The Russian-Ukrainian War Thread

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
There wont be anything in Adivka for some time. Ruined buildings, shattered lives, and UXO.
It is the same in Mar'inka, and will be the same in Ugledar, and Seversk. So no, no resistance movement.

Another dumb /interesting idea might be for Ukraine to take on those Russian deployments in Transnistria to aid /slash liberate Russian munitions there
I'm confident this was discussed and something was determined. Remember Russia still hasn't tried to eliminate Ukrainian leadership. And despite cross-border strikes and minor raids, Russian forces are pushing forward inside Ukraine but aren't reinvading Ukraine from Russian soil. Why is the front line near Kupyansk inside Ukraine a total war zone and the border between Russia and Ukraine a few kms away not? Why is Russia not dropping the bridges across the Dnepr one by one? There are some sort of non-public agreements in place. This is likely also why the west is so nervous about Ukraine not using their weapons to attack Russia itself.

I have obviously other sources than yours. And I will not describe my sources for safety reasons. But I can tell you that there are checks in public transportations and on roads. Maybe not every time you board a vehicle but certainly when you are crossing a certain distance, or certain administrative delimitations.

Men of mobilisation age can't go where they want. They have a card with a letter showing their mobilisation category: whether they will be in the next mobilisation wave or after the next one and so on. And they do need an authorisation to travel large distances within Russia and they can't leave Russia in any circumstances. They, and their wives also have limitations for selling real estate if they own some.

Now, it's true that not everybody is affected. And those unaffected are not aware of this. It's not like they control everybody all the time.

I don't know how these rules are enforced in reality. And what are the penalties. But taking a vehicle and driving it over 600km is quiet risky if you are an Ukrainian saboteur. Taking a train or a bus, even more. It's hard to imagine how Ukrainians infiltrators could rent or secure an accommodation for 20 nights in different places along the road, for several men, without being noticed and being 100% sure they won't be tipped off.
This is one hell of a claim. How exactly would something like this remain totally unknown? Because I also haven't heard anything about it...

Putin said that he doesn't wish the return of the Soviet Union. The reason is not that he doesn't wish to acquire more territories. The reason is that the Soviet Union is, by definition, an union of independent states. In USSR, the states where independent in theory and legally. Their borders were the same as the borders actually recognised. Putin wants to conquer land to annex it to Russia. He is not interested in a union. At some times he hoped that Belarus will join Russia but that project was aborted. But when he invades by force, annexation follows a few months later.
I disagree with what you say about the Baltics and Poland, but this part I think is spot on.
 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
I have obviously other sources than yours. And I will not describe my sources for safety reasons. But I can tell you that there are checks in public transportations and on roads. Maybe not every time you board a vehicle but certainly when you are crossing a certain distance, or certain administrative delimitations.

Men of mobilisation age can't go where they want. They have a card with a letter showing their mobilisation category: whether they will be in the next mobilisation wave or after the next one and so on. And they do need an authorisation to travel large distances within Russia and they can't leave Russia in any circumstances. They, and their wives also have limitations for selling real estate if they own some.

Now, it's true that not everybody is affected. And those unaffected are not aware of this. It's not like they control everybody all the time.

I don't know how these rules are enforced in reality. And what are the penalties. But taking a vehicle and driving it over 600km is quiet risky if you are an Ukrainian saboteur. Taking a train or a bus, even more. It's hard to imagine how Ukrainians infiltrators could rent or secure an accommodation for 20 nights in different places along the road, for several men, without being noticed and being 100% sure they won't be tipped off.
Ok, I think now I understand what you are referring to and I am pretty sure it was discussed here last spring when the new legislation came into effect. I am fairly certain I specifically discussed it, but could be mistaken.

To get this out of the way, there is less than zero chance, as a figure of speech, that something like what you are suggesting would be held under the carpet in Russia. But it sure sounds like something… What’s his name? Danilov? Would write on his Tweeter feed.

Last spring they introduced new legislation in Russia in regard to conscription notices that are now delivered electronically and are considered to be received regardless of what the recipient claims. So basically if one was assigned to your name, you are placed on the “government list”, call it that, and you have to report to a conscription office within… I don’t remember, call it a month or 30 days. If you do not report within that specified period of time, your information is shared with all other government agencies, which, in turn, would prohibit you from leaving the country, register vehicle or real estate, and so on. Those restrictions would remain in place until you report to the conscription office. In other words, you are considered to be a deserter until you report and register at a conscription office upon receipt of your conscription notice. Other than that, everyone is free to move and do whatever they want (in accordance with the Russian law).

I do not see how that is unreasonable at all and one would think those “nuts” would be “tightened” quite a bit more given the situation and the place we are talking about. It certainly feels like deja vu because I am sure I wrote similar stuff and sentiment prior, including some links and discussions about the implications and whatnot by lawyers from Russia, etc. Or maybe I am thinking of something else. Regardless, here it is. They do not live in the gestapo-like environment, like I noted in my previous post, haha. Try moving from Israel at the age of 17 and coming back for a visit at the age of 20, for example.

As for the “special saboteur forces”, again, it’s people that look exactly the same, some/many speak exact same Russian with no specific dialect that could be distinguished by an average “patrol man”, etc. Also, it is allegedly specificslly trained personnel. I mean it is just makes zero sense sleeping in the forest while walking 600 km. Sorry, but I find it comical even. On this, I have no source to refer to, but simply common sense suggests that once you clear the border, you can rent a car, apartment, whatever. Once close to the base is another story… Well, maybe, because the way the Russians are regularly protracted… Don’t forget that Ukrainians also claim to have about gazillion operatives and supporters within Russia and these guys should have zero issues finding a place to sleep and a car to drive anywhere in the country. While my last sentence is sarcasm, it definitely sounds more realistic than the “walking 600 km” version. So I think it is just another story like there were dozens of now.

