The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

[Feanor]

He is light years ahead of the rest of the pack in dealing with Trump.

One crocodile understands how another crocodile thinks much better then any normal person.

The latest Kursk equipment numbers from the counter I cited previously:

The Ukrainian retreat revealed piles and piles of destroyed and abandoned equipment that weren't previously seen. I'm not even sure we're done counting. It highlights how costly the Kursk adventure ultimately was.

It’s interesting how the perceptions change in this war. On the one hand, tracks are better for getting around. On the other, wheels are faster and they can keep moving with a few missing after multiple drone strikes. I see different people making different conclusions in this regard all the time.

In my opinion track are better overall due to the condition of the terrain especially when on the offensive. Wheels are only better when the ground allows it and defensively for troop rotations and resupply you have better opportunities to use known routes where the ground allows wheeled vehicles to pass.

I feel like I may have already asked about it, but is there any particular reason we (maybe just me?) hardly ever see or hear about Lancets anymore? FPV’s are cheaper and have longer range now? Ukrainians intercepting Lancets? Something else?

Probably just less of a spotlight, and yes FPV drones with longer range, wire-guidance, etc. all much cheaper and more available are outshining it due to volume. But they're still in play. Data is here;

Применение барражирующих боеприпасов "Ланцет" в зоне СВО

lostarmour.info

 

[KipPotapych]

One crocodile understands how another crocodile thinks much better then any normal person.

Lol

The Ukrainian retreat revealed piles and piles of destroyed and abandoned equipment that weren't previously seen. I'm not even sure we're done counting. It highlights how costly the Kursk adventure ultimately was.

Yes, absolutely. And I also have my doubts that this is it. I don’t think (but not sure) that number includes equipment lost in Sumy related to the Kursk offensive either, which is probably quite substantial as well.

I really can’t get my head around how anyone can think that this disaster was a good idea. Now Zelensky is saying that Russia is preparing an offensive in the Sumy region. You can’t make this stuff up, really. Now they are also fighting mostly FSB border guards and Rosgvardia in Belgorod region… again, losing more equipment/personnel and making little to no progress.

Probably just less of a spotlight, and yes FPV drones with longer range, wire-guidance, etc. all much cheaper and more available are outshining it due to volume. But they're still in play. Data is here;

Применение барражирующих боеприпасов "Ланцет" в зоне СВО

lostarmour.info

Thanks! Great info. The table of monthly usage there clearly indicates that it is used just as much. Less spotlight is probably what it is.

The other table (and a pie chart) also indicates that it is primarily a counter-battery weapon for the Russians (about 50% of all strikes?).


A little more context on the Russian grain exports discussed in the previous posts:



And, for those wondering:



Though I think “stolen” is no longer an appropriate term to describe the situation.


According to this Kyiv Independent report, Putin suggests that North Korea may be involved in the peace negotiations. Dividends for the North Koreans come in gold!

Russia's allies including North Korea could join Ukraine ceasefire talks, Putin says

Russian President Vladimir Putin also listed China, India, Brazil, and South Africa among those he sees as potential participants.

kyivindependent.com

Anyone saw the reported details of the new “mineral deal”? Every time there is another go at it, it becomes progressively worse for Ukraine (which is expected).

The new proposal stipulates that the U.S. is given first rights to purchase resources extracted under the agreement and that it recoup all the money it has given Ukraine since 2022, in addition to a 4% annual interest rate, before Ukraine begins to gain access to the fund's profits, according to the summary. The updated proposal was first reported by the Financial Times.

If agreed, the joint investment fund would have a board of five people, three appointed by the U.S. and two by Ukraine, and the funds generated would be converted into foreign currency and transferred abroad, according to the summary. The fund would be managed by the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC).

A separate source with knowledge of the negotiations said there had been discussions about having the DFC administer the fund.

https://www.reuters.com/world/us-is-pushing-more-expansive-minerals-deal-with-ukraine-sources-say-2025-03-27/

Other reports suggested that the Americans can withdraw their share of funds at any time, while there is no provision for the Ukrainians to withdraw their share at all. Lol. You can’t make this stuff up either.

