The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

vikingatespam

Well-Known Member
I found this on Russian artillery production estimates.


A clip from it (estimated HE shell production):

2019: 554,000 shells
2020: 637,000 shells
2021: 733,000 shells

I have my doubts that RU can triple or quadruple production in a short time period given the historical difficulties of doing this. Are they refurbing shells from stockpiles to make up for this ? Probably.
 

John Fedup

The Bunker Group
I found this on Russian artillery production estimates.


A clip from it (estimated HE shell production):

2019: 554,000 shells
2020: 637,000 shells
2021: 733,000 shells

I have my doubts that RU can triple or quadruple production in a short time period given the historical difficulties of doing this. Are they refurbing shells from stockpiles to make up for this ? Probably.
Would be nice if Russian production was that low but I have my doubts. They also likely have some ammo from NK and if they face critical shortages China will supply them. Western supply to Ukraine is pretty fragile and will get worse after Nov 5, perhaps even sooner.
 

Rob c

The Bunker Group
Verified Defense Pro
A question for the experts, with the ground freezing over winter, does this lower the sensitivity of land mines? In other words, with frozen ground any weight would be distributed over a wider area, does make the land mines less likely to go off?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
The best outcome right now is if the Russians cease attacking Ukraine and, as they have no intention of leaving occupied Ukraine, adopt a purely defensive position.
I mean... this is a war. Russian offensive operations are part of continuing combat across the front line. They're not something that exist separately. Russia will cease offensive operations when they either run out of forces to do so, or Ukraine starts massing for another counteroffensive, or the war ends.

If as you say Ukraine is running out of people to fight them then Russia continuing offensive operations is, in my view, an attempt to eradicate Ukraine as a viable entity, culture, people likely with a view to repopulate the territory with "ethnic" Russians much as happened in Kaliningrad.
There is no direct connection between the two. Russia is continuing offensive operations because they can't accomplish anything they can sell as a plausible victory domestically without offensive combat operations. They also can't force Ukraine to the negotiating table without offensive combat operations. The lack of manpower as mentioned above has to do with Ukrainians leaving the country. There is no evidence that Russia is trying to eradicate Ukraine as a viable cultural entity. And the population of ethnic Russians available to repopulate the area is shrinking. Russian demographics aren't exactly the greatest. Don't get me wrong, Ukraine's are worse, but Russia is in no shape to realistically repopulate large territories with ethnic Russians. This could change post-war if the Russian government increases the mother's capital program drastically, but this is speculation at this point. Lastly Kaliningrad was repopulated at a time when Russia did have positive population growth and is a tiny area. Russia could repopulate something the size of Kaliningrad even today (~15k sq km). For comparison just the part of Zaporozhye alone that Russia holds today is closer to 20k sq km. And there's Kherson, and the areas of the Donbas and Kharkov area they're recapturing now. Any demographic shift is likelier to happen due to the exodus of ethnic Ukrainians (with local ethnic Russians staying) then it is due to any repopulation efforts by Russia. Don't get me wrong, some Russians will move to these areas, internal migration is a thing, but large scale repopulation isn't really doable.

Ukraine is never going to be able to retake occupied Ukraine by force of arms and to be honest they, and we in the west, should recognise this as an unpleasant but incontrovertible fact.
Well.... never say never. But it's looking like a fairly remote possibility, and the opposite, Russia making significant additional gains is becoming more likely.

Whilst Russia continues to attack Ukraine the West should continue to supply weapons, so for me the way I see it is the ball is in the Russians hands. If Russia ceased attacks on Ukraine and holds what they have Western support will fall away rapidly , much bluster will be made (everywhere) , and it is certainly possible that what remains of Ukraine will continue to be supplied with arms to counter another attack in the future, and some form of NATO membership might be on the cards in the mid to distant future.
I don't think this is true. If Russia ceases offensive combat operations Ukraine will get a time to re-arm, get as many people under arms additionally as possible, and eventually more western aid will arrive (it already is just much slower the is needed). Russia will then face another Ukrainian counter-offensive in ~2025. And the fewer strikes Russia does on Ukrainian infrastructure and ports, the more the economy can function and therefore the fewer people will leave the country. In fact some might even come back, thus halting or even partially reversing the depopulation trend that's contributing to Ukraine's manpower shortage. I see no reason to think western support will fall away.