I will reply to other post later maybe because I came to post another bit about Zaluzhny situation.

Edit: Here is an article from the Canadian source talking about the legislation introduced back in April of last year discussed above:


After receiving the summons, the person has 20 days to show up at the enlistment office, and will be banned from leaving the country until they do so. Those who fail to turn up at a military enlistment office will be banned from leaving the country and face restrictions within Russia, including not being able to register a vehicle, small business or buy and sell real estate.

And:

Previously, men who wanted to avoid being drafted could try and stay off the radar of military officers by living at an undisclosed address. But once the electronic draft is implemented, that will be of no use.

As well as age eligibility:

Russia is also moving toward changing the age of conscription when men are eligible to be called up in the spring and autumn drafts. The current age range is between 18 and 27, and it will be increased so men between the ages of 21 and 30 can be conscripted.

Note that some of the quotes were taken from the part of the article titled “Dodging draft notices”. Also of interest is the following:

He says he used to think Russia's Gosuslugi, a digital portal where citizens can access several state and municipal services in one spot, was an innovative piece of Russian technology that made life easier and more comfortable.

Now, he says that notion has been turned on its head.


Compare this to the Ukrainian system, whatever it is called, that had been praised in the news not that long ago it seems as most innovative and the future for the developed world.
 
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KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
The last place I was waiting to chime in with some news on the Zaluzhny situation was The Washington Post and they finally did (they did before, but didn’t provide any new information):


I was going to write a little more, but now don’t have as much time, so it will be brief and some quotes from the article.

The article claims that the Ukrainian government has now informed the white house (in the US) that Zelensky decided to fire Zaluzhny. Yes, this is now, allegedly, getting to the point of beyond ridiculous, in my opinion. The article then states:

White House officials did not support or object to the high-stakes decision, but acknowledged it as the president’s sovereign choice, these people said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive conversation.

Imagine they provided “recommendations”. I am not rejecting the idea that they actually did at all, but to make a replacement of your top commander into a drama that it apparently is and so public is not something one would expect from a “strong leadership” of an “independent state”. But anyway…

The article also states that while the decision has been made, there is no timeline on when exactly this is going to happen (up to being held up indefinitely).

Zelensky has yet to issue a formal decree announcing the ouster of Zaluzhny, and it is uncertain when that might happen. The advance notice to Washington, which has not been previously reported, reflects the influential role of the United States as Ukraine’s most powerful military and political backer.

The early warning also provided the White House an opportunity to urge Zelensky to reconsider the pivotal decision — even though it decided against doing so.


And

But any move by the United States to challenge a decision by Zelensky, a popular figure in his own right, who has speculated privately that a new commander could rejuvenate Kyiv’s fortunes, could be seen as exercising undue influence.

So there is an actor, who became a president, whose official advisors have just as much understanding of military and war specifically as he does (and as I do, perhaps), who disagrees with a career general (who is more educated not only in military matters, but also international relations and in general), who decides to fire this general because he doesn’t agree with his assessment of the situation on the battlefield and thinks that a new commander “could rejuvenate Kiyv’s fortunes”. Oh wait, he also, as a professional entertainer, makes sure it isn't just a done deal, but also a drama worth making movie about, perhaps with Zaluzhny being played by an equivalent of Jack Nicholson of years back screaming “You can’t handle the truth!”

Ok, my apologies, I did get carried away there a bit, but common.

The article also mentions Budanov, as well as Syrsky as potential replacements. It says that it isn’t clear whether Budanov wants the position. About Syrsky it says the following:

But among rank-and-file soldiers, Syrsky is especially disliked, considered by many to be a Soviet-style commander[…]

The article ends with:

“It is unclear how it would affect Ukraine’s military performance,” she added. “That would depend on who succeeds him and how his successor is viewed by the rest of the military — and how effective his successor is on the battlefield.”

Edit: In the meantime, Zaluzhny wrote another opinion piece, for CNN this time, that also in some ways contradicts Zelesnky:

 

Sandhi Yudha

Well-Known Member
A little bit similar with what NOS wrote.
Here they also explain that Zaluzhny's potential replacements are not popular under the soldiers. But they also tell that Zelensky wants to be surrounded by @rse-licking people and want to get rid of Zaluzhny, because he is more popular than Zelensky and critical against him.
 

Fredled

Active Member
KipPotapych said:
Ok, I think now I understand what you are referring to...
Yes, that's what you are describing. Just that some restrictions applies not only to cannon feeding dodgers, but to all who are called or could be called.

I don't know why you and Feonor hasn't heard about that. Probably because it's just a detail. Western journalists are not reporting every nuance and every minor change in the application of the law.
Informations straight from someone living in Russia is increasingly difficult. People don't want to talk about these topics on the telephone or on messaging networks. If they do, they will rather say that Putin is a great leader and that everything in Russia is fine.

I never said that Russians are living under a Gestapo regime. Just that there are regular identity controls.

