on a Ukrainian SP howitzer. It's claimed as a PzH-2000, but it's probably a Krab or an AHS-90.


Chasov Yar.

Russian forces have advanced in southern Chasov Yar, threatening the remaining Ukrainian positions in the center with encirclement. South of there Russian forces are advancing near Stupovka. North of Chasov Yar Russian forces have inched forward in several spots north and north-east of Grigorievka.


Russian Strela-10 firing near Chasov Yar, likely at a UAV. With the new missiles these old systems do have a life, being able to engage even relatively small UAVs.


Russian drone strike hits a Ukrainian T-90A, east of Konstantinovka.


A Russian soldier poses with a destroyed Kirpi in Chasov Yar.


Toretsk.

It appears I spoke to soon about Ukraine being spent in Toretsk. Ukraine made another effort towards the center of the town, bypassing the stadium and the larger apartment buildings next to it. West of the town they've pushed Russian forces out of Scherbinovka and Novospasskoe. Meanwhile Russian forces have retaken the Krymskoe suburb including the mine complex but not the refuse mound. Russian forces are also advancing in the fields east and north-east of the town.


A brief combat video, allegedly a Ukrainian service member engaged in urban combat attempts to fire through a window but is wounded.


Reportedly Ukraine hit a Russian fire truck in Gorlovka. 4 firefighters are wounded.


Avdeevka area.

This section will refer to reactivated Russian advances north of Avdeevka. This area is south-west of Toretsk and east of Pokrovsk. Curiously enough this is the spot where the front lines are closes to Donetsk. Russia has grabbed the villages of Aleksandropol' and Panteleymonovka.


Pokrovsk area.

The fighting in this area remains a non-stop back and forth. Russian forces have pushed Ukrainian forces out of Shevchenko for at least the third time. Meanwhile Ukrainian forces have re-entered Kotlino and taken most of it. Near Peschanoe Russian forces have pushed out towards Pokrovsk again, while Ukrainian forces have pushed into Solenoe, bypassing Uspenovka from the north. In Uspenovka Russian forces have contested the village again. South of Zaporozhye (the village) Russian forces have taken some fields. East of Pokrovsk Russian forces have entered the first houses of Tarasovka.


A pile of Russian strike videos around Pokrovsk. We have a couple of MBTs, a van, some other vehicles that are hard to ID due to poor picture quality. They also hit static positions and at least one antenna, maybe a drone retranslator?


Another pile of Russian strike videos, hitting a T80BV, a 2S22 Bogdana, an MT-LB, and a light truck carrying infantry.


Russian strike on a Caesar howitzer near Pokrovsk.


Russian wire-guided drone strikes a disabled MaxxPro near Preobrazhenka.


Russian wire-guided drone hits an M113 west of Uspenovka, near Novoaleksandrovka.


Russian UGV delivers explosives into Tarasovka.


Russian TOS-1 and TOS-2 fires near Pokrovsk.


Russian soldiers riding scooters in the Pokrovsk area.


A Ukrainian AMX-10RC with improvised cage armor in the Pokrovsk area.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Kurakhovo area.

Russian forces took another chunk of area in the fields north of Andreevka. Meanwhile Ukrainian forces have pushed back up to the village, contesting the western outskirts. South of the river, Ukrainian forces have re-entered Konstantinopol' taking about half of it. Russian forces grabbed a chunk of ground north of Razdol'noe.


Russian strikes on Razliv.


Russian T-80BVM with a robust drone cage but unlike the shed tanks, it's mounted on the turret.


Velikaya Novoselka.

Rusian forces have advanced into Vol'noe Pole and have gained ground north of Skudnoe.


Russian forces strike a MaxxPro near Burlatskoe.


Zaporozhye.

Russian forces have pushed northward in Zaporozhye in the area between Pyatihatka and the Orekhov area. The've contested 4 villages, Stepovoe, Lobkovoe, Scherbaki, and Malie Scherbaki. I think this is a continuation of previous efforts. Russia made two attempts to advances west of Orekhov in Kamenskoe, and both ultimately failed. This is probably the alternative.


Russian soldiers using demo-packs on Ukrainian dugouts north of Rabotino.


Russian buhanka van got hit with an FPV drone but survived. It was acting as a MEDEVAC. Allegedly all occupants survived, though wounded.


Russian FPV drone setting up a smokescreen near a ruined rail bridge, Zaporozhye area.


Dnepr front.