I think that the only solution out of this for Russia is to force Ukraine to the negotiating table on something resembling realistic terms (without Ukraine issuing ultimatums about returning Crimea, or pretending like they've won a war they very much haven't) and get an actual peace treaty. And clearly the defeat of Ukraine's counter-offensive wasn't enough to accomplish this. I suspect the fall of Ugledar, Chasov Yar, and Seversk, won't accomplish this either. And those are fairly optimistic projections for Russian success in 2024. They would represent those significant gains I mentioned above. So it's almost certain this war will continue into 2025. Based on what I've seen I think it will take the Ukrainian army being at or near the breaking point, with no hope of gains to get Ukraine to sign a peace treaty that doesn't involve demanding the return of Crimea.
 

hauritz

Well-Known Member
The reality of modern warfare with its near transparent battlefield is that it is easier to defend than attack. This has always been the case of course but now it seems to be more so. Both Ukraine and Russia have attempted to push so far with very little to show for it other than massive casualties. If you look at a map now and from a year ago not much really seems to have changed. Most of the cities and villages they are fighting over have been reduced to rubble with their populations now gone.

At some point I expect there will be peace talks. Sadly for Ukraine those talks will involve ceding territory to the Russians.

The possibility then is that an emboldened Russia will just keep coming back for more.

The war drums are all ready beating in the rest of Europe.


If the Ukraine lines of Defence were to ever collapse and Russia were to start advancing across the rest of the Ukraine I honestly don’t know how NATO would respond.
 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
The reality of modern warfare with its near transparent battlefield is that it is easier to defend than attack. This has always been the case of course but now it seems to be more so. Both Ukraine and Russia have attempted to push so far with very little to show for it other than massive casualties. If you look at a map now and from a year ago not much really seems to have changed. Most of the cities and villages they are fighting over have been reduced to rubble with their populations now gone.

At some point I expect there will be peace talks. Sadly for Ukraine those talks will involve ceding territory to the Russians.

The possibility then is that an emboldened Russia will just keep coming back for more.

The war drums are all ready beating in the rest of Europe.


If the Ukraine lines of Defence were to ever collapse and Russia were to start advancing across the rest of the Ukraine I honestly don’t know how NATO would respond.
Like the Germany’s Ministry of Defence already said, it is highly unlikely that Russia will invade Poland. Why would Russia do that?
Even now Russia's armed forces struggle for every single square meter in eastern Ukraine.

The change is also quite small that Russia will conquer whole Ukraina, but if they succeed, i expect NATO can't do much. Unlike Poland Ukraine is not a NATO member.

So i think this is an averge 'newsreport'with a sensational title.
 

King Wally

Active Member
Afghanistan (multiple times) and Vietnam, both proved you don't need to militarily push an occupier out of your country to get them to leave. If you bleed them long enough a change in Russian leadership may lead to a voluntary exit after a long enough period of time. Politics are never static, even in a place like Russia. A good will gesture is never out of the question.