KipPotapych said:
As for the “special saboteur forces”, again, it’s people that look exactly the same, some/many speak exact same Russian with no specific dialect that could be distinguished by an average “patrol man”, etc.
That's only true for saboteurs who are recruited inside Russia. I have no idea, not even speculative ones, if Ukraine has recruited teams among the Russian population. But those who come from Ukraine will be recognised immediately by their accent even thought they are born Russian speaker. They can try to imitate how Russians from central Russia speak but I know form my own experience that it's very difficult to conceal your native accent.

On the Zaluzhny situation
Yesterday, Zelensky still mentioned Zaluzhny as Commander in Chief in his daily address to the nation.

I think that the Washington Post mistook a rumour for an official statement. It would be quiet surprising that Zhaluzny be dismissed.

Yet, not totally crazy neither. The summer counter-offensive has failed. Ukrainian forces may have lost more than we think. Zaluzhny is partly responsible for this.
Or to the contrary: Zaluzhny has been excessively cautious and didn't do what he was supposed to do.

F16's for Ukraine:
The delivery is, again, delayed. Everybody where sure that they would arrive by the end of 2023. Now they are talking about 2024 (understand before the end of).
It means they still don;t know when everything will be ready. It's probably a combination of several hurdles, I'll try to list here:
1. The delivery is conditioned by the replacement with F35's which is taking delays.
2. While pilot training goes well, maintenance team training takes more time than expected.
3. Airbase facilities are not ready or have been destroyed by Russian missiles (perhaps with F16's already inside)
4.F16 upgrades take more time or has been delayed by new requirements.
5. They are waiting to gather a certain number of F16's before sending them to then Ukrainian sky instead of sending them one by one. This would have a better effect.
6. They are delaying the delivery until Russian air defence are weakened. Some military experts have been saying that ot would be useless to send them since they would be downed within the first day.
 
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John Fedup

The Bunker Group
Yes, that's what you are describing. Just that some restrictions applies not only to cannon feeding dodgers, but to all who are called or could be called.

I don't know why you and Feonor hasn't heard about that. Probably because it's just a detail. Western journalists are not reporting every nuance and every minor change in the application of the law.
Informations straight from someone living in Russia is increasingly difficult. People don't want to talk about these topics on the telephone or on messaging networks. If they do, they will rather say that Putin is a great leader and that everything in Russia is fine.

I never said that Russians are living under a Gestapo regime. Just that there are regular identity controls.


That's only true for saboteurs who are recruited inside Russia. I have no idea, not even speculative ones, if Ukraine has recruited teams among the Russian population. But those who come from Ukraine will be recognised immediately by their accent even thought they are born Russian speaker. They can try to imitate how Russians from central Russia speak but I know form my own experience that it's very difficult to conceal your native accent.

On the Zaluzhny situation
Yesterday, Zelensky still mentioned Zaluzhny as Commander in Chief in his daily address to the nation.

I think that the Washington Post mistook a rumour for an official statement. It would be quiet surprising that Zhaluzny be dismissed.

Yet, not totally crazy neither. The summer counter-offensive has failed. Ukrainian forces may have lost more than we think. Zaluzhny is partly responsible for this.
Or to the contrary: Zaluzhny has been excessively cautious and didn't do what he was supposed to do.

F16's for Ukraine:
The delivery is, again, delayed. Everybody where sure that they would arrive by the end of 2023. Now they are talking about 2024 (understand before the end of).
It means they still don;t know when everything will be ready. It's probably a combination of several hurdles, I'll try to list here:
1. The delivery is conditioned by the replacement with F35's which is taking delays.
2. While pilot training goes well, maintenance team training takes more time than expected.
3. Airbase facilities are not ready or have been destroyed by Russian missiles (perhaps with F16's already inside)
4.F16 upgrades take more time or has been delayed by new requirements.
5. They are waiting to gather a certain number of F16's before sending them to then Ukrainian sky instead of sending them one by one. This would have a better effect.
6. They are delaying the delivery until Russian air defence are weakened. Some military experts have been saying that ot would be useless to send them since they would be downed within the first day.
I suspect point #1 may be important due to a significant number of new F-35 orders combined with the TR3/Block 4 delays.
 

Vivendi

Well-Known Member
I suspect point #1 may be important due to a significant number of new F-35 orders combined with the TR3/Block 4 delays.
Actually I am not so sure about that. The first F-16s to be shipped to Ukraine have already been replaced by F-35s. And even if those F-35s still run block 3 they are very capable compared to the F-16. For instance, Norway has received 40 (of 52) F-35, and already stopped flying their F-16 in January 2022. Ytterligere forsinkelser i F-35-levering (forsvaretsforum.no) F-16 - Forsvaret
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Situation in Avdiivka as reported by the UA sources is increasingly critical.


Key points:

- Russians are entrenched in the outskirts of the city from both, north and south;
- Russians are several times superior in strength and replenish their infantry without any issues;
- The 110th mech. brigade defending the city has been there for 2 years and is in need of rotation;
- Ammunition supplies are extremely low;
- I’ll quote this part in its entirety: "The weak point is, as always, the interaction and procedure for the use of all forces and means at the level of operational and tactical command. Lies in reports at the general level, the desire to reassure themselves and not irritate the top leadership with 'bad news' are very harmful. And the top leadership wants to hear only positive, not critical information. That's why there is no adequate response to changes in the situation," Butusov adds.
- Russians launched a “real hunt” for drone operators, hitting every building with antenna on it;
- Russian aircraft are operating virtually unhindered;
- Heavy losses on the Russian side, no word of the UA side;
- Russians concentrate reserves in the area much faster than Ukraine.