Zelenskiy said on Thursday the U.S. is "constantly" changing the terms of the proposed minerals deal, but added that he did not want Washington to think Kyiv was against the deal.

And today, a few minutes ago:




Found another tab I had open and was going to share but never did. According to a report from an Australian outlet, the Abrams intended for Ukraine have never got there and there is no certainty they ever will. I am assuming if the tensions rise between Ukraine and the USA even more, the chances of that happening will be approaching zero.

Uncertainty over Australian Abrams tanks donated to Ukraine - ABC News

amp.abc.net.au

Some Ukrainian reports indicate that Russians are shooting down JDAMs with their Buks and that their EW is quite effective:




Does anyone here follow the Duffel Blog? This is some (moderately) funny stuff (another tab I had opened):

Hegseth orders military to paint 'Z' on all vehicles

The markings will distinguish U.S. forces from “freedom-hating and war-mongering Ukrainians,” according to Hegseth.

www.duffelblog.com

 

[T.C.P]

Probably just less of a spotlight, and yes FPV drones with longer range, wire-guidance, etc. all much cheaper and more available are outshining it due to volume. But they're still in play. Data is here;

Применение барражирующих боеприпасов "Ланцет" в зоне СВО

lostarmour.info

We also get very regular videos of Ukrainian interceptor FPVs taking out lancets. This is an ability that Ukraine developed pretty recently, say 5-6 months.

I dont have an exact count the number of lancet interceptions should be north of 100 by now.

 

[seaspear]

I'm sure the Ukrainian forces lost a large amount of material in their retreat but overall there are enough sources to suggest that Russia has lost significantly more than Ukraine to the extent this has shaped their operations ,with more use of civilian unarmored vehicles transporting troops in vulnerable areas,the use of tanks with sheds on top not allowing their guns to traverse as troop carriers even donkeys supplying supplies to front lines , crew protection being flawed in Soviet design of tanks have resulted in many of the most experienced tank crews to be killed or injured

Combat losses and manpower challenges underscore the importance of ‘mass’ in Ukraine

Ukrainian forces managed to blunt Russian territorial advances and inflict significant casualties and material losses in 2024, even with ammunition shortages and a deficit in infantry. However, Ukraine will need continued Western support and better manpower-management to avoid further...

www.iiss.org

 

[Fredled]

The Ukrainian retreat revealed piles and piles of destroyed and abandoned equipment that weren't previously seen.

Ukrainians withdrew too fast. For months, they had prepared defence positions in Sudzha for the day they will retreat. And at the end, they couldn't use them because they got the order to leave Sudzha without fighting.
At the same time the Russians were intensively bombing the supply road. As a result many vehicles were lost because they ran out of fuel. Soldiers ran out of food too, thought this was not as dramatic.

Lack of US intel also played a role. In some cases they couldn't hit enemy artillery positions or couldn't see them coming. It was not the most significant factor, thought.
(That's what I heard and read in the last weeks from various sources.)

There is a rumour that the Russians promised not to fire on retreating Ukrainians. I don't think it's true and if it's true, it wouldn't have influenced the way Ukrainians conducts operation there. Ukrainians would never believe that Russian won't shot at them. Especially if they promised such a thing .

It's comprehensible that Ukrainian leaders ordered to rush up the retreat because they needed the resumption of US military aid ASAP. but they got trapped this way. Their biggest mistake was not securing the supply road before. I don't think that taking two or three days more to remove the troops safely would have changed a lot in the total of weapons supplied to Ukraine, but the lack of intel sharing maybe was worse than anything else.

Operation Pipeline Zombie (official name) was prepared weeks in advance. But, IMO, it was launched that day while Ukrainians were still there. 24h later it would have been too late.

Though I think “stolen” is no longer an appropriate term to describe the situation.

As "stolen", Ukrainians refer to grain grown on Ukrainian soil. In this sens, they are right.

Anyone saw the reported details of the new “mineral deal”?

No: Since Reuters is behind paywall, I lost one major source of "intelligence" LOL. I consider taking pay membership. But I'm in no hurry.