In regards to Russian aggression against NATO, the larger threat I feel is that Russia finds a way to destabilize NATO, perhaps through playing games with Article 5. Anders Puck Nielsen (Military Analyst) adds some thoughts on the issue here,
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Afghanistan (multiple times) and Vietnam, both proved you don't need to militarily push an occupier out of your country to get them to leave. If you bleed them long enough a change in Russian leadership may lead to a voluntary exit after a long enough period of time. Politics are never static, even in a place like Russia. A good will gesture is never out of the question.
There's a difference between a guerilla war and regular front line combat. Areas of the Donbas taken by Russia don't seem to have much in the way of resistance movements, and the ones in Kherson and Zaporozhye regions appear to be relatively manageable. There's also the fact that both Vietnam and Afghanistan took a horrific human toll, and the countries were left in ruins. It's an open question whether Afghanistan in particular would have been better off submitting to the Soviets, given how things turned out in the end. There's also the issue of terrain, Vietnam is a jungle, and Afghanistan is extremely mountainous. The areas of Ukraine being fought over are mostly steppes. They're far more open and accessible. There's the issue of distances, projecting power across Russia's most well connected European border is different from projecting power across the relatively underdeveloped Central Asian SSRs into Afghanistan, and Vietnam is a whole other story. Also in each case it was an occupation with an intent to accomplish some political goal. Here Russia is straight up annexing the territory. I suspect the story of the basmachi insurgency in Central Asia through the '20s and early '30s to be more relevant of an example, if a resistance movement really forms at all. At the end of the day the largest cities outside the Donbas Russia holds are tiny, and much of the population has left.
 

third_umpire

New Member
Wars are fought for territorial gains or strategic supremacy. Russia is not going to cede back annexed ukranian territory. After having effectively tamed and integrated chechenya with no immediate adversary russia had all the resources to use to expand its territory. It'll take a generation/25 years for things to normalise in the annexed territory and become integral part of russia. Russia is prepared to limit conflict to border region for many years. They can only be outsmarted by us and europe if they take conflict to central russian province which seems to be the gameplan. In that scenario russian economy will suffer immensely. Nuclear word cant be used to avoid this. No doubt whole of ukraine will come under russian fire in such case.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
So the Zelensky/Zaluzhny situation… True? Propaganda? I mean the conflict is obvious, but the firing and the whole thing? It was circulating in the RU and UA media for a couple/few days. Then this guy from the Economist tweets earlier today:


Then, a couple of hours later, this:


If the tweets do not show up, for those without a Tweeter account, the first tweet says that the UA government source says that the reports about firing are true. The second tweet says that multiple sources close to Zaluzhny, as well as top government sources believe the firing would happen tonight, but the order isn’t signed due to the outrage and there may be a walk back.

Then, the UA MoD officially denies this to be true on their Telegram channel. Zelensky’s office does the same.

The Economist dude gets accused to be spreading Russian propaganda by the Tweeter crowd (which also previously did the same to Rob Lee, Mike Kofman, among others) - basically the crowd, likely completely oblivious for the most part, does what social media is good at.

The RU and UA media were also referencing legit lawmakers when they posted the reports, btw.

Thoughts? I would guess he really wants to fire him but can’t for obvious reasons. If this was an actual attempt to do that, he is even… let’s call it not as smart.

Or is it shenanigans of some internal political party (Proroshenko et al, for example) moving their own political ambitions?
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
So the Zelensky/Zaluzhny situation… True? Propaganda? I mean the conflict is obvious, but the firing and the whole thing? It was circulating in the RU and UA media for a couple/few days. Then this guy from the Economist tweets earlier today:


Then, a couple of hours later, this:


If the tweets do not show up, for those without a Tweeter account, the first tweet says that the UA government source says that the reports about firing are true. The second tweet says that multiple sources close to Zaluzhny, as well as top government sources believe the firing would happen tonight, but the order isn’t signed due to the outrage and there may be a walk back.

Then, the UA MoD officially denies this to be true on their Telegram channel. Zelensky’s office does the same.

The Economist dude gets accused to be spreading Russian propaganda by the Tweeter crowd (which also previously did the same to Rob Lee, Mike Kofman, among others) - basically the crowd, likely completely oblivious for the most part, does what social media is good at.

The RU and UA media were also referencing legit lawmakers when they posted the reports, btw.

Thoughts? I would guess he really wants to fire him but can’t for obvious reasons. If this was an actual attempt to do that, he is even… let’s call it not as smart.