If anyone noticed, pretty much everything that had been reported about the RU forces and all their deficiencies (some true, some rubbish), mostly by the UA and the Brits, are also periodically reported about Ukrainian forces by the Ukrainians themselves and the western media. I find it interesting.

I wonder if they will keep defending Avdiivka as they did Bakhmut. I also understand that Avdiivka is one of the most reinforced places in Eastern Ukraine and wonder what it is like beyond.
 

KipPotapych

Well-Known Member
Yes, that's what you are describing. Just that some restrictions applies not only to cannon feeding dodgers, but to all who are called or could be called.

I don't know why you and Feonor hasn't heard about that. Probably because it's just a detail. Western journalists are not reporting every nuance and every minor change in the application of the law.
Informations straight from someone living in Russia is increasingly difficult. People don't want to talk about these topics on the telephone or on messaging networks. If they do, they will rather say that Putin is a great leader and that everything in Russia is fine.

I never said that Russians are living under a Gestapo regime. Just that there are regular identity controls.
I guess we will just have to disagree on this. For myself, I know for a fact that this is not the case. Your suggestion simply implies a significant restriction of movement of most young and possibly middle-aged men in Russia, as well as restrictions on real estate deals, registration of vehicles, operating their own business, etc. It just isn’t feasible and makes zero sense. Not only that there is no need for such measures because Russia does not need this much manpower for this war, but it would also be extremely unpopular and completely counterproductive to the internal production and economics in general.

I also have no issues communicating with anyone I do there and there was no difference in such communication before or after the invasion. People in Ukraine, on the other hand, and in Odessa in particular, did have such issues - for example, I have heard reports (this is all from personal life, so basically doesn’t mean anything to anyone here) that people have to clear their chat history because there have been checks of the personal phones, etc. These reports were numerous and frequent up to about a year ago or so, but I haven’t kept up to date as much lately either. So there is that.

I don’t mean any offence at all, so do not take it that way, but it does appear like you are reading some pretty heavy propaganda that has little to do with reality as far situation inside Russia is concerned. I heavily rely on Western analysis and media because I find them most reliable sources of info provided one can sort through the rubbish. I try not to put too much weight on what is said to me by the people in/from Russia or Ukraine and would rather refer to the opinion polls because they would account for bias. I also read both Russian and Ukrainian media. What you are suggesting is talked about in the Ukrainian media and not anywhere else, including people in Russia I am in contact with, western (reliable) media, and Russian media. There was talk about it last spring when the legislation was introduced due to confusion, but it was all cleared up within a week or two. So yeah, it is just not what is happening based on the evidence and reports. I would say there is about zero chance I would not have heard or read about it in the past year. In fact, provided the period of time that passed, most people here would read about it by now and it would certainly be posted and talked about in this very thread. But we, of course, can all believe what we choose to and I have absolutely no issues with that.

On the side note, what you are describing is more or less exactly what is going on in Ukraine though and is going to get worse as the need for more personnel becomes more and more urgent. Their description of similar things taking place in a much larger and stronger country, which also happens to be the enemy they are fighting, is completely understandable though. Not necessarily a great strategy, in my opinion, but definitely understandable.

That's only true for saboteurs who are recruited inside Russia. I have no idea, not even speculative ones, if Ukraine has recruited teams among the Russian population. But those who come from Ukraine will be recognised immediately by their accent even thought they are born Russian speaker. They can try to imitate how Russians from central Russia speak but I know form my own experience that it's very difficult to conceal your native accent.
Again, I disagree here, haha. There are people from Lviv, Kyiv, and other regions of Ukraine, that you will not be able to distinguish from an average Russian. I personally know such people here in Canada and they are all regular people that do not have any relationship to the Ukrainian Forces, special or otherwise. Some have heavy accent, others have zero issues switching from Ukrainian to a “perfect” accent-free Russian, and some do not know any Ukrainian but have a very noticeable accent that is very easy to identify, other have some, some have none. So I do not believe that it would be an issue at all. But I also do not think this is important enough to discuss at length because essentially it doesn’t really matter.

On the Zaluzhny situation
Yesterday, Zelensky still mentioned Zaluzhny as Commander in Chief in his daily address to the nation.

I think that the Washington Post mistook a rumour for an official statement. It would be quiet surprising that Zhaluzny be dismissed.

Yet, not totally crazy neither. The summer counter-offensive has failed. Ukrainian forces may have lost more than we think. Zaluzhny is partly responsible for this.
Or to the contrary: Zaluzhny has been excessively cautious and didn't do what he was supposed to do.
This was no mistake on the part of Washington Post. It has now been reported by basically every respectable outlet for weeks and was partially outlined by me in several previous posts. Zelensky said as much himself earlier today. This one is “fresh off the printer”:


According to the man himself, he is now planning some major changes in the military, as well as the civilian leadership:

President Volodymyr Zelensky said that a broad overhaul of Ukraine’s military and civilian leadership was needed to reboot the country’s war effort, suggesting that a major shake-up of his government was imminent.

Mr. Zelensky’s comments, in a broadcast aired on Sunday night, indicated that his plans went beyond replacing the top military commander, Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhny. Tensions between the military and civilian leadership, which have been building for months, seemed to reach a breaking point last week, when Mr. Zelensky summoned the general for a meeting to tell him he was being fired, according to Ukrainian officials familiar with the discussion.

However, the decision was put on hold, creating a sense of limbo at the top of the government at a precarious moment in the war.