The main thing is that Ukraine doesn't want to recognise Biden's donations as debt. And legally they are right. The way Americans value their aid can also be questionned. I think that's the main point. Interest rates of 4% is also a bit steep. And show an unfriendly attitude.
Other than this, it's normal that they get a priority to mineral resources because most of the funds will be Americans. Ukraine has little money to invest right now. Americans will only have the resources that the fund will allow them to extract. It doesn't prevent other companies to extract these resources too at the same time. The "Mineral Deal Fund" will have priority in exploitation licenses or in buying from locals, not the exclusivity.

We have indeed received the draft agreement, and we are currently reviewing it. This is a working version that essentially reflects the position of American legal advisors. We are forming our own position.

Once Ukraine's position on the document is finalized, the government will hold consultations with the Verkhovna Rada.

It is very important to emphasize that any public discussions regarding the text of this agreement at this stage only harm the negotiations and hinder constructive dialogue with our American partners. As soon as a consensus is reached, we will present our public position to the MPs.

link

Secondly, some time ago, our Deputy Prime Minister Yuliia Svyrydenko received this agreement in bilateral contact with Mr. Bessent (US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent). She received this document. She said it was difficult to comment on it, because it is a completely different document. There were a lot of things that were not discussed. There were also some things that the parties had already rejected.

This agreement needs to be compared to see if it is the same agreement. I want us to get a specific review by lawyers at the highest level. Let lawyers check all these agreements. I will accept the agreement that our side has officially received. The format has been changed. Let's study this format and talk. We have the Constitution of Ukraine

link: Understand what you can LOL.

Ukraine claim that they don't strike on energy facilities. If they don't, it quiet recent.

At the same time, they report that Russian forces have once again attacked the Sudzha gas metering station in Russia's Kursk region.
I don't know why Russians would target this gas station as it would be against their own interest. But they could have targeted Ukrainian forces nearby or Ukrainian forces taking cover behind a forbidden energy-related target.

They also report a Russian strike on Naftogaz Group.This seems more serious, thought it has to be veryfied.
If Russians really did this, it's very stupid because it shows total disregard to Donald Trump's peace efforts. Especialy since the ban on strike on energy related targets is a Russian proposal.

Some Ukrainian reports indicate that Russians are shooting down JDAMs with their Buks.

Good: Russians will destroy their own Buk's faster than it takes to destroy them on the ground with the same JDAMs.

and that their EW is quite effective

Yes. Not only for gliding bombs but for just about everything GPS guided. Allies are making big efforts to develop counter GPS jamming. Boeing is going to test in Ukraine a second version of its ground launched gliding bomb with an improved navigation system.

 

[seaspear]

One tactic Russia used on the retreating Ukrainians was to have resting on the ground drones near key roads and chokepoints that could then be remotely activated against targets , crews looking to the sky for the all clear were mistaken ,lessons to be learnt by military forces elsewhere

 

[KipPotapych]

Ukrainians withdrew too fast. For months, they had prepared defence positions in Sudzha for the day they will retreat.

Every single report I see from credible sources suggests that they never set up any solid defense positions. I posted some examples here previously. Where are you getting the information that they were preparing the defensive positions for months? The best prepared positions they had (and still have some of them), were those built by Russians. Not much else was done according to the numerous reports.

And at the end, they couldn't use them because they got the order to leave Sudzha without fighting.

The withdrawal started before the order came (had the order from the “above” come because the withdrawal had already began without it?). Again, I posted examples here previously. Without fighting?

Everyone who spoke to UP, soldiers and officers alike, emphasised the delayed withdrawal of troops from most of Kursk Oblast. They also stressed that in recent weeks the military had been forced to hold the line under unjustifiably harsh conditions.

What happened in Russia’s Kursk Oblast during the last month of defence

Ukrainska Pravda was among the few media outlets that managed to reach Sumy Oblast in the past week and work near the Ukrainian-Russian border, in the villages of Yunakivka, Mohrytsia and Myropillia. UP journalists also spoke with around twenty soldiers and commanders from four units...

www.pravda.com.ua

Again, I have no idea where you are getting your information from. You should reconsider your sources. The Ukrainian Forces have been getting hammered there for weeks with little to no supplies, evacuation, etc. Most had to withdraw on foot and not because of the “order to abandon without a fight”. That’s complete nonsense.