Or is it shenanigans of some internal political party (Proroshenko et al, for example) moving their own political ambitions?
There was an embarassing Russian offensive recently on the border of Lugansk and Kharkov regions. Russian forces broke Ukrainian lines and took ~20 sq kms including the villages of Krahmal'noe and Tabaevka. Moreover the Ukrainian counter-attack failed, a Ukrainian comms officer was killed and reportedly a significant piece of Ukrainian EW went down. Lastly, reports are that Russian offensive actions are continuing here towards the next village, Peshanoe. This also creates a significant threat of encirclement to Ukrainian positions in Kislovka and Kotlyarovka. Reportedly the commander of 103rd TerDef Bde was removed over this failure and Russian sources are claiming Leos and Bradleys involved in the failed Ukrainian counter-attack. So maybe it's related?
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
^ Interesting. Don’t think that alone would qualify as grounds for dismissal of Zaluzhny though. Not that there wouldn’t necessarily be an attempt to use it such; stranger things had surely happened in that part of the world. Who knows. The UA MoD’s message was also weird:


It basically says, something along the lines of “Dear journalist, we are answering you all at the the same time: this is not true”. I guess they had quite a few inquiries.

It seems to me it is a matter of time that something gives in that situation though. But I really have no idea.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
The story does have legs, according to the Ukrainian reports. According to the article (in Ukrainian), Zelensky and Zaluzhny met, the president offered him to write a letter of resignation, but didn’t offer him any other post, Zaluzhny refused, indicating that it is Zelensky’s right to decide who and how he wants to work with. The author is again citing top government officials and those close to Zalazhny.


In the meantime, the Twitter crowd added the note to the previously posted tweet indicating that it is fake news citing Ukrainian Pravda:



The world is mad.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Oskol Front.

So it appears Russian forces on the Kupyansk section of the front are completely stalled at Sin'kovka. There is some back and forth fighting but no significant movement. Instead Russia planned and executed, so far successfully, a medium-sized offensive between the villages of Krahmal'noe and Tabaevka, capturing sections of the road, both villages, and now the hills west of Tabaevka. Reportedly Russian forces are continuing to push towards Peschanoe. This push threatens Ukrainian positions at Kotlyarovka and Kislovka. It appears the 103rd TerDef Bde was here and they lost their senior comms officer in combat, and their brigade commander (Col. Kurko) was allegedly removed from his position.


Ukrainian Leo-2 getting hit on the Svatovo axis. This may or may not be part of the reported Ukrainian counter-attack at Tabaevka.


Some grim footage of Ukrainian infantry dismounting from an M113 as a BMP-2 lays down suppressing fire. Grim because a Russian quadcopter starts dropping munitions on them. All the cover fire in the world won't help.


Seversk Bulge.

Russian forces are pushing on Belogorovka from the north east with some success. They've gained some ground, but are still not on the outskirts of the village. To me this seems a curious choice. Clearly the key to breaking this area is to cut it off west of Seversk, why push here against no doubt well entrenched Ukrainian forces?


Russian forces attacking near Veseloe, Ukrainian forces withdrew from the village after Russia took the hills north-east of it. Note the vehicle commander (I think) is out of the vehicle, on top of it, observing impacts, in addition to the UAV support. It's likely the commander's sights aren't great from inside.


Artemovsk/Bakhmut.

Most recent Russian advances west of Artemovsk. Russian advances here were halted for a while, and while some movement has occurred, it appears Ukrainian reserves were able to stabilize the situation.


Russian forces destroy a rare Dana howitzer west of Kurdyumovka. Reportedly it belongs to the 28th Mech Bde.


Russian forces haul away a captured M113. Note this is in the area near the Berkhovskaya water reservoir. The area has been under Russian control for some time but is only now far enough in the rear for this stuck vehicle to get evacuated. This mirrors a pattern where Russian forces can pose with knocked out Bradleys and Leopards, but actually capturing them is another story.


Avdeevka.

Russian forces remain embattled in the city ruins north-west of Tsarskaya Ohota. A Ukrainian counter-attack seems to have been repulsed. In the mean time they are creeping up on the air defense base from the south. Initially there were reports it had fallen but this doesn't seem to be the case. It does appear that Russia controls the positions between the Vinogradniki neighborhood and Tsarskaya Ohota.