“A reset, a new beginning is necessary,” Mr. Zelensky told the Italian media outlet Rai News in the Sunday night broadcast. “I have something serious in mind, which is not about a single person but about the direction of the country’s leadership.”


It appears the guy is clearing the field as political tensions rise within and, perhaps, the need to assign some blame for the realities on the battlefield (he tried to put the blame entirely on the western partners just a few/couple of months ago, if anyone recalls, but was likely advised (or realized?) that it was not a sound strategy?). We will see what happens. I am fairly sure for myself that this is all completely counterproductive and could actually worsen the situation on the frontline and elsewhere. But hey, he surely seems to think that he knows better than maybe most capable general in his army and pretty much every half-decent analyst and expert on earth.

There is an interesting article by Mark Galeotti in The Time on the subject, but I am out of time at the moment and will have to come back to it at a later date.
 

Fredled

Active Member
@KipPotapych I don't have direct information from Ukraine, but since Ukraine is more in jeopardy than Russia it makes sens that rules under martial law are more in application than in Russia. The number of Ukrainians staying abroad to avoid mobilisation is also much higher proportionaly.

Those who are clearing their social network history have written or said things that their government would not like. Be it in Russia or Ukraine, these people should better do it. (The best is not write anything at all)
In Russia they are more afraid of what the people may learn from western sources. More and more channels are cut off. I imagine, in Ukraine too

About Russia, I only said that there were regular controls on people moving long distances targeting doggers and saboteurs. About real estate restrictions, I don't know exactly if they apply to actual doggers or to every mobilisable men. But such restrictions exist. The information is from last week.
As i said, for safety reason, I'm not telling what my sources are. And for the same reason, I may not have more information from Russia anymore on sensible topics. (You understand it's not from the internet or the medias.)

KipPotapych said:
It appears the guy (Zelensky) is clearing the field as political tensions rise within and, perhaps, the need to assign some blame for the realities on the battlefield (he tried to put the blame entirely on the western partners just a few/couple of months ago, if anyone recalls, but was likely advised (or realized?) that it was not a sound strategy?). We will see what happens. I am fairly sure for myself that this is all completely counterproductive and could actually worsen the situation on the frontline and elsewhere. But hey, he surely seems to think that he knows better than maybe most capable general in his army and pretty much every half-decent analyst and expert on earth.
Everytime in history, when a general looses a a battle or a war he is dismissed. Zaluzhny may not be responsible for the defeat but what do we know? We don't know how effective is Zaluzhny's competences. Fact is that he is extremely popular among soldiers in the ranks. And replacing him could be counter productive. But being popular doesn't mean competent. He can be popular and at the same made strategic mistakes.

About Zelensky balming the West: I can nothing but agree with him. The West has always promised unlimited support. And now, it looks like it's limited. No Taurus, no F16, no ATACMS (or very little)... Of course, it was not diplomatic to do so.

KipPotapych said:
Situation in Avdiivka as reported by the UA sources is increasingly critical.
I thought that they lost Avdiivka three weeks ago.
I was away for one week and it looks like they are still on the left bank too.

Yes: Deficiencies in the Russian army are the same, more or less, in the Ukrainian army. Same people. Same mentality.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
It appears Russian forces are breaking through in northern Avdeevka, cutting the chemical plant off from the rest of the town. They're allegedly less then 1km away from the main supply route for Ukrainian defenders in southern Avdeevka. If cut, this will result in operational encirclement, with the only other road out being through the fields west of town and dangerously close to Russian lines. I suspect we're about to see either an encirclement of 110th Mech soldiers in southern Avdeevka, or their withdrawal. Note this is a drastic shift from the initial attempt to encircle Avdeevka as a whole, and will leave the north-west side of town in Ukrainian hands, as well as the massive and complex chemical plant. I'll try to make a detailed update later tonight.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Update.

Overall not much has changed. Russian forces continue to make incremental gains across multiple areas with no major offensive, and no clear stragegic targets. Instead there seem to be multiple tactical targets of opportunity, with the largest one being Avdeevka.

Khar'kov region.

In Kharkov a Russian strike hit a Ukrainian hospital that was treating Ukrainian military wounded. This constitutes a warcrime regardless of what


Russia also struck either an IRIS-T very poor situated in a former Ukrainian air defense site that was hit previously, or a mockup, but a fairly convincing one.


Oskol Front.

After the recent Russian gains in Krahmal'noe, Russian efforts on the northern sections of this front have halted, and instead the focus has shifted on a push towards Terny. The intent seems to be to eliminate Ukraine's foothold on the left shore of the Zherebts river, as a prelude to pushing Ukraine across the Oskol. Russian forces are now under 2kms away from Terny with the push continuing.


Artemovsk/Bakhmut.

Russian forces continue to expand their area of control south-west of the town. This looks like a prelude to an assault on Krasnoe, but this is questionable since the village lies in a lowland. Russia will probably need to take Bogdanovka first, though of course it's hard to be sure.


In Lisichansk a Ukrainian strike hit a bakery. Allegedly the LNR minister of the MChS (ministry of emergency situations - firefighters, rescue workers, etc.) was visiting and was caught in the strike. The casualty count keeps rising, so far at least 18 killed and 10 wounded. Note Lisichansk is half of the dual-city Severodonetsk-Lisichansk, and most of that area remains in bad shape after the fighting. It wouldn't surprise me if this was one of very few bakeries operating in the city. As to whether this was a valid military target, let's just say I hope a Ukrainian minister suffers a similar fate (but without the collateral damage). I'd love to see all the screeching about a Russian strike of a similar nature compared with the relative silence about this one.