Several videos from Russia's 80th Arctic Bde. We see them hitting a Ukrainian boat on the Dnepr. The unit is operating in Kherson region.


Russian drone drops on a Ukrainian boat on the Dnepr.


Russian UMPK strikes, Kherson region.


Russian strike on a bridge over the river Konka, Kherson region.


Ukrainian forces in Kherson region hauling away a destroyed Caesar howitzer. It's dated to 13th Feb of this year, but it's unclear when this actually took place.


Black Sea/Crimea.

A series of Ukrainian drone strikes inside Crimea on Russian vehicles. They hit several radars, a Pantsyr-S1, a S-300V launchers, and an Mi-8 helicopter. We don't know over what time period these videos were collected but the lack of anti-drone pickets suggest that this all happened relatively quickly as Ukraine started using drones that have this reach.


A Ukrainian T-20 UAV controlled via Starlink that landed in Crimea, possibly due to EW.


DPRK Koksan howitzers have been spotted allegedly in Crimea. This likely closes the question about operators. Russia has apparently actually taken delivery of them.


Russian forces conducting training exercises in Crimea. All the BMP-2s have extra armor kits, though I can't make out if they got the Berezhok module, and the T-72B3 looks so clean, nothing like front-line vehicles. We also see a rare Tayfun-VDV, an MRAP with a 30mm RCWS. Interesting notes, the body armor doesn't match bewteen the artillery and mortarmen, suggesting they're getting leftovers.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Strikes.

The biggest changes we have here is that Ukraine is really feeling pulling personnel out of aid defense and into front line units. Russian strikes are going through much easier, and Russia is capitalising on this by mass-striking targets. Russia is increasing the quantities of Shaheds used too. I've said it before, and I'll say it again, I'm of the opinion that this war can't be won with long range strikes. So while Russia will likely be able to hit more of the milary aid coming into Ukraine, ultimately the significance is not that great.

Russian strikes landing in Kiev. Targets unclear.


Russian Iskander strike in Chernigov area against vehicles of allegedly the 144th Mech Bde.


Russia strike hitting Sumy. The first and second link are different strikes.


Russia hit Sumy, possibly munition storage based on the secondary detonations. The target hit is the Sumy scientific-production facility dedicated to Frunze.


Russia hit a train in Sumy with a Shahed, with a camera mounted on it.


Large scale Russian Shahed strikes hit Kharkov.


Merefa, Kharkov region, Russia hits the oil refinery again.


Russain mobile Shahed launcher hits a factory in Musiyki, Kharkov region.


Russia hit Poltava with Shaheds, causing a blackout. Possibly targeted energy infrastructure.


A pair of Russian Shahed strikes in Slavyansk, allegedly targeting the Ukrainian 18th National Guard Bde staging area.


Russia hit Kramatorsk again. I think this town is a major logistics hub for Ukrainian forces in the Seversk and Chasov Yar area, and it's frequently hit.


Russian strikes on allegedly rail infrastructure in Rovno region.


Russian Shahed strikes landing in Kirovograd.


Russian Shahed strikes landing in Kropivnitskiy, Kirovograd area. Allegedly the rail station and the nearby Gidrosila factory were hit.


Russian strikes hit Krivoy Rog. Multiple explosions reported.


Another Russian strike in Krivoy Rog hit a cafe.


Russian strikes on allegedly energy infrastructure in Il'ichevsk. The posts are from March 15th.


A large Russian Shahed strike on Dnepropetrovsk. There are reports that Russia has changed their tactics and instead mass focuses Shaheds on a single area.


Russian Shahed strikes landing in Zaporozhye.


Russian strike on a treeline near Novoivanovka, Zaporozhye area, allegedly a staging area for Ukrainian UAV operators.


Battle damage in Zaporozhye after Russian strikes.


Russian strikes landing in Odessa. Some secondary detonations can be seen, but given that many flammables exist in the port, it's unclear if this means anything. At least one of the targets was the aptly named Epicenter shopping mall, another was a substation in Chernomorsk.


Russian forces have installed new CRPA antennas on their Shahed drones, allegedly Chinese imports. Presumably this is intended to counter jamming.


Russian Shahed drone numbered 16604 has been spotted. The numbers typically just count upward sequentially.


Ukrainian F-16 intercepting a target over Ukraine.


A Ukrainian drone hit a multistory building in Rostov-na-Donu.


A look at the Russian Kochevnik drone defense team. Note they're using a radar normally part of a Pantsyr for their work.