Ukrainian counter-attack at Tsarskaya Ohota.


Footage from the sewer pipe Russian forces used to get past Ukrainian defenses in the southern part of Avdeevka.


3 Ukrainian POWs captured near Avdeevka.


Russian forces are also continuing to advance through Pervomayskoe.


Mar'inka Area.

Russian forces are creeping forward west of Mar'inka. The pace of advance mirrors the fight through Mar'inka and this makes sense. The terrain is virtually identical, and the opponent too.


Russia was pushed back from positions south and north of Novomihailovka losing the front-most tree-line in the west, south of the village, and reportedly losing control of Zverinets. Given the untenable position there, it's not clear if Ukraine intended to try and hold it, but Russia reclaimed Zverinets.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Other interesting tidbits.

A Ukrainian FPV drone apparently attacked a civilian excavator in Belgorod region.


An example of a Russian anti-UAV cage that did its job, catching two munitions.


A Ukrainian SP howitzer, type unclear, gets hit in the rear of the turret causing a spectacular explosion (ammo going off?). The vehicle is moving at a high speed and has anti-UAV cages, but neither save it.


Russian Tor-M2 attempts to intercept a Polish Warmate loitering munition. It can track the target and gets an intercept but the SAM doesn't manage to down the munition due to the fragmentation cloud being formed too far from the munition. The missile is poorly optimized for targets this small.


Russian forces using Invar bore-launched ATGMs in Ukraine. The type surfaces and disappears from footage regularly, possibly mirroring the delivery of fresh batches to the troops.


Apparently the first Skynex was destroyed in Ukraine shortly after arriving. Context is absent.


And a destroyed Caesar, location and context unclear.


Russia apparently hit Ukraine's 110th Bde staging area in Mirnograd, Donetsk region. Ukrainian sources confirm 16 KIA and 20 more in the rubble, their fate unclear.


Ukraine hit the center of Donetsk twice. The first time hit a market and some residential buildings, killing 18 or 25 (sources differ). The second time was with 8 rockets, reportedly at least 3 dead. Warning footage of corpses.


Ukrainian Gen. Krivonos confirms Russia destroyed Ukrainian missile manufacturing facilities in the recent strikes on Kiev. This is a stark contrast to Ukrainian MLRS strike on markets on Donetsk, or the downtown of Belgorod.


A downed Ukrainian Neptune missile washed up on the coast of the Azov Sea near Taganrog.


It appears ex-Kuwaiti M-84s are heading to Ukraine after repairs and presumably upgrades in Croatia. While in present form they are not by any stretch of the imagination a modern tank, there is no reason to think they can't be comparable to the T-72M1s Ukraine got, and should outperform Russian T-62s.


Ukrainian erzats MLRS out of S-5 rocket pods.


Ukrainian forces using a Kub chassis with a BRDM-2 turret, possibly as an armored evacuator.


Ukrainian KS-19 on MAN truck, being used as an erzats howitzer. Note it may be the case that ammo is available for the type even while conventional howitzer ammo is scarce.


First sighting of MIM-23 Hawk SAMs in Ukraine. If large numbers of these SAMs can be provided they could serve well against Russia's new jet-powered Shaheds.


Ukrainian footage of an AMX-10 shooting at targets. The type had a spectacular debut at the start of the offensive. And by spectacular I mean disasterous. It's been conspicuously absent since.


A rare Ukrainian CR-2 with side-cages and a roof cage. The photo is allegedly from last summer. These tanks appeared on the front line briefly and then promptly disappeared. It's unclear why.


First sighting of the M-60 AVLB bridgelayer in Ukrainian service.


Also first-sighting of ex-Polish S-125s in Ukrainian service. Note Ukraine also operated some of their own S-125s pre-war, though their value was questioanble. They've been notable absent from this war, possibly destroyed at start on static positions.


Partners in cage-building, a Ukrainian T-72M1 and a Russian T-72B3 mod'22 with elaborate cage set ups. The cages are clearly proliferating and gaining in complexity though their value is variable.