Gorlovka.

Ukraine seems to be launching probing attacks here but they appear to be intended to distract from Russian efforts elsewhere. Ukraine has recently launched a minor attack gaining some ground but not exploiting or building on it.


Donetsk region.

Russia reportedly hit two Ukrainian military trains in Pokrovsk. This isn't the first time they got hit in this specific location.


In Donetsk Ukraine struck bus No 70 in Donetsk by the rail station. It's alleged to have been a UAV strike.


Avdeevka.

It appears Russia is either right next to or has actually reached the railroad in the center of Avdeevka, and is likely less then 600m from the MSR for Ukrainian forces in southern Avdeevka. Due to the urban landscape the road is still open but if nothing is done to counter this crisis, Ukraine will lose most of Avdeevka. Russian forces have also taken a tactically significant will near the air defense btln area south of the town, leaving the Ukrainian garrison with their supply line under direct fire. Ukraine could still reverse the situation with a significant injection of reserves, but at this point Ukraine appears to be stretched thin on all fronts so another injection of fresh forces here could result in another "Tabaevka" situation elsewhere.


A Ukrainian Bradley in action in Stepovoe on the northern flank of Avdeevka.


A Ukrainian Bradley knocked out on a mine and finished off while trying to counter-attack Russian forces in southern Avdeevka. Reportedly out of the crew 1 is KIA, the other two escaped.


Shockingly civilians are still in Avdevvka. They're fleeing now. Note the town is basically gone. Also note, they're fleeing towards Ukraine's area of control, passing the chemical plant.


Pervomayskoe.

Russian forces continue to inch forward here as Ukraine is distracted by the situation in Avdeevka. Russia will likely continue to creep forward here, setting the stage for an eventual advance on Krasnogorovka.


Mar'inka.

Russian forces continue to inch forward in Georgievka, but the terrain makes significant Russian gains unlikely. Unless Russia can make significant gains on the flanks, the best case scenario it will be another slog like Mar'inka (well maybe marginally faster).


Novomihailovka.

Russian forces have secured the outskirts of Novomihailovka after previous failed attempts.

 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Other interesting tidbits.

An abandoned (knocked out?) Russian T-55 getting hit by a Ukrainian FPV drone in a field. The circumstances of this are murky. The type is apparently being used by Russia's 810th MarBde in the Zaporozhye area. To the best of my knowledge it's still a single btln, organized on SP Arty lines instead of tank lines. That means 6-vehicle batteries, with 3 batteries for the btln, for 18 guns.


Some interesting footage of a Russian 155th MarBde assault team apparently entering a Ukrainian trench. Note the unit started the war riding BMP-3s, and had them fairly late into the war (1 btln of BMP-3s, the rest of the Bde was on BTR-82As). Now they're on uparmored MT-LBs.


A Ukrainian MiG-29 launching a HARM.


Apparently Russia struck 2 PzH-2000s. Other then the previous footage where a PzH-2000 drove into a treeline and the treeline got hit, this is our first confirmation. At least one of the videos is fairly clear, giving us our first completely confirmed hit.


An interesting failure of the automated targeting system on Russia's next generation of Lancets. It's meant to hit a CV90 but instead targest a pile of debris nearby.


A Russian BAT-2 engineering vehicle with extra armor knocked out, reportedly it was being used as an ersatz mine-clearing vehicle. While the Russian military has dedicated MBT-chassis mineclearing vehicles they are relatively rare.


A Russian Z-STS armored truck allegedly survived an anti-tank mine. If true, we can relatively confidently classify this as an MRAP. The vehicle shares some commonality with the Tayfun 4X4 family, and went into production during this war.


Fragments of a Russian Lancet loitering munition after striking a Ukrainian M777 mockup. Note according to Russian MoD they've destroyed over 500 M777s, suggesting most strikes are misidentified or hit mockups.


A Russian T-90M and Tor-M2 at a repair base.


A Russian Ka-52 with components recycled from a different Ka-52 used to repair it.


Log armor from both sides.


Another look at the new roof cage design for T-90Ms that seems to be the new standard. It's distinctly different from the Krysha module for T-72s and T-80s likely due to the significant differences in turrets.


A worn-looking Russian BMP-3 with the extra-armor kit installed and a roof cage. It appears Russia was telling the truth regarding equipping all new BMP-3s with extra-armor kits, photos surfacing for the past months show almost exlusively that loadout.


A Russian BMP-2 with an extra-armor kit. It's interesting, the BMP-2 and the Bradley are vehicles from the same era with comparable capabilities (when we're talking about the vehicles themselves and not the "extras" like Link 16 and integration into a wider net). The Bradley got some impressive upgrades making it quite effective on the modern battlefield. Technologically Russia has the same upgrades available for the BMP-2 in the form of the extra-armor kit and the Berezhok module, but only ~120 extra armor kits were purchased pre-war and their current production has been invisible if it's happening at all. Meanwhile the Berezhok upgrade is continuing, meaning Russian BMP-2Ms remain woefully underarmored. It's an odd decision, especially considering the practically unresolvable ergonomic issues for the BMP-3.


A much improved Russian BREM-1 with ERA sideskirts, in the process of getting smoke launchers and a roof cage installed. It remains a unclear why Russia hasn't started equipping all BREM-1s with ERA sideskirts, clearly a necessily in this battlefield.


Russian MoD has apparently settled on the Volnorez tank EW for the T-80BVMs being used in the war.