Ukraine struck Engels, presumably targeting the local airbase. 30 civilian structures are reported damaged and 2 civilians wounded, and based on the explosion it's likely they hit munition storage.


Ukraine hit an oil storage facility in Krasnodar region.


A Ukrainian drone hit a store in Belgorod. 2 civilians are reported wounded.


Ukraine hit the Tuapse oil refinery or fuel storage. It's possible they used a new longer-ranged Neptune missile variant.


Ukraine hit a gas works office facility in Saratov.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Interesting bits.

A hard video of the realities of this war, from the Ukrainian side. We have Ukrainian forces in a position they captured from Russian soldiers. They get engaged with FPV drones every couple of minutes or so. A nearby Ukrainian element is engaged in a fire-fight with Russian forces. When they have casualties a YPR-765 shows up to rotate forces but gets stuck, and the soldiers get hit by mortar fires. They attempt to exfiltrate on foot but get hit by mortars too. The person filming was reportedly wounded by the mortar fires and died from his wounds. Note this is exactly the kind of tree-line to tree-line fighting that we often see. The condition of the treeline after repeated fighting is such that it doesn't offer any real cover or even concealment. To be clear, this is what success looks like. They've taken a position, and managed to reinforce. I suspect the stuck APC is doomed. Also to be clear, this applies to both sides. Warning graphic footage.


Another PzH-2000 getting hit. Not having more modern longer range shells is costing Ukraine.


Three Koksan M1989 howitzers getting hit by Ukrainian strikes. Note they're poorly camouflaged. It's likely they were relying on their longer range to stay alive. Up until now I'd consider this to be Kursk area, but we just got footage of a train of these in Crimea so... location unknown.


Russian T-72B3 (mod'25?) It's got Arena-M, double-layered ERA sideskirts, and roadwheels from a T-90M. It might have the new Relikt on the front glacis, but we can't tell from this image. It also has a KMT-8 mine trawl, which makes sense. It would be very silly to lose such a vehicle to a common mine.


A Russian BMP-2M with extra rubber sideskirts over the extra armor kit and a robust drone cage. I also think that's EW on top.


Russian BTR-82A with a robust drone cage and a set of chains in front of it. I can't tell if this is a half-assed erzats mine trawl or anti-drone chains.


A Russian MT-LB upgraded into a reasonable APC. Note the protection level is still drastically inadequate.


A Russian BRDM-2 with a robust drone cage and EW. I suspect this is a vehicle Russia has quite a few of still in storage.


We have the new Pantsyr-SV in Russian service. I suspect this is part of the current war based on the nature of the position. This is confirmation of continuing Pantsyr production, not just munitions, but systems. None of this variant were in service pre-war.


Ukraine's 47th Arty Bde is testing the new Bogdana-BG towed gun. It's using a Giatsint-B carriage.


A Ukrainian Bergenpanzer 3 with the 21st Mech Bde.


Ukraine's 501st Independent Marine Btln with a LAV 6.0 ACSV Bison.


Ukraine's 3rd Assault Bde with their M-240 heavy mortar. They're using an Iveco LMV to tow it.


Ukraine's 65th Mech testing their Gnome UGV. It carries two RPGs and a PKM.


Ukraine's 82nd Air-Assault Bde with their Stryker with it's new RCWS.


Ukraine's 116th Mech with a T-64BV cosplaying an Abrams.


Finally a fairly robust BMP-1 upgrade from Ukraine, it features the new combat module, cage armor around the hull and a foldable drone cage on top.


A Ukrainian FrankenSAM with RIM-7 Sea Sparrow missiles on a Buk TELAR.


Another Ukrainian FrankenSAM, with R-73s mounted on a Humvee. This is also Ukraine's 3rd Assault Bde.


Ukraine continues to use light Yak-152 planes to intercept drones.


There are reports that Ukraine will convert some of their brigades into corps, with the 13th National Guard Bde being expanded into the 13th Corps, and the 3rd Assault Bde into the 3rd Corps.


There is information that Ukraine has received 507 Kirpi and 180 Kirpi II MRAPs from Turkey. Often times people become skeptical about the volumes of aid provided to Ukraine. I think this is a good illustration, just one vehicle type from just one country.


There are reports that Ukraine is running out of missiles for their SAMP-T batteries.


There are reports that Ukraine will get another 18 Archer howitzers.


Putin signed a one-time bonus payout to LNR and DNR fighters that were wounded in combat prior to the annexation, going back all the way to '14.