A Russian T-62MV mod'22 with a roof cage roof hut. While initially used as erzats artillery, I suspect T-62Ms are going to be seeing front-line combat if they aren't already.


A closer look at new Russian roof-cages for the T-90Ms. They appear to be standard (this isn't the first such we've seen) but distinctly different from the Krysha modules on the T-72B3/80BVM models.


A rare BMPT with a roof cage and additional ERA.


A brand new Russian Tayfun-VDV in the war zone. Note it's an MRAP that carries an unmanned 30mm autocannon module.


Russian Desertcross buggy with a smokescreen set up. Normally this sort of thing is mounted on a larger truck. Reports of a deficit of vehicles have been floating around for a while about the Russian armed forces.


Fresh Desertcross buggies being trucked through Lugansk.


One hell of a frankentank, two Russian T-80BV chassis with RBU depth charge launchers for weapons being used as erzats-MLRS.


Russian 22160 patrol ships in Crimea with extra HMG posts set up no doubt for countering Ukrainian unmanned boats.


Russian Lancet strikes have cleared 1000, but what's most notable is that January is approaching the record-high numbers of the counter-offensive. The month isn't over and we're at 130 strikes for the month. This might be indication of increased production, or it might be an indication that Russia is expending stockpiles, pushing Ukraine as hard as possible while supplies are low. Numbers over the next months should serve as indicators.


There were reports of Russia using a P-35 missile against targets in Odessa region, but it's unclear whether this is in fact the case.


It appears the DPRK is also shipping munitions to Russia by sea.


A Russian source looked inside DPRK artillery shells and noticed inconsistencies in the propellant, resulting in consistent firing results for the same types for shells.

 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Ukrainian Gen. Krivonos confirms Russia destroyed Ukrainian missile manufacturing facilities in the recent strikes on Kiev.
I’d be cautious about statements of Gen. Krivonos. This is not to say whether he is right or wrong but he is a questionable individual with likely some grudges about the current government. For example:


He is also increasingly quoted by the RU news as of late. I wouldn’t be surprised if he is playing a part of the whole Zelensky/Zaluzhny/name UA politician “conspiracy”, if there is one.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I’d be cautious about statements of Gen. Krivonos. This is not to say whether he is right or wrong but he is a questionable individual with likely some grudges about the current government. For example:


He is also increasingly quoted by the RU news as of late. I wouldn’t be surprised if he is playing a part of the whole Zelensky/Zaluzhny/name UA politician “conspiracy”, if there is one.
Good context. I know this statement was made previously by Ukrainian sources so really he's just repeating it, but I don't recall immediately who that was. I'll be wary of his statements moving forward.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Here are some real issues that I talked about the other day and over the past year or more, but “fresh off the press” and with some real numbers:

Ukraine’s birthrates are plummeting. The next generation needs a plan

Detailed cliff notes:
  • The article begins by describing a scene that right away took me to the Children of Men movie, closer to the end, if I recall correctly, when Owen walks with the mother that gave birth, and everything and everyone around stops and looks;
  • Ukraine has the lowest fertility rate in the world, with an average of 0.7 per child-bearing aged woman, per government-funded think tank, down from 1.16 prior to the war, when the country already was in a profound demographic crisis;
  • Survival of the nation is a question;
  • Male life expectancy decreased form 66-67 to 57-58 since the war began;
  • Only Chad, Lesotho, Nigeria, and CAR have lower life expectancies;
  • Prior to the war, the proportion of population of ages 20-40 was already tiny;
  • Ministers had to develop a repopulation strategy for 2040 with strategic goals of increasing birth rates, eliminating early mortality, migration growth, adapting the society to aging population;
  • According to the director of the Institute for Demography and Social Studies at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, “they (the planners) tried to skip everything that actually needs to be done”;
  • An example of the family of four, where the wife and two kids left to London and the father stayed after the invasion and after two years, “the girls speak fluent English with perfect British accents. Ukrainian is fast becoming their second language”;
  • 57% of such families say they will return home after the war is over, per Ukrainian research agency;
  • Prior to the war, the population of Ukraine was estimated to be 36 million and around 25 million now, per the rector at the Kyiv School of Economics and a visiting fellow at LSE;
  • He believes that when the war is over, emigration will continue with soldiers freed up from service leaving to join their families, not the other way around;
  • Due to the size of the country and population density, prospects of economic recovery are questionable;
  • Any post-war government will have to throw open the borders to bring in new migrants;
  • Migrants would mainly come from post-Soviet Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, as well as European nations like Poland;
  • “That also implies some cultural change”.
Consider this grave reality and then consider that while realizing that reality (I mean they have to, right?), along with the reality of a near-collapse economic situation, they talk about taking Crimea back and returning the country to the 1991 borders, rejecting a possibility of negotiations, etc.