At the same time the Russians were intensively bombing the supply road. As a result many vehicles were lost because they ran out of fuel. Soldiers ran out of food too, thought this was not as dramatic.

Yes, this did happen. Hence, they could not stay there any longer. Common sense and reasoning should prevail.

Lack of US intel also played a role. In some cases they couldn't hit enemy artillery positions or couldn't see them coming. It was not the most significant factor, thought.
(That's what I heard and read in the last weeks from various sources.)

Again, every credible source I read indicated that this was not a contributing factor. I feel like we are going in circles about trivial stuff that is not overly complicated and there is no conspiracy involved.

There is a rumour that the Russians promised not to fire on retreating Ukrainians.

Again conspiracy stuff. The Russians won this battle fair and square. Ukrainians lost due to poor planning and shitty command or shitty goal setting by those above. They never reinforced their flanks, which was a huge problem. They kept trying to advance and expand the salient north, while having very limited logistics. I posted about the logistics back in the beginning. Even provided a link to a very good thread on the subject from a level headed fella. They have been losing this battle basically since they were stopped by the Russians a few days in. Read the Ukrainska Pravda article I cited above (just sort through the propaganda, it’s not hard). Also see the Russian advancement in the east or elsewhere: they create a salient, they then work on the flanks, if not doing it at the same time. They can also do what they do because they have manpower advantage, among other things.

Another example:

It's comprehensible that Ukrainian leaders ordered to rush up the retreat because they needed the resumption of US military aid ASAP. but they got trapped this way.

That’s not what happened. There is about zero probability they would withdraw from Kursk because the writing would be on the wall: they would start losing ground in Sumy. If there was no pressure from the US in regard to the peace talks, they would still retreat when they did. Maybe even earlier and save men and equipment. The situation was clearly critical, as outlined by everyone, analysts, participants, etc.

Their biggest mistake was not securing the supply road before.

Yes, among other things.

I don't think that taking two or three days more to remove the troops safely would have changed a lot in the total of weapons supplied to Ukraine, but the lack of intel sharing maybe was worse than anything else.

There was no safe withdrawal because they never did when that was a possibility, weeks, if not months ago. They could not remove equipment because there were no more ways out. Most had to leave on foot, in chaos. Some units stopped bringing more equipment in a while ago because they knew it would have to be either destroyed or abandoned (if it made it to the destination to begin with) because it was a one way street at that point. Two or three more days would have been devastating and add greatly to the losses of men.

Operation Pipeline Zombie (official name) was prepared weeks in advance. But, IMO, it was launched that day while Ukrainians were still there. 24h later it would have been too late.

The operation was a contributing factor to the Ukrainian quick decision to withdraw immediately and abandon a lot of equipment. I mean if someone leaves a pile of artillery shells next to a gun and flees, that means that they had to leave in a hurry.

It’s not hard to put the pieces together and see what happened. Especially when the Ukrainians themselves confirm the story.

Again, you must have sources that most others do not see out in the open.

As "stolen", Ukrainians refer to grain grown on Ukrainian soil. In this sens, they are right.

Completely disagree. What if it is the Ukrainian farmers that grow it there? That would be one example.

One tactic Russia used on the retreating Ukrainians was to have resting on the ground drones near key roads and chokepoints that could then be remotely activated against targets , crews looking to the sky for the all clear were mistaken ,lessons to be learnt by military forces elsewhere

They have been doing that since way before the final withdrawal. Since December or so (may e earlier), if I recall the first reports about it correctly. Here is the guy who watches too many videos (Perpetua) talking about it (going to copy and paste the whole thing for those who do not have X account), the post dates March 7:

For weeks, Ukrainian logistics in Kursk have suffered severe damage from drone attacks. These strikes seem to be linked to an organization within the Russian military called the Rubicon Center of Advanced Unmanned Systems, established by Putin in August 2024.

In mid-January and early February, Rubicon began releasing videos from Kursk. Initially, they shared occasional footage showing isolated vehicle strikes. But suddenly, they started posting large volumes of hits—dozens of destroyed vehicles of all types, including pickup trucks, vans, Kirpis, MaxxPros, Bradleys, and BMPs.