 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Ukrainian forces pulling out a stuck armored car with an MT-LB, Kursk border area, and an excellent illustration of the advantages of tracks in this kind of terrain.
It’s interesting how the perceptions change in this war. On the one hand, tracks are better for getting around. On the other, wheels are faster and they can keep moving with a few missing after multiple drone strikes. I see different people making different conclusions in this regard all the time.

Ukrainian F-16 low altitude over Sumy. There was much hoopla over claims that Russia managed to shoot one down but it appears to be untrue.
In the interview posted the other day, an alleged F-16 pilot claims to be flying daily over Russian targets and troops.

IMG_9121.jpeg

Interview is here (in Ukrainian):


I would say:



Russian Lancet strike
I feel like I may have already asked about it, but is there any particular reason we (maybe just me?) hardly ever see or hear about Lancets anymore? FPV’s are cheaper and have longer range now? Ukrainians intercepting Lancets? Something else?


DPRK Koksan howitzers have been spotted allegedly in Crimea. This likely closes the question about operators. Russia has apparently actually taken delivery of them.
There was an interesting observation made by this one weapons tracker the other day:

IMG_9114.jpeg

The biggest changes we have here is that Ukraine is really feeling pulling personnel out of aid defense and into front line units. Russian strikes are going through much easier, and Russia is capitalising on this by mass-striking targets. Russia is increasing the quantities of Shaheds used too.
I believe this is a combination of things, including what you are suggesting. I also noticed that lately Russians send a swarm of Shaheds into one or two places rather than a few to a dozen different areas. Not sure why this was not done before as it seems to be a better strategy. There were also reports that Ukraine actually has big problems with their air defences due to lack of supplies. For example (from March 15):

IMG_8952.jpeg


Ukraine struck Engels, presumably targeting the local airbase. 30 civilian structures are reported damaged and 2 civilians wounded, and based on the explosion it's likely they hit munition storage.
Ukrainians claim destruction of 96 cruise missiles at the airbase:


Satellite imagery clearly shows some destruction at the airbase, a couple of deep craters, etc.

Ukraine claimed to use the new Neptun whatever they call them missiles for the attack. I have seen one or two videos with the usual UAVs flying over the “cameramen” and making the hits at or the direction of the airbase.

After the strike, the lemmings have stirred up and started talking about the nuclear weapons being stored there and some being destroyed, lol. There were posts with some random dude talking about radiation levels in the area spiking up and concluding that the nukes were hit, lol.

IMG_9084.jpeg

Funny enough, if you look at the profile of the poster cited above, she identifies as a proud lemming and warns to distinguish between (Russian) propaganda and reality, lol:



Edit: note that that ^ person has over 34,000 followers!
 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
^ Reading further, I see that a couple of things I mentioned were mentioned by you as well.

Thanks for the update, by the way. It looks like a lot of time invested.


The latest Kursk equipment numbers from the counter I cited previously:

IMG_9111.jpeg


Edit: looking through the snapshots, I see this one I wanted to post a while back, but never did:

IMG_9080.jpeg


Edit 2: an example of impotence of Europe I was referring to:

IMG_9116.jpeg

Another one and a rather hilarious one:

IMG_9125.jpeg
 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
This is an excellent piece from the Carneigie Endowment. It discusses the negotiations, why the lifting of sanctions against the Agricultural Bank is important to Russia, their negotiating strategy, etc. It’s an excellent piece. To my surprise, it is stated that the ports may be excluded from the “sea ceasefire”, which changes things quite a bit. Very little point to having such a deal beyond symbolism then.



Anyone listened to Zaluzhny's interview the other day? I couldn't find it with English subtitles, but here are a few “bombs” he dropped and I should say pretty casually, almost as a comedian, with audience laughing at times.

IMG_9119.jpeg

IMG_9118.jpeg

A couple of comments on Putin’s speech regarding the Greenland situation.

IMG_9129.jpeg

IMG_9128.jpeg

He is light years ahead of the rest of the pack in dealing with Trump.


Edit: Dr Sergey Radchenko’s comment on the article cited above (and I agree):

I would add for my part that Putin is clearly trying to shift the blame for the failure of the Black Sea deal onto the Europeans, hoping that their recalcitrance will add to worsening tensions in transatlantic relations. I totally see Trump taking this bait, not least because the Europeans are very successfully pursuing self-defeating sanction policies.
 
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