Think about those numbers - the fertility rate, life expectancy, the current population… They mention the only countries having lower age expectancy for males being Nigeria, Lesotho, Chad, and CAR, but the fertility rates in those countries are 5.1 (#8 in the world), 2.9 (#60), 6.1 (#2), and 5.8 (#5), respectively. This is per Wikipedia, but probably more than sufficient to make that point.

In regard to the 57% of families returning home… Pretty sure the Prof stating that more will leave once the borders are open and those fathers currently fighting in particular, is correct on this, not the polling. Frankly, I personally think that you have to be out of your mind to return if you have an opportunity to stay wherever you are. For anecdotal evidence, I know quite a few Ukrainians here and only one woman wanted to return before she went back for visit a few months ago - now she wants to stay too. Some were certain they’d go back after they arrived, but they reconsidered very quickly. Most don’t even care about the assets they abandoned there, such as real estate, for example. But it is probably much, much easier to remain in Canada than elsewhere in the world and EU in particular. However, if the prospects of the EU membership are realistic, this solves that issue and opens the door for further significant emigration.

Then consider the actual estimated population to be at 25 million, as per the article. About 10 million people are collecting pensions (per the article cited by me on the previous page or the page before), likely another 5M are publicly employed (this is a guesstimate on my part), which leaves 10 million to support those 15M. We are not even talking about kids here, handicapped and otherwise unable to work, along with the fact that many of the remaining 10M are likely near retirement age.

Finally, consider the very last three points. The last point is probably a very gentle way to put it. I am not going to expand on it, but let’s just say that hopefully that those on the most extreme spectrum of the society have mostly had volunteered and perished by the time the war is over. Also, I highly doubt many, if any, migrants would come from Kazakhstan. The same is likely true for Poland.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
A little more on the Zaluzhny situation as today shined quite a bit more clarity by several articles confirming basically the same thing.

This article from The Times has the most details of what took place yesterday:


The article insists that Zaluzhny was actually dismissed yesterday by Zelensky, who had to reverse his decision after being pressured by the senior military commanders, as well as international partners.

It reports that Zaluzhny was summoned to a face-to-face meeting with the president where he told him and his advisors that “their assessments of the military situation were more positive than realistic.” At this point, he was asked to resign (according to three sources), but he refused. Zelensky informed him that he would then fire him. When Zaluzhny returned to his quarters, he told his deputies that he was fired and said that “he is packing his things” to one of the officers.

After Zaluzhny informed his subordinates that he is leaving, “senior commanders and international partners, including the US and the UK, expressed their concern.” The article then suggests that the rumours have triggered a backlash on the UA social media. Either Budanov or Syrsky were reported to be his potential replacement. According to the article, both rejected the offers and forced Zelensky to backpedal.

I know Budanov as Zaluzhny’s replacement was talked about for weeks all over the place, but Syrsky was rarely mentioned, from what I saw anyway. Common sense suggests that Budanov would be a terrible choice. From my previous reading, Syrsky is not among favourites in the ranks and by far, but is a capable individual, probably qualified. The rumours I read a while back, however, he is willing to unnecessarily sacrifice men on the line. The next article from The Economist talks about it a bit:


Not going to repeat what was reported in the previous article (they are very different though and it seems have different sources or approach reporting in very different ways).