The exact nature of Rubicon remains unclear. It is uncertain whether they operate as a single drone unit, a large coordinated force, or if they source videos from multiple existing drone groups. What is known is that Rubicon focuses on three main areas: Kursk, Pokrovsk, and Velyka Novosilka. However, their most intense and damaging operations are concentrated in Kursk.

Rubicon employs advanced drone tactics. They often target short sections of roads—100 to 300 meters long—and saturate these areas with drones. Attacks are frequently carried out in groups, sometimes striking the front, back, and sides of a vehicle almost simultaneously. This approach has also been used to hit multiple vehicles in a convoy at once, compounding the damage.

They also set traps by landing drones on roads and detonating them under passing vehicles, functioning like anti-tank mines—likely using upward-facing shaped charges.

Rubicon's drones are notably difficult to jam. Although they primarily use standard FPV drones, particularly night-vision variants, these drones appear to resist common electronic countermeasures. In practice, this makes them more effective than fiber-optic drones, which are typically harder to jam but more cumbersome.

The scale of the damage in Kursk is significant—hundreds of vehicles have been destroyed—posing a major threat to Ukrainian supply lines. Without significant advancements in jamming technology to counter Rubicon's capabilities, maintaining a hold in Kursk may become unsustainable.

The exact timeline of these attacks is uncertain. It is unclear whether the destruction occurred gradually or in a concentrated period. Rubicon's current activity is also ambiguous. The lack of new videos from Kursk could suggest that Ukraine has adapted to some extent—or it could simply mean Rubicon is releasing older footage for propaganda purposes.

Regardless, the threat Rubicon poses will not be limited to Kursk. If Ukraine retreats, these drone tactics are likely to follow, extending the problem to new areas unless countermeasures improve significantly.

https://x.com/AndrewPerpetua/status/1898098173429907543

 

[KipPotapych]

I'm sure the Ukrainian forces lost a large amount of material in their retreat but overall there are enough sources to suggest that Russia has lost significantly more than Ukraine to the extent this has shaped their operations ,with more use of civilian unarmored vehicles transporting troops in vulnerable areas,the use of tanks with sheds on top not allowing their guns to traverse as troop carriers even donkeys supplying supplies to front lines , crew protection being flawed in Soviet design of tanks have resulted in many of the most experienced tank crews to be killed or injured

Combat losses and manpower challenges underscore the importance of ‘mass’ in Ukraine

Ukrainian forces managed to blunt Russian territorial advances and inflict significant casualties and material losses in 2024, even with ammunition shortages and a deficit in infantry. However, Ukraine will need continued Western support and better manpower-management to avoid further...

www.iiss.org

Counterargument is straight forward: they would lose a lot a less equipment doing the same thing elsewhere, with a more favourable attrition rate, no? They lost more equipment than Russians. This is almost a fact at this point. Again, you need to add what they lost in Sumy, either on the way to Kursk or via supporting activities. Some of the equipment they lost is likely irreplaceable. Replacement of other is questionable as well, especially in quantities they sacrificed. Furthermore, all their equipment comes from abroad. Russia produces their own stuff, even if the production is below the replacement needs. Ukriane fully relies on external sources and we recently saw how that may turn out. The quantity the equipment they spent in Kursk is also significantly higher than what can be delivered by the allies. Only these arguments alone indicate that it was a very bad idea and extremely bad attrition ratio for Ukriane. Seeing it otherwise is simply self-persuasion to see what you want to see, in my opinion.

Another note, isn’t it strange that, regardless of the circumstances, it is always proposed that Ukriane is just doing it because the rate of attrition is extremely favourable for them (ie, they kill way more Russians, destroy way more of their equipment, etc)? This is clearly one example of that not being the case.

 

[rsemmes]

I see different people making different conclusions in this regard all the time.

Tracks are better, period; and more expensive. If they do wheels "as good as" tracks, they are going to be really expensive; and you don't buy a MBT if you might do with an AFV.

(That I was in a tank battalion has nothing to do with it.)