A Russian Msta-S (SM? look at the length of those sideskirts) with a roof cage and Nakidka at the factory.


A new Ukrainian Caesar in action.


A column of Ukrainian BTR-82As. This sort of footage is relatively rare, and it's unclear if this is new or old.


Reportedly a Bayraktar factory is being built near Kiev. Of course this seems pretty strange, given recent Russian strikes there.


A Chinese soldier in Russian service. Russian foreign recruitment efforts are alive and well though their total numbers are low.


A Russian T-90M that allegedly survived multiple FPV drone strikes. I have to wonder about internal damage. The vehicle is certainly repairable but that's not the same as surviving.


Reportedly Greece will not be handing over their S-300s to Ukraine. My best guess is that they will get the outdated Osa, but Greece will keep their S-300/Tor pairing.


On the other hand Bulgaria appears to finally be shipping their 100 BTR-60PBs from former police stocks.


A destroyed Ukrainian Caesar getting hauled away. It's likely the same one we saw recently in the last update post.


Despite the recent incident with the downing of the Il-76, Russia and Ukraine conducted a 195 for 195 prisoner exchange.


In a recent interview the commander of Ukraine's 118th TerDef Bde has suggested that Military Commisariat personnel be given authority to shoot people in the kneecap, if they refuse to exit a vehicle when being served with draft notices.

 

seaspear

Well-Known Member
Is it possible to to present totals of manpower and materials lost to these theatres instead of individual pictures of either sides losses ? there are claims that Russian losses in both are many times higher in Avdiivka and may provide a reason for Ukraine for staying as long as possible to inflict higher losses to Russian forces than may occur in less well prepared locations
 
For an excellent and very well sourced and explained losses overview I would watch this "Russia's Winter Offensive & The War in Ukraine - The Initiative, losses, & air, sea & land campaigns" by Perun (skip to 10 minutes mark).

His weekly defense related PowerPoint presentations are really worth your time (yes, some REALLY good and inciteful PowerPoint presentations :) ).
 

Big_Zucchini

Well-Known Member
I'm sure some of you have already heard about the leaked info on Shahed 136 production.

Source.

The relevant data was reportedly sent to media outlets, and those who analyzed the data say it shows a price tag of between $200,000 - $300,000 (depending on order size). However, Russia also seeks to produce these drones locally, at a price of $48,000 including labor costs which comprise about 43% of a unit cost.
I admit, seeing the number 6,000 used for both Iranian production (with asking price of $193,000) and Russian local production is confusing. Russia reportedly paid with gold.

Many had previously assumed the unit cost is ~$20,000, and this new revelation sparked some optimistic debate about cost-effectiveness of Ukrainian air defenses. But with Russia permitting itself flexibility in setting material and labor costs, and with localization of production and sourcing of materials, its purchasing power is inevitably stronger than its nominal economical power - which in turn changes the equation back to its favor. It matters very little if a locally produced drone with mostly locally sourced components is $20,000 or $200,000 if much of that cost is simply recycled inside Russia.

Is it possible to to present totals of manpower and materials lost to these theatres instead of individual pictures of either sides losses ? there are claims that Russian losses in both are many times higher in Avdiivka and may provide a reason for Ukraine for staying as long as possible to inflict higher losses to Russian forces than may occur in less well prepared locations
I'm not aware of anyone on Twitter doing theatre-specific losses categorization, but generally it's preferable for Ukraine to defend every defensible point as much as possible. Much harder to later regain it than to attempt holding it. Urban areas also present good opportunities for a defender which Ukraine should capitalize on.
Will Avdiivka eventually fall? Possibly. Likely. But it makes little sense to withdraw from it before it becomes totally indefensible.
 
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Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
I'm not aware of anyone on Twitter doing theatre-specific losses categorization, but generally it's preferable for Ukraine to defend every defensible point as much as possible. Much harder to later regain it than to attempt holding it. Urban areas also present good opportunities for a defender which Ukraine should capitalize on.
Will Avdiivka eventually fall? Possibly. Likely. But it makes little sense to withdraw from it before it becomes totally indefensible.
Suriyakmaps is claiming Ukraine is already withdrawing after Russia has gotten too close to their MSR. Confirmation is pending. Rybar confirms somewhat yesterdays' advances, but cautions that the situation remains fluid, and houses and streets can change hands multiple times per day. If Suriyakmaps is correct, Russia launched a fairly rapid and successful offensive in the north-east, possibly because the area was treat as secondary compared to the flanks and the southern side for most of the battle.


EDIT: Readovka, a staunchly pro-Russian media source, is cautioning from optimism suggesting that the battle is far from over.

 
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Fredled

Active Member
Feanor said:
In Lisichansk a Ukrainian strike hit a bakery.
Lysichansk has been completely destroyed before the Russians took over. Some civilians may have returned since, but if there is a bakery there, it mostly feeds the Russian military.
I don;t know if it's a legitimate target or not, but hitting food supplies for the enemy makes sens.

Feonor said:
In a recent interview the commander of Ukraine's 118th TerDef Bde has suggested that Military Commisariat personnel be given authority to shoot people in the kneecap, if they refuse to exit a vehicle when being served with draft notices.
Today I had the occasion to ask a friend who understands Ukrainian (he is not Ukrainian himself but understand the language). And I was very surprised of his reaction. He told me that he understands perfectly this commander.

There are many doggers who are just laughing at their call of duty while others are being killed or maimed.
Of course, shooting in the knees is barbaric. But the guy is very angry at those who don't make any effort while enjoying peace far from the front. It shouldn't be taken to the letter.