This article suggests that this was not the first attempt to remove Zaluzhny. It also states that The Economist confirmed that Zelensky informed the general that he had decided to dismiss him. It also reports that Zaluzhny was offered another position as the secretary of the national security council (lol?), which Zaluzhny refused. The article also talks about the same “replacements” and here is what it say about them:

General Syrsky, one of the army’s most experienced officers, was the operational brain behind two of Ukraine’s most remarkable victories against Russia in 2022: around Kyiv and in the Kharkiv region. But his harsh approach to fighting has made him unpopular in parts of the military. Last year he sacrificed battle-hardened commanders in the arguably pointless defence of the small town of Bakhmut.

General Budanov, Ukraine’s enigmatic and ambitious head of military intelligence, embraces a much more unconventional and untested approach to command. He has not led conventional armed forces before—or an organisation anything like the size of the Ukrainian army, which now employs approximately 1m people. Some have suggested he turned the job down at the last minute. A close colleague insists that General Budanov did not angle for General Zaluzhny’s position, but that he also had no right to turn a military position down. “It’s not you that makes these decisions,” the colleague adds.


The article also mentions the popularity of Zaluzhny in the west and among the Ukrianian troops. It also talks about the other examples when generals were replaced in war times and blah.

The last article I am going to cite here is from The New York Times:


This article states that according to two sources, one member of parliament and one former senior UA oficial, the process of dismissal has been slowed down because they can’t find a replacement for Zaluzhny.

It also suggests that the situation is affecting the moral of the Ukrainian troops (I bet) and that essentially there is no certainty now that Zaluzhny’s orders are backed by the president. The respect for Zaluzhny within the UA military is also discussed. Here is a quote from the article:

Along the front line, where Ukrainians are fighting intense, bloody engagements daily, some soldiers lamented the disruption. “Zaluzhny enjoys very high authority in the army,” said Lt. Pavlo Velychko, who is serving in Ukraine’s 101st Territorial Defense Brigade. Firing the general, he said, would be “a signal to commanders of all ranks: No matter how well you do your job, you can be removed without reason.”

It also provides some of the same examples of replacing top commanders during the times or war. This one actually mentions Gerasimov, but also his disappearance and speculates about his death, lol. Of course they talk about it at the end of the article. Ironically, none of these reports mentions Surovikin’s sacking as possibly purely political. I guess that could be left to speculation as we have no information on what actually took place, but if one is willing to speculate on death of Gerasimov…

So here it is…. All three articles also report that the popularity of Zaluzhny is higher than Zelensky’s among the UA public and all suggest that the potential moves are political. None say it straight up, but one gets the idea. Here is a quote from The Economist:

A source in Ukrainian intelligence predicts that attempts to use General Zaluzhny would continue as long as Ukraine remains a democracy. “We get up in the morning and want to eat,” he says. “Other people get up in the morning and can only think about being president.”

A quote from the NYT article:

If any move to replace the general is viewed as purely political rather than a militarily necessity, Mr. Zelensky could face a backlash not just among opposition politicians but the public, who polls show hold General Zaluzhny in the highest of regard.

A quote from The Times:

The general has communicated regularly with the president during meetings of the Stavka, or military council, but has struggled to get time alone with Zelensky away from his advisers, contributing to a lack of trust between the men, officials privy to the meetings say.

“Zelensky needs to understand that the military trusts Zaluzhny, and if the president wants the military to trust him, he needs to learn to trust Zaluzhny too,” a confidant of the general said.

“The advisers close to Zelensky have poured for him a warm bath, outside of which it is difficult to see the realities of the front.”


Personally, I’d sack Zelensky over Zaluzhny any time of day without giving it a second thought. All the guy does now is damage (has been from before the war, in my opinion, but now to the war effort as well). Even in this situation that borderlines a circus: your top commander tells you how he sees it and pretty much everyone with understanding agrees, yet Zelensky disagrees and talks rubbish every chance he gets. Oh well. Sad situation, really, especially in light of my post above this one.
 
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