 

[swerve]

Counterargument is straight forward: they would lose a lot a less equipment doing the same thing elsewhere, with a more favourable attrition rate, no? They lost more equipment than Russians. This is almost a fact at this point. Again, you need to add what they lost in Sumy, either on the way to Kursk or via supporting activities. Some of the equipment they lost is likely irreplaceable. Replacement of other is questionable as well, especially in quantities they sacrificed. Furthermore, all their equipment comes from abroad. Russia produces their own stuff, even if the production is below the replacement needs. Ukriane fully relies on external sources and we recently saw how that may turn out. The quantity the equipment they spent in Kursk is also significantly higher than what can be delivered by the allies. Only these arguments alone indicate that it was a very bad idea and extremely bad attrition ratio for Ukriane. Seeing it otherwise is simply self-persuasion to see what you want to see, in my opinion.

Another note, isn’t it strange that, regardless of the circumstances, it is always proposed that Ukriane is just doing it because the rate of attrition is extremely favourable for them (ie, they kill way more Russians, destroy way more of their equipment, etc)? This is clearly one example of that not being the case.

Not all Ukrainian equipment comes from abroad. Even without Donbas, Ukraine's an industrial country. It may be the biggest UAV maker in the world right now (albeit small ones), & makes artillery (a few dozen Bohdana 155mm howitzers are now reported to be being made each month in towed & SP models, more than any western country), ammunition (now the biggest producer in Europe outside Russia), some missiles (e.g. the anti-ship/cruise Neptun, which is now built in a long-range land attack version & has been hitting targets several hundred km from Ukraine), various kinds of engine including the engine for the Neptun (the Russians have been claiming to have destroyed the Motor Sich factory for almost three years, but still attack it, suggesting they don't believe their own claims), & so on . . .

Remember, Ukraine used to be a major arms exporter, & it wasn't all refurbished ex-Soviet equipment left over from the Cold War.

 

[Fredled]

@KipPotapych I agree that Ukrainians should have withdrawn from Kursk much earlier and that it was a mistake to stay that long.
I also agree that they would withdraw no matter what.
But the final and hasty withdrawal came exactly after the US cut aid and the US resumed aid exactly when the withdrawal was complete or almost complete.

Definitely, Ukrainians didn't went to Kursk because they would have a more favorable "rate of attrition". However they could exploit western tanks and IFVs much better during this type of operation than by staying passively on the defence line or by trying to go through heavily mined and heavily protected Russian positions inside Ukraine.

 

[Feanor]

Not all Ukrainian equipment comes from abroad. Even without Donbas, Ukraine's an industrial country. It may be the biggest UAV maker in the world right now (albeit small ones), & makes artillery (a few dozen Bohdana 155mm howitzers are now reported to be being made each month in towed & SP models, more than any western country), ammunition (now the biggest producer in Europe outside Russia), some missiles (e.g. the anti-ship/cruise Neptun, which is now built in a long-range land attack version & has been hitting targets several hundred km from Ukraine), various kinds of engine including the engine for the Neptun (the Russians have been claiming to have destroyed the Motor Sich factory for almost three years, but still attack it, suggesting they don't believe their own claims), & so on . . .

It's a complicated question. Ukraine produces howitzers, but all the chassis for the SP variant are imported. How about the manufacturing equipment? Ukraine made it themselves? It's likely also imported. There's even a question whether the Bogdana is made in Ukraine or with Ukrainian participation manufactured abroad. The Ukrainian missile program is extremely non-transparent, and pre-war it wasn't going well. Suddenly despite Russian strikes, people being mobilized, shortage of labor, problems with electricity, it's going much better. I strongly suspect there's foreign involvement in its design and manufacture. Ukraine's UAV manufacturing is an excellent example. Are they producing the components or building them like legos? For MBTs, IFVs, MRLS, SAMs, fighter jets, helos, Ukraine is fully dependent on import. The Kozak armored car is another good example. It's not a real APC and not a real MRAP, it's a commercial chassis (some use an Iveco chassis some a Ford F-550) with a domestic armored box placed on top. It's better than nothing, but it's worse then imported M113s.

Remember, Ukraine used to be a major arms exporter, & it wasn't all refurbished ex-Soviet equipment left over from the Cold War.