He is also talking about transvestites who shows up in mini skirt, hoping to be dismissed. He said, as long as you have balls (or were bornt with) you can also take a gun and shoot at the enemy.

I'm sure some of you have already heard about the leaked info on Shahed 136 production.

The relevant data was reportedly sent to media outlets, and those who analyzed the data say it shows a price tag of between $200,000 - $300,000 (depending on order size). However, Russia also seeks to produce these drones locally, at a price of $48,000 including labor costs which comprise about 43% of a unit cost.
,....
Trying to compare and estimate costs of drone production in Russia or Iran doesn't make sens because everything is financed no matter what. Both Iran and Russia are awash with black gold. They have enough money.

It's clear that those who supply Russia don't do it cheap. They know Russia have the money and will pay.
Those who provide Russia with sanctioned component are also making good business. Sanctions don;t prevent Russia to obtain components but it makes them much more expensive. Everything together at the end, is weighting on the Russian economy.

seaspear said:
Is it possible to to present totals of manpower and materials lost to these theatres instead of individual pictures of either sides losses ?
I'm not aware of anyone on Twitter doing theatre-specific losses categorization, but generally it's preferable for Ukraine to defend every defensible point as much as possible. Much harder to later regain it than to attempt holding it. Urban areas also present good opportunities for a defender which Ukraine should capitalize on.

Will Avdiivka eventually fall? Possibly. Likely. But it makes little sense to withdraw from it before it becomes totally indefensible.
I agree. Ukrainians have always said that their goal was not to defend specific positions per se, but to destroy as much ennemies as possible when they attack.
they also see no point in retreating since it will just bring the same situation a few miles further to the west.

Yet, Ukrainians don;t enjoy the same advantage as the Russian when they are on the defensive because Russians can bomb them with guided bombs and Grad-type rockets massively.
 

Feanor

Super Moderator
Staff member
Lysichansk has been completely destroyed before the Russians took over. Some civilians may have returned since, but if there is a bakery there, it mostly feeds the Russian military.
I don;t know if it's a legitimate target or not, but hitting food supplies for the enemy makes sens.
There absolutely were civilians still left in town. When Russian forces entered Severodonetsk-Lisichansk civilians that stayed behind greeted them. And since there there have been efforts (admittedly very limited ones) to fix up damaged homes including a Russian company with a government grant going around and doing half-assed window repairs. The twin cities had a population of 200k. There might be as few as only 20k left, but they definitely need a bakery.

On the subject of targeting food supplies;

"Several IHL rules are tailored to preserving food security in armed conflict. Additional Protocol I (1977) – applicable here as Ukraine and Russia are among the treaty’s 174 parties – prohibits the starvation of civilians as a method of warfare, provides enhanced legal protection to “objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population” "

In other words of Ukraine targeted the bakery to hit food supplies in the occupied area, this could be a war crime.


Today I had the occasion to ask a friend who understands Ukrainian (he is not Ukrainian himself but understand the language). And I was very surprised of his reaction. He told me that he understands perfectly this commander.

There are many doggers who are just laughing at their call of duty while others are being killed or maimed.
Of course, shooting in the knees is barbaric. But the guy is very angry at those who don't make any effort while enjoying peace far from the front. It shouldn't be taken to the letter.

He is also talking about transvestites who shows up in mini skirt, hoping to be dismissed. He said, as long as you have balls (or were bornt with) you can also take a gun and shoot at the enemy.
The point was to illustrate the attitudes and behaviors of Ukrainian military leadership. Whether they will literally kneecap draft dodgers or not, Ukrainian Military Commissariat personnel routinely beat people on the streets, often with very little provocation. Their behavior is disgusting on its face. And here is a senior Ukrainian commander openly advocating something far worse. It's an indicator of what this guy thinks is ok to say openly, and what we can expect in terms of the direction Ukrainian mobilization efforts will take. It's one thing for a private person to say "I understand this attitude". It's another thing for a high ranking military office in a public interview to make statements like this.
 

Fredled

Active Member
About Zaluzhny and Mobilisation
Their biggest different id about mobilisation. Zaluhzny demands that half a million men be mobilised now.
This is unrealistic.

Not because it will be unpopular. But because Ukraine doesn't have the money to do it and doesn't have the weapons and ammunitions for the new recruits and doesn't have proper artillery and air force to support the new units on the frontline.

If you mobilise half a million men, you have to pay them the time they are serving. Don;t think that they will fight for free.
In the Russian army, soldiers on the frontline are paid between $1800 and $2500. It's difficult to know exactly because the USD true exchange rate and spending power equivalent is not clearly known, but it's several times the average salary (which is also difficult to compare with the Western world's salaries). Soldiers salaries are a huge boon for their families.

In the Ukrainian army, they will have to do the same if they want a minimum of motivation. 500000 * €2000 = €1 Billion per month. €12B/year. (Euros because it's Ukraine. US dollars because it's Russia.)
It's not a small sum. It's the equivalent of the entire European funding facility for Ukraine aid. And the US one is not passed yet. And this is not counting compensation for the disabled and the deceased, not counting the premiums for the officers and other rewards, not counting all the extra expenses each soldier at the front requires.

Zaluzhby doesn't seem to understand that. He thinks that you just have to call for patriotic sentiments and every men will fulfil their duty for free. He is gravely mistaken.

Latest news about mobilisation from Ukrinform.
In other words, once you are mobilised, it's for 3 years.
 
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