No, not all. But almost all among big ticket items. Ukraine's BTR-4 was an export failure with a scandalous outcome in Iraq and abortive attempts to sell to Kazakhstan and Indonesia. Meanwhile Ukraine exported such a high proportion of their Soviet-made BTR-80s the AFU had to switch to BTR-70s as their main APC. The Dozor-B was rolled out in 2011 but Ukraine didn't manage to get substantial production off the ground until the project went to Poland to be manufactured under the name Oncilla. And the Thai T-84 debacle bears recollection. If Ukraine really had to rely on just their own manufacturing they would be utterly screwed.

So the point about Ukraine badly needing military aid to stay in the fight therefore being subject to the political whims of donor countries who may hand over piles of hardware or may cut all aid when an election changes who's in office stands.

 

[Fredled]

One of my source, but not the only one obviously, is Xavier Tytelman. This video about Cesar operations in Ukraine has an AI generated English soundtrack and the second half is in Ukraino-English and Franco-English.

 

[seaspear]

Counterargument is straight forward: they would lose a lot a less equipment doing the same thing elsewhere, with a more favourable attrition rate, no? They lost more equipment than Russians. This is almost a fact at this point. Again, you need to add what they lost in Sumy, either on the way to Kursk or via supporting activities. Some of the equipment they lost is likely irreplaceable. Replacement of other is questionable as well, especially in quantities they sacrificed. Furthermore, all their equipment comes from abroad. Russia produces their own stuff, even if the production is below the replacement needs. Ukriane fully relies on external sources and we recently saw how that may turn out. The quantity the equipment they spent in Kursk is also significantly higher than what can be delivered by the allies. Only these arguments alone indicate that it was a very bad idea and extremely bad attrition ratio for Ukriane. Seeing it otherwise is simply self-persuasion to see what you want to see, in my opinion.

Another note, isn’t it strange that, regardless of the circumstances, it is always proposed that Ukriane is just doing it because the rate of attrition is extremely favourable for them (ie, they kill way more Russians, destroy way more of their equipment, etc)? This is clearly one example of that not being the case.

This article goes into some depth losses of both sides it is not up to date grantedly but shows some trends which I was referring too if you have a source that can do a comparison of both sides losses I would be happy to peruse

Analysis of losses of heavy military equipment during the Russian invasion of Ukraine

Check out AndriiMaichub's Article on novyPro.com

www.novypro.com

 

[SinisterMinister]

Quite a fascinating read on the intelligence sharing operation between the US and Ukraine. Seems to reach far beyond what I would have thought previously, including real time tactical targeting. The article itself is hilariously one-sided in its storytelling, seeming to argue that the Americans are responsible for virtually every good outcome during the war, and that key setbacks were mostly a result of Ukrainians ignoring American advice or failing to properly mobilize their young men. Russian capabilities and innovation are totally dismissed. Their version of events regarding the 2023 counteroffensive is quite something.

Which gets at the most interesting question the article brings to mind: who gave this to the NYT, and why now? Seems to me it was sourced from American generals (and probably Lloyd Austin) and either Zaluzhnyi himself or his loyalists, all of whom are looking to point the blame for the failure of the war at the feet of someone else (Zelensky, Syrskyi, and the Republicans). But imo the article is actually quite damning of nearly everyone involved and represents clearly the inability of the the American military and civilian leadership to think and plan strategically. Did they really, actually believe Russia would be defeated? Because the article itself admits the likelihood of a tactical nuclear strike should Crimea be threatened was actually quite high. Why engage in a campaign with such strict limits if the goal was actually victory, rather than simply to attrit the Russians? The picture it paints is of a military running on autopilot, with a civilian leadership constantly vacillating. The military fights the war without a plan for long term victory, focused purely on operations and seeking to escalate wherever possible, while the President and Secretary of State try to keep things from spinning out of control.

Of course the most shocking thing to many will be the fact that (according to the article) American intelligence was essentially running the war, at least for a while. But if they are comfortable saying all this to the NYT, then obviously the Russians already know all this. I'm actually surprised, in that case, that Russia never attempted to shoot down any satellites, even just as a warning.

The Secret History of America’s Involvement in the Ukraine War